A modified proportional change model of attitude change by group discussion

The data of two experiments of dyadic group discussion have been reanalysed. An extended proportional change model was designed to explain the actual process of attitude change. The model is defined by two parameters. The first represents the impact of single pro-arguments and single con-arguments on the attitude or decision preference. The second describes the resistance to further change that increases with the distance from the initial position. It was hypothesized that the first parameter should be higher and the second lower, with a similar partner than with a dissimilar one. The prediction was confirmed for the first parameter only. A comparison of the extended proportional change model to related models concludes the report.     

Persuasive argumentation and social comparison as determinants of attitude polarization

Several of our studies indicate that persuasive-arguments theory by itself is an adequate explanation of polarization. Sanders and Baron (Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 1977, 13, 303–314) criticize this research. More generally, they contend that both argumentation and comparison are involved, “with persuasive arguments facilitating the shifts motivated by social comparison.” We feel that their critique is unconvincing. Relevant portions of the standard literature are reviewed to demonstrate that social comparison is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for polarization. Finally, we speculate about how persuasive-arguments theory could be extended to argument-poor settings (e.g., Asch's line comparison situation).     

Self-generated attitude change: A person by situation analysis of attitude polarization and attenuation

The potential moderating effects of differences in the need for cognition on the attitude polarization process were explored. Based on putative schematabased differences in information processing, it was predicted that an increased opportunity for thought would result in (a) more attitude polarization for low need for cognition persons than for high need for cognition persons and (b) more attitude attenuation for high need for cognition persons than for low need for cognition persons. Participants completed the Need for Cognition scale and were given either little or ample time to think about issues toward which they previously held moderate attitudes. Attitudes were reassessed following thought about the issues. The results were consistent with the predicted moderating effects of individual differences in the need for cognition on thought-induced attitude polarization. Implications of and alternative explanations for the findings are discussed.     

Group status,group size and attitude polarization

The influence of group status and group size on intergroup attitude differentiation was investigated. Hypothesized was that members of high status groups would polarize their attitudes more than members of low status group, and that minorities would show greater sensitivity to status differences than majorities. The results show that status affected intergroup differentiation as predicted, while group size did not.     

Interpersonal determinants of attitude change following counterattitudinal behavior

In a test of predictions derived from an identity-analytic model of self-presentational behavior, individuals who privately endorsed positive or negative attitudes about sexual behavior were asked to deliver a prosexuality speech while alone, while watched by observers, or while being watched by observers who questioned the morality of the subject’s actions. Subsequent attitude measures indicated that the subjects who initially adopted negative attitudes justified their behavior by expressing more favorable attitudes about sexuality, but only when no audience witnessed their speech. When an audience was present, these individuals emphasized their lack of choice. In contrast, subjects who privately endorsed positive attitudes publicly expressed less favorable attitudes when their morality was challenged by the observers. These findings suggest that attitude change following counterattitudinal behavior (a) stems from private image-maintenance needs as well as public self-presentational concerns, and (b) is sometimes designed to secure an image of morality as well as an image of consistency.     

Extremity shifts,risk shifts and attitude shifts after group discussion

Moscovici and Zavalloni (1969) suggest that both risk shifts and attitude shifts after group discussion are examples of a general group tendency to polarize opinions. In the present experiment, using both attitude and risk items, group discussion did not make individual opinions more extreme; only the group average became more extreme. This group extremity increase was not simply a more general way of conceptualizing the directional shifts in attitude and risk; group extremity increase appeared to be an effect of discussion that was independent of the risk and attitude shifts. Also, subjects in the co-working pretest of the standard risk-shift paradigm were found to be less extreme and more ‘agreeing’ than pretest subjects who were truly alone. This co-working/alone difference persisted after discussion and was not related to group extremity increase. On both attitude and risk items, group extremity increase was strongly correlated with group opinion convergence. It is argued from this correlation that group extremity increase may be an effect of some aspect of conformity influence.     

The benefits of argumentation are cross-culturally robust: The case of Japan

Thanks to the exchange of arguments, groups outperform individuals on some tasks, such as solving logical problems. However, these results stem from experiments conducted among Westerners and they could be due to cultural particularities such as tolerance of contradiction and approval of public debate. Other cultures, collectivistic cultures in particular, are said to frown on argumentation. Moreover, some influential intellectual movements, such as Confucianism, disapprove of argumentation. In two experiments, the hypothesis that Easterners might not share the benefits of argumentation was tested. In Experiment 1, Japanese participants had to solve a standard logical problem individually and then in groups. They performed significantly better in groups. In Experiment 2, Japanese participants had to estimate the weight of various animals. They did so individually, then after learning of another participant's estimates, then after discussing these estimates with the other participant, and then individually again. While the Japanese participants also benefitted from the discussion, these benefits were only visible when participants provided a final individual estimate. This delay is interpreted as reflecting the pressure to preserve social harmony that would have constrained Japanese participants to yield to their partner even when knowing that this did not improve the accuracy of their answer.     

Juror decision making: A case of attitude change mediated by authoritarianism

For a jury to reach a unanimous decision, certain individuals must change their attitudes with regard to the defendant's guilt during deliberations. Because these changers are the key to the group decision-making process, they were carefully scrutinized to ascertain demographic or personality characteristics which might be mediating their behavior. In three experiments, two using college students as subjects and one using Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas jury pool members, it was found that authoritarians changed their attitude with regard to the defendant's guilt more than equalitarians. Further, most of these “changers” were aware they had changed their attitude. There was no generalizable evidence for the proposition that authoritarians are more likely to favor a guilty verdict.     

Norms and attitude change II: The phenomenon of bipolarization

In a preceding article we discussed the links between norm and attitude change: a particular phenomenon in this relation will be developed in the present article. During a group discussion, and in the presence of a consistent confederate defending positions which follow the trend of the norms on the global level of society, subjects tend to polarize their attitudes much more than in control groups. In the opposite situation, we observe a division of the group: a number of subjects are sensitive to the confederate's reactionary positions; these subjects are initially, that is, before the interaction, ‘moderate’. The other subjects, with firmer initial positions, resist the consistent confederate, thus resigning themselves to not reaching the consensus demanded of them by the experimenter, and enduring the conflict resulting from the standstill in the group negotiation.     

Affective-cognitive consistency and thought-induced attitude polarization

Subjects whose preexperimental attitudes toward either capital punishment or censorship were high or low in affective-cognitive consistency were identified. These four groups thought about their attitudes by writing two essays, one on the topic for which consistency had been assessed (relevant essay) and one on the unassessed topic (distractor essay). In accord with the hypothesis that thought-induced attitude polarization requires the presence of a well-developed knowledge structure, high-consistency subjects evidenced greater polarization than low-consistency subjects only on the relevant topic after writing the relevant essay. Content analyses of subjects' relevant essays yielded additional data confirming Tesser's ideas regarding mediation: High (vs. low) consistency subjects expressed a greater proportion of cognitions that were evaluatively consistent with their prior affect toward the attitude object and a smaller proportion of evaluatively inconsistent and neutral cognitions. Moreover, although high-and low-consistency subjects did not differ in the amount of attitudinally relevant information they possessed or their awareness of inconsistent cognitions, their method of dealing with discrepant information diverged: High-consistency subjects evidenced a greater tendency to assimilate discrepant information by generating refutational thoughts that discredited or minimized the importance of inconsistent information.     

Imagery and argumentation in apologetics: a case study

This essay explores aspects of the relationship between imagery and thought in the work of the English apologist G.K. Chesterton (1874-1936), focusing on the language and imagery of energy and of vision in his work. It attempts to assess both the strengths and the weaknesses of the ways in which imagery and other aspects of this writer's use of language relate to his argumentation. It also explores the possibility that Chesterton's work can shed light on one of the philosophical dimensions of apologetics, namely, apologists’ attempts to present concepts that cannot be explicitly stated, as part of a defence of Christianity. In considering this issue, it brings Chesterton's use of imagery into dialogue with certain images in the work of the philosopher Mary Midgley and the apologist C.S. Lewis. Finally, it draws certain tentative conclusions concerning the role of imagery in relation to argumentation, within the field of apologetics.     

The role of situational involvement in consumers' attitude polarization

This investigation examines the effect of consumers' situational involvement on attitude polarization. The level of involvement of subjects with well-developed restaurant schemas was manipulated, and evaluations of a group of restaurants were obtained on three different occasions under conditions favorable to attitude polarization. Contrary to expectations, the evaluations exhibited no tendency toward greater extremity, even when situational involvement was high. Although inconsistent with some previous findings about attitude polarization, the results are explained in terms of schema complexity and structure. Managerial implications are discussed.     

Distraction and attitude change: A resolution

Previous studies have shown that distraction may either increase or decrease attitude change. The present experiment, designed to reconcile earlier findings, was based on the hypothesis that distraction should interfere with message reception but also increase yielding to the message. Distraction should thus increase attitude change to a simple message (one which is easily understood but not very convincing), but decrease attitude change to a complex message (one which is difficult to understand but convicing if understood). Subjects beard messages on two topics, sometimes while distracted by a tape recording of music and sometimes not. Message complexity was successfully manipulated for one of the topics. The results support a model of attitude change which considers the effects of independent variables on both reception and yielding.     

Religious intellectual humility,attitude change,and closeness following religious disagreement

Abstract

This study explored the role of intellectual humility (IH) in promoting attitude change and relationship closeness in the context of religious disagreement. Participants (N = 174) completed a preliminary survey that assessed their attitude on several contentious religious issues (e.g. gay marriage, abortion). Participants who disagreed about a contentious religious issue were then paired and engaged in a 10-min discussion. After the discussion, participants completed a series of questionnaires. The greatest degree of attitude change was seen in pairs with mutually high levels of IH, in which the participant self-reported high levels of IH and also perceived the discussion partner to have high levels of IH. Higher perceptions of the IH levels of the discussion partner predicted higher levels of closeness and trust. We discuss limitations, areas for future research, and practical implications.