Showing our seams: A reply to Eric Funkhouser

In a recent paper published in this journal, Eric Funkhouser argues that some of our beliefs have the primary function of signaling to others, rather than allowing us to navigate the world. Funkhouser’s case is persuasive. However, his account of beliefs as signals is underinclusive, omitting both beliefs that are signals to the self and less than full-fledged beliefs as signals. The latter set of beliefs, moreover, has a better claim to being considered as constituting a psychological kind in its own right than the set of beliefs Funkhouser identifies.     

Neither Fish nor Fowl: Implicit Attitudes as Patchy Endorsements

Implicit attitudes are mental states that appear sometimes to cause agents to act in ways that conflict with their considered beliefs. Implicit attitudes are usually held to be mere associations between representations. Recently, however, some philosophers have suggested that they are, or are very like, ordinary beliefs: they are apt to feature in properly inferential processing. This claim is important, in part because there is good reason to think that the vocabulary in which we make moral assessments of ourselves and of others is keyed to folk psychological concepts, like ‘belief’, and not to concepts that feature only in scientific psychology: if implicit attitudes are beliefs there is a prima facie case for thinking that they can serve as the basis for particular kinds of moral assessment. In this paper I argue that while implicit attitudes have propositional structure, their sensitivity and responsiveness to other mental representations is too patchy and fragmented for them to properly be considered beliefs. Instead, they are a sui generis kind of mental state, a state I dub patchy endorsements.     

From Puddles to Potholes: The Role of Overvalued Beliefs in Emotional Problems

The bygone notion of a “fixed idea” has evolved into an appreciation for overvalued beliefs, automatic thoughts, irrational beliefs, and dysfunctional attitudes and the role they can play in the lives of many clients. Overvalued beliefs are common and can be destructive when they guide the client toward extreme emotional reactions, disruptive behavioral patterns or create negative views of self or others. Overvalued beliefs become problematic when they are not aligned with commonly accepted views of reality, they are rigidly maintained despite insufficient evidence, and they create maladaptive self-perpetuating patterns. A metaphor is used to explain how minor puddles can evolve into major potholes, creating lasting damage. The destructive power of puddles shares some similarities with the subtle influence of overvalued beliefs on a client’s emotional and interpersonal functioning. Psychotherapy can help clients to confront the misguided accuracy, limited utility, and exaggerated potency of their beliefs. Therapy can help clients to disengage from the directive power of their beliefs, learning to tolerate various thoughts without reacting at an emotional or behavioral level.     

Multiple Objectives: A Neglected Problem in the Theory of Human Action

The options that people face are rarely ideal: they are good in some ways and poor in others. People have problems choosing among such options because they don’t know which ends to favor. Multiple objectives pose a problem not only for decision makers, but also for our account of decision making. People act to achieve their ends given their beliefs. In order to handle decisions with multiple objectives, however, this story must be supplemented by an account of which ends are implicated in which decisions (e.g., do individual goals guide particular choices? do different ends jointly pick out courses of action?). Unfortunately, such an account is lacking. As a result, there is a gap (at least) in our most basic account of human behavior. In this paper I explore that gap and examine some proposals for closing it.     

6~8岁儿童公平行为的内在动机：社会信号的作用

公平行为是个体对自己或别人不偏不倚的行为,存在本质公平与表现公平。本质公平,即个体本身渴望公平,能够依据某种公平原则做出公平行为;表现公平,即个体在行为上做出公平的表现而实质并非来自本身的意愿。研究1选取270名6~8岁儿童,采用资源分配任务考察儿童在有无社会信号作用下表现公平行为的发展特点,研究2选取300名6~8岁儿童,采用抛硬币任务来考察儿童是否会用公平程序来掩盖其不公平行为。结果表明：(1)有无社会信号条件对儿童公平行为存在显著影响,并存在显著的年龄差异。有社会信号条件下,儿童更多选择公平行为,无社会信号条件下,儿童更多选择对自己有利的不公平分配。(2)儿童选择通过抛硬币的方式来获取奖品的人数随着年龄增长显著上升,抛硬币的儿童报告自己得到好的奖品的概率显著多于得到不好奖品的概率。结论：社会信号作用下儿童更多会做出表现公平而非本质公平。     

What IS Wrong with Foundationalism is that it Cannot Solve the Epistemic Regress Problem*

There are many things that could be wrong with foundationalism. For example, some have claimed that a so‐called basic belief cannot be both 1) a reason for non‐basic beliefs and 2) such that it cannot be provided with at least prima facie justification.1 If something is a reason, they say, then that something has to be a proposition (or sufficiently proposition‐like) and if it is a proposition (or sufficiently proposition‐like), then it is the kind of thing that requires a reason in order to be even prima facie justified.2 Another reason that some give for rejecting normative foundationalism is that it leads directly to skepticism.3 There is no way, they claim, to move from so‐called basic propositions (typically given as first person introspective reports) to “external world” propositions by employing normatively acceptable principles of reasoning.4 Still others have thought that the invention of a nonrea‐soned reason was as ad hoc as the invention of an unmoved mover.5     

Unconscious Evidence

Can beliefs that are not consciously formulated serve as part of an agent's evidence for other beliefs? A common view says no, any belief that is psychologically immediate is also epistemically immediate. I argue that some unconscious beliefs can serve as evidence, but other unconscious beliefs cannot. Person‐level beliefs can serve as evidence, but subpersonal beliefs cannot. I try to clarify the nature of the personal/subpersonal distinction and to show how my proposal illuminates various epistemological problems and provides a principled framework for solving other problems.     

An exploratory study on the development of beliefs about symptoms as signals of arterial hypertension

An exploratory study on the development of beliefs about symptoms as signals of arterial hypertension. In spite of hypertension is known as an asymptomatic health problem, most of the people with such a diagnosis are convinced of experiencing very specific symptoms associated to specific changes in blood pressure (BP). In addition, such beliefs may affect treatment adherence. Previous studies have shown that hypertensive patients use the information they considered right about BP symptoms to regulate the type of decisions they follow in adhering to treatment. The aim of this study is to explore specific variables related with the formation of beliefs about symptoms in a sample of 171 hypertensive patients. Results show that 81,3% of the patients perceived specific symptoms related to changes in hypertension as well as that variables related with the development of these beliefs were mostly: (1) the presence of symptoms during the diagnosis process, (2) the occurrence of hypertensive crisis, and (3) the information provided by others concerning the relationships between symptoms and BP changes. The importance of paying attention to the beliefs of specific symptoms as well as to the circumstances related with the formation process of such beliefs is discussed.     

Are beliefs signals?

Eric Funkhouser argues that beliefs can function as social signals. I argue that Funkhouser’s argument for this conclusion rests on a problematic definition of “signal,” and that on standard definitions, the imperceptibility of beliefs disqualifies them from counting as signals. However, I also argue that Funkhouser’s insights about the social functions of beliefs can be true even if his claim that beliefs are signals is false.     

Adolescent beliefs about AIDS prevention

Abstract

Four hundred and ten school children, aged between 13 and 16 years, were administered a questionnaire to investigate (a) their perceptions of AIDS and implications of the disease for the victim; (b) beliefs about how best to prevent the spread of disease; (c) sources of information and (d) AIDS relevant topics they would like to learn in school. The results suggested that there were few differences in knowledge or attitude as a function of age, but some significant differences due to sex. Boys were more likely to derogate the AIDS victim compared with girls. In terms of different strategies for prevention, boys were more in favour of “scare” approaches, and girls of information-giving. The success of any AIDS education package may be at least partly determined by individual beliefs about the disease, and preferences for different educational strategies.     

Working in the Transference and Promoting Self-determination: Treating Beliefs as Opinions Rather than Certainties

We have all been in situations in which others have retained their beliefs despite evidence to the contrary. Instead of treating beliefs as opinions that can be modified, they use beliefs as facts that limit their relationships and opportunities. In this article, a short literature review and three vignettes are presented that discuss and demonstrate how to work with and, when appropriate, modify counterfactual beliefs within the transference. Issues of self-determination, the unconscious, countertransference, and some Kleinian concepts such as the third, containment, and the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions are also explored.     

The effect of serving as a model of self-control on subsequent resistance to deviation in children

The effect of having a child serve as a rule-following model for other children on the model's own subsequent rule-following was investigated in a resistance to deviation situation. First- and second-grade boys (age range 73 to 94 months) who were told they would serve as self-controlling models for others and who actually served in this capacity touched prohibited toys less than did boys who were not told they would serve as models. Boys told they were to serve as models but who were prevented from performing deviated at a level between the models and boys given no responsibility. Having children serve as rule-following models for others is suggested as an effective, non-punitive technique to increase their self-control.     

Self-other differences in children's perceptions about the causes of important events

Three studies examined differences between children's (ages 8-15) beliefs about the effectiveness of multiple internal and external causes for producing outcomes in their own lives versus in those of their peers. Differences specific to the school domain were found: Starting at age 11 or 12, children perceived internal causes as more important for others than for themselves; and only beliefs about the self related to perceived control. More strikingly, a sample of gifted children, who presumably receive social feedback that they are different from their peers, reported that (a) they exerted more control and possessed more ability than their peers and (b) other children knew less about the causes of school performance and had to rely more on effort and powerful others; only beliefs about the self correlated to cognitive performance. These results suggest that self-other differences are produced by both developmental change and environmental opportunities.     

Believability and syllogistic reasoning

In this paper we investigate the locus of believability effects in syllogistic reasoning. We identify three points in the reasoning process at which such effects could occur: the initial interpretation of premises, the examination of alternative representations of them (in all of which any valid conclusion must be true), and the "filtering" of putative conclusions. The effect of beliefs at the first of these loci is well established. In this paper we report three experiments that examine whether beliefs have an effect at the other two loci. In experiments 1 and 2 subjects drew their own conclusions from syllogisms that suggested believable or unbelievable ones. In the third experiment they evaluated conclusions that were presented to them. The data show that beliefs both affect the examination of alternative models and act as a filter on putative conclusions. We conclude by showing how some types of problem and some problem contents make the existence of alternative models more obvious than others.     

Proper Basicality

Foundationalist epistemologies, whether internalist or externalist, ground noetic structures in beliefs that are said to be foundational, or properly basic. It is essential to such epistemologies that they provide clear criteria for proper basicality. This proves, 1 argue, to be a thorny task, at least insofar as the goal is to provide a psychologically realistic reconstruction of our actual doxastic practices. I examine some of the difficulties, and suggest some implications, in particular for the externalist epistemology of Alvin Plantinga.     

Belief,quasi-belief,and obsessive-compulsive disorder

Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) poses a puzzle about beliefs: Those with OCD experience anxiety and motivation suggesting that they believe something, even though they may profess not to believe that very thing. OCD also poses a puzzle about free will, since persons with OCD often describe their behavior as compelled, though it is unclear how it is compelled. This paper argues that at least some cases of OCD are best described as being driven by “quasi-beliefs” which have some, but not all, of the functional properties of beliefs. (A brief discussion contrasts these quasi-beliefs with the “aliefs” recently posited by Tamar Gendler.) An alternative to the quasi-belief account of OCD is the claim is that OCD can be explained in terms of ordinary beliefs that simply have irrational contents. The paper argues that the quasi-belief account of OCD fits the empirical details of the disorder better than alternative accounts.     

Attributions of intergroup bias and outgroup homogeneity to ingroup and outgroup others

The research in this article explores the structure and content of attributed intergroup beliefs: to what extent do perceivers think others of their ingroup and their outgroup display intergroup evaluative bias and outgroup homogeneity? We report studies that address this question in ethnicity, gender, and nationality intergroup contexts. In all of these, we show that perceivers attribute to others more biased intergroup beliefs than they themselves espouse. Even when perceivers themselves do not show intergroup bias or outgroup homogeneity, they attribute such biases to others, both others from their ingroup and others from their outgroup. We argue that such attributed intergroup beliefs are fundamentally important to expectations concerning intergroup interaction. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Pluralistic folk psychology and varieties of self-knowledge: an exploration

Turning the techniques we use to understand other people onto ourselves can provide an insight into the types of self-knowledge that may be possible for us. Adopting Pluralistic Folk Psychology, according to which we understand others not primarily by thinking about invisible beliefs and desires that cause behavior, but instead by modeling others as people - with rich characters, relationships, past histories, cultural embeddedness, personality traits, and so forth. A preliminary investigation shows that we understand ourselves at least in terms of our phenomenal states, informational states, perceptual states, traits, desires, and beliefs. I then appeal to empirical research to examine the accuracy of our sense of self-understanding in these ways, and argue that these are often non-veridical. Moreover, in our folk practices, we do not take our statements of self-understanding as infallible, but we allow others to help us see ourselves. While there is room for some improvement in our acurarcy, I conclude that our sense of self is largely a joint construct of self and others, and that looping effects play a significant role in what one’s self turns out to be. The self is a fluid thing that we are constantly creating through our actions and self-constituting thoughts, but it is a creation we do not make alone. Others help to create us, as we help to create them.     

A critique of Plantinga's theological foundationalism

Conclusion I think that the epistemological theory presented by Plantinga would be more plausible if it were amended in a way that would be consistent with the no-foundations view suggested above. We have considered in detail his conception of basic beliefs in Section II above, and noted that his conception of basicality was obscure. For Plantinga, beliefs are basic only under certain conditions, and this is an obscure notion of basicality because unlike basic beliefs in a more traditional foundationalist theory, there is no incorrigibility at the foundation, with no suitable substitute. Consequently, a foundationalist like Plantinga is faced with the same problem he thinks is inherent in coherentism; namely, how warrant for the noetic structure is guaranteed.In fact, it is unclear how Plantinga's version of foundationalism differs significantly from Williams' no-foundations view. If the noetic structure is potentially unlimited in the way that I have suggested, one could have a temporally local foundationalism which is consistent with Williams' no-foundations view, for all of Williams' arguments attack the notion of ultimate warrant for the noetic structure. And if, at a given time, a person takes certain beliefs in their noetic structure as basic contingent upon subsequent assessment of those beliefs, we have something very much like Plantinga's foundationalism. Such beliefs would be basic in the sense of being non-inferentially credible, but this would not entail their functioning as grounds for the noetic structure as a whole, for the element lacking in this no-foundations view is the certain sort of experience which Plantinga thinks is necessary as a ground of the basic belief. But given the problems discussed above concerning criteria for basicality and the consequent problems concerning the identification of what sorts of experience function as a suitable ground, it is unclear in what way Plantinga's position is preferable.Plantinga's fundamental objection to a coherence view of justification was that there is no way of accounting for ultimate warrant for a noetic structure. But in reference to his own theory, Plantinga states that:The justification-conferring conditions mentioned above must be seen as conferring prima facie rather than ultima facie, or all-things-considered justification. This justification can be overridden. (Reason, 83)If, however, basic beliefs are merely prima facie justified and can be overridden, then there is no accounting for ultimate warrant in theological foundationalism either. Basic beliefs in a foundationalist position are supposed to serve the function of providing an end to the process of justification, but they do not serve this function in Plantinga's system. In defending the no-foundations view of justification, Williams recognizes that some beliefs are in fact accepted as non-inferentially credible or that some beliefs happen to be reliable (86, 94). If this is all that basic beliefs amount to, i.e. beliefs that are prima facie credible yet still defeasible, then theological foundationalism may as well scrap any hope of supplying adequate grounds for a noetic structure.

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