Why do we think? Consequences of regarding thinking as behavior

Cognitive psychologists have made significant progress in explaining how people think. However, relatively little time and energy have been invested in understanding why we think--the factors that make us start or stop thinking, choose and change strategies and solutions. Such questions are linked to motivation and to discriminative and reinforcing stimuli. In this article, the idea that studying thinking as a form of behavior closely connected to antecedent stimuli and consequences leads to potentially important questions that are not presently being studied in the field of cognitive psychology. This is not an argument for reverting to behaviorism--rather, the argument is made that integrating a behavioral perspective on thinking would enrich cognitive psychology.     

Why do employees undertake creative action?

There is much research identifying factors that lead to a creative outcome, but little on what leads employees to begin the creative process in the first place. This research used semi‐structured interviews with 65 engineers to explore the factors and processes involved in this phenomenon. We found that general work motivation, creativity requirements, cultural support for creativity, time resources, and autonomy were all used as cues in deciding whether undertaking creative action would be worthwhile via judgmental processes of expectancy and instrumentality. We also discovered overlaps with the cognate literatures of organizational citizenship and proactivity and explore these in discussing new areas for research.     

Why do we need perceptual content?

Most representationalists argue that perceptual experience has to be representational because phenomenal looks are, by themselves, representational. Charles Travis (2004 Travis, C. (2004). The silence of the senses. Mind, 113, 57–94.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) argues that looks cannot represent. I argue that perceptual experience has to be representational due to the way the visual system works.     

Why do temporal generalization gradients change when people make decisions as quickly as possible?

Three experiments investigated temporal generalization performance under conditions in which participants were instructed to make their decisions as quickly as possible (speed), or were allowed to take their time (accuracy). A previous study (Klapproth & Müller, 2008) had shown that under speeded conditions people were more likely to confuse durations shorter than the standard with the standard than in the accuracy conditions, and a possible explanation of this result is that longer stimulus durations are "truncated" (i.e., people make a judgement about them before they have terminated, thereby shortening their effective duration) and that these truncated durations affect the standard used for the task. Experiment 1 investigated performance under speed and accuracy conditions when comparison durations were close to the standard or further away. No performance difference was found as a function of stimulus spacing, even though responses occurred on average before the longest durations had terminated, but this lack of effect was attributed to "task difficulty" effects changing decision thresholds. In Experiment 2, the standard duration was either the longest or the shortest duration in the comparison set, and differences between speed and accuracy groups occurred only when the comparisons were longer than the standard, supporting the "truncation" hypothesis. A third experiment showed that differences between speed and accuracy groups only occurred if some memory of the standard that was valid for more than one trial was used. In general, the results suggest that the generalization gradient shifts in speeded conditions occur because of truncation of longer comparison durations, which influences the effective standard used for the task.     

Teachers’ epistemological beliefs as an antecedent of autonomy-supportive teaching

A large body of research has been devoted to the outcomes of autonomy-supportive teaching (AST). However, research on its antecedents is scarce. The present study explored teachers’ personal epistemology as a possible predictor of students’ perceptions of AST. We administered surveys to 622 students in 23 seventh- and eighth-grade classrooms regarding the extent to which their teachers tried to take the students’ perspective and to provide rationale—major aspects of autonomy support. At the same time, their teachers’ personal epistemologies were assessed. Hierarchical linear model analysis revealed that students of teachers scored with more objectivist (absolutist) personal epistemologies reported that their teachers were less likely to be autonomy supportive. AST, in turn, predicted students’ optimal internalization of pro-social behavior. Further exploration of a range of teachers’ personal characteristics, then, would appear to be an important and productive approach to understanding the variability of teachers’ engagement in autonomy supportive practices.     

Why do we punish? Deterrence and just deserts as motives for punishment

One popular justification for punishment is the just deserts rationale: A person deserves punishment proportionate to the moral wrong committed. A competing justification is the deterrence rationale: Punishing an offender reduces the frequency and likelihood of future offenses. The authors examined the motivation underlying laypeople's use of punishment for prototypical wrongs. Study 1 (N = 336) revealed high sensitivity to factors uniquely associated with the just deserts perspective (e.g., offense seriousness, moral trespass) and insensitivity to factors associated with deterrence (e.g., likelihood of detection, offense frequency). Study 2 (N = 329) confirmed the proposed model through structural equation modeling (SEM). Study 3 (N = 351) revealed that despite strongly stated preferences for deterrence theory, individual sentencing decisions seemed driven exclusively by just deserts concerns.     

Why do we slow down after an error? Mechanisms underlying the effects of posterror slowing

People often become slower in their performance after committing an error, which is usually explained by strategic control adjustments towards a more conservative response threshold. The present study tested an alternative hypothesis for explaining posterror slowing in terms of behavioural interferences resulting from error monitoring by manipulating stimulus contrast and categorization difficulty in a choice reaction time task. The response-stimulus interval (RSI) was either short or long, using a between-subject (Experiment 1) and a within-subject design (Experiment 2). Posterror slowing was larger and posterror accuracy lower in short than in long RSI situations. Effects of stimulus contrast disappeared in posterror trials when RSI was short. At long RSIs, stimulus contrast was additive with posterror slowing. The results support the idea that at least two mechanisms contribute to posterror slowing: a capacity-limited error-monitoring process with the strongest influence at short RSIs and a criterion adjustment mechanism at longer RSIs.     

Anger rumination: an antecedent of athlete aggression?

Objectives. The aim of this study was to examine the relationship between anger rumination (the propensity to think almost obsessively over past experiences that have provoked negative affect in the form of anger) and athlete aggression. It was predicted that high levels of anger rumination would be associated with an increased propensity to aggress.Method. A questionnaire comprising the Anger Rumination Scale (Sukhodolsky, Golub, & Cromwell, 2001), aggression and demographic questions was distributed to 305 male and female competitive athletes of varying ability who represented several team and individual sports.Results. Principal component factor analysis revealed a single rumination factor rather than the four-factor solution previously described. No differences in Anger Rumination Scale score were found between males and females, team and individual sport players or competitive level. Provocation and anger rumination were significantly correlated with athletes’ reported aggressive behaviour. Aggression was higher in males compared to females. Type of sport was also related to incidence of aggression; athletes who participated in individual sports reported lower levels of aggression than athletes who played team sports.Conclusions. It was concluded that provocation and anger rumination were significant predictors of subsequent aggression and suggestions for preventing rumination, such as thought stopping and thought switching, were made.     

How do we know what we are doing? Time, intention and awareness of action

Time is a fundamental dimension of consciousness. Many studies of the "sense of agency" have investigated whether we attribute actions to ourselves based on a conscious experience of intention occurring prior to action, or based on a reconstruction after the action itself has occurred. Here, we ask the same question about a lower level aspect of action experience, namely awareness of the detailed spatial form of a simple movement. Subjects reached for a target, which unpredictably jumped to the side on some trials. Participants (1) expressed their expectancy of a target shift during the upcoming movement, (2) pointed at the target as quickly and accurately as possible before returning to the start posiment to the target shift if required and (3) reproduced the spatial path of the movement they had just made, as accurately as possible, to give an indication of their awareness of the pointing movement. We analysed the spatial disparity between the initial and the reproduced movements on those with a target shift. A negative disparity value, or undershoot, suggests that motor awareness merely reflects a sluggish record of coordinated motor performance, while a positive value, or overshoot, suggests that participants' intention to point to the shifting target contributes more to their awareness of action than their actual pointing movement. Undershoot and overshoot thus measure the reconstructive (motoric) and the preconstuctive (intentional) aspects of action awareness, respectively. We found that trials on which subjects strongly expected a target shift showed greater overshoot and less undershoot than trials with lower expectancy. Conscious expectancy therefore strongly influences the experience of the detailed motor parameters of our actions. Further, a delay inserted either between the expectancy judgement and the pointing movement, or between the pointing movement and the reproduction of the movement, had no effect on visuomotor adjustment but strongly influenced action awareness. Delays during either interval boosted undershoots, suggesting increased reliance on a time-limited sensory memory for action. The experience of action is thus strongly influenced by prior thoughts and expectations, but only over a short time period. Thus, awareness of our actions is a dynamic and relatively flexible mixture of what we intend to do, and what our motor system actually does.     

Why do we eat? Children's and adults' understanding of why we eat different meals

In this study the author examined why children and adults think they need to eat. Preschoolers through adults were provided with physiological, social, psychological, and routine causes for eating breakfast, lunch, snack, and dinner, and were asked to either agree or disagree with the causal responses provided. A 4 Reason x 4 Meal repeated measures analysis of variance revealed significant main effects for meals and reasons, as well as significant Meal x Reason and Meal x Reason x Grade interactions. The effect sizes ranged from 0.1 to 0.7. Across all age groups, participants acknowledged physiological needs and desires (fulfilling hunger and needs to stay healthy) and routine (e.g., it is dinner time) as the primary causes for eating breakfast, lunch, and dinner. However, for snack physiological needs were the primary reason. Second-grade students onward spontaneously produced biological justifications such as the need for energy and nutrition as important reasons for food consumption. These results lend support to the developmental model that children's and adults' understanding of eating changes in middle childhood.     

Why do we do what we do? The Attention–Readiness–Motivation framework

According to many theories of motivation, the principal driver of human behavior is the affectively driven valuation of actions. Actions are valued by maximizing the difference between stimulus value (the benefits and costs inherent in the stimulus outcome that is the expected result of a given action) and action costs (the effort required to perform that action). However, such accounts have difficulty explaining why individuals act inconsistently in what appear to be comparable situations and often act in ways that seem inconsistent with relevant action values. In particular, we highlight several seemingly anomalous default effects which cannot be explained via traditional valuation‐based factors. In this article, we present the Attention–Readiness–Motivation framework, according to which such behavioral anomalies occur because stimulus value and action costs are respectively influenced by endogenous attention and action readiness—cognitive variables that are typically not considered as a part of the valuation calculus.     

Why do people change in therapy? A preliminary study

Why do people change in therapy? A preliminary study. This work represents the beginning of a new way to study the processes that can explain the therapeutic change. The method used is the observation and analysis of therapeutic sessions directly recorded and developed inside a behavioural approach. The category system tries to carry out a functional analysis of the therapist-client interaction which enables the identification of learning processes that work in clinical setting and explain success in therapy. Outcomes are provisional but show the utility of this initial trend of investigation to the comprehension of clinical phenomenon. Conclusions also emphasize the importance of associative learning processes on the therapeutic change.     

Social support from work and family domains as an antecedent or moderator of work-family conflicts?

On the basis of Conservation of Resources theory, we investigated how social support from supervisor, co-workers, life partner, and family members is associated with work-family conflicts in N = 107 working mothers. We used data from a cross-sectional questionnaire and a standardized diary to examine two possible forms of interplay: (a) Social support as an antecedent of work-family conflicts, and (b) moderating effects of social support on the relationship between domain-specific strain and work-family conflicts. Overall, results favored social support as an antecedent of work-family conflicts.     

Utility blindness: Why do we fall for deals?

Utility blindness occurs under limited information processing when consumers base their purchase decisions solely on transaction utility (gains from the deal) rather than on total utility. When the deal is attractive enough, consumers will buy a product even though the total utility is little or negative; on the other hand, an unattractive deal might decrease consumers' purchase likelihood even when the total utility is unaffected by the promotion. In this paper, three experiments provide evidence for the existence of utility blindness and demonstrate that information processing limitation is the underlying process. Transaction utility salience and cognitive load are identified as the moderating factors. Theoretical contributions, managerial implications, limitations, and future areas of the current research are also discussed. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When do people cooperate? The neuroeconomics of prosocial decision making

Understanding the roots of prosocial behavior is an interdisciplinary research endeavor that has generated an abundance of empirical data across many disciplines. This review integrates research findings from different fields into a novel theoretical framework that can account for when prosocial behavior is likely to occur. Specifically, we propose that the motivation to cooperate (or not), generated by the reward system in the brain (extending from the striatum to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex), is modulated by two neural networks: a cognitive control system (centered on the lateral prefrontal cortex) that processes extrinsic cooperative incentives, and/or a social cognition system (including the temporo-parietal junction, the medial prefrontal cortex and the amygdala) that processes trust and/or threat signals. The independent modulatory influence of incentives and trust on the decision to cooperate is substantiated by a growing body of neuroimaging data and reconciles the apparent paradox between economic versus social rationality in the literature, suggesting that we are in fact wired for both. Furthermore, the theoretical framework can account for substantial behavioral heterogeneity in prosocial behavior. Based on the existing data, we postulate that self-regarding individuals (who are more likely to adopt an economically rational strategy) are more responsive to extrinsic cooperative incentives and therefore rely relatively more on cognitive control to make (un)cooperative decisions, whereas other-regarding individuals (who are more likely to adopt a socially rational strategy) are more sensitive to trust signals to avoid betrayal and recruit relatively more brain activity in the social cognition system. Several additional hypotheses with respect to the neural roots of social preferences are derived from the model and suggested for future research.     

Do we need an existential philosophy of the railway? Why then a philosophy of sport?

A lively debate has arisen about the need and the character of phenomenology—of phenomenology in general and of sports phenomenology in particular. This paper responds to Irena Martínková and Jim Parry who ‘defended’ philosophical phenomenology against my critique of their book about phenomenological approaches to sport. Where the defense maintains the existence of one single and correct phenomenology, understood as a sort of existential philosophy, this paper argues for a diversity of different types of phenomenology and more concretely for a phenomenological method that goes ‘back to phenomena.’     

Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory

Reasoning is generally seen as a means to improve knowledge and make better decisions. However, much evidence shows that reasoning often leads to epistemic distortions and poor decisions. This suggests that the function of reasoning should be rethought. Our hypothesis is that the function of reasoning is argumentative. It is to devise and evaluate arguments intended to persuade. Reasoning so conceived is adaptive given the exceptional dependence of humans on communication and their vulnerability to misinformation. A wide range of evidence in the psychology of reasoning and decision making can be reinterpreted and better explained in the light of this hypothesis. Poor performance in standard reasoning tasks is explained by the lack of argumentative context. When the same problems are placed in a proper argumentative setting, people turn out to be skilled arguers. Skilled arguers, however, are not after the truth but after arguments supporting their views. This explains the notorious confirmation bias. This bias is apparent not only when people are actually arguing, but also when they are reasoning proactively from the perspective of having to defend their opinions. Reasoning so motivated can distort evaluations and attitudes and allow erroneous beliefs to persist. Proactively used reasoning also favors decisions that are easy to justify but not necessarily better. In all these instances traditionally described as failures or flaws, reasoning does exactly what can be expected of an argumentative device: Look for arguments that support a given conclusion, and, ceteris paribus, favor conclusions for which arguments can be found.     

Why do gorillas make sequences of gestures?

Great ape gestures have attracted considerable research interest in recent years, prompted by their flexible and intentional pattern of use; but almost all studies have focused on single gestures. Here, we report the first quantitative analysis of sequential gesture use in western gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla), using data from three captive groups and one African study site. We found no evidence that gesture sequences were given for reasons of increased communicative efficiency over single gestures. Longer sequences of repeated gestures did not increase the likelihood of response, and using a sequence was seldom in reaction to communicative failure. Sequential combination of two gestures with similar meanings did not generally increase effectiveness, and sometimes reduced it. Gesture sequences were closely associated with play contexts. Markov transition analysis showed two networks of frequently co-occurring gestures, both consisting of gestures used to regulate play. One network comprised only tactile gestures, the other a mix of silent, audible and tactile gestures; apparently, these clusters resulted from gesture use in play with proximal or distal contact, respectively. No evidence was found for syntactic effects of sequential combination: meanings changed little or not at all. Semantically, many gestures overlapped massively with others in their core information (i.e. message), and gesture messages spanned relatively few functions. We suggest that the underlying semantics of gorilla gestures is highly simplified compared to that of human words. Gesture sequences allow continual adjustment of the tempo and nature of social interactions, rather than generally conveying semantically referential information or syntactic structures.