Phenomenal characteristics of co‐created guided imagery and autobiographical memories

Concern has recently been raised about the potential for guided images to be mistaken for memories of actual events. According to the reality‐monitoring framework, such misattributions can occur due to the similarity of sensory and reflective memory characteristics acquired at encoding, or due to source judgement processes at retrieval. A study was conducted to examine the similarity of guided images and perceived memories at imagery encoding, and after a short delay. Participants rated the characteristics of an actual event, a natural imagery event (e.g. a fantasy), and a guided imagery experience, immediately and after a one‐week interval. For each condition, participants discussed their memory or guided imagery experience with the researcher as they reviewed or created it. Ratings indicated that guided imagery was similar to perceived memory with respect to sensory characteristics. However, the factors associated with supporting memories (contextual and temporal detail, setting familiarity, and recollection of surrounding events) were less vivid for guided imagery than for perceived events. In all cases, these patterns were stable over time. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The differential contributions of visual imagery constructs on autobiographical thinking

There is a growing theoretical and empirical consensus on the central role of visual imagery in autobiographical memory. However, findings from studies that explore how individual differences in visual imagery are reflected on autobiographical thinking do not present a coherent story. One reason for the mixed findings was suggested to be the treatment of visual imagery as an undifferentiated construct while evidence shows that there is more than one type of visual imagery. The present study investigates the relative contributions of different imagery constructs; namely, object and spatial imagery, on autobiographical memory processes. Additionally, it explores whether a similar relation extends to imagining the future. The results indicate that while object imagery was significantly correlated with several phenomenological characteristics, such as the level of sensory and perceptual details for past events – but not for future events – spatial imagery predicted the level of episodic specificity for both past and future events. We interpret these findings as object imagery being recruited in tasks of autobiographical memory that employ reflective processes while spatial imagery is engaged during direct retrieval of event details. Implications for the role of visual imagery in autobiographical thinking processes are discussed.     

The effect of repeated imagery on memory

Imagery is a powerful psychotherapeutic technique, but one that is potentially risky as individuals can mistake an imagined experience for an autobiographical one. Two experiments examined whether repeatedly imagining the same scenario influences the likelihood of such errors. Repetition increased the similarity between phenomenological ratings of imagery and autobiographical memory: After three repetitions, imagery ratings were equal to those for memories. However, repetition also increased recognition and source accuracy for both autobiographical memories and imagery, indicating that repetition may have contrasting effects when one is using heuristic versus systematic source monitoring processes. These results suggest that psychotherapists should not repeat imagery scenarios for legally‐relevant issues, unless systematic source judgment processes can be assured, to protect clients from potential memory errors associated with therapeutic imagery. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Vantage perspective during encoding: The effects on phenomenological memory characteristics

The vantage perspective from which a memory is retrieved influences the memory’s emotional impact, intrusiveness, and phenomenological characteristics. This study tested whether similar effects are observed when participants were instructed to imagine the events from a specific perspective. Fifty student participants listened to a verbal report of car-accidents and visualized the scenery from either a field or observer perspective. There were no between-condition differences in emotionality of memories and the number of intrusions, but imagery experienced from a relative observer perspective was rated as less self-relevant. In contrast to earlier studies on memory retrieval, vantage perspective influenced phenomenological memory characteristics of the memory representation such as sensory details, and ratings of vividness and distancing of the memory. However, vantage perspective is most likely not a stable phenomenological characteristic itself. Implications and suggestions for future research are discussed.     

Characterizing the subjective experience of episodic past,future, and counterfactual thinking in healthy younger and older adults

Recent evidence demonstrates remarkable overlap in the neural and cognitive mechanisms underlying episodic memory, episodic future thinking, and episodic counterfactual thinking. However, the extent to which the phenomenological characteristics associated with these mental simulations change as a result of ageing remains largely unexplored. The current study employs adapted versions of the Memory Characteristics Questionnaire and the Autobiographical Interview to compare the phenomenological characteristics associated with both positive and negative episodic past, future, and counterfactual simulations in younger and older adults. Additionally, it explores the influence of perceived likelihood in the experience of such simulations. The results indicate that, across all simulations, older adults generate more external details and report higher ratings of vividness, composition, and intensity than young adults. Conversely, younger adults generate more internal details across all conditions and rated positive and negative likely future events as more likely than did older adults. Additionally, both younger and older adults reported higher ratings for sensory, composition, and intensity factors during episodic memories relative to future and counterfactual thoughts. Finally, for both groups, ratings of spatial coherence and composition were higher for likely counterfactuals than for both unlikely counterfactuals and future simulations. Implications for the psychology of mental simulation and ageing are discussed.     

Autobiographical memories of anxiety-related experiences

Ninety-nine undergraduate students retrieved three memories associated with each of the five emotional experiences: panic, trauma, worry, social anxiety, and feeling content. Subsequently, they answered 24 questions assessing properties of each memory, including the vividness and perceived accuracy of the memories and sensory, emotional, and anxiety-related experiences during retrieval. Memories were coded for affective tone and specificity. Results indicated that panic-related and trauma-related memories were rated similarly as content memories, but that they generally were associated with more imagery and emotional experiencing than worry-related or social anxiety-related memories. Participants experienced panic and worry symptoms to the greatest degree when they retrieved panic-related and trauma-related memories. All anxiety-related memories were characterized by more negative tone than content memories. Panic-related and trauma-related memories were more specific than worry-related, social anxiety-related, and content memories. These findings can explain partially why individuals with some, but not all, anxiety disorders experience enhanced memory for threatening material.     

Shaping our personal past: Assessing the phenomenology of autobiographical memory and its association with object and spatial imagery

A new instrument has been developed that allows a comprehensive assessment of the relevant dimensions of the phenomenology of autobiographical memories (Assessment of the Phenomenology of Autobiographical Memory, APAM), and their association with visual object and spatial imagery has been examined. An initial version of APAM consisting of 30 items (the first 28 measured on a seven-point Likert-type scale) was developed and administered to a sample of 138 undergraduates. To test whether each item consistently measured the same dimension across different memories, all questions were rated for 12 cues. Results showed that 25 Likert-type items possessed adequate levels of internal consistency and unidimensionality across cues. We also found that higher levels of visual object imagery were associated with more sensory details and recollective qualities of memory, and with stronger experience of sensory and emotional reliving. The theoretical and practical usefulness of APAM as well as the relevance of visual object imagery in the phenomenology of autobiographical memory are discussed.     

Importing perceived features into false memories

False memories sometimes contain specific details, such as location or colour, about events that never occurred. Based on the source-monitoring framework, we investigated one process by which false memories acquire details: the reactivation and misattribution of feature information from memories of similar perceived events. In Experiments 1A and 1B, when imagined objects were falsely remembered as seen, participants often reported that the objects had appeared in locations where visually or conceptually similar objects, respectively, had actually appeared. Experiment 2 indicated that colour and shape features of seen objects were misattributed to false memories of imagined objects. Experiment 3 showed that perceived details were misattributed to false memories of objects that had not been explicitly imagined. False memories that imported perceived features, compared to those that presumably did not, were subjectively more like memories for perceived events. Thus, perception may be even more pernicious than imagination in contributing to false memories.     

Importing perceived features into false memories

False memories sometimes contain specific details, such as location or colour, about events that never occurred. Based on the source-monitoring framework, we investigated one process by which false memories acquire details: the reactivation and misattribution of feature information from memories of similar perceived events. In Experiments 1A and 1B, when imagined objects were falsely remembered as seen, participants often reported that the objects had appeared in locations where visually or conceptually similar objects, respectively, had actually appeared. Experiment 2 indicated that colour and shape features of seen objects were misattributed to false memories of imagined objects. Experiment 3 showed that perceived details were misattributed to false memories of objects that had not been explicitly imagined. False memories that imported perceived features, compared to those that presumably did not, were subjectively more like memories for perceived events. Thus, perception may be even more pernicious than imagination in contributing to false memories.     

Phenomenal characteristics of autobiographical memories and imagined events in sub‐clinical obsessive‐compulsive checkers

Phenomenal characteristics of autobiographical memories and imagined experiences were examined in checking‐ and non‐checking‐prone individuals. Participants were asked to retrieve a positive, a negative and a neutral memory, and to imagine a positive, a negative and a neutral experience. They were then requested to evaluate each event according to characteristics such as sensory and contextual details. The main results revealed that non‐checking‐prone participants reported more general vividness than checking‐prone individuals for real events. In addition, non‐checking‐prone individuals reported more visual details and vividness for real than imagined experiences, while no difference between real and imagined events was found for checking‐prone participants. These results suggest that checking‐prone participants report poor memories of real events, which could in turn explain their difficulties distinguishing between real and imagined events. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Factors of imagery and event recall

The relationships among various measures of mental imagery and childhood memory were examined using factor analysis and other correlational procedures. Forty-six subjects completed nine mental imagery measures (Marks’s VVIQ, Gordon’s Vividness Scale Forms 1 and 2, Space Relations Form of the Differential Aptitude Test, Barratt’s Visualization Forms A and B, Betts’s QMI, Cut the Cube Task, and Richardson’s VVQ), a number of memory measures, and two measures of the observer/field “point-of-view” distinction. Analysis revealed three distinct imagery factors, “vividness and control,” “spatial manipulation,” and “spontaneous elaboration,” as well as a fourth “childhood memory” factor. Childhood memory was not significantly correlated with any imagery variables, but observer perspectives were associated more often with childhood memories than with recent memories. In addition, the tendency to recall events from the field perspective was correlated with the spatial manipulation factor.     

Remembering the past and imagining the future: a role for nonvisual imagery in the everyday cognition of blind and sighted people

Images can be generated in all sensory modalities. Nevertheless, research on the everyday use of mental imagery, for example in autobiographical memory tasks, has suggested that it is only visual images that facilitate memory retrieval (e.g., Williams, Healy, & Ellis, 1999). If this is the case, individuals born without sight may be forced to rely more on verbal encoding (Goddard & Pring, 2001). This paper explores the presence and everyday role of nonvisual sensory imagery in 16 individuals with and 16 without sight. Using a cue word paradigm, contrary to previous research, Experiment 1 suggested that for both blind and sighted people, nonvisual imageries have a significant role to play in the generation of autobiographical memories. These results were reinforced by similar findings in Experiment 2, which used the same cue word method to explore the role of visual and nonvisual (auditory) imagery when generating future events. The results refute the claim that "useful" imagery in everyday tasks is exclusively visual.     

Phenomenal characteristics of autobiographical memories for positive,negative, and neutral events

We investigated memory qualities for positive, negative, and neutral autobiographical events. Participants recalled two personal experiences of each type and then rated their memories on several characteristics (e.g. sensorial and contextual details). They also reported whether they ‘see’ the events in their memories from their own perspective (‘field’ memories) or whether they ‘see’ the self engaged in the event as an observer would (‘observer’ memories). Positive memories contained more sensorial (visual, smell, taste) and contextual (location, time) details than both negative and neutral events, whereas negative and neutral memories did not differ on most dimensions. Positive and negative events were more often recollected with a field perspective than neutral events. Finally, participants were classified in four groups according to the repressive coping style framework. Emotional memories of repressors were not less detailed than those of the other groups. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Individual differences in visual imagery determine how event information is remembered

Individuals differ in how they mentally imagine past events. When reminiscing about a past experience, some individuals remember the event accompanied by rich visual images, while others will remember it with few of these images. In spite of the implications that these differences in the use of imagery have to the understanding of human memory, few studies have taken them into consideration. We examined how imagery interference affecting event memory retrieval was differently modulated by spatial and object imagery ability. We presented participants with a series of video-clips depicting complex events. Participants subsequently answered true/false questions related to event, spatial, or feature details contained in the videos, while simultaneously viewing stimuli that interfered with visual imagery processes (dynamic visual noise; DVN) or a control grey screen. The impact of DVN on memory accuracy was related to individual differences in spatial imagery ability. Individuals high in spatial imagery were less accurate at recalling details from the videos when simultaneously viewing the DVN stimuli compared to those low in spatial imagery ability. This finding held for questions related to the event and spatial details but not feature details. This study advocates for the inclusion of individual differences when studying memory processes.     

Do you remember the day of your graduation ceremony from junior high school?: A factor structure of the Memory Characteristics Questionnaire1

Abstract: Autobiographical memory refers to the recollection of experiences from an individual's life. Johnson, Foley, Suengas, and Raye (1988) developed a Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ) to examine several qualitative characteristics of autobiographical memories such as sensory, affective, and contextual details. In the present study, we attempted to determine the factor structure of the MCQ. We asked 1183 participants to rate actual autobiographical memories using the MCQ. On the basis of the factor analyses of the MCQ, we obtained eight factors: (a) clarity, (b) retrospective recollection, (c) time information, (d) overall impression, (e) sensory experiences, (f) spatial information, (g) bizarreness, and (h) events before and after. This factor structure is generally consistent with previous studies that have investigated the factor structure of the MCQ.     

Individual differences in the phenomenology of mental time travel: The effect of vivid visual imagery and emotion regulation strategies

It has been claimed that the ability to remember the past and the ability to project oneself into the future are intimately related. We sought support for this proposition by examining whether individual differences in dimensions that have been shown to affect memory for past events similarly influence the experience of projecting oneself into the future. We found that individuals with a higher capacity for visual imagery experienced more visual and other sensory details both when remembering past events and when imagining future events. In addition, individuals who habitually use suppression to regulate their emotions experienced fewer sensory, contextual, and emotional details when representing both past and future events, while the use of reappraisal had no effect on either kind of events. These findings are consistent with the view that mental time travel into the past and into the future relies on similar mechanisms.