Aversive Racism and Resistance to Affirmative Action: Perception of Justice Are Not Necessarily Color Blind

This study utilized a factorial survey design to assess attitudes toward affirmative action as a function of targeted group (Black, handicapped, or elderly persons), framing of the policy (with or without social justification), and institutional context (business, college, or social organization). Resistance to affirmative action was aroused more by policies specifying Blacks as the targeted group and by policies presented without justification. Supportive of the aversive racism framework, the level of resistance to the policies presented without justification for Blacks as the target group was higher than for all other targeted groups with or without justification. Implications for these findings for strategies to reduce negative attitudes toward affirmative action are discussed.     

Why Brains Are Not Computers,Why Behaviorism Is Not Satanism,and Why Dolphins Are Not Aquatic Apes

Modern psychology has, to all intents and purposes, become synonymous with cognitive psychology, with an emphasis on the idea that the brain is a form of computer, whose job is to take in sensory input, process information, and produce motor output. This places the brain at a remove from both the body and environment and denies the intimate connection that exists between them. As a result, a great injustice is done to both human and nonhuman animals: On the one hand, we fail to recognize the distinctive nature of nonhuman cognition, and on the other hand, we continue to promote a somewhat misleading view of human psychological capacities. Here, I suggest a more mutualistic, embodied, enactive view might allow us to ask more interesting questions about how animals of all kinds come to know their worlds, in ways that avoid the (inevitable) anthropocentric baggage of the cognitivist viewpoint.     

The Evidence of Things Seen and Not Seen: The Legacy of Race and Racism

Franklin , A.J. From Brotherhood to Manhood: How Black Men Rescue Their Relationships and Dreams from the Invisibility Syndrome. John Wiley & Sons , 2004.     

Personality and Spirituality: Christian Prayer and Eastern Meditation Are Not the Same

A random sample of 1,033 adults in an Australian community survey completed a form containing the abbreviated Revised Eysenck Personality Questionnaire together with questions about the practice of prayer and Eastern meditation. While prayer was associated with low psychoticism scores, Eastern meditation was associated with high psychoticism scores.     

Concepts as Tools Not Rules: a Commentary on (Re-) Defining Racism

In (Re-) Defining Racism, Alberto Urquidez argues that conflicting philosophical accounts over the definition of racism are at bottom linguistic confusions that would benefit from a Wittgensteinian-inspired approach. In this essay, I argue that such an approach would be helpful in disputes over the definition of metaphysically contested concepts, such as “race,” or semantically contested concepts, such as “racialization.” I disagree, however, that such insights would prove helpful or do very little for disputes concerning normatively contested concepts, such as “racism.”

     

Not All Laughs Are Alike: Voiced but Not Unvoiced Laughter Readily Elicits Positive Affect

We tested whether listeners are differentially responsive to the presence or absence of voicing, a salient, distinguishing acoustic feature, in laughter. Each of 128 participants rated 50 voiced and 20 unvoiced laughs twice according to one of five different rating strategies. Results were highly consistent regardless of whether participants rated their own emotional responses, likely responses of other people, or one of three perceived attributes concerning the laughers, thus indicating that participants were experiencing similarly differentiated affective responses in all these cases. Specifically, voiced, songlike laughs were significantly more likely to elicit positive responses than were variants such as unvoiced grunts, pants, and snortlike sounds. Participants were also highly consistent in their relative dislike of these other sounds, especially those produced by females. Based on these results, we argue that laughers use the acoustic features of their vocalizations to shape listener affect.     

Why Monte Carlo Simulations Are Inferences and Not Experiments

Monte Carlo simulations arrive at their results by introducing randomness, sometimes derived from a physical randomizing device. Nonetheless, we argue, they open no new epistemic channels beyond that already employed by traditional simulations: the inference by ordinary argumentation of conclusions from assumptions built into the simulations. We show that Monte Carlo simulations cannot produce knowledge other than by inference, and that they resemble other computer simulations in the manner in which they derive their conclusions. Simple examples of Monte Carlo simulations are analysed to identify the underlying inferences.     

We Are the World—and They Are Not: Prototypicality for the World Community,Legitimacy, and Responses to Global Inequality

The relation between developed and developing countries is characterized by inequalities that sometimes hinder actions against worldwide problems. The current research presents an intergroup approach, based on the ingroup projection model, towards an analysis of psychological processes that perpetuate global inequality on a social group level. Precisely, we argue that people from developed countries perceive their group as more prototypical for the world population than they perceive people from developing countries. These perceptions of ingroup prototypicality should in turn relate to legitimacy beliefs and predict unfavorable behavioral intentions towards developing countries. We present two studies that corroborate our hypotheses: In Study 1, participants from a developed country perceived their ingroup as more prototypical for the superordinate group (i.e., world population) than the outgroup (i.e., developing countries), which in turn was related to beliefs that global inequality is legitimate. This finding was replicated in Study 2, and the predicted effect of ingroup prototypicality on behavioral intentions was mediated by legitimacy beliefs. These findings demonstrate that intergroup processes can contribute to perpetuating global inequality.     

The Nature of Contemporary Prejudice: Insights from Aversive Racism

Within the United States, declines in the overt expression of racial prejudice over several decades have given way to near universal endorsement of the principles of racial equality as a core cultural value. Yet, evidence of persistent and substantial disparities between Blacks and Whites remain. Here, we review research that demonstrates how the actions of even well-intentioned and ostensibly non-prejudiced individuals can inadvertently contribute to these disparities through subtle biases in decision making and social interactions. We argue that current racial attitudes of Whites toward Blacks in the United States are fundamentally ambivalent, characterized by a widespread contemporary form of racial prejudice, aversive racism , that is manifested in subtle and indirect ways, and illustrate its operation across a wide range of settings, from employment and legal decisions, to group problem-solving and everyday helping behavior. We conclude by describing research aimed at combating these biases and identify new avenues for future research.     

Personality Disorders Are Not as We Thought: Hierarchical Factor Structure at the Criterion Level

The use of personality disorder (PD) categories persists, despite the evidence against them. An often overlooked reason for this is the fact that the true structure underlying the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) taxonomy is still unknown: We cannot be certain which disorders are valid, and which ones are arbitrary mixtures of heterogeneous traits. To address this gap, we factor analyzed the Personality Diagnostic Questionnaire (PDQ–4+; Hyler, 1994 Hyler, S. E. (1994). PDQ–4+ Personality Diagnostic Questionnaire–4+. New York, NY: New York State Psychiatric Institute. [Google Scholar]) at the criterion level in a mixed clinical and nonclinical sample of 2,519 individuals. The resulting structure was more similar to current dimensional taxonomies than to the DSM classification at all hierarchical levels. Whereas paranoid and antisocial PDs—and to a lesser extent avoidant, dependent, depressive, and schizoid PDs—were fairly homogeneous, all other disorders turned out to be combinations of 2 or 3 unrelated dimensions. Our results strongly support the structure of empirically based dimensional taxonomies and relocate DSM criteria within this emerging framework, thus contributing to preserving much of the knowledge accumulated to date.     

Between Insensitivity and Incompleteness: Against the Will Theory of Rights

This paper recasts an old objection to the will theory in the light of recent attempts to defend that theory, notably by Nigel Simmonds and Hillel Steiner. It enlists the idea of duties of care—effectively restrictions over legal officials’ discretionary exercise of powers—to form a dilemma for such theorists: either legal officials’ discretion over powers is restricted by duties of care for the unempowerable, or it is not. If their discretion is unrestricted, then the will theory is insensitive to the (values of the) lives of the unempowerable, in virtue of the fact that these lives are viewed as not meriting direct normative consideration. If, on the other hand, their discretion is restricted by duties of care, then the will theory has no argumentative resources within its conceptual apparatus to ascribe or justify them. It is therefore incomplete as a theory of rights.     

Value inquiry: Insensitivity,egoism, and the ethical community

Editorial

Value inquiry: Insensitivity, egoism, and the ethical community     

Privacy Rights,and Why Negative Control is Not a Dead End: A Reply to Munch and Lundgren

Lauritz Munch and Björn Lundgren have recently replied to a paper published by us in this journal. In our original paper, we defended a novel version of the so-called ‘control theory’ of the moral right to privacy. We argued that control theorists should define ‘control’ as what we coined ‘Negative Control’. Munch and Lundgren have recently provided a range of interesting and challenging objections to our view. Independently of each other, they give almost identical counterexamples to our definition of Negative Control. In this comment, we show that while the counterexamples are genuine counterexamples, they do not force us to abandon the idea of Negative Control. Furthermore, we reply to two additional objections raised by Lundgren. One of these replies involves giving a new account of what the relation is between the concept of privacy and the right to privacy.

     

Racism: On the phenomenology of embodied desocialization

This paper addresses racism from a phenomenological viewpoint. Its main task is, ultimately, to show that racism as a process of “negative socialization” does not amount to a contingent deficiency that simply disappears under the conditions of a fully integrated society. In other words, I suspect that racism does not only indicate a lack of integration, solidarity, responsibility, recognition, etc.; rather, that it is, in its extraordinary negativity, a socially constitutive phenomenon per se. After suggesting phenomenology’s potential to tackle the question of racism, I will focus on the experiential oppressiveness of racism, i.e., the ways in which it affects its victims’ lived experiences, in transforming their habitual ways of life and, finally, their subjectivities. My major thesis is that racism works via both inter-kinaesthetically as well as symbolically inflicted distortions of the victim’s body schema. As such a process of “negative socialization,” racism, however, influences the embodied self-conception of the oppressor, who finds himself compelled to adhere to some kind of invisible norm such as, e.g., “whiteness.”     

Name Letter Preferences Are Not Merely Mere Exposure: Implicit Egotism as Self-Regulation

People prefer the letters in their own names to letters that are not in their own names. Furthermore, people prefer the numbers in their own birthdays to numbers not in their own birthdays. In this article we argue that these examples of implicit egotism are best conceptualized as the product of unconscious self-regulation processes rather than a result of mere exposure. In support of this hypothesis, a study of name-letter preferences showed that people preferred their own name letters even when these letters were relatively rare. Furthermore, the name-letter and birthday-number preferences of high and low self-esteem participants diverged in response to an experimentally manipulated self-concept threat. We conclude that implicit egotism, specifically name-letter and birthday-number preferences, represent a form of unconscious self-regulation. Implications of these results for the mere exposure explanation of name-letter preferences and for theory and research in implicit egotism are discussed.