Affective empathy as core moral agency: psychopathy,autism and reason revisited

Empathy has become a common point of debate in moral psychology. Recent developments in psychiatry, neurosciences and social psychology have led to the revival of sentimentalism, and the ‘empathy thesis’ has suggested that affective empathy, in particular, is a necessary criterion of moral agency. The case of psychopaths – individuals incapable of affective empathy and moral agency, yet capable of rationality – has been utilised in support of this case. Critics, however, have been vocal. They have asserted that the case of autism proves the empathy thesis wrong; that psychopathy centres on rational rather than empathic limitations; that empathy is not relevant to many common normative behaviours; and that rationality is required when empathy fails. The present paper analyses these four criticisms. It will be claimed that they each face severe difficulties, and that moral agency ought to be approached via a multi-tier model, with affective empathy as a baseline.     

Morphological Rationalism and the Psychology of Moral Judgment

According to rationalism regarding the psychology of moral judgment, people’s moral judgments are generally the result of a process of reasoning that relies on moral principles or rules. By contrast, intuitionist models of moral judgment hold that people generally come to have moral judgments about particular cases on the basis of gut-level, emotion-driven intuition, and do so without reliance on reasoning and hence without reliance on moral principles. In recent years the intuitionist model has been forcefully defended by Jonathan Haidt. One important implication of Haidt’s model is that in giving reasons for their moral judgments people tend to confabulate – the reasons they give in attempting to explain their moral judgments are not really operative in producing those judgments. Moral reason-giving on Haidt’s view is generally a matter of post hoc confabulation. Against Haidt, we argue for a version of rationalism that we call ‘morphological rationalism.’ We label our version ‘morphological’ because according to it, the information contained in moral principles is embodied in the standing structure of a typical individual’s cognitive system, and this morphologically embodied information plays a causal role in the generation of particular moral judgments. The manner in which the principles play this role is via ‘proceduralization’ – such principles operate automatically. In contrast to Haidt’s intuitionism, then, our view does not imply that people’s moral reason-giving practices are matters of confabulation. In defense of our view, we appeal to what we call the ‘nonjarring’ character of the phenomenology of making moral judgments and of giving reasons for those judgments.

Moral cognition,affect, and psychopathy

Few theorists would challenge the idea that affect and emotion directly influence decision-making and moral judgment. There is good reason to think that they also significantly assist in decision-making and judgment, and in fact are necessary for fully effective moral cognition. However, they are not sufficient. Deliberation and more reflective thought processes likewise play a crucial role, and in fact are inseparable from affective processes. I will argue that while the dual-process account of moral judgment set forth by Craigie (2011) has great merit, it fails to appreciate fully the extent to which affective and reflective processes are not only integrated, but also mutually interdependent. Evidence from psychopathy indicates that when reflective processes are not assisted adequately by what I will call ‘affective framing’, and moral cognition is of the “cooler,” less emotionally-informed variety, what results is not effective cognitive functioning, but rather psychopathology. My proposed account of affective framing aims to make sense of the way in which affect plays a strictly necessary and integral role not just in intuitive moral responses, but also in reflective moral judgments, so that moral cognition is accomplished by the joint operation of affective processes and reflective reasoning processes.     

Leibniz's Twofold Gap Between Moral Knowledge and Motivation

Moral rationalists and sentimentalists traditionally disagree on at least two counts, namely regarding the source of moral knowledge or moral judgements and regarding the source of moral motivation. I will argue that even though Leibniz's moral epistemology is very much in line with that of mainstream moral rationalists, his account of moral motivation is better characterized as sentimentalist. Just like Hume, Leibniz denies that there is a necessary connection between knowing that something is right and the motivation to act accordingly. Instead, he believes that certain affections are necessary for moral motivation. On my interpretation, then, Leibniz is an externalist about judgements and motivation: he is committed to a gap between the judgement that something is morally right and the motivation to act accordingly. As a matter of fact, I will argue that there are two gaps. The first and less controversial one has to do with the fact that Leibniz reconciles his psychological egoism with ethical altruism through his account of love. The second gap between moral judgements and motivation is a more fundamental one: Leibniz denies that there are any necessary connections between beliefs and motivation, or even more generally, between perceptions and appetitions.     

It takes one to know one: Relationship between lie detection and psychopathy

We investigated primary and secondary psychopathy and the ability to detect high-stakes, real-life emotional lies in an on-line experiment (N = 150). Using signal detection analysis, we found that lie detection ability was overall above chance level, there was a tendency towards responding liberally to the test stimuli, and women were more accurate than men. Further, sex moderated the relationship between psychopathy and lie detection ability; in men, primary psychopathy had a significant positive correlation with the ability to detect lies, whereas in women there was a significant negative correlation with deception detection. The results are discussed with reference to evolutionary theory and sex differences in processing socio-emotional information.     

Multiple moral foundations predict responses to sacrificial dilemmas

Moral dilemmas, by definition, demand trade-offs between competing moral goods (e.g., causing one harm to prevent another). Although moral dilemmas have served as a methodological pillar for moral psychology, surprisingly little research has explored how individual differences in moral values influence responses to dilemmatic trade-offs. In a cross-sectional study (N = 307), we tested competing claims regarding the relationship between the endorsement of foundational moral values and responses to sacrificial dilemmas, in which one judges the moral acceptability of causing fatal harm to one person to save multiple others. Inconsistent with Moral Dyad Theory, our results did not support the prediction that Harm concerns would be the unequivocally most important predictor of sacrifice endorsement. Consistent with Moral Foundations Theory, however, multiple moral values are predictive of sacrifice judgments: Harm and Purity negatively predict, and Ingroup positively predicts, endorsement of harmful action in service of saving lives, with Harm and Purity explaining similar amounts of unique variance. The present study demonstrates the utility of pluralistic accounts of morality, even in moral situations in which harm is central.     

当代道德教育指向:从道德顺从到道德选择的理路

我国的道德教育有着悠久的历史,其主体流质是道德顺从教育,原因有:伦理本位的思想传统;群体本位的教育倾向和道德教育的政治统治功能强化。当代道德教育的时代背景的变迁即社会结构的转型和多元化社会的形成以及当代道德教育人本倾向和生活世界的实践回归,标示着道德选择教育成为了道德教育的内在要求和指向。     

The Ethical Perspective: An Identity Theory of the Psychological Influences on Moral Choice

The 2008 Presidential Address presents the theory of ethical perspective, an identity theory of moral psychology designed to detect the psychological influences on moral choice. Part 1 treats findings on altruism and genocide as an analytical lens through which we can gain insight into political and moral behavior. Part 2 describes moral psychology as a field, presenting a new and broader conceptualization for the discipline. Part 3 outlines an identity theory of moral choice that focuses on the critical role of the ethical perspective, to suggest how an empirically based theory of moral choice looks in practice. Part 4 concentrates on the basic assumptions underlying the theory of ethical perspective. It presents empirical evidence that supports this theoretical framework, from fields as diverse as neuroscience and primatology to child development and linguistics, thus demonstrating political psychology's important links to other disciplines. In addition to presenting a new theory of moral psychology, designed to fill an important gap in the literature on ethics and moral choice, the Address treats studies of altruism and genocide as an illustration of research that reveals broader insight into the nature of political psychology as a discipline.     

Empathy deficits and trait emotional intelligence in psychopathy and Machiavellianism

This study investigated the relationships between psychopathy (primary and secondary), Machiavellianism, trait emotional intelligence and empathy, using an image task that required an appropriate empathic response to the emotional displays of others (happy, sad and neutral). Results indicated that primary psychopathy and Machiavellianism were positively associated with the experience of positive affect from sad stimuli, while secondary psychopathy and Machiavellianism were positively associated with the experience of negative affect in response to neutral stimuli, and the opposite pattern was found for trait emotional intelligence. Regressional analyses demonstrated that secondary psychopathy, Machiavellianism, trait emotional intelligence and state anxiety are important predictors when stimuli are ambiguous.     

A transition of Chinese humanism and aesthetics from rationalism to irrationalism

Chinese people attach importance to intuition and imagery in ways of thinking that are quite sensible, but the result, i.e. the thoughts that are popularized in virtue of political power, are rather rational. These rational thoughts, which were influenced by Buddhism and continually became introspective, had been growing more irrational factors. Up to the middle and late Ming Dynasty, when the economy was developed, they merged with the growing emphasis on daily needs of food and clothes and the envisagement to the utilitarian circumstances, and finally broke through the threshold of rationalism. Under the attack of Geng Dingxiang, Li Zhi who emphasized these thoughts was forced beyond his previous boundaries and led a whole variation in how he viewed a series of issues including values, humanity, ethics and aesthetics. This indicated a historical change from rationalism to irrationalism in Chinese humanism and aesthetics thoughts. Translated by Huang Deyuan from Xueshu Yuekan 学术月刊 (Academic Monthly), 2006, (11): 103–112     

Moral Instincts and the Problem with Reductionism: A Critical Look at the Work of Marc Hauser

In his most recent book Moral Minds, Marc Hauser argues that many foundational moral instincts have clear biological explanations. To make this argument, Hauser focuses on the similarities between the acquisition of morality and the acquisition of language. Similar to language, one learns a particular moral framework from one's environment, but the biological components necessary for moral development are universal. While I agree with Hauser's overall conclusion regarding moral instincts, I reject the notion that a purely biological analysis of morality can provide an adequate framework for justification. The problem, as I see it, is Hauser acknowledges the bottom-up influences taking place between biology and moral formation, but he refuses to account for the top-down influences that occur between metaphysical assumptions, moral beliefs, and biological conclusions. Thus, the current critique will focus on the connection between Hauser's failure to account for top-down influence and the subsequent shortcoming related to moral justification.     

道德心理学的哲学思考--论心理学与伦理学的会通与融合

道德心理学把规范伦理学与实证心理学在哲学层面上结合起来,为理解人的道德行为提供了一种新的视角。伦理学与心理学的这种融合具体体现为：个人同一性与道德行为必须在心理上保持一致,才能形成真正的道德同一性,因此,美德有其独特的气质和情绪心理学机制。道德是在社会生活中形成的,处理好道德的社会关系是培养良好美德的基础。道德既有理性的层面,也有非理性的层面,培养和确立人的内在理性是成为道德人的心理学基础。基于心理学对道德生活的重要性,一种以心理学为基础的美德伦理学正在出现。     

The differential association between alexithymia and primary versus secondary psychopathy

Using a sample of 104 college students, this study tested the hypothesis that alexithymia is positively related to secondary (also known as “neurotic psychopathy”), but not primary psychopathy (i.e., inability to form emotional bonds with others and a fear insensitivity). Participants completed the TAS-20 (alexithymia), the LSRP (primary and secondary psychopathy), the PPI-R (psychopathy), and the trait version of the STAI (trait anxiety). The interaction between the latter two measures was used as a second index of primary and secondary psychopathy. Support was found for the study hypothesis with both methods of assessing psychopathy (i.e., the LSRP subscales or the combination of the PPI-R and the STAI). These results further our understanding of both alexithymia and psychopathy.     

Instrumental rationality in psychopathy: implications from learning tasks

Whether psychopathic offenders are practically rational has attracted philosophical attention. The problem is relevant in theoretical discussions in moral psychology and in discussions concerning the appropriate social response to the crimes of these individuals. We argue that classical and current experiments concerning the instrumental learning in psychopaths cannot directly support the conclusion that they have impaired instrumental rationality, construed as the ability to transfer motivation by means-ends reasoning. We claim that these experiments appear to show that psychopaths in certain circumstances are not aware of the relevant means for their ends. Moreover, we suggest how further empirical research could help to settle the issue.     

Dual-process morality and the personal/impersonal distinction: A reply to McGuire, Langdon, Coltheart, and Mackenzie

A substantial body of research supports a dual-process theory of moral judgment, according to which characteristically deontological judgments are driven by automatic emotional responses, while characteristically utilitarian judgments are driven by controlled cognitive processes. This theory was initially supported by neuroimaging and reaction time (RT) data. McGuire et al. have reanalyzed these initial RT data and claim that, in light of their findings, the dual-process theory of moral judgment and the personal/impersonal distinction now lack support. While McGuire and colleagues have convincingly overturned Greene et al.’s interpretation of their original RT data, their claim that the dual-process theory now lacks support overstates the implications of their findings. McGuire and colleagues ignore the results of several more recent behavioral studies, including the study that bears most directly on their critique. They dismiss without adequate justification the results of a more recent neuroimaging study, three more recent patient studies, and an emotion-induction study. Their broader critique is based largely on their conflation of the dual-process theory with the personal/impersonal distinction, which are independent.     

Relationship between psychopathy and indirect aggression use in a noncriminal population

Psychopathy has long been associated with increased use of direct aggression and violence, especially among male inmates. Little research has, of yet, considered the relation between psychopathy and indirect forms of aggression. The current research sought to investigate the relationship between psychopathy and indirect aggression in a noncriminal sample. The results indicated that there was a strong relationship between psychopathic traits and indirect aggression, with strong correlations between indirect aggression and both factor 1 (coldheartedness) and factor 3 (impulsive antisociality). This association remained significant even after the effects of direct aggression had been controlled for. Path analysis indicated that both direct and indirect aggression was underpinned by the same psychopathy factors. This suggests that high psychopathy scorers will utilize direct and indirect aggression equally and, as such, the choice of one type of aggression over the other may be dependant on either situational factors or external moderators. Aggr. Behav. 35:408–421, 2009. © 2009 Wiley‐Liss, Inc.     

Psychopathy,unconscious shame and attachment: Considering the psychodynamics of psychopathy

Recent psychopathy research has involved a critical re-examination of the construct. Absent from this research has been an analysis of the role unconscious shame might play in etiology, traits and behaviour. Outside of the domain of psychopathy research, the significant role shame plays in intra- and interpersonal dynamics has been comprehensively investigated for the past few decades. More recently, exploration into the role that attachment plays in the development of shame has been suggested. The extant shame literature has explored the connection between unconscious shame and a range of behaviours, many of which are characteristic of psychopathy. While there have been some investigations on the association between psychopathy and conscious shame, this paper suggests that the exploration of unconscious shame, and its development resulting from certain attachment dynamics, can potentially further enhance our conceptualisation of psychopathy with regard to etiology, traits, behaviour, assessment and treatment. After reviewing the literature on unconscious shame, attachment and psychopathy, recommendations for future research are suggested.     

Adolescent psychopathy features: 6-year temporal stability and the prediction of externalizing symptoms during the transition to adulthood

This study investigated the 6-year stability and predictive validity of adolescent psychopathy features during the transition to young adulthood. It represents one of the longest outcome studies of youth psychopathy to date, and therefore addresses a primary criticism of the research area (i.e., lack of demonstrated associations between child and adult psychopathy features). Recruited participants were 475 males enrolled in the Minnesota Twin and Family Study who had completed a research-based measure of psychopathy features consisting of separate emotional detachment (or affective) and antisocial tendencies (or behavioral) subscales. These psychopathy features and various externalizing symptoms (i.e., conduct problems, impulsivity, and substance use disorder) were assessed through rating scales and structured diagnostic interview at an intake assessment (ages 16-18) and 6-year follow-up. Consistent with prediction, adolescent psychopathy features displayed moderate stability across the transition from adolescence to adulthood [intraclass correlation coefficients (ICCs) = 0.40-0.41]. The antisocial tendencies subscale was uniquely related to most externalizing symptoms both in adolescence and in adulthood, whereas the emotional detachment subscale showed appropriate discriminant validity in its lack of association with externalizing symptoms. These findings suggest that psychopathy features are relatively stable from adolescence to adulthood and provide possible insights into the development and maintenance of externalizing difficulties during the adult transition.