The Emerging View of Emotion as Social Information

Emotions play an important role in coordinating social life. In the last decade, traditional research on the intrapersonal effects of emotions has been complemented by a growing focus on interpersonal effects. I propose that a primary function of emotion at this interpersonal level is to disambiguate social interaction by providing information about the expresser’s feelings, goals, motives, and intentions. Building on this idea, I introduce the emotions as social information (EASI) model. The model posits that emotional expressions influence observers by eliciting affective reactions in them and/or by triggering inferential processes, depending on the observer’s information processing motivation and ability and on social-contextual factors. I discuss implications of this view for theorizing about the social functions of emotions; the evolution of emotion; the influence of emotional expressivity, emotion recognition, and emotion regulation; and the role of culture.     

Are Emotions Natural Kinds?

ABSTRACT— Laypeople and scientists alike believe that they know anger, or sadness, or fear, when they see it. These emotions and a few others are presumed to have specific causal mechanisms in the brain and properties that are observable (on the face, in the voice, in the body, or in experience)—that is, they are assumed to be natural kinds. If a given emotion is a natural kind and can be identified objectively, then it is possible to make discoveries about that emotion. Indeed, the scientific study of emotion is founded on this assumption. In this article, I review the accumulating empirical evidence that is inconsistent with the view that there are kinds of emotion with boundaries that are carved in nature. I then consider what moving beyond a natural-kind view might mean for the scientific understanding of emotion.     

SELF‐DECEPTION ABOUT EMOTION

In this paper, I address an ignored topic in the literature on self‐deception—instances in which one is self‐deceived about their emotions. Most discussions of emotion and self‐deception address either the contributory role of emotion to instances of self‐deception involving beliefs or assume what I argue is an outdated view of emotion according to which emotions just are beliefs or some other type of propositional attitude. In order to construct an account of self‐deception about emotion, I draw a distinction between two variants of self‐deception about emotion: cognitively motivated self‐deception and phenomenologically motivated self‐deception. After providing an account of each variant, I discuss the importance of the role that perception plays in cases of self‐deception about emotion. I conclude with a comment on the relevance of this discussion for contemporary debates in moral theory.     

Normal recognition of emotion in a prosopagnosic

In the leading model of face perception, facial identity and facial expressions of emotion are recognized by separate mechanisms. In this report, we provide evidence supporting the independence of these processes by documenting an individual with severely impaired recognition of facial identity yet normal recognition of facial expressions of emotion. NM, a 40-year-old prosopagnosic, showed severely impaired performance on five of six tests of facial identity recognition. In contrast, she performed in the normal range on four different tests of emotion recognition. Because the tests of identity recognition and emotion recognition assessed her abilities in a variety of ways, these results provide solid support for models in which identity recognition and emotion recognition are performed by separate processes.     

Theory of mind and its relationship with executive functions and emotion recognition in borderline personality disorder

Impaired social cognition has been claimed to be a mechanism underlying the development and maintenance of borderline personality disorder (BPD). One important aspect of social cognition is the theory of mind (ToM), a complex skill that seems to be influenced by more basic processes, such as executive functions (EF) and emotion recognition. Previous ToM studies in BPD have yielded inconsistent results. This study assessed the performance of BPD adults on ToM, emotion recognition, and EF tasks. We also examined whether EF and emotion recognition could predict the performance on ToM tasks. We evaluated 15 adults with BPD and 15 matched healthy controls using different tasks of EF, emotion recognition, and ToM. The results showed that BPD adults exhibited deficits in the three domains, which seem to be task‐dependent. Furthermore, we found that EF and emotion recognition predicted the performance on ToM. Our results suggest that tasks that involve real‐life social scenarios and contextual cues are more sensitive to detect ToM and emotion recognition deficits in BPD individuals. Our findings also indicate that (a) ToM variability in BPD is partially explained by individual differences on EF and emotion recognition; and (b) ToM deficits of BPD patients are partially explained by the capacity to integrate cues from face, prosody, gesture, and social context to identify the emotions and others' beliefs.     

Characterization of facial emotion recognition in bipolar disorder: Focus on emotion mislabelling and neutral expressions

Increasing evidence suggests that facial emotion recognition is impaired in bipolar disorder (BD). However, patient–control differences are small owing to ceiling effects on the tasks used to assess them. The extant literature is also limited by a relative absence of attention towards identifying patterns of emotion misattribution or understanding whether neutral faces are mislabelled in the same way as ones displaying emotion. We addressed these limitations by comparing facial emotion recognition performance in BD patients and healthy controls on a novel and challenging task. Thirty-four outpatients with BD I and 32 demographically matched healthy controls completed a facial emotion recognition task requiring the labelling of neutral and emotive faces displayed at low emotional intensities. Results indicated that BD patients were significantly less accurate at labelling faces than healthy controls, particularly if they displayed fear or neutral expressions. There were no between-group differences in response times or patterns of emotion mislabelling, with both groups confusing sad and neutral faces, although BD patients also mislabelled sad faces as angry. Task performance did not significantly correlate with mood symptom severity in the BD group. These findings suggest that facial emotion recognition impairments in BD extend to neutral face recognition. Emotion misattribution occurs in a similar, albeit exaggerated manner in patients with BD compared to healthy controls. Future behavioural and neuroimaging research should reconsider the use of neutral faces as baseline stimuli in their task designs.     

Simulationist models of face-based emotion recognition

Recent studies of emotion mindreading reveal that for three emotions, fear, disgust, and anger, deficits in face-based recognition are paired with deficits in the production of the same emotion. What type of mindreading process would explain this pattern of paired deficits? The simulation approach and the theorizing approach are examined to determine their compatibility with the existing evidence. We conclude that the simulation approach offers the best explanation of the data. What computational steps might be used, however, in simulation-style emotion detection? Four alternative models are explored: a generate-and-test model, a reverse simulation model, a variant of the reverse simulation model that employs an "as if" loop, and an unmediated resonance model.     

Emotion as Position-Taking

It is a popular thought that emotions play an important epistemic role. Thus, a considerable number of philosophers find it compelling to suppose that emotions apprehend the value of objects and events in our surroundings. I refer to this view as the Epistemic View of emotion. In this paper, my concern is with a rivaling picture of emotion, which has so far received much less attention. On this account, emotions do not constitute a form of epistemic access to specific axiological aspects of their objects. Instead it proposes that they are ways of taking a stand or position on the world. I refer to this as the Position-Taking View of emotion. Whilst some authors seem sympathetic to this view, this it has so far not been systematically motivated and elaborated. In this paper, I fill this gap and propose a more adequate account of our emotional engagement with the world than the predominant epistemic paradigm. I start by highlighting the specific way in which emotions are directed at something, which I contrast with the intentionality of perception and other forms of apprehension. I then go on to offer a specific account of the valence of emotion and show how this account and the directedness of emotions makes them intelligible as a way of taking a position on something.     

Reconstructing Judgment: Emotion and Moral Judgment

A traditional association of judgment with “reason” has drawn upon and reinforced an opposition between reason and emotion. This, in turn, has led to a restricted view of the nature of moral judgment and of the subject as moral agent. The alternative, I suggest, is to abandon the traditional categories and to develop a new theory of judgment. I argue that the theory of judgment developed by Justus Buchler constitutes a robust alternative which does not prejudice the case against emotion. Drawing on this theory I then develop how to conceptualize the ways in which feeling and emotion can be (or be components of) moral judgments.     

Integrating cognitive and emotion paradigms to address the paradox of aging

ABSTRACT

Thirty years ago, the subfields of emotion and cognition operated relatively independently and the associated science reflected the tacit view that they were distinct constructs. Today, questions about the integration of cognition and emotion are among the most interesting questions in the field. I offer a personal view of the key changes that fuelled this shift over time and describe research from my group that unfolded in parallel and led to the identification of the positivity effect.     

Holistic person processing: faces with bodies tell the whole story

Faces and bodies are typically encountered simultaneously, yet little research has explored the visual processing of the full person. Specifically, it is unknown whether the face and body are perceived as distinct components or as an integrated, gestalt-like unit. To examine this question, we investigated whether emotional face-body composites are processed in a holistic-like manner by using a variant of the composite face task, a measure of holistic processing. Participants judged facial expressions combined with emotionally congruent or incongruent bodies that have been shown to influence the recognition of emotion from the face. Critically, the faces were either aligned with the body in a natural position or misaligned in a manner that breaks the ecological person form. Converging data from 3 experiments confirm that breaking the person form reduces the facilitating influence of congruent body context as well as the impeding influence of incongruent body context on the recognition of emotion from the face. These results show that faces and bodies are processed as a single unit and support the notion of a composite person effect analogous to the classic effect described for faces.     

FEELING WITHOUT THINKING: LESSONS FROM THE ANCIENTS ON EMOTION AND VIRTUE-ACQUISITION

Abstract: By briefly sketching some important ancient accounts of the connections between psychology and moral education, I hope to illuminate the significance of the contemporary debate on the nature of emotion and to reveal its stakes. I begin the essay with a brief discussion of intellectualism in Socrates and the Stoics, and Plato's and Posidonius's respective attacks against it. Next, I examine the two current leading philosophical accounts of emotion: the cognitive theory and the noncognitive theory. I maintain that the noncognitive theory better explains human behavior and experience and has more empirical support than the cognitive theory. In the third section of the essay I argue that recent empirical research on emotional contagion and mirroring processes provides important new evidence for the noncognitive theory. In the final section, I draw some preliminary conclusions about moral education and the acquisition of virtue.     

Kantian Ethics: After Darwin

In this article I reevaluate Immanuel Kant's moral philosophy from a post–Darwinian perspective. Taking an evolutionary approach to human reasoning and incorporating some recent work on the science of the emotions, I argue that the Kantian bifurcation of reason and emotion, which underlies his moral philosophy, is no longer tenable. Kant's practical defense of his ethics as being the only option that can save morality from the dangers posed by naturalism is also considered and rejected. Instead, I argue that an evolutionary view of reason and emotion can provide an adequate ground for morality and explore the possibility and advantages of such an ethics.     

Effect of positive emotion on consolidation of memory for faces: The modulation of facial valence and facial gender

Studies have shown that emotion elicited after learning enhances memory consolidation. However, no prior studies have used facial photos as stimuli. This study examined the effect of post-learning positive emotion on consolidation of memory for faces. During the learning participants viewed neutral, positive, or negative faces. Then they were assigned to a condition in which they either watched a 9-minute positive video clip, or a 9-minute neutral video. Then 30 minutes after the learning participants took a surprise memory test, in which they made “remember”, “know”, and “new” judgements. The findings are: (1) Positive emotion enhanced consolidation of recognition for negative male faces, but impaired consolidation of recognition for negative female faces; (2) For males, recognition for negative faces was equivalent to that for positive faces; for females, recognition for negative faces was better than that for positive faces. Our study provides the important evidence that effect of post-learning emotion on memory consolidation can extend to facial stimuli and such an effect can be modulated by facial valence and facial gender. The findings may shed light on establishing models concerning the influence of emotion on memory consolidation.     

The role of motion and intensity in deaf children’s recognition of real human facial expressions of emotion

There is substantial evidence to suggest that deafness is associated with delays in emotion understanding, which has been attributed to delays in language acquisition and opportunities to converse. However, studies addressing the ability to recognise facial expressions of emotion have produced equivocal findings. The two experiments presented here attempt to clarify emotion recognition in deaf children by considering two aspects: the role of motion and the role of intensity in deaf children’s emotion recognition. In Study 1, 26 deaf children were compared to 26 age-matched hearing controls on a computerised facial emotion recognition task involving static and dynamic expressions of 6 emotions. Eighteen of the deaf and 18 age-matched hearing controls additionally took part in Study 2, involving the presentation of the same 6 emotions at varying intensities. Study 1 showed that deaf children’s emotion recognition was better in the dynamic rather than static condition, whereas the hearing children showed no difference in performance between the two conditions. In Study 2, the deaf children performed no differently from the hearing controls, showing improved recognition rates with increasing rates of intensity. With the exception of disgust, no differences in individual emotions were found. These findings highlight the importance of using ecologically valid stimuli to assess emotion recognition.     

Language as context for the perception of emotion

In the blink of an eye, people can easily see emotion in another person's face. This fact leads many to assume that emotion perception is given and proceeds independently of conceptual processes such as language. In this paper we suggest otherwise and offer the hypothesis that language functions as a context in emotion perception. We review a variety of evidence consistent with the language-as-context view and then discuss how a linguistically relative approach to emotion perception allows for intriguing and generative questions about the extent to which language shapes the sensory processing involved in seeing emotion in another person's face.     

The Descent of Shame1

Shame is a painful emotion concerned with failure to live up to certain standards, norms, or ideals. The subject feels that she falls in the regard of others; she feels watched and exposed. As a result, she feels bad about the person that she is. The most popular view of shame is that someone only feels ashamed if she fails to live up to standards, norms, or ideals that she, herself, accepts. In this paper, I provide support for a different view, according to which shame is about failure to live up to public expectations. Such a view of shame has difficulties explaining why an audience is central to shame, why shame concerns the self as a whole, and why the social rank of someone affects their ability to shame others. These features, I argue, are best explained by reference to the descent of shame in the emotion connected with submission in nonhuman animals. The function of submission—to appease relevant social others—also throws light on the sort of emotion that shame is. From the point of view of other people, a subject who experiences shame at her own failing is someone who is committed to living together with others in a socially sanctioned way. The argument is not that we must understand the nature of shame in terms of what it evolved for, but that its heritage is important to understanding the emotion that shame has become.     

Assessing collective affect recognition via the Emotional Aperture Measure

Curiosity about collective affect is undergoing a revival in many fields. This literature, tracing back to Le Bon's seminal work on crowd psychology, has established the veracity of collective affect and demonstrated its influence on a wide range of group dynamics. More recently, an interest in the perception of collective affect has emerged, revealing a need for a methodological approach for assessing collective emotion recognition to complement measures of individual emotion recognition. This article addresses this need by introducing the Emotional Aperture Measure (EAM). Three studies provide evidence that collective affect recognition requires a processing style distinct from individual emotion recognition and establishes the validity and reliability of the EAM. A sample of working managers further shows how the EAM provides unique insights into how individuals interact with collectives. We discuss how the EAM can advance several lines of research on collective affect.     

情绪具身观：情绪研究的新视角

情绪具身性有着广泛的理论假说与研究证据, 从情绪外周理论到面部反馈假说、躯体标记假说再到现在的情绪具身观, 都一致认为情绪是具身的。情绪具身观认为情绪是包括大脑在内的身体的情绪, 身体的解剖学结构、身体的活动方式、身体的感觉和运动体验决定了我们怎样加工情绪。相关的行为和脑机制研究均支持了情绪加工的具身性。目前关于具身情绪的理论解释主要有镜像神经元系统假说、具身模仿论和知觉符号系统理论等。作为一种新兴的理论观点, 情绪具身观为情绪研究提供了新的视角。