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1.
Donald Capps 《Journal of religion and health》2008,47(1):103-117
In an earlier article (Capps, 2007a) on Erik H. Erikson’s earliest writings (1930–1931) I focused on the relationship between the child’s melancholia and conflict
with maternal authority, and drew attention to the restorative role of humor. In a subsequent article (Capps, 2007b) on Erikson’s Childhood and Society (1950) I explored the same theme of the relationship of melancholia and the mother, but focused on the restorative role of play.
In this article drawing from his Insight and Responsibility (1964) I continue this exploration of the relationship of melancholia and the mother, but focus on the restorative role of
dreams. In support of this understanding of dreams, I focus on Erikson’s interpretation of one of Sigmund Freud’s dreams in
light of the first two stages of the life cycle, and his view that the dream itself is inherently maternal.
Donald Capps is Professor of Pastoral Psychology at Princeton Theological Seminary. His books include Men, Religion, and Melancholia (1997), Freud and Freudians on Religion (2001), and Men and Their Religion: Honor, Hope, and Humor (2002). He has served as editor of Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion and as President of the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion. 相似文献
2.
Donald Capps 《Pastoral Psychology》2007,55(3):253-270
In Men, Religion, and Melancholia: James, Otto, Jung, and Erikson (D. Capps, 1997) and Men and Their Religion: Honor, Hope, and Humor (D. Capps, 2002), I argued that men are no less religious than women, but their religiousness is different from that of women because it
has its psychological origins in the emotional separation between a boy and his mother around the ages of three to five. Employing
Freud’s “Mourning and Melancholia” (S. Freud, 1917/1963) essay, I suggested that their religiousness is rooted in an ontological state of melancholy (which
is different from the psychological state of depression). In Men and Their Religion I identified the religions of honor and of hope as the primary forms of male melancholic religion, and suggested that humor
is a third form that may come to one’s assistance when one experiences the limitations of the other two religions. In this
article, I focus on my own early adolescent years (age 11–14) and explain how one boy became reliably religious, that is, how he embraced or internalized the religions of honor and of hope. In the companion article, I will
explain how these two religions were relativized—and thereby preserved—by the religion of humor. 相似文献
3.
Maurice A. Finocchiaro 《Argumentation》2007,21(3):253-268
Krabbe (2003, in F.H. van Eemeren, J.A. Blair, C.A. Willard and A.F. Snoeck Henkemans (eds.), Proceedings of the Fifth Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation, Sic Sat, Amsterdam, pp. 641–644) defined a metadialogue as a dialogue about one or more dialogues, and a ground-level dialogue
as a dialogue that is not a metadialogue. Similarly, I define a meta-argument as an argument about one or more arguments,
and a ground-level argument as one which is not a meta-argument. Krabbe (1995, in F.H van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J.A. Blair, C.A. Willard and A.F. Snoeck Henkemans (eds.), Proceedings of the Third ISSA Conference on Argumentation, Sic Sat, Amsterdam, pp. 333–344) showed that formal-fallacy criticism (and more generally, fallacy criticism) consists of
metadialogues, and that such metadialogues can be profiled in ways that lead to their proper termination or resolution. I
reconstruct Krabbe’s metadialogical account into monolectical, meta-argumentative terminology by describing three-types of
meta-arguments corresponding to the three ways of proving formal invalidity he studied: the trivial logic-indifferent method;
the method of counterexample situation; and the method of formal paraphrase. A fourth type of meta-argument corresponds to
what Oliver (1967, Mind
76, 463–478), Govier (1985, Informal Logic
7, 27–33), and Copi (1986) call refutation by logical analogy. A fifth type of meta-argument represents my reconstruction of
arguments by parity of reasoning studied by Woods and Hudak (1989, Informal Logic
11, 125–139). Other particular meta-arguments deserving future study are Hume’s critique of the argument from design in the
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, and Mill’s initial argument in The Subjection of Women about the importance of established custom and general feeling vis-à-vis argumentation. 相似文献
4.
Mother,Melancholia, and Art in Erik H. Erikson’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Toys and Reasons</Emphasis> 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Donald Capps 《Journal of religion and health》2007,46(3):369-383
In three earlier articles (2007a, 2007b, 2007c), I focused on the theme of the relationship of melancholia and the mother, and suggested that the melancholic self may
experience humor, play, and dreams as restorative resources. In this article, I want to make a similar case, based on Erik
H. Erikson’s Toys and Reasons (1977), for art (in this particular case, a painting of the Annunciation). I have made a similar case for the restorative role of art in articles on Leonard da Vinci’s Mona Lisa (Capps, Pastoral Psychology, 53, 107–137, 2004) and James McNeill Whistler’s painting of his mother (Capps, Pastoral Psychology, 2007d). In the present article, however, I focus on the special biographical circumstances in Erikson’s own development of a melancholy
self and the painting he discusses in Toys and Reasons, thereby suggesting that individuals may find a particular work of art especially relevant to their own experience of melancholy.
I conclude with Erikson’s testimonial at the memorial service of a colleague and friend who translated her own melancholy
into her service to others.
相似文献
Donald CappsEmail: |
5.
Martin Shuster 《希帕蒂亚:女权主义哲学杂志》2013,28(3):618-632
Although the ethics of humor is a relatively new field, it already seems to have achieved a consensus about ethics in general. In this paper, I implicitly (1) question the view of ethics that stands behind many discussions in the ethics of humor; I do this by explicitly (2) focusing on what has been a chief preoccupation in the ethics of humor: the evaluation of humor. Does the immoral content of a joke make it more or less humorous? Specifically, I analyze whether a sexist joke is more humorous because of its sexism. Contra recent trends in the ethics of humor, I answer this question affirmatively. To this end, the paper presents a detailed and novel reading of Bergson's philosophy of humor, which I argue connects most easily and significantly to the alternate view of ethics I have in mind. 相似文献
6.
Donald Capps 《Journal of religion and health》2008,47(4):560-576
In four earlier articles, I focused on the theme of the relationship of melancholia and the mother, and suggested that the
melancholic self may experience humor (Capps, 2007a), play (Capps, 2008a), dreams (Capps, 2007c), and art (Capps, 2008b) as restorative resources. I argued that Erik H. Erikson found these resources to be valuable remedies for his own melancholic
condition, which had its origins in the fact that he was illegitimate and was raised solely by his mother until he was three years
old, when she remarried. In this article, I focus on two themes in Freud’s Leonardo da Vinci and a memory of his childhood (1964): Leonardo’s relationship with his mother in early childhood and his inhibitions as an artist. I relate these two themes
to Erikson’s own early childhood and his failure to achieve his goal as an aspiring artist in his early twenties. The article
concludes with a discussion of Erikson’s frustrated aspirations to become an artist and his emphasis, in his psychoanalytic
work, on children’s play.
Donald Capps is Professor of Pastoral Psychology at Princeton Theological Seminary. His books include Men, Religion, and
Melancholia (1997), Freud and Freudians on Religion (2001), and Men and Their Religion: Honor, Hope, and Humor 相似文献
7.
Jonathan Tallant 《Philosophia》2010,38(2):271-280
It is, I think, possible to generate a variation of McTaggart’s (Mind 17:457–474, 1908) paradox that infects all extant versions of presentism. This is not to say that presentism is doomed to failure. There may
be ways to modify presentism and I can’t anticipate all such modifications, here. For the purposes of the paper I’ll understand
‘presentism’ to be the view that for all x, x is present (cf. Crisp (2004: 18)). It seems only right that, at a conference devoted to McTaggart’s work on time, we continue to pursue new ways in which
his now infamous arguments remain relevant to us today. 相似文献
8.
Donald Capps 《Journal of religion and health》2007,46(4):591-606
In an earlier article on Erik H. Erikson’s earliest writings (Capps, 2007), I focused on the relationship between the child’s melancholia and conflict with maternal authority, and drew attention
to the restorative role of humor. In this article, I discuss two of the three chapters in part three, “The Growth of the Ego,”
of Erikson’s first major book, Childhood and Society [Erikson, Childhood and society. New York: W. W. Norton, 1950, Childhood and society (rev. edition). New York: W. W. Norton, 1963]. I explore the same theme of the relationship of melancholia and the mother, but focus on the restorative role of play.
I interpret the differences between the two cases in light of Sigmund Freud’s essay, “Mourning and Melancholia” [Freud, Mourning
and melancholia. In S. Freud, General psychological theory (pp. 164–179). P. Rieff (ed.). New York: Collier Books. 1963].
相似文献
Donald CappsEmail: |
9.
Isidora Stojanovic 《Erkenntnis》2012,76(1):49-58
It has been long known (Perry in Philos Rev 86: 474–497, 1977; No?s 13: 3–21, 1979, Lewis in Philos Rev 88: 513–543 1981) that de se attitudes, such as beliefs and desires that one has about oneself, call for a special treatment in theories of attitudinal content. The aim of this paper is to raise similar concerns for
theories of asserted content. The received view, inherited from Kaplan (1989), has it that if Alma says “I am hungry,” the asserted content, or what is said, is the proposition that Alma is hungry (at a given time). I argue that the received view has difficulties handling de se assertion, i.e., contents that one expresses using the first person pronoun, to assert something about oneself. I start from
the observation that when two speakers say “I am hungry,” one may truly report them as having said the same thing. It has
often been held that the possibility of such reports comes from the fact that the two speakers are, after all, uttering the
same words, and are in this sense “saying the same thing”. I argue that this approach fails, and that it is neither necessary
nor sufficient to use the same words, or words endowed with the same meaning, in order to be truly reported as same-saying.
I also argue that reports of same-saying in the case of de se assertion differ significantly from such reports in the case of two speakers merely implicating the same thing. 相似文献
10.
Michael Devitt 《Erkenntnis》2010,73(2):251-264
In “Intuitions in Linguistics” (2006a) and Ignorance of Language (2006b) I took it to be Chomskian orthodoxy that a speaker’s metalinguistic intuitions are provided by her linguistic competence.
I argued against this view in favor of the alternative that the intuitions are empirical theory-laden central-processor responses
to linguistic phenomena. The concern about these linguistic intuitions arises from their apparent role as evidence for a grammar.
Mark Textor, “Devitt on the Epistemic Authority of Linguistic Intuitions” (2009), argues that I have picked the wrong intuitions: I should have picked non-judgmental linguistic “seemings”. These reside
between metalinguistic judgments and linguistic performances and have an epistemic authority that the orthodox view may well
be able to explain. Textor seems to think that the metalinguistic intuitions are not evidence at all. I argue that he is wrong
about that. More importantly, I argue that there are no “in-between” linguistic seemings with epistemic authority. 相似文献
11.
《South African Journal of Philosophy》2013,32(4):400-412
abstractThe moral status of gossip is generally defmed negatively from a Western perspective and, I argue, is or should be accorded a more positive role in African accounts of ethics. In a broadly communitarian vein, I argue that a characteristically Western approach to gossip is problematic - in that it casts a fundamental aspect of human life as moral wrongdoing, does not provide an adequate fit between wrongness and censure, and excludes significant morally positive values realised through gossip - and argue for a more nuanced account. Examining and responding to five arguments for the viciousness of gossip, and proposing four candidate virtues, I develop an account that distinguishes vicious from virtuous forms of gossip. 相似文献
12.
Mark A. Bedau 《Synthese》2012,185(1):73-88
This paper describes and defends the view that minimal chemical life essentially involves the chemical integration of three
chemical functionalities: containment, metabolism, and program (Rasmussen et al. in Protocells: bridging nonliving and living
matter, 2009a). This view is illustrated and explained with the help of CMP and Rasmussen diagrams (Rasmussen et al. In: Rasmussen et al.
(eds.) in Protocells: bridging nonliving and living matter, 71–100, 2009b), both of which represent the key chemical functional dependencies among containment, metabolism, and program. The CMP model
of minimal chemical life gains some support from the broad view of life as open-ended evolution, which I have defended elsewhere
(Bedau in The philosophy of artificial life, 1996; Bedau in Artificial Life, 4:125–140, 1998). Further support comes from the natural way the CMP model resolves the puzzle about whether life is a matter of degree. 相似文献
13.
Donald Capps 《Pastoral Psychology》2006,54(5):413-438
In an earlier article (Capps, 2006), I presented evidence that humor has important psychological benefits. It would seem, therefore, that religion and humor would be allies, for religion is also considered compatible with psychological well-being (Capps, 1985). In fact, however, while religion and humor are not enemies, neither are they, for the most part, allies. I review theoretical works that reflect religion's mistrust of humor, then focus on the empirical studies by Vassilis Saroglou that confirm this mistrust. Building on Saroglou's own theoretical analysis of this mistrust, I suggest that some grounds for this mistrust are legitimate, but most are not. I conclude that religion and humor should overcome their current estrangement. 相似文献
14.
J. Ritola 《Argumentation》2006,20(2):237-244
In a recent article, D. A. Truncellito (2004, ‘Running in Circles about Begging the Question’, Argumentation
18, 325–329) argues that the discussion between Robinson (1971, ‘Begging the Question’, Analysis
31, 113–117), Sorensen (1996, ‘Unbeggable Questions’, Analysis
56, 51–55) and Teng (1997, ‘Sorensen on Begging the Question’, Analysis
57, 220–222) shows that we need to distinguish between logical fallacies, which are mistakes in the form of the argument, and rhetorical fallacies, which are mistakes committed by the arguer. While I basically agree with Truncellito’s line of thinking, I believe this distinction is not tenable and offer a different view. In addition, I will argue that the conclusion to draw from the abovementioned discussion is that validity is not a sufficient criterion of begging the question, and that we should be wary of the containment-metaphor of a deductive argument. 相似文献
15.
Michael Wolff 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2010,41(2):359-371
In an earlier article (see J Gen Philos Sci (2010) 41: 341–355) I have compared Aristotle’s syllogistic with Kant’s theory
of “pure ratiocination”. “Ratiocinia pura” („reine Vernunftschlüsse“) is Kant’s designation for assertoric syllogisms Aristotle has called ‘perfect’. In Kant’s view
they differ from non-pure ratiocinia precisely in that their validity rests only on the validity of the Dictum de omni et nullo (which, however, in Kant’s view can be further reduced to more fundamental principles) whereas the validity of non-pure ratiocinia additionally presupposes the validity of inferences which Kant calls consequentiae immediatae. I have argued that Kant’s view is in some (not in all) essential features in accordance with Aristotle’s view concerning
perfect syllogisms and certainly leading to a tenable and interesting logical theory. As a result I have rejected not only
the interpretation of Aristotle adopted by Theodor Ebert, but also the objections he has raised against Kant’s logical theory.
As far as Aristotle is concerned, Ebert has attempted to defend his position in the first part of his reply to my article
published in J Gen Philos Sci (2009) 40: 357–365, and I have argued against this defence in issue 1 of the J Gen Philos Sci (2010) 41: 199–213 (cf. Ebert’s answer
in the same issue pp. 215–231). In the following discussion I deal with Eberts defence of his criticism of Kant published
in the second part of his reply to my article (see J Gen Philos Sci (2009) 40: 365–372). I shall argue, that Kant’s principle ‘nota notae est nota rei ipsius’ and his use of technical vocabulary stand up to the objections raised by Ebert. His attempts to prove that Kant’s logical
theory is defective are based on several misinterpretations. 相似文献
16.
Donald Capps 《Journal of religion and health》2010,49(4):620-631
The author was the founder and secretary pro-tem of the Bad Poets Society at Princeton Theological Seminary. This distinction
does not appear on his official resume. The Society did not have meetings but it had a newsletter that came out several times
a year comprised of bad poetry written by members of the faculty and staff. These poetic works included reflections on institutional
matters. This article contains bad poetry by the author relating to such matters. This poetry illustrates Sigmund Freud’s
(Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious. Norton, New York, 1960) view of humor as saving in the expenditure of painful emotions, costly inhibitions, and difficult thinking. The parasitical
nature of bad poetry is also noted and illustrated with the author’s own poems. 相似文献
17.
Ian Underwood 《Philosophical Studies》2010,151(2):265-283
Baxter (Australas J Philos 79:449–464, 2001) proposes an ingenious solution to the problem of instantiation based on his theory of cross-count identity. His idea is
that where a particular instantiates a universal it shares an aspect with that universal. Both the particular and the universal
are numerically identical with the shared aspect in different counts. Although Baxter does not say exactly what a count is,
it appears that he takes ways of counting as mysterious primitives against which different numerical identities are defined. In contrast, I defend the idea—suggested,
though not quite endorsed, by Baxter himself—that counts are independent dimensions of numerical identity. Different ways
of counting are explained by the existence of these different sorts of identity (i.e., counts). For the instantiation of a
universal by a particular, I propose one dimension concerned with the individuation of particulars (the p-count) and another
dimension concerned with the individuation of universals (the u-count). On that basis, I give a clear definition of cross-count
identity that explains its asymmetrical nature (i.e., the fact that particulars instantiate universals, but not vice versa).
I extend the theory to a third dimension—that of time, or the t-count—and thereby defend Baxter’s ideas on change, and the
contingency of instantiation. Baxter (Mind 97(388):575–582, 1988; Australas J Philos 79:449–464, 2001) proposes the related idea of composition as (cross-count) identity. Parts are individually cross-count identical with the
wholes that they constitute, and they collectively share all aspects across counts with those wholes. I propose an innovation
by which totality is shared distinctness across counts. The theory applies to both the totality of particulars that instantiate any given universal, and the totality
of parts that constitute any given whole. I argue that this has several advantages over Armstrong’s view, which is based on
a dubious external totalling relation. I also argue that Armstrong’s theory of numbers (or quantities) as internal relations ought to be rejected in favour of
an account based on identity and distinctness. The paper concludes with a careful analysis of external relations in Baxter’s
framework. I argue that we must recognise one further dimension of identity in order to differentiate between, e.g., the aspects
of Abelard insofar as he loves Heloise and Abelard insofar as he loves Isobel. Each of these aspects is identical with Abelard
and identical with loving-by, yet they must be in some way distinct. I therefore propose the r-count, in which multiple distinct relational properties
are the very same relation (-part). The existence of these four independent dimensions explains the fact that particulars,
universals, relations, and times are fundamentally different sorts of things in the ontology. Each is individuated with respect
to a different dimension of identity. 相似文献
18.
Adolfo García de la Sienra 《Axiomathes》2010,20(1):81-94
Herman Dooyeweerd (1985) argued that among the modalities making up the fabric of reality a specifically economic one is to be found. The aim of
the present paper is to discuss the texture of such a modality and how it both differentiates and intertwines with others.
For an updated brief, albeit cogent and analytically lucid presentation of the Law Framework ontology, see Clouser (2009). Dooyeweerd’s view entails that the proper object of economics is irreducible to that of other disciplines, but a non-reductionist
view of the object of economics presupposes that the nuclear meaning of that discipline has been clearly delimited: this is
required in order to determine its nature and separate identity as a scientific discipline. By ‘the nuclear meaning of a discipline’
I understand a pre-theoretical delimitation of its field of research, such as that of the field of physics, characterized
by the laws governing force and energy. Within one and the same field there may be many theories, theories competing to explain
the same phenomena, or dealing with phenomena so different that it is nearly impossible to trace conceptual connections among
them. This last situation calls for a unified-field theory. In the second section of this paper I will attempt to defend a
rather commonly accepted definition of the field of economics that sees this discipline as a science of choice. In the third
I will show how the analytical conception it involves can be naturally complemented with a classificatory one. According to
a classificatory conception, the aggregated social-level phenomena, patterns and regularities economic theories usually deal
with, are economic in that sense, even though they are not prima facie cases of individual behavior, or are unintended consequences of aggregated individual choices. In the fourth I will discuss
the meaning of the most general, supra-arbitrary economic laws—the modal laws of economics. In the final section I will offer
a non-reductionist view of economics that nevertheless takes into account its intertwining with other spheres. 相似文献
19.
Sebastian Enqvist 《Erkenntnis》2010,72(3):315-335
In the paper “On the role of the research agenda in epistemic change”, Olsson and Westlund have suggested that the notion
of epistemic state employed in the standard framework of belief revision (Alchourrón et al. 1985; G?rdenfors 1988) should be extended to include a representation of the agent’s research agenda (Olsson and Westlund 2006). The resulting framework will here be referred to as interrogative belief revision. In this paper, I attempt to deal with the problem of how research agendas should change in contraction, a problem largely left open by Olsson and Westlund. Two desiderata of an appropriate solution are suggested: one is a principle of continuity, stating that changes in the research agenda should somehow reflect that certain long term research interests are kept fixed. The other desideratum, which is based on part of Olsson and Westlund’s motivation for
adding research agendas to the epistemic states, is that we should be able to account for how contraction may serve to open
up new, fruitful hypotheses for investigation. In order to achieve these desiderata, I base my solution on a revised version of Olsson and Westlund’s notion of epistemic state. 相似文献
20.
In 2009 we distributed a questionnaire on the deadly sins. It combined two research instruments—The Life Attitudes Inventory constructed by Capps (Pastoral Psychology 37:229–253, 1989) and the Deadly Sins Scale developed by Nauta and Derckx (Pastoral Psychology 56:177–188, 2007). In a previous article (Capps and Haupt 2011) we reported on findings from the Life Attitudes Inventory. In this article we report on findings from the Deadly Sins Scale and then discuss the fact that an unusually high percentage of the respondents identified positively with the item “I achieve
my goals in life.” We suggest that their identification with this item is a reflection of the fact that humans are hopeful
by nature. 相似文献