Beyond sympathy: Smith’s rejection of Hume’s moral theory

Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS) has long been recognized as importantly influenced by, and in part responding to, David Hume’s earlier ethical theory. With regard to Smith’s account of the foundations of morals in particular, recent scholarly attention has focused on Smith’s differences with Hume over the question of sympathy. Whilst this is certainly important, disagreement over sympathy in fact represents only the starting point of Smith’s engagement with – and eventual attempted rejection of – Hume’s core moral theory. We can see this by recognizing the TMS’s account of moral foundations as predicated upon a rejection of Hume’s distinction between the natural and artificial virtues. Smith is in turn revealed as generating a major break with Hume – a break which, if based on a superior theory of moral foundations (as Smith thought it to be) has important consequences for how we treat Smith and Hume in both the history of philosophy and contemporary moral theory.     

Fichte’s method of moral justification

ABSTRACT

While Kant’s claim that the moral law discloses our freedom to us has been extensively discussed in recent decades, the reactions to this claim among Kant’s immediate successors have gone largely overlooked by scholars. Reinhold, Creuzer, and Maimon were among three prominent thinkers of the era unwilling to follow Kant in making the moral law the condition for knowing our freedom. Maimon went so far as to reject Kant’s method of appealing to our everyday awareness of duty on the grounds that common human understanding is susceptible to error and illusion. In this paper I shall examine how these skeptical reactions to Kant’s position shaped the background for Fichte’s method of moral justification, leading up to his own deduction of the moral law in the System of Ethics (1798). By way of conclusion, I shall propose a new interpretation of how consciousness of the moral law serves as an entry-point to Fichte’s form of idealism.     

Children’s models of division

Young children find it much easier to solve concrete partitive division problems when the objects to be shared are grouped by the divisor rather than by the quotient, but the reverse is true in quotitive division problems [J. Exp. Child Psychol. 81 (2002a) 1; Dev. Sci. 5 (2002b) 452]. In previous research, the objects to be shared were grouped and the perceptual display was slightly different in the Grouping-by-Divisor and Grouping-by-Quotient conditions and this may have contributed to the difference between the conditions. In the study reported here, partitive and quotitive division problems were presented to 5–8-year-olds. The objects to be shared were presented in a grid and the “groups” were created by verbal instruction; the perceptual arrangement was identical in both conditions. The Grouping-by-Divisor condition remained significantly easier than the Grouping-by-Quotient condition in the partitive problems but the reverse was true in the quotitive problems. This shows that the perceptual arrangement of objects cannot fully explain the difference in difficulty between the Grouping-by-Divisor and Grouping-by-Quotient conditions and also provides support for the notion that young children rely on models that are based on restricted concrete representations when solving division problems. The results are discussed in terms of theories about the development of executive function, children’s attentional focus and the development of an integrated understanding of division.     

Schools as promoters of moral judgment: the essential role of teachers’ encouragement of critical thinking

The assumption that high level functioning is characterized by a great deal of autonomy is central to some major theories of moral development [Kohlberg (in T. Lickona (ed.) Moral development and behavior: Theory, research and social issues, 1976); Piaget (The moral judgment of the child, 1932)] and to the self-determination theory of motivation [Ryan and Deci (The American Psychologist, 55, 68–78, 2000)]. Based on these theories, we hypothesized that students’ perceptions of their teachers as autonomy supportive, mainly in the form of encouragement of critical thinking, and perhaps also choice, would be positively associated with students’ advanced moral judgment. Data collected from 12th grade students in two regular schools and two democratic schools supported this hypothesis. Results also showed that being a student in a democratic school (as opposed to a regular one) was associated with autonomous moral judgment, and that this association was mediated by students’ perceptions of teachers as encouraging criticism, but not choice. A possible implication is that programs of moral education should explicitly promote teachers’ inclination to encourage critical thinking in their students.

‘The moral irrelevance of moral coercion’

Philosophical Studies - An agent A morally coerces another agent, B, when A manipulates non-epistemological facts in order that B’s moral commitments enjoin B to do what A wants B to do, and...     

God meets Satan’s Apple: the paradox of creation

It is now the majority view amongst philosophers and theologians that any world could have been better. This places the choice of which world to create into an especially challenging class of decision problems: those that are discontinuous in the limit. I argue that combining some weak, plausible norms governing this type of problem with a creator who has the attributes of the god of classical theism results in a paradox: no world is possible. After exploring some ways out of the paradox, I conclude that the classical theist should accept Marilyn Adams’s view that no norms (of morality or of rationality) apply to gods.     

A critique of Thad Metz’s African theory of moral status

Thad Metz defends what he considers to be a novel theory of moral status, i.e. an account about what beings are owed direct duties in virtue of their moral significance. Metz claims that his account is African, it is plausible and that it is worth taking seriously like other competing accounts in the Western philosophical tradition. In this article, I give four reasons why we should doubt, if not reject, these claims of plausibility. Firstly, I show how a theory that accounts for moral status by relying solely on some facet of human nature ultimately fails to grant intrinsic value to non-human components, and as such it will always prefer human interests over those of nonhuman components, and further it won’t have a moral-theoretical basis to assign intrinsic value to non-human components. Secondly, I hope to demonstrate that this theory will not be able to account for the moral status of Martians and in turn show that it does not secure the standing of animals from such beings. I also argue that his account does not give credible evidence for the intuition that severely injured human persons have greater moral status than animals with similar internal properties. Finally, I briefly indicate that this theory does not have the corpus to explain our duties to people who have died, or at least, their bodies.     

An evolutionary perspective on Kohlberg’s theory of moral development

The purpose of this research was to test the proposition that moral development and social evolution have progressed together, each enabling the other. Stage 1 and Stage 2 reasons for behaving morally are to avoid punishment and achieve rewards. Since moral behavior at these stages is externally determined they do not form a basis for cooperative living. Stage 3 morality involves the reasoning that people are obligated to care for their family and friends; this would appear to be the morality of hunter and gatherer societies. Stage 4 morality involves the reasoning that people must obey authority in the form of traditional norms, written laws, and the legal system; this would appear to be the morality of nation states. Stage 5 morality involves the reasoning that people should obey democratically created rules which presumably create the greatest good for the greatest number and Stage 6 morality involves the reasoning that people should follow universal ethical principles like justice. These moralities would appear to be the morality of international social organizations. To test the hypothesis that moral development and social evolution progressed together, the Measures of Moral Reasoning Scale was created, consisting of six scales measuring Kohlberg’s stages of moral reasoning. As a measure of social evolution (i.e., inclusion), participants were asked how many of their resources they intended to invest in the following targets over their lifetimes: self, biological children, mate, biological parents, biological siblings, friends (but not relatives), American strangers, and non-American strangers. Supporting the hypothesis, Stage 1 and 2 measures correlated with the intent to invest in the self but not others; the Stage 3 measure correlated with the intent to invest in the participant’s children, mate, parents, siblings, and friends (a hunter-gatherer social organization); the Stage 4 measure correlated with investment in all of the above targets except self and non-American strangers (a nationalistic social organization); the Stage 5 measure correlated with investment in children, mate, parents, and American strangers (a nationalistic social organization), and the Stage 6 measure correlated with investment in all of the targets except self (a global social organization).

     

God’s moral goodness and supererogation

What do we understand by God’s goodness? William Alston claims that by answering this question convincingly, divine command theory can be strengthened against some major objections. He rejects the idea that God’s goodness lies in the area of moral obligations. Instead, he proposes that God’s goodness is best described by the phenomenon of supererogation. Joseph Lombardi, in response, agrees with Alston that God does not have moral obligations but says that having rejected moral obligation as the content of divine goodness, Alston cannot help himself to supererogation as a solution to the content of God’s moral goodness. If God has no moral obligations and does not perform supererogatory acts, Lombardi suggests that God’s goodness may be explicated through concentrating on God’s benevolence, but he does not develop this theme. I propose that Alston’s idea of divine supererogation without obligation is sustainable, but that a reshaping of the concept of supererogation is required; one in which love, rather than benevolence, plays an important part. If the love associated with supererogation is characterised in a certain way, I suggest this adds a new angle to the understanding of divine goodness.     

The development of children’s sympathy,moral emotion attributions,and moral reasoning in two cultures

The current study investigated the development of children’s sympathy, moral emotion attributions, and moral reasoning in two cultures: Chile and Switzerland. One hundred seventy-six children in two age groups (i.e., 6 and 9 years old) were asked to report their sympathy. Moral emotion attributions and moral reasoning were measured using two hypothetical moral transgressions (i.e., omitting a prosocial duty, stealing from another child). Younger Chilean children reported higher levels of sympathy than younger Swiss children. Across cultures, older children attributed more moral emotions than did younger children. Younger Swiss children used more moral reasoning following judgements about rule violations than did younger Chilean children. The findings are discussed from both a developmental and cross-cultural perspective.     

The role of entrenchment in children’s and adults’ performance on grammaticality judgment tasks

Between the ages of 3 and 7 years, children have been observed to produce verb argument structure overgeneralization errors (e.g., Don’t giggle me; Bowerman, 1982, 1988; Pinker, 1989). A number of recent studies have begun to find evidence that the precise distributional properties of the input may provide an important part of the explanation for why children retreat from overgeneralization errors (Brooks & Tomasello, 1999; Brooks, Tomasello, Dodson, & Lewis, 1999). The current study evaluates the role of entrenchment (Braine & Brooks, 1995) in constraining argument structure overgeneralization errors using a grammaticality judgment task. The 5-year-olds, 8-year-olds, and adults were presented with examples of argument structure errors containing high and low frequency verbs matched for semantic class and asked to indicate whether, or the extent to which they found the sentences to be grammatical. The data show that across all groups, sentences with argument structure errors containing low frequency verbs were judged to be significantly more grammatical than those containing high frequency verbs. These findings provide further support for the entrenchment hypothesis and suggest that verb frequency plays an important and continuing role in determining a speaker’s choice of verb argument structure.     

The engineer’s moral right to reputational fairness

This essay explores the issue of the moral rights of engineers. An historical case study is presented in which an accomplished, loyal, senior engineer was apparently wronged as a result of actions taken by his employer in pursuit of legitimate business interests. Belief that the engineer was wronged is justified by showing that what happened to him violated what can validly be termed one of his moral rights as an engineer: the right to reputational fairness. It is then argued that, this right notwithstanding, under certain circumstances it is morally permissible for employers to override it. The paper concludes by identifying two complementary facets of this right, discussing its scope, and indicating what is required of employers obliged to respect it in two types of action contexts. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the Society for the History of Technology in Washington, D.C. on October 16, 1993. I am indebted to Stephanie J. Bird, Taft Broome, Deborah Johnson, Carl Mitcham, Walter Vincenti, Vivian Weil, and Caroline Whitbeck for helpful critical comments. Professor of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management and, by courtesy, of Civil Engineering, and in the Program in Science, Technology, and Society, School of Engineering, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA, 94305-2120.     

Exploration of Ethical Debates through Desai’s The Inheritance of Loss,Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go and Smith’s On Beauty

This essay examines debates over alternative ethical formulations that break from the Kantian model through contemporary fiction—Kiran Desai’s The Inheritance of Loss (2006), Kazuo Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go (2005) and Zadie Smith’s On Beauty (2005). The essay returns to the theory, the ethics of care, put forward by Carol Gilligan in In a Different Voice (1982), which has regained significance in the context of questions surrounding care in contemporary ethical thinking. While the three novels are concerned with ideas of care, beauty, justice and the tyranny of the mainstream, this essay examines particular themes in particular texts which suggest that ideas with otherwise subversive potential—like care or beauty or justice—lose their radicalism when they are incorporated within the impersonal, masculinist mainstream. Carol Gilligan’s feminine ethics of care, with its respect for the particular, is not only still important as the stimulus to thinking about alternatives to overarching ethical discourses, but it could also re-confer these concepts of care, beauty and justice their revolutionary potential.     

Theoretical and empirical comparison of Luce’s choice model and logistic Thurstone model of categorical judgment

Theoretical predictions of the two models are analyzed and shown to be different if the number of categories is three or more. Then two common methods of testing mathematical models empirically are examined: (1) direct testing of predictions embodied in constraint equations, and (2) minimum chi-square methods. In the experimental investigation, two undergraduate subjects performed an eight-stimulus, 8-response category judgment of loudness in a neutral and a payoff biased condition. There were no significant departures from the Thurstone model, but substantial and significant departure from the choice model, especially in the biased condition. Chi-square tests were more powerful than constraint tests, but less good at identifying the source of conflict between data and theory.     

Moral internalism and moral cognitivism in Hume’s metaethics

Most naturalists think that the belief/desire model from Hume is the best framework for making sense of motivation. As Smith has argued, given that the cognitive state (belief) and the conative state (desire) are separate on this model, if a moral judgment is cognitive, it could not also be motivating by itself. So, it looks as though Hume and Humeans cannot hold that moral judgments are states of belief (moral cognitivism) and internally motivating (moral internalism). My chief claim is that the details of Hume’s naturalistic philosophy of mind actually allow for a conjunction of these allegedly incompatible views. This thesis is significant, since readers typically have thought that Hume’s view that motivation is not produced by representations, coupled with his view that moral judgments motivate on their own, imply that moral judgments could never take the form of beliefs about, or representations of, the moral (virtue and vice).