A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Belief

This paper describes and defends in detail a novel account of belief, an account inspired by Ryle's dispositional characterization of belief, but emphasizing irreducibly phenomenal and cognitive dispositions as well as behavioral dispositions. Potential externalist and functionalist objections are considered, as well as concerns motivated by the inevitably ceteris paribus nature of the relevant dispositional attributions. It is argued that a dispositional account of belief is particularly well-suited to handle what might be called "in-between" cases of believing—cases in which it is neither quite right to describe a person as having a particular belief nor quite right to describe her as lacking it.     

Do intuitions about Frankfurt-style cases rest on an internalist prejudice?

“Frankfurt-style cases” (FSCs) are widely considered as having refuted the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) by presenting cases in which an agent is morally responsible even if he could not have done otherwise. However, Neil Levy has recently argued that FSCs fail because (i) our intuitions about cases involving counterfactual interveners (CIs) are inconsistent (we accept that the mere presence of CIs is enough to make us gain but not lose responsibility-underwriting capacities), and (ii) this inconsistency is best explained by the fact that our intuitions about such cases are grounded in an internalist prejudice about the location of mental states and capacities. In response to this challenge, we argue that (i) there is no inconsistency in our intuitions about cases involving CIs, as soon as we draw the comparison properly, and that (ii) intuitions about such cases do not rest on an internalist prejudice, but on a more basic distinction between two kinds of dispositions. Additionally, we discuss some methodological issues that arise when comparing intuitions about thought experiments and end with a discussion of the implications of our argument for the reliability of intuitions about FSCs.     

Erotomanie, pathologische Verliebtheit, kognitive Distorsionen: psychopathologische Übergänge beim Stalking

Stalking is a widespread phenomenon which can be caused by different motives and in rare cases can be considered as an expression of mental illness. Stalking can occur as a symptom of schizophrenia or erotomania. The criminal culpability of psychotic stalkers is diminished and appropriate treatment has to be administered. However, there are cases which are not clearly distinct from delusional disorders. Stalking may be driven by morbid infatuation which impairs cognitive and affective capability. As the boundaries between full criminal responsibility and diminished criminal responsibility according to German penal law are blurred, these cases require thorough forensic assessment.     

Framing how we think about disagreement

Disagreement is a hot topic right now in epistemology, where there is spirited debate between epistemologists who argue that we should be moved by the fact that we disagree and those who argue that we need not. Both sides to this debate often use what is commonly called “the method of cases,” designing hypothetical cases involving peer disagreement and using what we think about those cases as evidence that specific normative theories are true or false, and as reasons for believing as such. With so much weight being given in the epistemology of disagreement to what people think about cases of peer disagreement, our goal in this paper is to examine what kinds of things might shape how people think about these kinds of cases. We will show that two different kinds of framing effect shape how people think about cases of peer disagreement, and examine both what this means for how the method of cases is used in the epistemology of disagreement and what this might tell us about the role that motivated cognition is playing in debates about which normative positions about peer disagreement are right and wrong.     

Knowledge,reasoning, and deliberation

Epistemologists have become increasingly interested in the practical role of knowledge. One prominent principle, which I call PREMISE, states that if you know that p, then you are justified in using p as a premise in your reasoning. In response, a number of critics have proposed a variety of counter-examples. In order to evaluate these problem cases, we need to consider the broader context in which this principle is situated by specifying in greater detail the types of activity that the principle governs. I argue that if PREMISE is interpreted as governing deductive reasoning, then the examples lose their force. In addition, I consider the cases, discussed by Keith DeRose, where the subject is in more than one practical context at the same time. In order to account for these latter cases, we need to further specify the scope of PREMISE. I distinguish two ways of understanding PREMISE, as a knowledge-action principle and as a knowledge-deliberation principle. I conclude by arguing for the knowledge-deliberation version of the principle and by exploring what this principle says about the practical role of knowledge.     

On going (and getting) nowhere with our words: New skepticism about the philosophical method of cases

The philosophical “method of cases” has been the subject of intense discussion. In a recent paper, Frank Jackson attempts to vindicate the method by proposing that it is underwritten by the “representational view of language.” Jackson's proposal is potentially very significant. For if it is true, then the method of cases stands, but quite possibly also falls, with the representational view of language as characterized by Jackson. The aim of this paper is to question the philosophical method of cases by showing that it does in fact presuppose a particular view of language that is at the very least questionable, both philosophically and empirically.     

Casuistry as methodology in clinical ethics

This essay focuses on how casuistry can become a useful technique of practical reasoning for the clinical ethicist or ethics consultant. Casuistry is defined, its relationship to rhetorical reasoning and its interpretation of cases, by employing three terms that, while they are not employed by the classical rhetoricians and casuists, conform, in a general way, to the features of their work. Those terms are (1) morphology, (2) taxonomy, (3) kinetics. The morphology of a case reveals the invariant structure of the particular case whatever its contingent features, and also the invariant forms of argument relevant to any case of the same sort: these invariant features can be called topics. Taxonomy situates the instant case in a series of similar cases, allowing the similarities and differences between an instant case and a paradigm case to dictate the moral judgment about the instant case. This judgment is based, not merely on application of an ethical theory or principle, but upon the way in which circumstances and maxims appear in the morphology of the case itself and in comparison with other cases. Kinetics is an understanding of the way in which one case imparts a kind of moral movement to other cases, that is, different and sometimes unprecedented circumstances may move certain marginal or exceptional cases to the level of paradigm cases. In conclusion, casuistry is the exercise of prudential or practical reasoning in recognition of the relationship between maxims, circumstances and topics, as well as the relationship of paradigms to analogous cases.     

Epistemic Privilege and Expertise in the Context of Meta-debate

I argue that Kotzee’s (Argumentation 24:265–281, 2010) model of meta-debate succeeds in identifying illegitimate or fallacious charges of bias but has the unintended consequence of classifying some legitimate and non-fallacious charges as fallacious. This makes the model, in some important cases, counter-productive. In particular, cases where the call for a meta-debate is prompted by the participant with epistemic privilege and a charge of bias is denied by the participant with social advantage, the impasse will put the epistemically advantaged at far greater risk. Therefore, I propose treating epistemic privilege as a variety of expert opinion specifically in cases where meta-debate participants come to an impasse in deliberation. My proposal exposes the problem of interpreting debate contexts as both adversarial and free from social power differentials.     

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES CAN A UNIONIZED COMPANY USE TESTING FOR PROMOTION?1

A job-related, “fair test” of ability, when used as one tool and not as the sole determining factor, has been established by arbitrators to be an appropriate selection instrument. If a test has been determined as being job-related (i.e., related to the actual performance of the job), has been administered and scored both fairly and consistently, it will be considered a “fair test.” Generally, in unioncompany contracts that mention testing, a “fair test” contains the above qualifications. Arbitrators have indicated that the union involved should be afforded the opportunity to see the test; it was made quite clear, however, that the union should not have the test. In all cases reviewed, tests were upheld by arbitrators when they (1) were “fair tests,” and (2) did not conflict with the contract language. Past testing practice was not a determining factor when these two conditions existed. A total of 69 cases between 1953 and 1967 have been found relevant–27 from 1953 to 1962 and 42 from 1963 to 1967. In the first study, 13 cases were lost by a company; in six of these cases a company violated the union-company contract and in seven cases the test used did not qualify as a “fair test.” A total of twelve cases were lost by a company in the second study; in two cases a company violated the union-company contract and in ten cases the test used did not qualify as a “fair test.”     

Testimonially based Knowledge from False Testimony

I provide an example to illustrate the contention that there are cases in which a recipient can acquire testimonially based knowledge from false testimony. The example involves a case in which the proposition believed by the recipient, though derived in a testimonially based way, is not identical with the proposition attested to. I conclude by suggesting that if we are to make sense of such cases as cases of testimonially based knowledge, we need to make some revisions both in our conception of the ways in which testimonially-grounded warrant can accrue to a belief and in our conception of what 'testimonial authority' can apply to.     

The significance of unusual acts in sexual homicide

In addition to being an unusual form of crime, sexual homicide (SH) sometimes includes unusual crime scene behaviours, such as carving on the victim, evisceration (i.e., removal of internal organs), skinning the victim, cannibalism and vampirism. The current study investigates these unusual crime scene behaviours to better understand their meaning as well as to explore whether such behaviours are associated with a specific crime-commission process. Using a sample of 762 SH cases, the study uses a combination of chi-square and stepwise forward logistic regression analyses to identify the differences between cases with and without unusual acts. Findings reveal that SH cases with unusual acts present a specific crime-commission process. This crime-commission process is characterised by a greater level of sadism—as demonstrated by the presence of mutilation and foreign object insertion—as well as a greater level of organisation from the selection of a contact location where the risk of being seen or heard was low. These findings provide a better understanding of these behaviours and could help investigators facing such cases.     

Explaining Addiction: How Far Does the Reward Account of Motivation Take Us?

ABSTRACT

Choice theorists such as George Ainslie and Gene Heyman argue that the drug-seeking behaviour of addicts is best understood in the same terms that explain everyday choices. Everyday choices, they claim, aim to maximise the reward from available incentives. Continuing drug-use is, therefore, what addicts most want given the incentives they are aware of but they will change their behaviour if and when better incentives become available. This model might explain many typical cases of addiction, but there are hard cases that pose a problem. In these hard cases the addicted individual does not cease using drugs in the face of consequences that are so adverse it is implausible that they are unaware of more rewarding paths of action. These cases force the choice theorist into a dilemma: either these addicts’ drug use does not count as action and so is best described by a neurobiological model, or reference to ‘reward’ in these cases means merely ‘motivated’ and so provides no explanatory power. We propose a different model of motivation that takes self-conception into account. We show how that can better explain the hard cases of addiction and also inform our understanding of recovery and self-control.     

Experiential blindness revisited: In defence of a case of embodied cognition

The sensorimotor theory (Noë, 2004, Noë, in press) discusses a special instance of lack of perceptual experience despite no sensory impairment. The phenomenon dubbed “experiential blindness” is cited as evidence for a constitutive relation between sensorimotor skills and perceptual experience. Recently it has been objected (Adams and Aizawa, 2008, Aizawa, 2007) that the cases described by Noë as experiential blindness are cases of pure sensory deficit. This paper argues that while the objections bring out limitations of Noë’s sensorimotor theory they do not do enough to challenge a robust perception–action interdependence claim. There are genuine cases of experiential blindness and these are better explained by the hypothesis of the interdependence of perception and action rather than by a passive vision approach. The cases provide support for a strong thesis of embodied cognition where ongoing sensorimotor dynamics non-trivially constrain perceptual content.     

Endogenous psychoses in relation to absent phenylalanine hydroxylase activity in thrombocytes

Out of 100 psychotic patients who underwent neurobiochemical examination, in 24 cases activity of phenylalanine hydroxylase in the thrombocytes was found to be absent. 38% of these cases were susceptible to stimulation in vitro by means of folic acid derivative, without actually reaching a normal level of activity. The patients are presented first as a homgeneous group, then in the two major diagnostic divisions, and divided according to the biochemical data. An account is given of early experiences in the treatment of the more intractable cases.     

The Logic of Analogy in the Law

This paper deals with two issues in the field of reasoning by analogy in the law. The one issue is whether there exists such a thing as analogous rule application, or whether there is only the ‘normal’ application of a broadened rule. It is argued that if rules, as the entities made by a legislator, are distinguished from generalised solutions for cases, the idea of analogous application of rules makes sense. It is also shown how the so-called ‘reason-based model of rule application’, in contrast to the traditional modus ponens or subsumption model, makes it easy to give a logical account of analogous rule application. The other issue is how to argue logically about whether two cases are sufficiently similar to adopt the outcome of the one case for the other case. Section 3 provides a general logical model to establish this. The model is based on the comparison of the reasons for and against a particular solution in the two cases.     

Restorative Rigging and the Safe Indication Account

Typical Gettieresque scenarios involve a subject, S, using a method, M, of believing something, p, where, normally, M is a reliable indicator of the truth of p, yet, in S’s circumstances, M is not reliable: M is deleteriously rigged. A different sort of scenario involves rigging that restores the reliability of a method M that is deleteriously rigged: M is restoratively rigged. Some theorists criticize (among others) the safe indication account of knowledge defended by Luper, Sosa, and Williamson on the grounds that it treats such cases as knowledge. But other theorists also criticize the safe indication account because it treats the cases as examples of ignorance when they are really examples of knowledge. I answer both groups of critics by arguing that (1) restorative rigging can enable us to know things, and (2) restoratively rigged cases can meet the relevant conditions of the safe indication account.     

Epistemic Unities

I bring together social ontology and social epistemology by consideringsocial entities (``epistemic unities') that are constituted by the holdingof epistemic relations between their members. In particular, I focus onthe relation of taking someone as an expert. Among the types of structuresexamined are ones with a single expert and one or more non-experts whomay or may not know of each other's situation; and ones with more thanone expert, including cases in which the relation between the experts ishierarchical and cases in which it is symmetrical. These structures modela variety of social situations which can thus be given a unified treatment.Among the cases I discuss are persons, which I argue are multiple-expertunities of persons at times. Taking a person as a social unity like this offersa clear sense in which some groups can also be person-like.     

Never Mind the Trolley: The Ethics of Autonomous Vehicles in Mundane Situations

Trolley cases are widely considered central to the ethics of autonomous vehicles. We caution against this by identifying four problems. (1) Trolley cases, given technical limitations, rest on assumptions that are in tension with one another. Furthermore, (2) trolley cases illuminate only a limited range of ethical issues insofar as they cohere with a certain design framework. Furthermore, (3) trolley cases seem to demand a moral answer when a political answer is called for. Finally, (4) trolley cases might be epistemically problematic in several ways. To put forward a positive proposal, we illustrate how ethical challenges arise from mundane driving situations. We argue that mundane situations are relevant because of the specificity they require and the scale they exhibit. We then illustrate some of the ethical challenges arising from optimizing for safety, balancing safety with other values such as mobility, and adjusting to incentives of legal frameworks.     

The Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS), but not the Defence Mechanism Test (DMTm), separates schizophrenics and normal controls in a factorial cluster analysis

Ten schizophrenic patients and ten healthy control subjects matched with respect to sex, age and education were tested by a psychological test battery including WAIS, WCST, FAS and a modified version of the tachistoscopic Defence Mechanism Test (DMTm). In a Q-factor analysis two factors were derived in the analysis of DMTm test scores. The distribution of cases among these factors was wholly at random. On the other hand, when analysing WAIS scores, five factors were derived and schizophrenic cases as well as control subjects were almost unequivocally clustered by different factors. It is argued that also if an unequivocal categorisation of cases had been achieved in the analysis of DMTm data, such a finding might well have been interpreted as an effect of anomalies in cerebral structures assumed to be of critical importance in the filtering of signals in the stream of visual perception. The existence of such anomalies in schizophrenics is now well established by neuroimaging as well as postmortem studies, and findings are also well in accordance with phenomenological and physiological data. The failure of DMTm to separate schizophrenic and control subjects does thus make the second and important step in a discussion on validity entirely superfluous, namely whether signs recorded really measure what they are assumed to measure, in this case defence mechanisms in a psychoanalytic sense.     

Representation of inflected nouns in the internal lexicon

The lexical representation of Serbo-Croatian nouns was investigated in a lexical decision task. Because Serbo-Croatian nouns are declined, a noun may appear in one of several grammatical cases distinguished by the inflectional morpheme affixed to the base form. The grammatical cases occur with different frequencies, although some are visually and phonetically identical. When the frequencies of identical forms are compounded, the ordering of frequencies is not the same for masculine and feminine genders. These two genders are distinguished further by the fact that the base form for masculine nouns is an actual grammatical case, the nominative singular, whereas the base form for feminine nouns is an abstraction in that it cannot stand alone as an independent word. Exploiting these characteristics of the Serbo-Croatian language, we contrasted three views of how a noun is represented: (1) the independent-entries hypothesis, which assumes an independent representation for each grammatical case, reflecting its frequency of occurrence; (2) the derivational hypothesis, which assumes that only the base morpheme is stored, with the individual cases derived from separately stored inflectional morphemes and rules for combination; and (3) the satellite-entries hypothesis, which assumes that all cases are individually represented, with the nominative singular functioning as the nucleus and the embodiment of the noun’s frequency and around which the other cases cluster uniformly. The evidence strongly favors the satellite-entries hypothesis.