共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Michael Blome-Tillmann 《Philosophical Studies》2008,138(1):29-53
Epistemic contextualism—the view that the content of the predicate ‘know’ can change with the context of utterance—has fallen
into considerable disrepute recently. Many theorists have raised doubts as to whether ‘know’ is context-sensitive, typically
basing their arguments on data suggesting that ‘know’ behaves semantically and syntactically in a way quite different from
recognised indexicals such as ‘I’ and ‘here’ or ‘flat’ and ‘empty’. This paper takes a closer look at three pertinent objections
of this kind, viz. at what I call the Error-Theory Objection, the Gradability Objection and the Clarification-Technique Objection.
The paper concludes that none of these objections can provide decisive evidence against contextualism. 相似文献
2.
Lars Gundersen 《Erkenntnis》2010,72(3):353-364
According to Nozick’s tracking theory of knowledge, an agent a knows that p just in case her belief that p is true and also satisfies the two tracking conditionals that had p been false, she would not have believed that p, and had p been true under slightly different circumstances, she would still have believed that p. In this paper I wish to highlight an interesting but generally ignored feature of this theory: namely that it is reminiscent
of a dispositional account of knowledge: it invites us to think of knowledge as a manifestation of a cognitive disposition to form true beliefs.
Indeed, given a general account of dispositions in terms of subjunctive conditionals, the two tracking conditionals are satisfied
just in case the belief in question results from some cognitive disposition to form true beliefs. Recently, such a conditional
account of dispositions has, however, been criticised for its vulnerability to so-called ‘masked’, ‘mimicked’ and ‘finkish’
counterexamples. I show how the classical counterexamples to Nozick’s theory divide smoothly into four corresponding categories
of counterexamples from epistemic masking, mimicking and finkishness. This provides strong evidence for the thesis that satisfaction of the two tracking conditionals
is symptomatic of knowledge and that knowledge is instead constituted by a dispositional capability to form true beliefs. The attempt to capture such a cognitive, dispositional capability in
terms of the tracking conditionals, although providing a good approximation in a wide variety of cases, still comes apart
from the real thing whenever the epistemic layout is characterised by masking-, mimicking- and finkish mechanisms. In the
last part of the paper I explore the prospect of improving the tracking theory in the light of these findings. 相似文献
3.
Michael Heidelberger 《Erkenntnis》2011,75(3):467-482
The term “historical epistemology” can be read in two different ways: (1) as referring to a program of ‘historicizing’ epistemology,
in the sense of a critique of traditional epistemology’s tendency to gloss over historical context, or (2) as a manifesto
of ‘epistemologizing’ history, i.e. as a critique of radical historicist and relativist approaches. In this paper I will defend
a position in this second sense. I show that one can account for the historical development and diversity of science without
disavowing the relevance of a (normatively understood) epistemology and without denying the existence of human cognitive universals
across historical and cultural differences. In support of my thesis, I draw on cognitive scientific research on causal and
symbolic cognition, arguing that causal understanding constitutes a basic part of science, which, in the course of its development,
becomes more and more superimposed by a culturally and historically variable symbolic superstructure. 相似文献
4.
Komarine Romdenh-Romluc 《Synthese》2008,163(2):145-156
The traditional account (TA) of first-person thought draws conclusions about this type of thinking from claims made about
the first-person pronoun. In this paper I raise a worry for the traditional account. Certain uses of ‘I’ conflict with its
conception of the linguistic data. I argue that once the data is analysed correctly, the traditional approach to first-person
thought cannot be maintained. 相似文献
5.
Michael P. Levine 《Philosophia》1989,19(2-3):209-225
‘Epistemics: an enterprise linking traditional epistemology, first with cognitive science and, second, with social scientific and humanistic
disciplines that explore the interpersonal and cultural processes impinging on knowledge and belief’ (Epistemology and Cognition, p. vii) 相似文献
6.
Steven Crowell 《Synthese》2008,160(3):335-354
This paper argues that transcendental phenomenology (here represented by Edmund Husserl) can accommodate the main thesis of
semantic externalism, namely, that intentional content is not simply a matter of what is ‘in the head,’ but depends on how
the world is. I first introduce the semantic problem as an issue of how linguistic tokens or mental states can have ‘content’—that
is, how they can set up conditions of satisfaction or be responsive to norms such that they can succeed or fail at referring.
The standard representationalist view—which thinks of the problem in first-person terms—is contrasted with Brandom’s pragmatic
inferentialist approach, which adopts a third-person stance. The rest of the paper defends a phenomenological version of the
representationalist position (seeking to preserve its first-person stance) but offers a conception of representation that
does not identify it with an entity ‘in the head.’ The standard view of Husserl as a Cartesian internalist is undermined by
rejecting its fundamental assumption—that Husserl’s concept of the ‘noema’ is a mental entity—and by defending a concept of
‘phenomenological immanence’ that has a normative, rather than a psychological, structure. Finally, it is argued that phenomenological
immanence cannot be identified with ‘consciousness’ in Husserl’s sense, though consciousness is a necessary condition for
it. 相似文献
7.
Peter Hawke 《Philosophical Studies》2011,153(3):351-364
In this paper, the author defends Peter van Inwagen’s modal skepticism. Van Inwagen accepts that we have much basic, everyday
modal knowledge, but denies that we have the capacity to justify philosophically interesting modal claims that are far removed
from this basic knowledge. The author also defends the argument by means of which van Inwagen supports his modal skepticism,
offering a rebuttal to an objection along the lines of that proposed by Geirrson. Van Inwagen argues that Stephen Yablo’s
recent and influential account of the relationship between conceivability and possibility supports his skeptical claims. The
author’s defence involves a creative interpretation and development of Yablo’s account, which results in a recursive account
of modal epistemology, what the author calls the “safe explanation” theory of modal epistemology. 相似文献
8.
9.
Corey J. Maley 《Philosophical Studies》2011,155(1):117-131
Representation is central to contemporary theories regarding the mind/brain. But the nature of representation—both in the
mind/brain and more generally—is a source of ongoing controversy. One way of categorizing representational types is to distinguish
between the analog and the digital: the received view is that analog representations vary smoothly, while digital representations
vary in a step-wise manner. In other words, ‘digital’ is synonymous with ‘discrete’, while ‘analog’ is synonymous with ‘continuous’.
I argue that this characterization is inadequate to account for the ways in which representation is (and should be) used in
cognitive science; in its place, I suggest an alternative taxonomy. I will defend and extend David Lewis’s account of analog
and digital representation, distinguishing analog from continuous representation, as well as digital from discrete representation.
I will argue that the distinctions available in this fourfold account better accord with representational features of interest
in cognitive science than the received analog/digital dichotomy. 相似文献
10.
Patrick Allo 《Philosophical Studies》2011,153(3):417-434
The logic of ‘being informed’ gives a formal analysis of a cognitive state that does not coincide with either belief, or knowledge.
To Floridi, who first proposed the formal analysis, the latter is supported by the fact that unlike knowledge or belief, being
informed is a factive, but not a reflective state. This paper takes a closer look at the formal analysis itself, provides
a pure and an applied semantics for the logic of being informed, and tries to find out to what extent the formal analysis
can contribute to an information-based epistemology. 相似文献
11.
Jeffrey W. Roland 《Philosophia》2010,38(1):179-193
C. S. Jenkins has recently proposed an account of arithmetical knowledge designed to be realist, empiricist, and apriorist:
realist in that what’s the case in arithmetic doesn’t rely on us being any particular way; empiricist in that arithmetic knowledge
crucially depends on the senses; and apriorist in that it accommodates the time-honored judgment that there is something special
about arithmetical knowledge, something we have historically labeled with ‘a priori’. I’m here concerned with the prospects
for extending Jenkins’s account beyond arithmetic—in particular, to set theory. After setting out the central elements of
Jenkins’s account and entertaining challenges to extending it to set theory, I conclude that a satisfactory such extension
is unlikely. 相似文献
12.
Friederike Moltmann 《Philosophical Studies》2010,150(2):187-220
In recent work on context-dependency, it has been argued that certain types of sentences give rise to a notion of relative
truth. In particular, sentences containing predicates of personal taste and moral or aesthetic evaluation as well as epistemic
modals are held to express a proposition (relative to a context of use) which is true or false not only relative to a world
of evaluation, but other parameters as well, such as standards of taste or knowledge or an agent. I will argue that the sentences
that apparently give rise to relative truth should be understood by relating them in a certain way to the first person. More
precisely, such sentences express what I will call ‘first-person-based genericity’, a form of generalization that is based
on an essential first-person application of the predicate. The account differs from standard relative truth account in crucial
respects: it is not the truth of the proposition expressed that is relative to the first person; the proposition expressed
by a sentence with a predicate of taste rather has absolute truth conditions. Instead it is the propositional content itself
that requires a first-personal cognitive access whenever it is entertained. This account, I will argue, avoids a range of
problems that standard relative truth theories of the sentences in question face and explains a number of further peculiarities
that such sentences display. 相似文献
13.
Liezl van Zyl 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):91-104
In this paper I argue that the disagreement between modern moral philosophers and (some) virtue ethicists about whether motive
affects rightness is a result of conceptual disagreement, and that when they develop a theory of ‘right action,’ the two parties
respond to two very different questions. Whereas virtue ethicists tend to use ‘right’ as interchangeable with ‘good’ or ‘virtuous’
and as implying moral praise, modern moral philosophers use it as roughly equivalent to ‘in accordance with moral obligation.’
One implication of this is that the possibility of an act being right by accident does not pose a problem for consequentialism
or deontology. A further implication is that it reveals a shortcoming in virtue ethics, namely that it does not—yet needs
to—present an account of moral obligation.
相似文献
Liezl van ZylEmail: |
14.
Timothy Chan 《Synthese》2010,173(3):211-229
One version of Moore’s Paradox is the challenge to account for the absurdity of beliefs purportedly expressed by someone who
asserts sentences of the form ‘p & I do not believe that p’ (‘Moorean sentences’). The absurdity of these beliefs is philosophically puzzling, given that Moorean sentences (i) are
contingent and often true; and (ii) express contents that are unproblematic when presented in the third-person. In this paper
I critically examine the most popular proposed solution to these two puzzles, according to which Moorean beliefs are absurd
because Moorean sentences are instances of pragmatic paradox; that is to say, the propositions they express are necessarily false-when-believed. My conclusion is that while a Moorean
belief is a pragmatic paradox, it is not
just another pragmatic paradox, because this diagnosis does not explain all the puzzling features of Moorean beliefs. In particularly,
while this analysis is plausible in relation to the puzzle posed by characteristic (i) of Moorean sentences, I argue that
it fails to account for (ii). I do so in the course of an attempt to formulate the definition of a pragmatic paradox in more
precise formal terms, in order to see whether the definition is satisfied by Moorean sentences, but not by their third-person
transpositions. For only an account which can do so could address (ii) adequately. After rejecting a number of attempted formalizations,
I arrive at a definition which delivers the right results. The problem with this definition, however, is that it has to be
couched in first-person terms, making an essential use of ‘I’. Thus the problem of accounting for first-/third-person asymmetry
recurs at a higher order, which shows that the Pragmatic Paradox Resolution fails to identify the source of such asymmetry
highlighted by Moore’s Paradox. 相似文献
15.
Stanley and Williamson (The Journal of Philosophy 98(8), 411–444 2001) reject the fundamental distinction between what Ryle once called ‘knowing-how’ and ‘knowing-that’. They claim that knowledge-how
is just a species of knowledge-that, i.e. propositional knowledge, and try to establish their claim relying on the standard
semantic analysis of ‘knowing-how’ sentences. We will undermine their strategy by arguing that ‘knowing-how’ phrases are under-determined
such that there is not only one semantic analysis and by critically discussing and refuting the positive account of knowing-how
they offer. Furthermore, we argue for an extension of the classical ‘knowing-how’/‘knowing-that’-dichotomy by presenting a
new threefold framework: Using some core-examples of the recent debate, we will show that we can analyze knowledge situations
that are not captured by the Rylean dichotomy and argue that, therefore, the latter has to be displaced by a more fine-grained
theory of knowledge-formats. We will distinguish three different formats of knowledge we can have of our actions, namely (1)
propositional, (2) practical, and (3) image-like formats of knowledge. Furthermore, we will briefly analyze the underlying
representations of each of these knowledge-formats. 相似文献
16.
B. Brogaard 《Synthese》2006,152(1):47-79
Russell’s new theory of denoting phrases introduced in “On Denoting” in Mind 1905 is now a paradigm of analytic philosophy. The main argument for Russell’s new theory is the so-called ‘Gray’s Elegy’
argument, which purports to show that the theory of denoting concepts (analogous to Frege’s theory of senses) promoted by
Russell in the 1903 Principles of Mathematics is incoherent. The ‘Gray’s Elegy’ argument rests on the premise that if a denoting concept occurs in a proposition, then
the proposition is not about the concept. I argue that the premise is false. The ‘Gray’s Elegy’ argument does not exhaust
Russell’s ammunition against the theory of denoting concepts. Another reason Russell rejects the theory is, as he says, that
it cannot provide an adequate account of non-uniquely denoting concepts. In the last section of the paper, I argue that even
though Russell was right in thinking that the theory of denoting concepts cannot provide an adequate account of non-uniquely
denoting concepts, Russell’s new theory does not succeed in eliminating the occurrence of all denoting concepts, as it requires
a commitment to the existence of variables that indirectly denote their values. However, the view that variables are denoting
concepts is unproblematic once the ‘Gray’s Elegy’ argument is blocked. 相似文献
17.
Cynthia Freeland 《Philosophical Studies》2007,135(1):95-109
In this paper, we offer an analysis of ‘group intentions.’ On our proposal, group intentions should be understood as a state
of equilibrium among the beliefs of the members of a group. Although the discussion in this paper is non-technical, the equilibrium
concept is drawn from the formal theory of interactive epistemology due to Robert Aumann. The goal of this paper is to provide
an analysis of group intentions that is informed by important work in economics and formal epistemology. 相似文献
18.
Western philosophy has been greatly influenced by visual metaphors. Knowing something has commonly, yet implicitly, been conceptualized
as seeing something clearly, learning has been framed as being visually exposed to something, and the mind has been understood
as a ‘mirror of nature’. A whole ‘epistemology of the eye’ has been at work, which has had significant practical implications,
not least in educational contexts. One way to characterize John Dewey’s pragmatism is to see it as an attempt to replace the
epistemology of the eye with an epistemology of the hand. This article develops the epistemology of the hand on three levels:
A level of embodiment and metaphors, of craftsmanship and social practices, and of schooling and education. 相似文献
19.
Martin Carrier 《Synthese》2011,180(2):189-204
Duhem–Quine underdetermination plays a constructive role in epistemology by pinpointing the impact of non-empirical virtues
or cognitive values on theory choice. Underdetermination thus contributes to illuminating the nature of scientific rationality.
Scientists prefer and accept one account among empirical equivalent alternatives. The non-empirical virtues operating in science
are laid open in such theory choice decisions. The latter act as an epistemological test tube in making explicit commitments
to how scientific knowledge should be like. 相似文献
20.
Diane Antonio 《Sophia》2001,40(2):47-65
Julian of Norwich (b. 1342) anticipated the ontological and epistemological work on sexed embodiment pioneered in the work
of Merleau-Ponty and Irigaray in the 20th century. Her epistemology of sensual ‘showings’ helped reconfigure women’s embodiment
and speech acts (‘bodytalk’): by recognizing cognitive emotions and the knowledge-producing body; and by envisioning the intertwining
of human flesh with All That Is. The paper next examines Merleau-Ponty’s somatic discourse on the chiasmic flesh, which leads
to a discussion of Irigaray’s work on poetic mimesis. 相似文献