Anxiety and the Face of the Other: Tillich and Levinas on the Origin of Questioning

With almost a century of historical distance between Heidegger’s retrieval of the question of being and contemporary concern about the Other, we have accrued invaluable experiences for critical leverage about what it is to ask one another questions. I offer a sketch aimed at adapting Tillich’s theological system grounded in existential questioning to today by juxtaposing him with Levinas’ philosophical ethics. Tillich and Levinas provide motive for reflection on the topic of questioning in particular. In the case of Tillich, questions constitute a crucial moment in the dialogue between our contemporary existential situation and religious symbols, or in what he called the ‘method of correlation.’ Furthermore, Tillich locates in the very structure of questioning the germ of our participation in our essential nature despite existential disruption. Beneath his more provocative and prophetic discourse on the absolute desolation and height of the Other, Levinas sees in questions a different kind of possibility. It is not our essential and existential selves, but oneself and the absolutely Other who come together in the question yet retain their infinite difference. Heidegger is the immediate predecessor from whom both Tillich and Levinas inherit a predilection for reflection on questioning. What is at stake is not merely the legacy of Heidegger’s construal of questioning, but, more importantly here, the fundamental sources Tillich and Levinas posit as the origin of our questioning.     

Mourning Religion: A Response

Mourning Religion is a brilliant collection of essays responding both to Freud’s essay “Mourning and Melancholia” and Peter Homans’ assertion that the academic study of religion represents a creative expression of mourning the loss of religion in secular (western) society. This essay poses questions concerning the role of theology as a mode of analysis; Ricoeur’s concept of “second naiveté” in relation to disillusionment and religion; Celia Brickman’s reflections on globalization, marginalization, and a shift in psychological language from “primitivity” to “vulnerability”; the role of the body in the work of religious studies; melancholia as “re-membering” amid multiplicity and fragmentation; and mourning as protest and resistance. The essay concludes with a reflection on ambiguity and transcendence in dialogue with Freud’s essay “On Transience.”     

Two for the show: Anti-luck and virtue epistemologies in consonance

This essay extends my side of a discussion begun earlier with Duncan Pritchard, the recent author of Epistemic Luck.Pritchard’s work contributes significantly to improving the “diagnostic appeal” of a neo-Moorean philosophical response to radical scepticism. While agreeing with Pritchard in many respects, the paper questions the need for his concession to the sceptic that the neo-Moorean is capable at best of recovering “‘brute’ externalist knowledge”. The paper discusses and directly responds to a dilemma that Pritchard poses for virtue epistemologies (VE). It also takes issue with Pritchard’s “merely safety-based” alternative. Ultimately, however, the criticisms made here of Pritchard’s dilemma and its underlying contrast of “anti-luck” and “virtue” epistemologies are intended to help realize his own aspirations for a better diagnosis of radical scepticism to inform a still better neo-Moorean response.     

How is God-talk logically possible? A sketch for an argument on the logic of ‘God’

In this paper I want to argue for the optimal way to characterise the logical and semantical behaviour of the singular term ‘God’ used in religious language. The relevance of this enterprise to logical theory is the main focus as well. Doing this presupposes to outline the two rivaling approaches of well-definition of singular terms: Kripke’s (“rigid designators”) and Hintikka’s (“world-lines”). ‘God’ as a “rigid designator” is purified from all real-life-language-games of identification and only spells out a metaphysical tag, which favours the view of “anything goes”. Instead, ‘God’ as a “world-line,” plus two ways of quantification, is much more flexible to theological traditions, teachings of the church, religious practices and personal feelings. Thus, it provides a sufficiently well-defined singular term for the purposes of logical theory. The whole sketch is based on Jaakko Hintikka’s logical ideas, mainly on his responses to different authors in PJH. I have systematically omitted direct references to his texts because I have modified considerably his ideas for my own purposes.     

Abravanel in Italy: the critique of the kabbalist Elijah Hayyim Genazzano

Among many uncharted vistas of scholarship on Isaac Abravanel, a comprehensive account of his scholarly afterlife seems especially distant. This essay illustrates the possibilities latent in the study of Abravanel’s reception-history by investigating a sharp critique of Abravanel composed in his lifetime. Its author was a Tuscan kabbalist, Elijah Hayyim ben Benjamin of Genazzano (c. 1440–c. 1510), who studied with the renowned talmudist and kabbalist, Benjamin of Montalcino, and engaged in a disputation with a Franciscan friar, Francesco d’Acquapendente. The critique, which appears in Elijah’s ’Igeret ḥamudot (an epistolary tract sent to Benjamin of Montalcino’s son David), comprises such central themes of medieval and early modern Jewish thought as aggadic authority, prophecy’s relationship to human perfection, and philosophy’s relationship to Kabbalah. It unexpectedly serves as the main exhibit in Elijah’s larger argument regarding the limits of the human intellect and of truths arrived at by way of philosophic “speculation.” After surveying Abravanel’s exegetical monograph ‘Aṭeret zeqenim, the immediate object of Elijah’s wrath, the essay investigates the conceptual components of Elijah’s critique. It concludes by seeking to explain the thoroughly baneful image of Abravanel that Elijah presents despite the significant spiritual sensibilities and intellectual points of contact these two thinkers shared. The key appears to be differences between Elijah’s Italian religious-intellectual context and the Ibero-Jewish tradition that shaped Abravanel. The essay argues that differences in their formative intellectual contexts, coupled with the genuinely elusive character of Abravanel’s religious thought, are among the things that kept the type of Sephardic traditionalism that Abravanel represented—elements of which Elijah ought to have applauded—hidden from Elijah’s view.     

Confucianism between Tradition and Modernity, Religion, and Secularization: Questions to Tu Weiming

The article discusses central assumptions of Tu Weiming’s program of overcoming the “enlightenment mentality” and throws a critical light on his conceptions of religious or spiritual Confucianism, of a Confucian modernity, and of the “multiple modernities” theory in general. It defends a unitary rather than multiple concept of modernity in terms of the realization of a morally controlled “principle of free subjectivity” and tries to show how Confucianism, understood as a secular ethics, could contribute to this goal.     

Multiculturalism and Equal Human Dignity: An Essay on Bhikhu Parekh

Bhikhu Parekh is an internationally renowned political theorist. His work on identity and multiculturalism is unquestionably thoughtful and nuanced, benefiting from a tremendous depth of knowledge of particular cases. Despite his work’s many virtues, however, the normative justification for Parekh’s recommendations is at times vague or ambiguous. In this essay, I argue that a close reading of his work, in particular his magnum opus Rethinking Multiculturalism and the selfproclaimed “sequel” A New Politics of Identity, reveals that his claims frequently rely upon a Kantian account of moral dialogue and indeed moral personhood that he remains unwilling to claim. Recognizing this latent Kantianism is essential to a thorough assessment of Parekh’s work on identity, and his criticisms of other theorists. It is only because of his ambiguity that his multiculturalism is able to avoid the sort of charges that he levels against other responses to diversity, including those of such authors as Rawls, Habermas, Kymlicka, and Raz.     

Popper’S Evolutionary Epistemology Revamped

In a paper entitled “Revolution in Permanence”, published in the collection “Karl Popper: Philosophy and Problems”, John Worrall (1995) severely criticised several aspects of Karl Popper’s work before commenting that “I have no doubt that, given suffi-cient motivation, a case could be constructed on the basis of such remarks that Popper had a more sophisticated version of theory production......” (p. 102). Part of Worrall’s criticism is directed at a “strawpopper”: in his “Darwinian Model” emphasising the similarities and differences between genetic mutation, variation in animal behaviour and the gestation of scientific theories, Popper (1975, 1981, 1994) never stated that tentative scientific conjec-tures “while more or less random, are not completely blind.” He was referring to variation in animal species behaviour, and about tentative scientific conjectures he said nothing, although common sense would indicate that presumably he regarded them as being less blind and less random. In Popper (1977, 1983), giving a summary of his “Darwinian Model”, he repaired this omission about tentative scientific conjectures by inserting the sentence “On a level of World 3 theory formation they are of the character of planned gropings into the unknown.” Recent developments in the field of genetics (see for example Raff (1996), Lewis (1999), Korn (2002)) indicate that Popper’s intuitions were along the modern lines while Worrall’s intuitions are old fashioned. Therefore Popper’s “Darwinian Model” remains both viable and fruitful.     

Mencius?? aesthetics and its position

Mencius’ aesthetics unfolded around the ideal personality in his mind. Such an ideal personality belonged to a great man who was sublime, practical and honorable, and it was presented as the beauty of magnificence or the beauty of masculinity. Mencius put forward many propositions such as “the completed goodness that is brightly displayed is called greatness,” nourishing “one’s grand qi 气 (the great morale personality),” “only after a man is a sage can he completely suits himself to his own form,” “the saints only apprehended before me that of which my mind approves along with other men,” being “conscious of sincerity on self-examination,” and flowing “abroad, above and beneath, like that of Heaven and Earth,” all of which described an ideal personality through the course of its formation and its psychological experience. As a prominent school before the Qin dynasty, Mencius’ aesthetics greatly developed the Confucian teaching of “internal sage.” It shared many similarities with Zhuangzi’s thought and was also an aesthetic mode opposed to the latter. Both kinds of aesthetics were prominent: Mencius’ teaching was like imposingly towering and muscularly overflowing majestic mountains; Zhuangzi’s thought was like gracefully flowing water with an air of femininity. In real life though, Mencius’ teaching has greater practical significance in addressing the unbearable lightness of being, a disease of modernity.     

Another conversion. Stanisław Brzozowski’s ‘diary’ as an early instance of the post-secular turn to religion

This essay is an attempt to analyze an important decision Brzozowski took at the end of his life, i.e. his late turn towards Catholicism, which, despite his own objections, we should nonetheless call a religious conversion. The main reason why Brzozowski resisted the traditional rhetoric of conversion lies in his often repeated conviction that faith cannot invalidate life, because “what is not biographical, does not exist at all.” Brzozowski, therefore, rejects conversion understood as a radical and abrupt revolution of the soul, which annuls everything that happened before, and turns to a model of religiosity (“Catholicism, undoubtedly”) which preserves his entire biographical past. In this manner, Brzozowski seeks his own formula of faith, more adequate to the “situation” of the modern man who lives in and through History. I argue that the model of “conversion without conversion” Brzozowski chose as representative of modern man is typically, though avant la lettre, post-secular: closer to the Jewish sources of past-oriented tschuva than to the mystical timelessness of traditionally Christian metanoia. The idea that redemption consists not in a liberation of a pure spirit but in a patient working-through of the universal history of creation is an implicit credo of the whole modern age, first fully articulated by Brzozowski and only later in the writings of Hermann Cohen, Franz Rosenzweig, and Walter Benjamin. Brzozowski emerges as a relatively early precursor of the future post-secular option whose advocates, like the author of The Diary, will not allow themselves to “lose a single moment,” either of their lives or the world’s history.     

Deconstruction is not vegetarianism: Humanism,subjectivity, and animal ethics

This essay examines Jacques Derrida’s contribution to recent debates in animal philosophy in order to explore the critical promise of his work for contemporary discourses on animal ethics and vegetarianism. The essay is divided into two sections, both of which have as their focus Derrida’s interview with Jean-Luc Nancy entitled “‘Eating Well’, or the Calculation of the Subject.” My task in the initial section is to assess the claim made by Derrida in this interview that Levinas’s work is dogmatically anthropocentric, and to determine whether Levinas’s conception of ethics leaves a place for animals. In the second half of the essay I turn to an analysis of Derrida’s discussion of vegetarianism and its critical relation to the humanism and anthropocentrism that he is calling into question. The main argument that I seek to advance here is that deconstruction should not be strictly identified with vegetarianism (as certain of Derrida’s readers have suggested), but rather that what is needed is a thorough deconstruction of existing discourses on vegetarianism, a project that remains largely to be developed.     

Superaddressee or Who Will Succeed a Mentor?

This philosophical essay is inspired by a four-year pedagogical relationship that continues in its altered form today. The main focus of this piece is the transformation of a mentor as an immediate addressee into mentor as a superaddressee, an influential third listener who oversees observable dialogues. I explore the mutual responsibilities of a student and a mentor in order to uncover the elements in the pedagogical chemistry responsible for the transformation of an addressee into a superaddressee. Confirmation (a perfect form of understanding) of a student’s intellectual and moral uniqueness, incarnation of a particular value deemed desirable by a student, and education of a student into the dialogic ways of being on his or her own are the necessary ingredients of the process of becoming a superaddressee. Initially a mentor engages in the pedagogy of understanding whose ideal outcome is confirmation of a student’s intellectual and moral makeup. After the dialogue is over, a mentor often moves into the domain of inner speech from where he or she continues to offer perfect understanding, especially in the absence of such understanding from an immediate addressee. Two types of superaddressees are identified and their relationship with the invoking consciousness is explored. I conclude that becoming a superaddressee is the most generous pedagogical contribution to a student’s future: a mentor thus makes his or her voice available to a student’s inner dialogue, often without receiving anything in return. Mikhail Bakhtin is highly influential in my writing. “Superaddressee” or “a third listener” is one of his coinages. The term is treated in “The Problem of the Text” as part of the collection “Speech genres and other late essays” (1986), alluded to in Voloshinov’s (1976) “Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art” and expanded upon in Frank Farmer’s (2001) “Saying and Silence.”     

An American Drag Queen in West Berlin: The Negotiation of Homosexual Identity,Transgressive Behavior and Social Acceptance in late 1960s and early 1970s West Germany

My work analyzes a number of confrontations between Tobi Marsh, a gay drag queen, and his German-Jewish landlord, Stark, in late 1960s and early 1970s West Berlin. Based upon an extensive personal interview with Marsh, my work uses subjective testimony to examine the complexity of lived-experience for gay men in Bundesrepublik society right at the time when the West Germany government extended full political and legal equality to gay men. Marsh’s testimony details two separate incidents during which Stark, who knew Marsh was openly gay and performed as a drag queen, attacked Marsh’s sexual orientation. While perhaps not significant in and of itself, a closer look at Marsh’s account reveals that Stark made use of very specific social contexts in order to condemn Marsh’s sexual identity. In fact, on both occasions some other social transgression entirely served as a catalyst to the confrontation, one a racial transgression and another an ethno-religious transgression. In both cases, however, Stark made use of the situation of a “double-transgression” to censure Marsh and his company first and foremost as homosexuals. At the same time, the sexual nature of Stark’s outbursts reveals that Stark was actually concerned about the tenuous standing and respectability of his own person and household as a likewise marginalized individual in West German society. Indeed, Stark’s attacks on Marsh’s homosexuality were disguised attempts to assert his own position in “respectable” West German society at Marsh’s expense. Marsh’s run-ins with Stark, then, both add to the growing literature on the various forms of informal prejudice suffered by gay men in post-World War II West German society and serve as a larger lens through which to view the rich complexity of life for gay men in a country still undergoing democratization where social belonging was being negotiated along a number of fronts.     

Wen,Haiming, <Emphasis Type="Italic">Confucian Pragmatism as the Art of Contextualizing Personal Experience and World</Emphasis>

Certain discussions about “relativism” in the philosophy of Zhuangzi turn on the question of the morality of his dao 道. Some commentators, most notably Robert Eno, maintain that there is no ethical value whatsoever to Zhuangzi’s dao as presented in the Cook Ding episode and other “knack passages.” In this essay, it is argued that there is indeed a moral dimension to Cook Ding’s dao. One way to recognize it is to explore the similarity between that dao and John Dewey’s notion of educational method. There are moral traits that Dewey can appeal to in recommending his method. It is argued here that these traits represent the moral features of Cook Ding’s dao as well.     

Rawls and Research on Cognitively Impaired Patients: A Reply to Maio

In his paper, “The Relevance of Rawls’ Principle of Justice for Research on Cognitively Impaired Patients” (Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 23 (2002):45–53), Giovanni Maio has developed athought-provoking argument for the permissibility of non-therapeutic research on cognitively impaired patients. Maio argues that his conclusion follows from the acceptance of John Rawls’s principles of justice, specifically, Rawls’s “liberty principle” Maio has misinterpreted Rawls’s “libertyprinciple” – correctly interpreted it does notsupport non-therapeutic research on cognitivelyimpaired patients. Three other ‘Rawlsian’ arguments are suggested by Maio’s discussion –two “self-respect” arguments and a “presumed consent” argument – but none of them are convincing. However, an alternative argument developed from Rawls’s discussion of “justice in health care” in his most recent book, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, may justify certain kinds of non-therapeutic research on some cognitively impaired patients in special circumstances. We should not expect anything more permissive from a liberal theory of justice. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

A Psychology of Religious Plurality: From Intra-Religious Dialogue to Intra-Psychic Reality

Panikkar’s (The intra-religious dialogue, 1978) classic, re-issued by Paulist Press in 1999, grapples with the theological challenges in the disciplines of comparative theology and the theology of religions through what he terms, “intra-religious dialogue.” In this psychology of religious plurality, I use works from a variety of disciplines to highlight the achievements of Panikkar’s intra-religious dialogue, as well as to critique his work in the hope of finding categories of understanding that can be profitably used to face the inter-personal crises of the contemporary world, namely religious terrorism.