Recognizing group cognition

In this paper, we approach the idea of group cognition from the perspective of the “extended mind” thesis, as a special case of the more general claim that systems larger than the individual human, but containing that human, are capable of cognition (Clark, 2008, Clark and Chalmers, 1998). Instead of deliberating about “the mark of the cognitive” (Adams & Aizawa, 2008), our discussion of group cognition is tied to particular cognitive capacities. We review recent studies of group problem solving and group memory which reveal that specific cognitive capacities that are commonly ascribed to individuals are also aptly ascribed at the level of groups. These case studies show how dense interactions among people within a group lead to both similarity-inducing and differentiating dynamics that affect the group’s ability to solve problems. This supports our claim that groups have organization-dependent cognitive capacities that go beyond the simple aggregation of the cognitive capacities of individuals. Group cognition is thus an emergent phenomenon in the sense of Wimsatt (1986). We further argue that anybody who rejects our strategy for showing that cognitive properties can be instantiated at multiple levels in the organizational hierarchy on a priori grounds is a “demergentist,” and thus incurs the burden of proof for explaining why cognitive properties are “stuck” at a certain level of organizational structure. Finally, we show that our analysis of group cognition escapes the “coupling-constitution” charge that has been leveled against the extended mind thesis (Adams & Aizawa, 2008).     

Beyond the Isolated Self: Extended Mind and Spirituality

Extended Cognition is a theory from philosophy of mind that has its roots in the more general notion of Embodied Cognition. Embodied cognition understands all human thought as involving the body (not just the brain), and as always situated in particular contexts. Cognitive extension goes further to suggest that intelligent mental processes often include things outside the brain and body, involving interactions with other persons or external artifacts that significantly enhance cognitive capacities. Thus, while intelligence was once thought to be an attribute of a single individual’s brain, it is now understood to extend into processes outside the person within immediate interactive space. For example, smart phones or problem-solving groups expand cognitive capacities beyond what is possible on one’s own. This article explores the possibility of supersizing-through-extension spirituality and Christian life within the interactive space of congregations and religious communities.     

Interactive Elicitation and Exchange of Knowledge

This paper gives a state-of-the-art report on the use of techniques based on personal construct psychology to automate interactive elicitation of cognitive structures for group learning and decision making. It outlines the structure and key components of the RepGrid implementation on a network of Macintosh computers, which includes tools for interactive reperto y grid elicitation and analysis, and a system for intemctizely exchanging and comparing reperto y grids from multiple simultaneous users on the network. The users of RepGrid are attempting to extend and understand their own thinking and problem-solving capabilities by interacting w'th other people. They are able to: see the relationship of thrir points of view to those of others explore differing termin, logy for the same constructs become aware of differing constructs having the same terminology extend their own construct systems with those of others provide others with constructs they have found valuable explore a problem-solving domain using the fill group resources     

Fitting in with the flock: Social attractiveness as a mechanism for well‐being in religious groups

For most people, religion is practiced and experienced within a social group of believers who interact regularly. Yet the role of social psychological intergroup processes has largely been ignored with respect to religious phenomena. The present study explores social attraction as a mechanism by which religious groups affect the psychological well‐being of their members. Data were taken from a large survey of the members of 411 religious congregations in the United States. Linear mixed modeling analyses were conducted predicting two aspects of well‐being in the religious context from a range of variables at the levels of the individual, of the group, and of individual–group fit. Fit measures between individual characteristics and norms within congregations were found to be significant predictors of well‐being for a variety of measures across domains of demographics, religious beliefs, religious behavior, and group integration. These results support the view that the intragroup process of social attraction is a mechanism by which people obtain some benefits from belonging to religious groups. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The spatial intersection of minds

Spatial formats of information are ubiquitous in the cognitive and neural sciences. There are neural uses of space in the topographic maps found throughout cortex. There are metaphorical uses of space in cognitive linguistics, physical uses of space in ecological psychology, and mathematical uses of space in dynamical systems theory. These varied informational uses of space each provide a single contiguous medium through which cognitive processes can be shared across subsystems. As we further develop our understanding of how the human mind processes information in real time, the continuous sharing and cascading of information patterns between brain areas can be extended to a sharing and cascading of information between multiple brains and bodies to produce coordinated behavior. Essentially, the way you and the people around you negotiate your shared space affects the way you think, because space is a fundamental part of how you think. It is via space that the mental processes of one mind can form an intersection with the mental processes of another mind.     

Finding a home: Developmental and neurobiological perspectives on cultural models

This article looks at cultural models in the light of human development, and neurobiological findings in motivation, learning, and cognition. It is argued that at the individual level, the acquisition of cultural models relies on several innate, neurobiologically based motivational, learning, and cognitive systems. These are: (a) a primary motivation to form social bonds which is driven by affect; (b) highly specialized social learning circuits, involving, but not limited to, mirror neuron systems, that facilitate the encoding of social information through implicit, embodied, imitational learning processes; and (c) the formation of culturally based templates for behavior and cognition centered around structures, collectively known as the “default mode network,” which is essential to self‐understanding, autobiographical memory, social cognition, prospection, and theory‐of‐mind. Cultural models, it is argued, are acquired through innate motivational processes that tie the individual emotionally to a secure base of familiar people and customs. This instinctual desire for proximity to others facilitates the efficient, largely implicit, patterning of knowledge and expectations. Shared knowledge and expectations, in turn, create a common, mostly implicit or unconscious, experience of subjectivity within groups. This allows each individual to automatically and effortlessly interact with similarly enculturated others.     

Cognitive enhancement by drugs in health and disease

Attempts to improve cognitive function in patients with brain disorders have become the focus of intensive research efforts. A recent emerging trend is the use of so-called cognitive enhancers by healthy individuals. Here, we consider some of the effects - positive and negative - that current drugs have in neurological conditions and healthy people. We conclude that, to date, experimental and clinical studies have demonstrated relatively modest overall effects, most probably because of substantial variability in response both across and within individuals. We discuss biological factors that might account for such variability and highlight the need to improve testing methods and to extend our understanding of how drugs modulate specific cognitive processes at the systems or network level.     

Anxious personality and functional efficiency of the insular-opercular network: A graph-analytic approach to resting-state fMRI

The brain is an intricate network, not only structurally but also functionally. On the functional level, connectivity in the brain is organized in separable yet interacting networks that support information processing by maintaining a ready state, even in the absence of external stimulation. It has been hypothesized that an insular-opercular network underlies the processing of emotionally salient information and that individual differences in functional connectivity within this network correspond to individual differences in trait anxiety. Here, we tested this relationship by applying graph analysis to multiple regions of interests delineating the insular-opercular network to estimate the characteristic path length that quantifies the overall information exchange efficiency within a given network. We found that people scoring high on the anxiety-related temperament-dimension harm avoidance had decreased insular-opercular network efficiency in the resting state, as indicated by a higher characteristic path length. Furthermore, people scoring high on harm avoidance showed generally reduced functional connectivity between brain regions; the relationship between harm avoidance and insular-opercular network efficiency remained significant when controlling for mean connectivity within this network. No such results were found for other resting-state networks. The results provide insights into how personality is organized in the human brain and point toward clinically relevant endophenotypes for affective and mood disorders.     

Emergent Processes in Group Behavior

ABSTRACT— Just as neurons interconnect in networks that create structured thoughts beyond the ken of any individual neuron, so people spontaneously organize themselves into groups to create emergent organizations that no individual may intend, comprehend, or even perceive. Recent technological advances have provided us with unprecedented opportunities for conducting controlled laboratory experiments on human collective behavior. We describe two experimental paradigms in which we attempt to build predictive bridges between the beliefs, goals, and cognitive capacities of individuals and patterns of behavior at the group level, showing how the members of a group dynamically allocate themselves to resources and how innovations diffuse through a social network. Agent-based computational models have provided useful explanatory and predictive accounts. Together, the models and experiments point to tradeoffs between exploration and exploitation—that is, compromises between individuals using their own innovations and using innovations obtained from their peers—and the emergence of group-level organizations such as population waves, bandwagon effects, and spontaneous specialization.     

The Ways of ‘Being’ and ‘Becoming’ Human

We argue that developing integrative models of psychological phenomenon require dealing simultaneously with information-theoretic and meaning making processes at the individual and group levels. Attempts to fuse these across levels based on intentionality become difficult because phenomena at the lower level organisms are conceptualized employing concrete systems language, while in case of human and social systems both concrete and abstracted systems concepts are used. Intentionality also needs to be looked at as arising out of the processes of both being and becoming. Fusing of psycho-and socio-logics necessarily requires taking into consideration psychological processes and notions of intentionality and future within cultural contexts in a more holistic manner. It is also argued that both at personal and collective levels, human intentionality operate as bounded intentionality alternating between states of being and becoming.     

Decoding the Large-Scale Structure of Brain Function by Classifying Mental States Across Individuals

ABSTRACT— Brain-imaging research has largely focused on localizing patterns of activity related to specific mental processes, but recent work has shown that mental states can be identified from neuroimaging data using statistical classifiers. We investigated whether this approach could be extended to predict the mental state of an individual using a statistical classifier trained on other individuals, and whether the information gained in doing so could provide new insights into how mental processes are organized in the brain. Using a variety of classifier techniques, we achieved cross-validated classification accuracy of 80% across individuals (chance = 13%). Using a neural network classifier, we recovered a low-dimensional representation common to all the cognitive-perceptual tasks in our data set, and we used an ontology of cognitive processes to determine the cognitive concepts most related to each dimension. These results revealed a small organized set of large-scale networks that map cognitive processes across a highly diverse set of mental tasks, suggesting a novel way to characterize the neural basis of cognition.     

Précis of neuroconstructivism: how the brain constructs cognition

Neuroconstructivism: How the Brain Constructs Cognition proposes a unifying framework for the study of cognitive development that brings together (1) constructivism (which views development as the progressive elaboration of increasingly complex structures), (2) cognitive neuroscience (which aims to understand the neural mechanisms underlying behavior), and (3) computational modeling (which proposes formal and explicit specifications of information processing). The guiding principle of our approach is context dependence, within and (in contrast to Marr [1982]) between levels of organization. We propose that three mechanisms guide the emergence of representations: competition, cooperation, and chronotopy; which themselves allow for two central processes: proactivity and progressive specialization. We suggest that the main outcome of development is partial representations, distributed across distinct functional circuits. This framework is derived by examining development at the level of single neurons, brain systems, and whole organisms. We use the terms encellment, embrainment, and embodiment to describe the higher-level contextual influences that act at each of these levels of organization. To illustrate these mechanisms in operation we provide case studies in early visual perception, infant habituation, phonological development, and object representations in infancy. Three further case studies are concerned with interactions between levels of explanation: social development, atypical development and within that, developmental dyslexia. We conclude that cognitive development arises from a dynamic, contextual change in embodied neural structures leading to partial representations across multiple brain regions and timescales, in response to proactively specified physical and social environment.     

Domain-specific and domain-general processes underlying metacognitive judgments

Metacognition and self-awareness are commonly assumed to operate as global capacities. However, there have been few attempts to test this assumption across multiple cognitive domains and metacognitive evaluations. Here, we assessed the covariance between “online” metacognitive processes, as measured by decision confidence judgments in the domains of perception and memory, and error awareness in the domain of attention to action. Previous research investigating metacognition across task domains have not matched stimulus characteristics across tasks raising the possibility that any differences in metacognitive accuracy may be influenced by local task properties. The current experiment measured metacognition in perceptual, memorial and attention tasks that were closely matched for stimulus characteristics. We found that metacognitive accuracy across the three tasks was dissociated suggesting that domain specific networks support an individual’s capacity for accurate metacognition. This finding was independent of objective performance, which was controlled using a staircase procedure. However, response times for metacognitive judgments and error awareness were associated suggesting that shared mechanisms determining how these meta-level evaluations unfold in time may underlie these different types of decision. In addition, the relationship between these laboratory measures of metacognition and reports of everyday functioning from participants and their significant others (informants) was investigated. We found that informant reports, but not self reports, predicted metacognitive accuracy on the perceptual task and participants who underreported cognitive difficulties relative to their informants also showed poorer metacognitive accuracy on the perceptual task. These results are discussed in the context of models of metacognitive regulation and neuropsychological evidence for dissociable metacognitive systems. The potential for the refinement of metacognitive assessment in clinical populations is also discussed.     

12th Biannual conference of the German cognitive science society (Gesellschaft für Kognitionswissenschaft)

The intimate relation between biology and cognition can be formally examined through statistical models constrained by the asymptotic limit theorems of communication theory, augmented by methods from statistical mechanics and nonequilibrium thermodynamics. Cognition, often involving submodules that act as information sources, is ubiquitous across the living state. Less metabolic free energy is consumed by permitting crosstalk between biological information sources than by isolating them, leading to evolutionary exaptations that assemble shifting, tunable cognitive arrays at multiple scales, and levels of organization to meet dynamic patterns of threat and opportunity. Cognition is thus necessary for life, but it is not sufficient: An organism represents a highly patterned outcome of path-dependent, blind, variation, selection, interaction, and chance extinction in the context of an adequate flow of free energy and an environment fit for development. Complex, interacting cognitive processes within an organism both record and instantiate those evolutionary and developmental trajectories.     

An investigation of everyday prospective memory

Prospective memory, remembering to carry out one’s planned activities, was investigated using a naturalistic paradigm. Three experiments, with a total of 405 participants, were conducted. The goal was to demonstrate that the cognitive processing underlying successful everyday prospective remembering involves components other than mere “memory.” Those components are probably best represented as individual differences in various cognitive capacities. More specifically, metamemory, attentional capacities, and planning processes that reprioritize intentions according to the demands of everyday life may determine how people actually accomplish the plans they establish for themselves. The results of these experiments suggest that researchers interested in the topic will have to contend with a multidimensional set of factors before any comprehensive understanding of prospective remembering can be realized.     

Relationships between cognitive coping,self-esteem,anxiety and depression: A cluster-analysis approach

It is important for prevention efforts and for designing appropriate interventions to identify people at risk of depression while considering cognitive coping and individual characteristics. This study with 334 French adults examined the ways in which people may combine the use of several cognitive coping strategies and investigated whether depression, self-esteem, and state- and trait-anxiety would differ across distinctive cognitive coping profiles. A two-phased cluster analytic plan was employed to derive clusters of cognitive coping profiles. We identified three profiles that differed according to the levels of depression, self-esteem, and state- and trait-anxiety. Research should therefore not focus on a single cognitive coping strategy, but on all cognitive coping strategies that are used simultaneously to investigate the relation between cognitive coping and emotional problems. Cognitive coping profiles provided a deeper understanding of how different individuals cope with negative and unpleasant events, and they allowed us to identify targeted groups that are most likely to benefit from specific mental health promotion and prevention campaigns.     

语言能力的老化机制：语言特异性与非特异性因素的共同作用

语言能力的衰退是由于一般认知能力衰退引起的, 还是由于语言加工系统的衰退引起的, 抑或是两者的共同作用?研究中测量了青年组和老年组的一般认知能力(加工速度、工作记忆和抑制能力), 以及在词汇、句子和语篇三个水平上的语言理解能力和语言产生能力。结果发现, 一般认知能力、语言理解和语言产生能力都存在年老化现象。分层回归分析表明, 一般认知能力对语言能力的贡献, 以及语言理解能力和产生能力之间的相互贡献在青年组和老年组中是不同的, 且存在词汇、句子和语篇水平上的差异。在词汇水平上, 青年人的成绩能够被一般认知能力和另一种语言能力所显著预测, 而老年人的成绩却不受一般认知因素影响; 在句子水平上, 青年人的成绩仍能被一般认知能力或另一种语言能力所解释, 但这两类变量都无法预测老年人的任务成绩; 在语篇水平上, 青年人理解任务的成绩显著地受到产生能力影响, 而老年人的理解和产生任务成绩则分别可以被一般认知能力和语言理解能力所解释。对组间差异的回归分析表明, 一般认知能力和另一种语言能力对组间差异都有显著贡献, 且前者的贡献大于后者。上述研究结果表明, 语言能力的老化是语言特异性因素和非特异性因素共同作用的结果。     

A Piagetian perspective on mathematical construction

In this paper, we offer a Piagetian perspective on the construction of the logico-mathematical schemas which embody our knowledge of logic and mathematics. Logico-mathematical entities are tied to the subject's activities, yet are so constructed by reflective abstraction that they result from sensorimotor experience only via the construction of intermediate schemas of increasing abstraction. The ‘axiom set’ does not exhaust the cognitive structure (schema network) which the mathematician thus acquires. We thus view ‘truth’ not as something to be defined within the closed ‘world’ of a formal system but rather in terms of the schema network within which the formal system is embedded. We differ from Piaget in that we see mathematical knowledge as based on social processes of mutual verification which provide an external drive to any ‘necessary dynamic’ of reflective abstraction within the individual. From this perspective, we argue that axiom schemas tied to a preferred interpretation may provide a necessary intermediate stage of reflective abstraction en route to acquisition of the ability to use formal systems in abstracto.     

Groups as social network members: Overlooked sources of social support

In a study of the link between physical disability and social relationships among the elderly, questions about social network and social support evoked a surprisingly large number of group responses. People mentioned "my grandchildren," "the people in my building," "people at the senior center," and other groups in ways that suggested that the real unit of support was extraindividual and could not be accurately understood by reference to individual people within those groups. This paper describes the frequency of such responses and the circumstances under which they emerged. Definitions of social support and of social network should not be restricted to dyadic relationships between individuals; better understanding of social support processes would derive from consideration of the kinds of social support functions best offered by groups vs. individuals and consideration of differences in the ways in which support is derived from groups and individuals.