Is rational-emotive therapy (RET) “rationalist” or “constructivist”?

Conclusion Mahoney, Guidano, and other modern constructivists and process-oriented therapists are partly on the right track and are making some interesting additions to traditional cognitive therapy. But they sometimes also revert to inefficient and side-tracking psychoanalytically-oriented methods of therapy. RET, in both its individual and family therapy approaches, attempts to use the most effective and hardheaded of the so-called rationalist methods—including active—directive changing of unrealistic and irrational Beliefs, skill training, problemsolving, bibliotherapy, in vivo desensitization, and reinforcement procedures-and it also employs many of the methods of the cognitive constructivists—including the disclosing of tacit philosophies; the achievement of a profound philosophical change in clients' attitudes toward themselves, toward others, and toward life situations; the use of the therapist's relationship with clients to show them how to unconditionally accept themselves; and the employment of many dramatic, emotive, and experiential exercises to change clients' feelings as well as their thoughts and behaviors. RET is particularly interested in effecting both individual and familial change as quickly and as efficiently as feasible. It is therefore rational (efficaciously hedonic)and emotive (energetically experiential). Or at least tries to be!Keynote address to World Congress of Cognitive Therapy, Oxford, England June 29, 1989     

A dictionary of rational-emotive feelings and behaviors

Rational-emotive therapy (RET) hypothesizes that people mainly make themselves emotionally disturbed and dysfunctional in their behavior by starting with rational Beliefs (rBs) about their Goals (G) and then by consciously or unconsciously converting these into irrational Beliefs (iBs) or dogmatic, absolutistic musts and commands. To help clients and others to clearly see the differences between their rational Beliefs and their irrational Beliefs, to understand the disordered feelings and behaviors to which the latter lead, and to help them become more rational, less disturbed, and less dysfunctional in their activities, the authors have constructed and herewith present a dictionary of rational-emotive equivalents.Ted Crawford is a Consultant on Communication and Group Processes in Santa Barbara, California. Albert Ellis, Ph.D., is the Executive Director of the Institute for Rational-Emotive Therapy in New York City.     

Comments on R.M. Grieger's “contextual model of the ABCs of RET”

Grieger's (1985) contextual model of the ABCs of RET is examined and found to have many interesting and thought-provoking aspects. Its hypotheses in regard to emphasizing various therapeutic aspects of RET are evaluated and found to make good sense but sometimes to be stated in an extreme manner that may lead to questionable results.     

The revised ABC's of rational-emotive therapy (RET)

Although I was perceptive enough to realize, in my first paper on rational-emotive therapy (RET) in 1956, that cognitions, emotions, and behaviors almost always are not pure or disparate but significantly include each other, I have appreciably added to this concept and have stressed forceful emotive and educative, as well as strong behavioral, techniques of RET in recent years. I have also increasingly pointed out that the ABC's of RET-A standing for Activating Events, B for Beliefs about these events, and C for emotional and behavioral Consequences of these Beliefs-also influence, include, and interact with each other. The present paper gives salient details of how A's, B's, and C's, as well as cognitions, emotions, and behaviors all importantly affect one another and how they become combined into dysfunctional, demanding core Basic Philosophic Assumptions that lead to neurotic disturbances. To change and to keep changing these dysfunctional basic assumptions, RET uses a number of intellectual, affective, and action techniques that often are applied in a forceful, persistent, active-directive manner. It is more cognitive than most of the other cognitive-behavior therapies in that it tries to help many (not all) clients to make an elegant or profound philosophic change (Ellis, 1979b, 1985b). But it is also more emotive and behavioral than most other popular therapies in that it assumes that neurotic individuals' core basic philosophies assumptions are, as Muran (in press) points out, tacit cognitive-affective-motoric structures that account for emotional experiences in the face of external stimuli, and that therefore therapists had better teach their clients (and the general public) several powerful cognitive-emotive-behavioral methods of helping themselves change.Albert Ellis is President of the Institute for Rational-Emotive Therapy, 45 East 65th Street, New York, NY, 10021     

Cognitive therapy with obsessive-compulsive disorder: a comparative evaluation.

After a 4-week waiting period 21 obsessive-compulsives were randomly allocated to two treatment conditions (1) Rational Emotive Therapy (RET) and (2) exposure in vivo. RET consisted of analysing irrational thoughts; exposure in vivo was self-controlled. After six sessions and another 4-week waiting period all patients received six sessions of exposure in vivo. Both treatments resulted in significant improvement on anxiety/discomfort, Maudsley Obsessional Compulsive Inventory, and Dutch Obsessional Compulsive Questionnaire and in a reduction of scores on the Irrational Beliefs Test. Results were maintained to a follow-up 6 months later. No significant differences were found between the two conditions.     

The relationships among the general attitude and belief scale,other dysfunctional cognition measures,and depressive or bulimic tendencies

This study assessed the relationships between the General Attitude and Belief Scale (GABS) and measures of 1) irrational beliefs derived from Ellis' older and newer theorizing, 2) reasoning errors based on Beck's theory, and 3) affective and behavioral disorder, specifically depression and bulimia. Female undergraduates (n=160) completed the GABS, Irrational Beliefs Scale, Irrational Beliefs Test, Rational Behaviors Inventory, Dysfunctional Attitude Scale, Cognitive Error Questionnaire and the Beck Depression Inventory, Center for Epidemiologic Studies — Depression Scale, and Bulimia Test. Results supported the internal consistency and construct validity of the GABS; progressively higher correlations were obtained with measures more similar to the GABS theoretically.Dr. Eleanor H. Wertheim is Senior Lecturer at the Department of Psychology, La Trobe University in Melbourne, Australia. Zeffie Poulakis is associated with the Department of Psychology at La Trobe University where she completed her honours degree, B.B.Sc. (Hons).The authors thank Christine Brown for helping to recruit subjects and administer measures.     

On Grieger's (1985) contextual model of the ABCs of RET

Several features of Grieger's (1985) contextual model of the ABCs of RET are criticized. It is argued that (a) Grieger fails at various points to give due regard to the interactive nature of evaluative and interpretive thinking and that he fails to show clearly how people's evaluative thinking can color the interpretations that they make about A; (b) Grieger fails to distinguish clearly between the terms create and influence; (c) Grieger's claim that Life Positions are dichotomous is not valid; (d) the Life Position of Living Psychologically implies a philosophy toward psychological events, a point neglected by Greiger; (e) Grieger's statements about individuals being totally responsible for their wellbeing are overgeneralizations; (f) Grieger fails to show clearly how some invalid and unempirical declarations can be signs of emotional disturbance; and (g) Grieger's view that emotional disturbance can be seen asirrelevant encourages clients' indifference rather than rational concern. Nevertheless, Grieger has introduced an interesting and thought provoking model into the RET literature. Several suggestions are made to improve the model.Grieger (1985) has outlined a complex model of the ABCs of RET which he terms contextual. It is in many ways an excellent and ambitious model which will, as he hopes, promote much debate among rational-emotive theorists and therapists. However, in my opinion, the model has certain deficiencies and in response to his request for comments on his paper, I will outline these and will indicate how his model could be improved.Windy Dryden Ph.D. is Senior Lecturer in Psychology, Goldsmiths' College (University of London), England and Co-Editor of the Journal of Cognitive Psychotherapy: An International Quarterly.     

Collaborators in the Marginalization of REBT—The Use and Misuse of Three Approaches to Psychotherapy and Other Videotaped Demonstrations

Long time users of the 1965 film, Three Approaches to Psychotherapy (TAP), have fostered the marginalization of Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT). For more than three decades, the counseling profession has consistently and relentlessly embraced TAP as an accurate, timely, and realistic portrayal of what RET, and now REBT, is all about—despite indications, then and now, that the demonstration was seriously flawed and the film is now hopelessly outdated. The need for accurate, timely and realistic multimedia demonstrations is essential to the training of mental health professionals.     

Self-reported affect and core irrational thinking: A preliminary analysis

Prior tests of irrational thinking have included affect words in their irrational idea statements. Thus, because of content similarity, spuriously high correlations may have been previously observed between the endorsement of irrational ideas and self reported affect. A new measure of core irrational ideas, the Personal Beliefs Test, was given to 70 adults between the ages of 17 and 58. Results showed moderate correlations with neuroticism and self-reported negative affect, and a non-significant association with positive affect, thus supporting RET theory. Most of the explained variance in negative affect was related to the endorsement of irrational, Low Frustration Tolerance and Self Worth statements. This suggests that rational emotive therapists might devote greater time to disputing these ideas. Since most studies, including the present one, find only moderate correlations (i.e. .20 to .70) between irrational thinking and negative affect, it seems important to review the hypothesis that such thinking is theprimary cause of emotionality.He is a Fellow of the Institute for Rational Emotive Therapy and Holds the ABPP diploma in Clinical Psychology.Copies of the Personal Beliefs Test can be obtained from the author.     

Use of the Survey of Personal Beliefs Scale: Further validation of a measure of irrational beliefs with psychiatric inpatients

Development of valid instruments for measuring underlying irrational beliefs is necessary for ongoing research of Rational-Emotive Therapy (RET). This study was designed to further evaluate the validity of one such measure, the Survey of Personal Beliefs (SPB). Adult psychiatric inpatients completed the SPB and measures of depression, hopelessness, and anxiety, as well as a conceptually similar measure of irrational thinking, the Belief Scale. It was predicted that if construct validity exists for the SPB then a significant correlation would exist between irrational beliefs as measured by the SPB and depression, hopelessness, and anxiety. It was also predicted that if the scale has construct validity, then patients being treated with RET would demonstrate a greater reduction in irrational thinking based on SPB scores than would inpatients receiving treatment not based on RET. To evaluate for discriminate validity, it was predicted that the SPB would correlate more highly with a conceptually similar measure of irrational thinking than with measures of depression, hopelessness, and anxiety. The findings of this study offer support for the validity of the SPB. Additional and unexpected findings as well as recommendations are discussed.Dr. Nottingham is an Associate Fellow and Approved Supervisor of the Institute for Rational-Emotive Therapy. He is in independent practice with Germantown Psychological Associates, P.C. and is Director of Psychology and Clinical Director of Adult Mental Health Services at Parkwood Hospital, Olive Branch, MS.I would like to thank Ivey Bright, Brad Barris, and Dee Conrad for their assistance in data collection. Additionally, without the assistance and support of the Parkwood Hospital administration and staff, this research could not have been completed.     

From a linear to a contextual model of the ABCs of RET

The Contextual ABC Model follows from the recognition that the ABCs of RET ... are oversimplified and omit salient information about human disturbance and its treatment (Ellis, 1984). It is an attempt to capture the mutual and reciprocal intricacies of the ABC process, the complexities of human cognition, and the power of the person to create feelings and behaviors, thoughts and ideas, and even environmental events independent of any prior activating stimuli. It is believed that this model adds to the scope and power of RET's theory and practice without subtracting from or omitting what already exists.     

Motivationally selective risk judgments: Do fear and curiosity boost the boons or the banes?

Recent theories of judgment and decision-making have focused increasingly on the role of motivation, affect, and other drive states. The current research examined whether specific motivational orientations associated with approach versus avoidance might be linked selectively to judgments of positive versus negative decision outcomes and future events. Findings from three studies suggest that fear—an emotion intrinsically linked to threat avoidance—was more strongly associated with judgments of negative outcomes than judgments of positive outcomes. In contrast, curiosity—a motivational orientation associated with approaching desired information and experiences—was more strongly associated with judgments of positive outcomes than judgments of negative outcomes. Findings are discussed with respect to functionalist theories of motivation and selective cognition.     

Cognitive appraisal of daily hassles in college students displaying high or low irrational beliefs

It is argued that Lazarus' construct of cognitive appraisal in life stress might usefully be related to Ellis' ABC model. To test the hypothesized role of cognitive appraisal in Lazarus' model of life stress, 240 male and female undergraduate students completed the Hassles Scale and the Irrational Beliefs Test (IBT). Based upon their scores on the IBT, subjects displaying high irrational beliefs differed significantly from subjects displaying low irrational beliefs in reported hassles frequency (higher for high irrational belief subjects) and reported hassles intensity (greater for high irrational belief subjects). Results are interpreted specifically as supportive of the cognitive appraisal construct in Lazarus' life stress model and generally as quite consistent with RET theory. An attempt is made to relate the cognitive appraisal construct to the ABC model in RET theory.Susan Mills Harran is a graduate of the M.S. Psychology program at Villanova University and is currently a Ph.D. candidate in clinical psychology at Hahneman University.Daniel J. Ziegler is Professor of Psychology, former Chair of the Psychology Department, and current Dean of the Graduate School at Villanova University.     

Daniel levinson and his theory of adult development: A reminiscence and some clarifications

I offer some reminiscences occasioned by the death of Daniel Levinson, a modern pioneer in the study of the human life cycle. I clarify three controversial aspects of Levinson's theory—its universality, the role of critical life events, and the place of relationships—as well as briefly foreshadow findings from his forthcoming book on women. I show that relationships to people, enterprises, and social institutions are the stuff out of which the individual life structure—Levinson's central concept—is formed. Levinson's dream was of a society in which the developmental needs of adults were better understood and met so that they could more generatively fill their roles in the institutions upon which the young depend. He thought this essential to the evolution of a society that would be both more competent and more humane. In this dream, which was a product of his own difficult mid-life transition and a measure of the success he achieved in integrating its polarities, Levinson united a warm, scientific interest in others with an affectionate curiosity about nature.     

Beliefs about personality change and continuity

Lay conceptions of personality change and continuity were examined in a sample of 112 undergraduates. Participants rated their personal change over 5 years (past or future), the change they perceived to be normative over 10-year age spans between 15 and 65, their beliefs about whether personality is fixed or malleable (“lay theories”) and their beliefs about the causes of personality change and continuity. Beliefs about normative personality change generally corresponded to research evidence on adult trajectories of the Big Five factors, with some age bias, whereas recalled and anticipated personal change tended to be more positive than these norms. Participants tended to endorse environmental causes more for personality change than for continuity. Lay theories were not consistently associated with these causal beliefs, or with beliefs about personal and normative change.     

Sex role identification and young women's irrational beliefs

The present study was designed to examine the relationship between young women's beliefs about approval, frustration, and dependency and their sex-role identification. Sixty-six college women responded to a questionnaire which contained the Irrational Beliefs Test (Jones, 1969) and the Multidimensional Sex Role Inventory (MSRI; Bernard, 1981). As predicted, women who score high in irrational beliefs concerning approval, frustration, and dependency also scored higher on the MSRI scale pertaining to anxiety and neuroticism than did their more rational counterparts. Also, the high irrational group scored lower than did the low irrational group on the MSRI scale measuring instrumental-agentic traits. These results have two implications for feminist RET psychotherapists. First, they clarify the value of using instruments to assess both irrational beliefs and sex role identification in treatment planning. Secondly, they sensitize the psychotherapist to the impact of sex-role socialization and identification on the psychological adjustment of young women.This article is based in part on a master's thesis completed by Tracy L. Vining, M.A.The authors thank William Tooke, Ph.D., for his helpful advice.Tracy L. Vining, M.A., is a School Psychologist at the Wayne Finger Lakes BOCES in Rushville, N.Y. William P. Gaeddert, Ph.D., is an Associate Professor in the Psychology Department at SUNY-Plattsburgh, and Naomi B. McCormick is a Professor in the Psychology Department at SUNY-Plattsburgh and a Fellow of the Institute for Rational-Emotive Therapy.     

Narrative access and production in preschoolers' false belief reasoning

False belief tests seem to show the apparent acquisition at around age 4 of an ability to understand the representational status of mind. In this article, preschoolers' performance on a false belief task was manipulated in terms of their grasp of its narrative base. Five experiments are reported in which 3-year-olds were helped to become familiar with the events that comprise the false belief procedure by going through a picture book version of the task, before being asked to judge the protagonist's mental state. In Experiment 1, children who had failed a traditional task succeeded if they narrated the book version back to the experimenter, particularly if they were fluent in their story recall. Experiment 2 showed that this success occurred either if the child recited the story or if she or he was taken through each page twice in succession. Experiment 3 combined the most effective procedures with a younger group of children (mean age 3;3) and revealed 95% success as long as they could recall the prerequisite events. Experiments 4 and 5 probed possible limiting conditions for success by inserting an extra episode in the story and changing the format of the test question. The results suggest that the structure of 3-year-olds' event memories is central to their poor performance in the traditional false belief task—a clear grasp of the false belief “narrative” is necessary for successful performance. When they are given the opportunity to link discrete events into a coherent narrative, they have no problem demonstrating an understanding of others' minds—being able to recount the narrative is sufficient for successful performance.     

Planning, personality, and prediction: The role of future focus in optimistic time predictions

The present studies examined cognitive processes underlying the tendency to underestimate project completion times. Two experiments tested the hypothesis that people generate overly optimistic predictions, in part, because they focus narrowly on their future plans for the target task and thus neglect other useful sources of information. Consistent with the hypothesis, instructing participants to adopt a “future focus”—in which they generated concrete, specific plans for the task at hand—led them to make more optimistic predictions about when they would complete their intended Christmas shopping (Study 1) and major school assignments (Study 2). The future focus manipulation did not have a corresponding effect on actual completion times, and thus increased the degree of optimistic bias in prediction. The studies also demonstrated that the optimistic prediction bias generalized across different task domains, relevant individual differences (i.e., trait optimism and procrastination), and other contextual variations.     

Correlates of African American and Latino parents' messages to children about ethnicity and race: a comparative study of racial socialization

Recently, social scientists have become increasingly interested in the nature of communications from parents to children regarding ethnicity and race. Termed racial socialization, race-related messages to children may have important consequences for children's identity development and well-being. This study examined the frequency and correlates of two dimensions of racial socialization—messages about ethnic pride, history, and heritage (Cultural Socialization) and messages about discrimination and racial bias (Preparation for Bias)—among 273 urban African American, Puerto Rican, and Dominican parents. Parents reported more frequent Cultural Socialization than Preparation for Bias. There were no significant ethnic group differences in the frequency of Cultural Socialization. However, African American parents reported more frequent Preparation for Bias than did Dominican parents who, in turn, reported more frequent messages of this sort than did Puerto Rican parents. Ethnic identity was a stronger predictor of Cultural Socialization among Puerto Rican and Dominican parents than among their African American counterparts. In contrast, perceived discrimination experiences was a stronger predictor of Preparation for Bias among African American and Dominican parents than among Puerto Rican parents. Finally, race-related phenomenon accounted for more variance in both Cultural Socialization and Preparation for Bias among parents reporting on their behaviors with children 10–17 years old as compared to parents reporting on their behaviors with children 6–9 years old.