Reading On Certainty through the Lens of Cavell: Scepticism,Dogmatism and the ‘Groundlessness of our Believing’

Abstract

While Cavell is well known for his reinterpretation of the later Wittgenstein, he has never really engaged himself with post-Investigations writings like On Certainty. This collection may, however, seem to undermine the profoundly anti-dogmatic reading of Wittgenstein that Cavell has developed. In addition to apparently arguing against what Cavell calls ‘the truth of skepticism’ – a phrase contested by other Wittgensteinians – On Certainty may seem to justify the rejection of whoever dares to question one’s basic presuppositions. According to On Certainty, or so it seems, the only right response to someone with different certainties is a reproach like ‘Fool!’ or ‘Heretic!’. This article aims to show that On Certainty need not be taken to prove Cavell wrong. It explains that Wittgenstein, in line with the first two parts of The Claim of Reason, does not reject scepticism out of hand but rather questions the sceptic’s self-understanding. Using arguments from Part Three of The Claim, the article moreover argues that a confrontation with divergence calls for self-examination rather than self-righteousness. Precisely because Wittgenstein acknowledges ‘the groundlessness of our believing’ or, in Cavellian terms, ‘the truth of skepticism’, he is not the authoritarian thinker that some have taken him to be.     

Are most of our concepts innate?

Fodor has argued that, because concept acquisition relies on the use of concepts already possessed by the learner, all concepts that cannot be definitionally reduced are innate. Since very few reductive definitions are available, it appears that most concepts are innate. After noting the reasons why we find such radical concept nativism implausible, I explicate Fodor's argument, showing that anyone who is committed to mentalistic explanation should take it seriously. Three attempts at avoiding the conclusion are examined and found to be unsuccessful. I then present an alternative way around Fodor's nativism; I maintain that concepts at a given level of explanation can be semantically primitive, yet at least partially acquired if some of the conditions at a lower level of explanation that are responsible for the concept's presence are themselves acquired.Thanks are due to Jerry Samet and to Bob Shope for detailed and very helpful comments. I am also indebted to Ned Block, Susan Carey, Noam Chomsky, Jerry Fodor, Thomas Kuhn, Georges Rey, and Bob Stalnaker for their comments, criticisms, and suggestions on an earlier work, out of which this essay evolved.     

Noogenesis—the fundamental problem of our time

The possibility of long wave economic cycles are considered under both market capitalism and command socialism. Capitalist long waves can be generated by a two‐stage multiplier‐accelerator model and socialist long waves can be generated by an equivalent model strictly for investment cycles. Under certain conditions chaotic dynamics can occur at turning points in both cases. It is argued that a systemic crisis leading to a systemic transformation is most likely to occur at such a point.     

Mapping our Progress: Identifying, Categorizing and Comparing Universities’ Ethics Infrastructures

Ethics researchers have scrutinized ethical business problems, which have been demonstrated through the actions of managers at Enron, WorldCom, and Arthur Andersen, among others. In response to these business transgressions, the US government has implemented the Sarbanes–Oxley Act to shore up businesses’ ethics infrastructures. However, universities, too, struggle with ethics problems. These include NCAA (National Collegiate Athletic Association) violations, discrimination issues, sexual harassment, endowment admits, plagiarism, and research funding manipulation. Despite these problems, we have little knowledge regarding universities’ ethics infrastructures and codes of conduct, and insignificant empirical research on academic ethics issues (Kelley & Chang, Journal of Higher Education, under review, 2006; Morgan & Korschgen, College Student Journal, Sept., 2001). This lack of knowledge exists despite the critical role universities play in shaping the moral behavior of future generations (Langlais, The Chronicle of Higher Education, January 13:B11, 2006; Woo, BizEd, May/June:22–27, 2003). In this paper, we conduct exploratory research to identify the elements of universities ethics’ infrastructures. From our research, we develop an understanding of the ethics policies and infrastructure elements in place at a representative group of universities. We compare these infrastructures to those in business as well as across Carnegie Classifications. We then conclude with recommendations for developing university ethics infrastructures and suggestions for future research.     

Is the History of our Universe Finite?

Modern cosmology indicates that our universe has a finite age. However, it is not understood whether the initial state before the Big Bang is finite in history or not. In this article, I show by simple arguments that the initial state must be finite in history if it is real. If the initial state is not real, a special transition is needed to specify the beginning of the real time. Moreover, if our universe is just one of the many universes, it can be shown that the history of the universe generator must also be finite.     

Evolutionary debunking: Can moral realists explain the reliability of our moral judgments?

Evolutionary debunking arguments, notably Sharon Street’s Darwinian Dilemma (2006), allege that moral realists need to explain the reliability of our moral judgments, given their evolutionary sources. David Copp (2008) and David Enoch (2010) take up the challenge. I argue on empirical grounds that realists have not met the challenge and moreover cannot do so. The outcome is that there are empirically-motivated reasons for thinking moral realists cannot explain moral reliability, given our current empirical understanding.     

No unchallengeable epistemic authority,of any sort,regarding our own conscious experience – Contra Dennett?

Dennett argues that we can be mistaken about our own conscious experience. Despite this, he repeatedly asserts that we can or do have unchallengeable authority of some sort in our reports about that experience. This assertion takes three forms. First, Dennett compares our authority to the authority of an author over his fictional world. Unfortunately, that appears to involve denying that there are actual facts about experience that subjects may be truly or falsely reporting. Second, Dennett sometimes seems to say that even though we may be mistaken about what our conscious experience is, our reports about “what it’s like to be us” must be correct. That view unfortunately requires a nonstandard and unremarked distinction between facts about consciousness and facts about “what it’s like.” Third, Dennett says that reports about experience may be “incorrigible.” However, that claim stands in tension with evidence, highlighted by Dennett himself, that seems to suggest that people can be demonstrably mistaken about their own experience. Dennett needlessly muddies his case against infallibilism with these unsatisfactory compromises.     

Information search in decisions from experience. Do our patterns of sampling foreshadow our decisions?

Do different patterns of sampling influence the decisions people make, even when the information the decisions are based on is equivalent? Do more and less switching between options correlate with different kinds of decision policies? In past research, the correspondence between search and decision patterns has been difficult to ascertain because the information obtained has often been confounded with its consequences in an exploration-exploitation trade-off. We used a sampling task in which information is explored prior to being exploited. We found that search patterns did reveal decision policies. Individuals who transitioned more frequently between options were more likely to choose options that win most of the time in round-wise comparisons and were more likely to underweight rare, risky events. Less switching between options was associated with choosing options that win in the long run on the basis of summary comparisons--decisions consistent with expected-value maximization and linear weighting of outcomes.     

Will managed care change our way of being?

The authors studied psychotherapeutic practices commonly used in managed care settings and the theories and rhetorical strategies that justify them to speculate about if or how they are beginning to influence societywide understandings about the proper way of being human at the turn of the millennium. The practices--and effects--of managed care regulations on the self are interpreted by studying how the patient, the therapist, and the therapeutic relationship come to light in managed care settings. These categories are then used to speculate about the configuration of the newly emerging, 21st-century self. By extending hermeneutic concerns about instrumentalism and technicism, the authors suggest a new way of thinking about psychotherapy modeled less on positivist science and more on moral discourse. Finally, given this more hermeneutic understanding of psychotherapy, the authors speculate about alternative conceptions and arrangements of care.     

Empathizing and systemizing: What are they,and what do they contribute to our understanding of psychological sex differences?

Empathizing and systemizing have recently been put forward as two important individual‐difference dimensions, whose different mean levels in men and women are argued to account for many psychological sex differences. This paper presents a series of studies designed to investigate the reliability and validity of the empathizing and systemizing quotients (EQ & SQ), to relate them to existing personality constructs, and to replicate reported sex and sexual orientation‐related differences. Correlations with interests and social behaviour suggest the two measures are valid. However, empathizing appears essentially equivalent to agreeableness in the five‐factor model of personality. Systemizing cannot be reduced to established personality dimensions, though it is moderately correlated with conscientiousness and openness. Men have higher levels of systemizing than women, and non‐heterosexual women higher than heterosexuals. However, no differences were found between heterosexual and non‐heterosexual men. Although systemizing and empathizing account for a number of observed sex differences, there are others they do not explain.     

Resiliency: A shift in our perception?

Abstract

As our clients often underestimate their own resources and potential, do helpers fall victim to the same phenomena? This article contends that helpers are often overly attentive to client deficits and pathology to the detriment of acknowledging family and other client strengths and resources brought into the therapeutic arena. Much of our professional training results in an overreliance upon pathological lenses which is to the disadvantage of both client and helper. Family therapists must remain vigilant to not becoming seduced into the attractive web of “pathologizing.” Experiences that heightened this awareness for the author are described, followed by illustration of the importance and benefit of therapists becoming more sensitive to the study of human resiliency.     

Cognitive fusion and emotion differentiation: does getting entangled with our thoughts dysregulate the generation,experience and regulation of emotion?

We tested whether cognitive fusion impairs emotion differentiation and thereby mediates relations between cognitive fusion and depression and panic symptoms among 55 adults (M_age?=?26.8 (3.9), 50.9% women). Using visual stimuli, we elicited multiple emotion states and measured (a) emotional intensity – the subjective emotion intensity of elicited emotions (i.e. Specific Emotion Intensity – SEI), as well as (b) emotional differentiation – the degree of co-activation of multiple negative emotions when a specific emotion was elicited (i.e. Multiple Emotion Co-Activation – MECA). First, as hypothesised, we found that cognitive fusion predicted lower levels of emotion differentiation (MECA). In contrast, as hypothesised, these effects were significantly greater than the (null) effects of cognitive fusion on emotion intensity (SEI). Second, as predicted, MECA, but not SEI, predicted depression and panic symptoms. Finally, we found that MECA mediated the effects of cognitive fusion on depression and panic symptoms. The present findings contribute novel, preliminary empirical insight into associations between cognitive fusion, impaired emotion differentiation and mental ill-health.     

"Who should survive?: one of the choices on our conscience": mental retardation and the history of contemporary bioethics

The film "Who Should Survive?: One of the Choices on Our Conscience" contains a dramatization of the death of an infant with Down syndrome as the result of the parents' decision not to have a congenital intestinal obstruction surgically corrected. The dramatization was based on two similar cases at The Johns Hopkins Hospital and was financed by the Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr., Foundation. When "Who Should Survive?" was exhibited in 1971, the public reaction was generally critical of the parents' decision and the physicians' inaction. Although technological developments in medicine were a necessary condition for the production of this film and its unanticipated reception, they were not a sufficient condition. The proximate cause was a changed understanding of the capabilities of individuals with Down syndrome. Part of the impetus for this change was data showing the adverse effects of institutionalization on normal children.     

Précis of Foundations of language: brain, meaning, grammar, evolution

The goal of this study is to reintegrate the theory of generative grammar into the cognitive sciences. Generative grammar was right to focus on the child's acquisition of language as its central problem, leading to the hypothesis of an innate Universal Grammar. However, generative grammar was mistaken in assuming that the syntactic component is the sole course of combinatoriality, and that everything else is "interpretive." The proper approach is a parallel architecture, in which phonology, syntax, and semantics are autonomous generative systems linked by interface components. The parallel architecture leads to an integration within linguistics, and to a far better integration with the rest of cognitive neuroscience. It fits naturally into the larger architecture of the mind/brain and permits a properly mentalistic theory of semantics. It results in a view of linguistic performance in which the rules of grammar are directly involved in processing. Finally, it leads to a natural account of the incremental evolution of the language capacity.     

School in our memory: do we remember our time in middle and high school differently?

ABSTRACT

The present study investigated autobiographical memories of school. While previous works have shown that most memories relating to school are social as opposed to academic, there are still strong theoretical arguments for the presumed prevalence of educationally oriented memories from at least some parts of the school period. The goal of the study was to replicate previous studies while addressing some of their limitations. In our study, only memories of high school were more socially and less educationally oriented. Also, memories of high school were more positive and emotionally intense. We discuss the further implications of these effects.     

Are we aware of our ability to forget? Metacognitive predictions of directed forgetting

It is often important to accurately predict not only what information we will later remember, but also what information we are likely to forget. The present research examined these abilities in the context of item-method directed forgetting, to determine whether people are aware of their strategic control of remembering and forgetting, as well as what cues are used when making metacognitive judgments. Participants studied words, each of which was followed by a cue to remember (R) or forget (F) the word for an upcoming test, and also made predictions of how likely they would be to later recall each word. When asked to recall all of the words, regardless of cue, both recall and predicted recall were fairly sensitive to the R or F instructions, despite some overconfidence. A similar and stronger pattern was found when words were assigned positive or negative point values as cues to remember or forget. These findings suggest that item-based cues to remember or forget information can be successfully utilized when making metacognitive judgments, and that people are fairly aware of the control they have over both remembering and forgetting information.     

Do others judge us as harshly as we think? Overestimating the impact of our failures, shortcomings, and mishaps

When people suffer an embarrassing blunder, social mishap, or public failure, they often feel that their image has been severely tarnished in the eyes of others. Four studies demonstrate that these fears are commonly exaggerated. Actors who imagined committing one of several social blunders (Study 1), who experienced a public intellectual failure (Studies 2 and 3), or who were described in an embarrassing way (Study 4) anticipated being judged more harshly by others than they actually were. These exaggerated fears were produced, in part, by the actors' tendency to be inordinately focused on their misfortunes and by their resulting failure to consider the wider range of situational factors that tend to moderate onlookers' impressions. Discussion focuses on additional mechanisms that may contribute to overly pessimistic expectations as well as the role of such expectations in producing unnecessary social anxiety.