Cognition and motivation in emotion

The role of cognition--and to some extent motivation--in emotion, the ways meaning is generated, unconscious appraising, and the implications of this way of thinking for life-span development are addressed. It is argued that appraisal is a necessary as well as sufficient cause of emotion and that knowledge is necessary but not sufficient. This position is examined in light of what is known about emotions in infants and young children, the effects of drugs on acute emotions and moods, and recent patterns of thought about the brain in emotions. The discussion of how meaning is generated is the core of the article. Automatic processing without awareness is contrasted with deliberate and conscious processing, and the concept of resonance between an animal's needs and what is encountered in the environment is examined. The idea that there is more than one way meaning is achieved strengthens and enriches the case for the role of appraisal in emotion and allows the consideration of what is meant by unconscious and preconscious appraisal and the examination of how they might work.     

Recognition: Recognizing The Brother And The Other: Avishai Margalit

Recognition is a name of a problem rooted in German idealism and Hegel's thought. It is not one problem but a family of problems. Indeed, it is a research programme, in which Axel Honneth is an important practitioner.
The tree of knowledge, like other trees, should be inspected by its fruits and not by exposing its roots. So my main concern is in rendering the problem of recognition in current idiom, rather than in Hegel's original idiom. What I shall try to do here is to present an account of the problem of recognition, which is parallel to the account suggested in Honneth's Struggle of Recognition . It is parallel in Plutarch's sense of 'parallel' lives, namely as an object of comparison.     

Triangulation as splitting in the service of ambivalence

Ambivalence mastery is postulated as a primary dynamic in triangulation, by appealing to splitting and other defense mechanism strategies in synthesizing incompatible affect. The rationale of admissible triangles in balance theory is critically evaluated, and is elaborated in terms of directional vectors and the interpretation of the triangle as a transformed variant of the double bind. Using an illustrative case presentation where an adolescent was instrumental in forming a coalition with his father against an uncle, a theoretical model is developed reconceptualizing various family systems tenets and addressing inconsistencies in hypothesized mechanisms. Ambivalence is analyzed in terms of transference and as a prerequisite of triangulation, the role of the triangulated in relational stability is examined, and the dyad/triad evolution is elaborated. The model is then related to the basic theoretical positions in family systems literature.     

Triangulation as splitting in the service of ambivalence

Ambivalence mastery is postulated as a primary dynamic in triangulation, by appealing to splitting and other defense mechanism strategies in synthesizing incompatible affect. The rationale of admissible triangles in balance theory is critically evaluated, and is elaborated in terms of directional vectors and the interpretation of the triangle as a transformed variant of the double bind. Using an illustrative case presentation where an adolescent was instrumental in forming a coalition with his father against an uncle, a theoretical model is developed reconceptualizing various family systems tenets and addressing inconsistencies in hypothesized mechanisms. Ambivalence is analyzed in terms of transference and as a prerequisite of triangulation, the role of the triangulated in relational stability is examined, and the dyad/triad evolution is elaborated. The model is then related to the basic theoretical positions in family systems literature.     

Healing the wounds and the wounds of healing: a journey of the spirit

This article is a reflective narrative about the death of a parent told from the perspective of her daughter. It is an experience-based account. This shared journey of mother and child links the familiar realm of the conscious and known self to a realm that is not known in the same way and is not merely the self. It is as if one end is in the midst of life's struggles and crises and the other in another realm; yet the whole works together as a single force. In this way the idea is introduced that the very challenges and trauma of life can be a wound that is a healing of wounds, in so far as it prompts recognition of the realm that is out of sight, though the wound certainly is real enough.     

The reticence of visual phenomenal character: A spatial interpretation of transparency

It is often claimed that the phenomenal character of visual experience is ‘transparent’ in that the phenomenal features of visual experience do not seem ‘mental’. It is then claimed that this transparency speaks in favour of some theories of experience while speaking against others. In this paper, I advance both a negative and a positive thesis about transparency. My negative thesis is that visual phenomenal character is reticent in that it does not reveal whether it is mental or non-mental in nature. This, in turn, means that, by itself, transparency does not speak in favour of (and against) the theories it is often thought to speak in favour of (and against). My positive thesis is that the phenomenon referred to as the ‘transparency’ of visual phenomenal character is best characterized in spatial, not mental, terms.     

Some Supposedly New Sorts of Discrimination

ABSTRACT Whether reverse discrimination is justifiable cannot be determined, it is argued, until what is meant by 'reverse discrimination' has been. Recent talk of 'reverse discrimination' and 'discrimination in favour of' suggests that there are some new sorts of discrimination. But the two qualifications 'reverse' and 'in favour of' seem often to be confused in so far as it is assumed that reverse discrimination is only in favour of. After noting differences between the use of 'discrimination' in fiscal contexts—where the phrase 'discrimination in favour of' has an established usage—and in political contexts, a sense of the phrase to fit the latter is proposed: to discriminate in favour of a group is to favour it at the expense of some other group so that the other group is discriminated against. The meaning of the qualification 'reverse' is then sought. Ambiguities in the terms 'reverse' and 'compensatory' are noted. In so far as policies described as being reverse discrimination are genuinely discriminatory, for it is not clear from their characterisation that they need constitute discrimination of any sort, it is only within a historical context that they can be distinguished from the old sort of discrimination. It is thus concluded that there are no new sorts of discrimination.     

Pastoral Care: Myth and Reality

The increase in pastoral-care systems in secondary schools over the last fifteen years is examined. It is suggested that pastoral care is more effective in allaying the anxieties of teachers and their organisations than it is in meeting the social and personal needs of pupils. It is also suggested that pastoral-care systems assume responsibilities which are more properly those of the family, and that the best way schools can offset the effects of poor home environments is via good subject teaching and increased pupil involvement in schools.     

A Feminist Interpretation of Hume on Testimony

Hume is usually taken to have an evidentialist account of testimonial belief: one is justified in believing what someone says if one has empirical evidence that they have been reliable in the past. This account is impartialist: such evidence is required no matter who the person is, or what relations she may have to you. I, however, argue that Hume has another account of testimony, one grounded in sympathy. This account is partialist, in that empirical evidence is not required in order for one to be justified in believing some of the assertions of one's friends.     

好意原则的局限性

Radical interpretation is used by Davison in his linguistic theory not only as an interesting thought experiment but also a general pattern that is believed to be able to give an essential and general account of linguistic interpretation. If the principle of charity is absolutely necessary to radical interpretation, it becomes, in this sense, a general methodological principle. However, radical interpretation is a local pattern that is proper only for exploring certain interpretation in a specific case, and consequently the principle of charity is an applicable principle in the limited scope. It is neither the case that every linguistic interpretation is in nature radical nor that the principle of charity is the primary and fundamental principle for all linguistic interpretation as Davidson believes.      

A diffusion model of perceptual memory

A model is presented of the perceptual process through which an observer compares two consecutively observed stimuli. Emphasis is placed on the marmer in which a memory of the first stimulus is maintained until the comparison stimulus is observed. It is argued that the role of this perceptual memory process provides the primary distinction between detection and recognition tasks. Two experiments are reported: an experiment in which the observer is asked to judge the similarity in position of two points of light presented serially in a dark room; and an experiment in which the observer judges the similarity in loudness of two serially presented tones. The visual experiment is discussed in relation to the analysis of autokinesis and involuntary eye movements, while the auditory experiment is shown to have special relevance to the issue of time-order errors.     

Freedom in responsibility: a response.

This paper is a critical response to Elisabeth Gr?b-Schmidt's article "Freedom in responsibility: On the relevance of 'sin' as hermeneutic guiding principle in bioethical decision making." Gr?b-Schmidt's chief contention is that ethics begins with anthropology, and that moral responsibility is thereby grounded within a set of given limits. Freedom is distorted into sin when these limits are transgressed. My principal complaint is that her account of the relationship between freedom and sin is grounded in a tragic ontology. Alternatively, I contend that anthropology is grounded in Christology in which freedom is a gift of the Spirit. Consequently, sin is not so much tragic as it marks a refusal of humans to accept their divine election. The issues of human cloning and embryonic stem-cell research are used to exemplify what difference these respective differences might make in a process of moral deliberation.     

Less Happiness in Cities,but Why and so What? One More Reason to Stop Overpopulation

Average happiness in big cities with more than 250,000 inhabitants is, in the USA, lower than average happiness in towns and in the country. Adam Kozaryn offers several explanations. One explanation is that core characteristics of cities, such as size, density and heterogeneity lead to a deterioration of social relations. This explanation is insufficient because average happiness in cities can also be relatively high, as is the case in poor nations, compared to happiness in towns and in the country. Important factors like relative safety and the availability of services have to be considered additionally. A second explanation is that capitalism plays a more dominant role in cities, with similar negative effects. This explanation is also insufficient because the negative effects of capitalism are not limited to cities. A more plausible explanation is that average happiness in American cities is relatively low, because of the interaction of their core characteristics and capitalism. More people should live in smaller places, but this is impossible. There are too many people and big cities are needed to minimize their ecological footprint. Overpopulation is the root of the problem. A discussion about the maximum size of the population is needed. There is no reason to fear for a negative impact on individual freedom, but people can pay attention to this discussion if they make up their mind about having children.     

Truth as Translation – Part A

According to Tarski's Convention T, the adequacy of a truth definition is (implicitly) defined relatively to a translation mapping from the object language to the metalanguage; the translation mapping itself is left unspecified. This paper restates Convention T in a form in which the relativity to translation is made explicit. The notion of an interpreted language is introduced, and a corresponding notion of a translation between interpreted languages is defined. The latter definition is stated both in an algebraic version, and in an equivalent possible worlds version. It is a consequence of our definition that translation is indeterminate in certain cases. Finally, we give an application of our revised version of Convention T and show that interpreted languages exist, which allow for vicious self-reference but which nevertheless contain their own truth predicate. This is possible if only truth is based on a nonstandard translation mapping by which, e.g., the Liar sentence is translated to its own negation. In this part of the paper this existence result is proved only for languages without quantifiers; in Part B the result will be extended to first-order languages.     

Simple and associative recognition memory in the hippocampal region

Although it is well established that the hippocampal region is involved in the formation of declarative memory, the exact nature of its involvement is unclear. One view is that the hippocampal region is involved only in tasks that require the formation or use of associations. According to this view, the hippocampal region is not involved in traditional tests of recognition memory. An alternative view is that the hippocampal region combines and extends the processing carried out by structures in the parahippocampal gyrus and that it is involved in all forms of declarative memory, including recognition memory. Using event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we observed hippocampal activity during both traditional and associative recognition memory tasks. Critically, the hippocampal region was no more active in the associative recognition task than in the traditional recognition task.     

Reforming Theology,Reframing Science

Abstract : What is the role of science in theology? What internal dynamics compel theology to take science seriously? Those are the questions—posed in a characteristically cautious academic fashion. There is a back‐story that needs to be told, however, if we are to get at these questions with the vigor they require: Without radical reformation of theology, there is little chance that we can even begin to work on the agenda that science poses to Christian faith and life. Faith is a journey in which we seek to make sense of the world and our lives in it in the light of the gospel we have received. The gospel is about God, God's presence and redemptive work in Jesus Christ and God's continuing presence in the Holy Spirit. But since it is God's presence and work in the world and for us, the gospel is also about the world and about human being—and that is where science comes in, provoking its reformation. Science is now an irreplaceable source of knowledge about the world and ourselves, and in some respects its knowledge is normative. Scientific knowledge has reshaped our view of the world and ourselves in ways that are so commonly known that it is unnecessary to elaborate. To relate our gospel to our actual lives in the empirical world—that is theology's motivation for taking science seriously. But theology must be reformed and reshaped if it is to be capable of taking science seriously. In this essay we focus on this reforming of theology.     

A note on steady states and the weber-fechner law

The steady state of a simple reaction system has been shown to have some of the properties of a psychophysical discrimination system, including the possibility of deducing a generalized Weber-Fechner Law, both in integral form and in difference form. The Weber ratio so deduced is not constant, and its dependence on stimulus intensity is exhibited. The dependence of the difference limen on the internal threshold is discussed; it is found that in general there is a finite value of this threshold for which response is impossible. This critical threshold is lower for higher values of the reference stimulus intensity. Similarly, it is shown that the difference limen and the Weber ratio, for a fixed value of the threshold, become infinite (i.e., discrimination is impossible) for a value of the stimulus intensity which in general is finite.     

Distributing versus focusing attention in visual short-term memory

Visual short-term memory (VSTM) is traditionally considered a robust form of visual memory resistant to interference from subsequent visual input. This study shows that the robustness of VSTM depends on the way attention is allocated in VSTM. When attention is distributed across multiple memory items, VSTM for these items is vulnerable to interference from subsequent input, including passively viewed images and the postchange testing displays. Yet attention can readjust its focus in VSTM on the basis of an attentional orienting cue presented long after encoding. When attention is oriented to a particular memorized item, the memory is resistant to subsequent interference. This effect, however, is eliminated when the subset of items demanding focal attention exceeds one, suggesting that orienting attention in VSTM is less flexible than orienting attention in perception. We propose that the robustness of VSTM is influenced by whether attention is focused or distributed in VSTM.     

One trial learning and the suppression of interference

An experiment was made to investigate the conditions under which a subject who has learned a series of items in one order can relearn the same items in a different order in one trial. The hypothesis tested was that one-trial learning is ensured in this situation if interference between the two tasks is reduced to zero. It is shown that complete suppression of such interference, obtained by overtraining on the task which is learned first, is not sufficient to ensure the learning of the second in one trial. Comparison of the present experiment with a similar one reported by Mandler and Heinemann (1956) suggests the hypothesis that the discovery of order in the stimulus situation is necessary, in addition to the suppression of interference, if one trial learning is to occur. The relation of the results to the problem of negative transfer is also discussed.     

Polarized vernier optometer

An optometer that makes use of polarized light and is based on the Scheiner principle is described. It is similar in construction and use to the better-known laser optometer, but it is less expensive, avoids some of the problems inherent in using lasers, and is responded to very well by subjects in behavioral research. Uses of the device are discussed, and the laser and vernier optometers are contrasted. It is concluded that the polarized vernier optometer is an economical and effective alternative to the laser optometer in behavioral research settings.