CREATED CO-CREATOR IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF CHURCH AND ETHICS

Abstract Philip Hefner's work on created co‐creator is presented for consideration as a contemporary theological anthropology. Its reception within the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America falls into three main lines, which are reviewed here because they are suggestive of its potential impact on Christian thinking. This review raises two major questions and leads to a critique. The first question is whether created co‐creator should be replaced by another term for the sake of more clearly encapsulating the ideas represented in Hefner's work. The second question concerns the moral “payoff” of created co‐creator. Such questions lead to the critique that Hefner's corpus gives insufficient attention to responsibility as integral to freedom and that it lacks a theory of obligation. I then sketch the amenability and benefit of linking created co‐creator with “responsibility ethics,” exemplified by the work of Hans Jonas.     

BUDDHISM,FREE WILL,AND PUNISHMENT: TAKING BUDDHIST ETHICS SERIOUSLY

In recent decades, there has been growing interest among philosophers in what the various Buddhist traditions have said, can say, and should say, in response to the traditional problem of free will. This article investigates the relationship between Buddhist philosophy and the historical problem of free will. It begins by critically examining Rick Repetti's Buddhism, Meditation, and Free Will (2019), in which he argues for a conception of “agentless agency” and defends a view he calls “Buddhist soft compatibilism.” It then turns to a more wide-ranging discussion of Buddhism and free will—one that foregrounds Buddhist ethics and takes seriously what the various Buddhist traditions have said about desert, punishment, and the reactive attitudes of resentment, indignation, and moral anger. The article aims to show that, not only is Buddhism best conceived as endorsing a kind of free will skepticism, Buddhist ethics can provide a helpful guide to living without basic desert moral responsibility and free will.     

HUMAN SURVIVAL: THE RESPONSIBILITY OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION

Abstract. Public awareness of threats to human survival has emerged with significant strength since the 1970s. Recognition that growth cannot continue infinitely on a finite planet was affirmed by publication of the Club of Rome report, The Limits to Growth. In turn, the responsibility of science for human survival has been widely debated, at least since detonation of the atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, but the conjunction of threats to human survival and scientific responsibility has remained rather vague. Clarification of this dual issue must take into account the role of religion, since only through a creative alliance of science and religion can a satisfactory resolution of the threats posed by global problems be found.     

TRANSCENDING OUR BIOLOGY: A VIRTUE ETHICS INTERPRETATION OF THE APPEAL TO NATURE IN TECHNOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS

“Arguments from nature” are used, and have historically been used, in popular responses to advances in technology and to environmental issues—there is a widely shared body of ethical intuitions that nature, or perhaps human nature, sets some limits on the kinds of ends that we should seek, the kinds of things that we should do, or the kinds of lives that we should lead. Virtue ethics can provide the context for a defensible form of the argument from nature, and one that makes proper sense of its enduring role in debates concerning our relationship to technology and the environment. However, the notion of an ethics founded upon an account of the essential features of human nature is controversial. On the one hand, contemporary biological science no longer defines species by their essential characteristics, so from a biological point of view there just are no essential characteristics of human beings. On the other hand, it might be argued that humans have, in some sense, “transcended our biology,” so an understanding of humans as a biological species is extraneous to ethical questions. In this article, I examine and defend the argument from nature, as a way to ground an ethic of virtue, from some of the more common criticisms that are made against it. I argue that, properly interpreted as an appeal to an evaluative account of human nature, the argument from nature is defensible with the context of virtue ethics and, in this light, I show how arguments from nature made in popular responses to technological and environmental issues are best understood.     

THE ANALYST'S WAY OF BEING: RECOGNIZING SEPARABLE SUBJECTIVITIES AND THE PENDULUM'S SWING

Whether the analyst finds the patient's emerging transference affectively tolerable or intolerable plays an important role in the analytic couple's negotiation of the configuration that the transference‐countertransference relationship ultimately assumes. If the analyst is deeply repelled by transference‐related roles to which he is assigned, patient‐ascribed attributions, or projection‐drenched interactions, he may react in violent protest, engaging in enactments that say more about his separable subjectivity than about the intersubjective situation. While there has been a recent trend to view enactments as a crucial aspect of psychoanalytic technique, this trend risks overlooking the way in which the analyst's way of being comes into play in the treatment.     

ON THE ANALYST'S IDENTIFICATION WITH THE PATIENT: THE CASE OF J.‐B. PONTALIS AND G. PEREC

The writer Georges Perec was in psychoanalysis with Jean‐Bertrand Pontalis for four years in the early 1970s. In this essay, the author presents the exceptional interest this analyst took in this patient and the ways in which that interest manifested itself in his work, psychoanalytic and otherwise. Many correlative factors suggest that identificatory processes persisted beyond the treatment and were maintained into Pontalis's later life. While this paper is primarily intended to provide evidence to support this view of a specific case, the author closes by reflecting that this may be a more general phenomenon and the reasons for this.     

A RESPONSE TO HANS LUCHT'S “VIOLENCE AND MORALITY: THE CONCESSION OF LOSS IN A GHANAIAN FISHING VILLAGE”

The violent encounter between Africans and the forces of globalization raises the question of whether Africans should capitulate to these forces or seek to morally transform them, notwithstanding the uncertainty of achieving success. This essay argues that an exclusively existentialist interpretation of the African predicaments is inadequate because it erects a false dichotomy between African religious and moral sensibilities. It proposes instead an ethic of responsibility that affirms the interdependence of not only these two realms of life, but also of communal well‐being and individual's subjectivity.     

COMPARISON AND HISTORY IN THE STUDY OF RELIGIOUS ETHICS: An Essay on Michael Cook's Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought1

Qur'an 3:104 speaks of “commanding right and forbidding wrong” as a constitutive feature of the Muslim community. Michael Cook's careful and comprehensive study provides a wealth of information about the ways Muslims in various contexts have understood this notion. Cook also makes a number of comparative observations, and suggests that “commanding” appears to be a uniquely Muslim practice. Scholars of religious ethics should read Cook's study with great appreciation. They will also have a number of questions about his comparative comments. In this article, I suggest that scholars of comparative ethics should think less about the “uniqueness” of the materials examined by Cook, and more about the ways groups of human beings discipline their members, thereby constituting and maintaining themselves as communities of virtue.     

FORGIVENESS,COMMEMORATION, AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: THE ROLE OF MORAL EMOTIONS

Abstract: Forgiveness of wrongdoing in response to public apology and amends making seems, on the face of it, to leave little room for the continued commemoration of wrongdoing. This rests on a misunderstanding of forgiveness, however, and we can explain why there need be no incompatibility between them. To do this, I emphasize the role of what I call nonangry negative moral emotions in constituting memories of wrongdoing. Memories so constituted can persist after forgiveness and have important moral functions, and commemorations can elicit these emotions to preserve memories of this sort. Moreover, commemorations can be a restorative justice practice that promotes reconciliation, but only on condition that the memories they preserve are constituted by nonangry negative, not retributive, emotions.     

THE AMBIGUITY OF MORAL EXCELLENCE: A Response to Aaron Stalnaker's “Virtue as Mastery”

This response draws on Saba Mahmood's work on Muslim subjectivities in order to consider how Stalnaker's conceptualization of virtue might be applied to non‐Confucian sources. I argue that when applied cross‐culturally, Stalnaker's revised definition of “skillful virtue” raises normative and metaethical questions about what counts as a skill versus a mere bodily practice, the process by how skill is acquired, and how we can both allow for the ambiguity of skills and continue to make constructive arguments about them.     

COMPARING PLEASURE AND PAIN: THE FUNDAMENTAL MATHEMATICAL EQUIVALENCE OF REWARD GAIN AND SHOCK REDUCTION UNDER VARIABLE INTERVAL SCHEDULES

The relationship between positive and negative reinforcement and the symmetry of Thorndike's law of effect are unresolved issues in operant psychology. Here we show that, for a given pattern of responding on variable interval (VI) schedules with the same programmed rate of food rewards (positive reinforcement VI) or electric shocks (negative reinforcement VI), there is a fundamental mathematical equivalence between reward gain and shock reduction. We also provide the first normative account of how animals should respond on a negative VI schedule, showing that it is better to space responses evenly than to respond with a variable interresponse time (IRT). Published data from rats, however, indicate that these animals respond irregularly, often with a burst of activity immediately following a shock. While this is irrational in the experimental setting, it may represent an appropriate response to the heterogeneity of stimuli commonly encountered in natural environments. We discuss the broader implications of our analysis for understanding how animals evaluate appetitive and aversive stimuli.     

BION'S THINKING ABOUT GROUPS: A STUDY OF INFLUENCE AND ORIGINALITY

One of Bion's least‐acknowledged contributions to psychoanalytic theory is his study of the relationship between the mind of the individual (the ability to think), the mentalities of groups of which the individual is a member, and the individual's bodily states. Bion's early work on group therapy evolved into a study of the interplay between mind and bodily instincts associated with being a member of a group, and became the impetus for his theory of thinking. On the foundation of Bion's ideas concerning this interaction among the thinking of the individual, group mentality, and the psyche‐soma, the author presents his thoughts on the ways in which group mentality is recognizable in the analysis of individuals.     

“THESE ANXIETIES ARE NOT MINE”: ADOLESCENCE,THE OEDIPAL CONFIGURATION,AND TRANSGENERATIONAL FACTORS

Part 1 of this paper draws on the film Back to the Future (1985) to highlight various aspects of adolescence, the oedipal situation, and transgenerational factors. The authors then discuss the Oedipus myth and its themes of adolescence, narcissism, identity, acting out, repetition, aggression, and the parent–child relationship, among others. Comments drawn from Winnicott's writing on oedipal issues are discussed as well. As an illustration of some of these issues, in Part 2, the authors present the clinical case of Osvaldo, age sixteen. Transference‐countertransference issues in this treatment are explored in depth.