Homelessness: What is a psychologist to do?

Contrasts person-centered and structural explanations for homelessness. Methodological problems in studies of homeless people tend to exaggerate the role of individual deficits as causes of homelessness. A review of data on the distribution of poverty and of inadequate and unaffordable housing, with special emphasis on families, suggests the importance of structural causes. Data from 700 families requesting shelter and 524 families randomly drawn from the public assistance case load in New York City provide more support for a structural than for an individual deficit model. Individual demographic factors are also important. Implications are drawn for research and action by psychologists.     

Who wants to be collectively guilty? A causal role for motivation in the regulation of collective guilt

Motivation and Emotion - Two studies tested the role of guilt instrumentality in motivating the regulation of collective guilt up or down by motivated reasoning, and its dependence on mental...     

Why does a school psychologist need to know about learning strategies?

School psychologists need to know more about learning strategies because an understanding of these processes can facilitate the design and implementation of intervention programs and procedures. An effective learning strategy is any cognitive, affective, or behavioral activity that facilitates encoding, storing, retrieving, or using knowledge. Four categories of learning strategies are discussed (knowledge acquisition, comprehension monitoring, active study strategies, and support strategies). In addition, a case study is presented to demonstrate how knowledge about these strategies can be used by the school psychologist. Finally, principles in determining the possible involvement of learning strategy deficits in an achievement problem are presented.     

Who wants to live forever? Immortality,authenticity, and living forever in the present

Death is a bad thing by virtue of its ability to frustrate the subjectively valuable projects that shape our identities and render our lives meaningful. While the presumption that immortality would necessarily result in boredom worse than death proves unwarranted, if the constraint of mortality is a necessary element for virtues, relationships, and motivation to pursue our life-projects, then death might nevertheless be a necessary evil. Mortal or immortal, it’s clear that the value of one’s life depends on its subjectively determined quality, rather than its quantity. Thus, it is imperative to live forever in the present, with flourishing always in mind.     

Who wants to become more conscientious,more extraverted,or less neurotic with the help of a digital intervention?

Desires to increase in extraversion and conscientiousness as well as to decrease in neuroticism are the three most prevalent personality change goals. This study describes characteristics of people who wanted to change one of these personality traits (total N = 1196) with the help of a digital personality change intervention. The extent to which characteristics predicted the selection of one change goal over the other two was explored using machine learning. Individuals desired to change traits with lower (in case of desires to increase) or higher (in case of desires to decrease) self- and observer-reports and with greater self-other discrepancies. This identification of characteristics of people who desired to change certain personality traits informs future interventions.     

Who wants privacy protection,and what do they want?

As privacy controversies have become more salient since the early 1980s, one response by policy makers has been to try to encourage consumers to demand privacy protection, by expecting goods and services to be designed with privacy‐enhancing technologies (PETs) embedded in them. But what scope is there for this? Conventional approaches to understanding consumer demand for privacy protection have not been very helpful in providing robust accounts of when consumers will want which kinds of protection. This paper offers a neo‐Durkheimian institutionalist theoretical account of the roots of consumer preferences for privacy and services with PETs in particular, which yields testable hypotheses for future research. It grounds preferences in risk perceptions, shows how distinct styles of risk perceptions are the result of distinct types of situation in social organisation, and derives typical demand curves for each of these types, before exploring the extent of mobility of preferences predicted by the theory, which in turn provides the basis for understanding the scope for persuading consumers to demand privacy‐respecting services of different types. Rooted in the sociology of knowledge and in anthropological approaches, the argument represents a challenge to psychometric, naïve empiricist and postmodernist accounts, and it offers a distinct research agenda. Copyright © 2002 Henry Stewart Publications Ltd.     

What is it Like to be a Phenomenologist?

In a recent paper, 'On the Persistence of Phenomenology' (in T. Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience , Paderborn, 1995), Diana Raffman presents a new argument for qualia, an argument that provides new focus for the qualia debate. We think Raffman's work relocates the debate to a better neighbourhood, a neighbourhood in which what tempts us to think that there must be qualia or phenomenal information is highlighted. Raffman, we argue, locates the core thought shared by many of the friends of qualia, namely, that our conceptual resources are inadequate for capturing the richness of experience. Experience is ineffably determinate. Moreover, Raffman's argument in support of this thought seems especially embarrassing to scientific-minded materialists, since the argument relies largely on well established empirical facts. We show, however, that Raffman's argument fails. So, if we are correct that her argument highlights what is tempting about qualia, then we have also shown that it is not tempting.     

Should there be a duty to report crime?

A number of studies have examined why people do or do not respond when they observe criminal activities. Traditionally, the legal system has not punished the failure to report a crime. This study sought to ascertain whether a sample of college students and public citizens thought there should be legal punishments for the failure to report crimes. Respondents (N = 301) were presented a list of illegal acts and asked to select from a list (no punishment, fine, or prison sentences) what type of punishment should be enforced for failure to report that crime. Analysis indicated that the sample thought there should be punishments for most of the crimes, with a fine as the modal response. For more serious crimes, more serious punishments were selected, and there were some sex differences. It appeared that public support for such laws might be strong.     

Who Doesn't Want to be Envied? Personality Correlates of Emotional Responses to Outperformance Scenarios

Individuals who outshine others may experience distress if their performance poses an interpersonal threat. A scenario-based measure, the Test of Responses to Outperforming Others (TROO), was developed to assess positive and negative responses to outperformance among undergraduates. Three studies provided preliminary validation. Studies 2 and 3 examined personality correlates. Narcissism emerged as a robust predictor of positive emotion on the TROO and anger in response to scenarios involving hostile provocation. Sociotropy consistently predicted greater distress on the TROO. Of importance, sociotropy's role could not be reduced to factors such as self-esteem, depressive symptoms, the Big Five, gender, or social desirability.     

When do infants expect hands to be connected to a person?

A violation-of-expectation paradigm was used to test whether infants infer a person based on the presence of hands alone. Infants were familiarized to a pair of hands that extended out from a curtain to play with a rattle, after which the curtain was opened to reveal either a real person or a mannequin. Infants’ looking at these outcomes was compared with baseline looking at the person and the mannequin. Experiment 1 showed that 9-month-olds looked significantly longer at the mannequin than at the person after familiarization to hands. Experiment 2 ruled out a low-level feature matching interpretation by showing the same looking pattern in 9-month-olds even when the hands were covered with silver gloves. In Experiment 3, 6-month-olds showed no differential looking at the mannequin and person after familiarization to hands. Taken together, these experiments suggest that infants acquire the expectation that hands are connected to a person between 6 and 9 months of age. This finding has implications for how infants’ attribute goals to manual actions.     

Who? What? When? Using a timeline technique to facilitate recall of a complex event

Accurately recalling a complex multi-actor incident presents witnesses with a cognitively demanding retrieval task. Given the important role played by temporal context in the retrieval process, the current research tests an innovative timeline technique to elicit information about multiple perpetrators and their actions. Adopting a standard mock witness paradigm, participants were required to provide an account of a witnessed event. In Experiment 1, the timeline technique facilitated the reporting of more correct details than a free recall, immediately and at a two-week retention interval, at no cost to accuracy. Accounts provided using the timeline technique included more correct information about perpetrator specific actions and fewer sequencing errors. Experiment 2 examined which mnemonic components of the timeline technique might account for these effects. The benefits of exploiting memory organization and reducing cognitive constraints on information flow are likely to underpin the apparent timeline advantage.     

What is it Like to be a Group Agent?

The existence of group agents is relatively widely accepted. Examples are corporations, courts, NGOs, and even entire states. But should we also accept that there is such a thing as group consciousness? I give an overview of some of the key issues in this debate and sketch a tentative argument for the view that group agents lack phenomenal consciousness (pace Schwitzgebel 2015 ). In developing my argument, I draw on integrated information theory, a much‐discussed theory of consciousness. I conclude by pointing out an implication of my argument for the normative status of group agents.