Narrow-band 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 16, 24, 32, 48, 64, and 96 cycles/360 degrees angular frequency filters

We measured human frequency response functions for eleven angular frequency filters using a forced-choice procedure in a supra-threshold summation paradigm. Each of the eleven functions of 17 experimental conditions was measured 4-9 times among 12 observers. Results show that, for the arbitrarily selected filter phases, maximum summation effect occurred at test frequency for all filters. These results lead to the conclusion that there are narrow-band angular frequency filters operating in human visual system mostly through summation surrounded by inhibition at the specific test frequency ranges. Our previous suggestion (Simas and Santos, 2002), arguing that summation for the higher angular frequency filters should occur if background angular frequency contrast were set to a maximum of 5 times the test frequency threshold, was supported.     

Truth-ratios,process, task,and knowledge

In this paper, I delineate two major problems facing reliabilist approaches in epistemology. I argue that Alvin Goodman's (1986) position fails to solve either problem. I then suggest an alternative reliabilist approach that ties truth-ratio assessments to particular, well-specified cognitive tasks. I claim that a well-specified cognitive task is an empirical hypothesis about a system that involves the specification of input and output types and nomic correlations (including statistical correlations) that underlie the system's performance. On my approach, one characterizes processes by reference to the system's dispositions across the situations consistent with the task. Characterization is best understood as revealing a strategy or a set of strategies for generating outputs from inputs relying on certain nomic correlations associated with the task.     

Contextualism,Contrastivism, Relevant Alternatives,and Closure

Contextualists claim two important virtues for their view. First, contextualism is a non-skeptical epistemology, given the plausible idea that not all contexts invoke the high standards for knowledge needed to generate the skeptical conclusion that we know little or nothing. Second, contextualism is able to preserve closure concerning knowledge – the idea that knowledge is extendable on the basis of competent deduction from known premises. As long as one keeps the context fixed, it is plausible to think that some closure principle can be articulated that will survive scrutiny. Opponents of contextualism often try to gain an advantage over it by claiming that their view mimics these virtues of contextualism as well as having other virtues. A recent example of the same is termed ‘contrastivism," as presented by Jonathan Schaffer. I will argue that the representation made is chimerical, that in fact contrastivism has no hope of mirroring these twin virtues of contextualism.     

Saints, heroes, sages, and villains

This essay explores the question of how to be good. My starting point is a thesis about moral worth that I??ve defended in the past: roughly, that an action is morally worthy if and only it is performed for the reasons why it is right. While I think that account gets at one important sense of moral goodness, I argue here that it fails to capture several ways of being worthy of admiration on moral grounds. Moral goodness is more multi-faceted. My title is intended to capture that multi-facetedness: the essay examines saintliness, heroism, and sagacity. The variety of our common-sense moral ideals underscores the inadequacy of any one account of moral admirableness, and I hope to illuminate the distinct roles these ideals play in our everyday understanding of goodness. Along the way, I give an account of what makes actions heroic, of whether such actions are supererogatory, and of what, if anything, is wrong with moral deference. At the close of the essay, I begin to explore the flipside of these ideals: villainy.     

RELATIONSHIPS AMONG PAY, RACE, SEX, OCCUPATIONAL PRESTIGE, SUPERVISION, WORK AUTONOMY, AND JOB SATISFACTION IN A NATIONAL SAMPLE

Published evidence, based largely on bivariate methods of analysis, generally suggests that pay, race, occupational prestige, supervisory status, and work autonomy are associated with job satisfaction and that sex is not. Regression analysis of a representative sample of U.S. workers, which partialled out the effects of a number of other variables, affirms that supervisory status makes an independent contribution to job satisfaction and that sex is unrelated, but suggests that the zero-order effects of pay, race, occupational prestige, and work autonomy are spurious.     

Love,Sex, Romance,and Psychoanalytic Goals

There are many ways for people to have meaningful relationships and satisfying lives, which may differ from the implicit Freudian psychoanalytic ideal of the couple that sustains love, intimacy, romance, and genital sexual passion throughout life. An alternative is proposed, based on the work of Harry Stack Sullivan, which examines the ability of the person to find love, sexual satisfaction, security, and happiness in a combination and arrangement that feels satisfying and that allows for interpersonal intimacy without coercing or harming another person. Good clinical work also considers what John Money called the “lovemap,” a cluster of relational and sexual patterning for the individual that can be relatively enduring throughout the lifespan.     

MAGIC,RELIGION, SCIENCE,TECHNOLOGY, AND ETHICS IN THE POSTMODERN WORLD

Abstract. In this essay I argue that magic, religion, science, technology, and ethics are components of cultures that coexist at every stage of the evolution of societies and cultures and are interconnected and intertwined with each other within the web of relationships with other components of social life and culture. They undergo changes under the influence of each other and of social and cultural factors that coevolve with them throughout the history of humanity in the direction of democratization. The religion‐and‐science discussion is embedded within the framework of the postmodern social scientific discourse to illustrate that the apparent contradictions or substitutions disappear and that in actual human experience there is cooperation and complementarity between these elements of culture.     

Time, trace, memory

Objections to a trace hypothesis for interval timing do not apply to the multiple-time-scale (MTS) theory, which incorporates a dynamic trace tuned by the system history and can easily accommodate interval timing over a 1,000:1 range. The MTS model can also account for Weber's law as well as systematic deviations from it. Contrary to our critics, we contend that patterns of variance in interval timing experiments are not fully described by scalar expectancy theory, and that attempting to understand timing by assigning variance to different elements of a flexible model that lacks inductive support is a flawed strategy, because the attempt may be successful even if the model is wrong. We further argue that biological plausibility is an unreliable guide to the development of behavioral theory, that prediction is not the same as test, that induction should precede deduction, and that a rat is not a clock.     

Personality,spirituality, suicide,and self-injury proneness among lesbian,gay, and bisexual adults

The present study sought to clarify gaps in current knowledge integrating personality, spirituality, and risk for suicide/self-harm among sample of 336 lesbian, gay, and bisexual community members. It was hypothesised that Neuroticism would positively predict, and Extraversion and Agreeableness would negatively predict, measures of suicide and self-injury proneness. Additionally, it was predicted that spirituality, defined as Spiritual Life Integration (SLI) and Social Justice Commitment, would interact with personality traits to attenuate risk for suicide and self-injury. Results supported the role of Neuroticism, and identified an unexpected predictor of Conscientiousness, at the main effect level. Moderation patterns were observed such that Agreeableness and Extraversion interacted with SLI to attenuate risk, such that high levels of each trait and high levels of spirituality were protective against suicide and self-injury proneness. Theoretical and practical implications with emphasis on counselling intervention implementation and future research are discussed.     

Masculinity,femininity, self-esteem,and subclinical depression

A study involving 197 university undergraduates (83 males, 114 females) tested the hypothesis that depressive symptoms assessed by the short form of the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) would be negatively related to masculinity (M) scores from the Personal Attributes Questionnaire (PAQ) but unrelated to femininity scores (F). It was also hypothesized that the negative relationship between masculinity and self-reports of depressive symptoms may be due to shared variance in self-esteem. The results supported predictions. In particular, the negative relationship linking masculinity to depressive symptoms disappeared when the effects of self-esteem were partialed out. Results are discussed in terms of the thesis that self-esteem may reflect in part the dominant masculine values of Western-type cultures and that manifestations of psychological ill health may occur when there is reduced opportunity to engage in behaviors that reflect these values.     

QUINTUPLE EXTENSION: MIND, BODY, HUMANISM, RELIGION, SECULARISM

Extension of the system that includes the key substrates for sensation, perception, emotion, volition, and cognition, and all representational sources for cognition, supports the view that there is an extended mind and an extended body. These intellectual views can be made practical in a humanist system based on extensions and in religious systems based on extensions. Independently, there is also an institutional extension of secularism. Hence, I maintain, there are five principal forms of extension.     

Goodness, Values, Reasons

Contemporary value theory has been characterized by a renewed interest in the analysis of concepts like “good” or “valuable”, the most prominent pattern of analysis in recent years being the socalled buck-passing or fitting-attitude analysis which reduces goodness to a matter of having properties that provide reasons for pro-attitudes. Here I argue that such analyses are best understood as metaphysical rather than linguistic and that while the buck-passing analysis has some virtues, it still fails to provide a suitably wide-ranging pattern of analysis for conceptualizing evaluative properties. Instead, a better alternative can be found in a metaphysical version of the Geachean view that goodness is always attributive and never predicative, namely that goodness is always a matter of relative placement in certain kinds of comparison classes. It is then suggested that the good and the valuable need to be separated from each other and that the latter is a species of the former.     

Harmful dysfunction, disorder, disease, illness, and evolution.

Can psychiatric disorders be conceptualized as "harmful dysfunctions" (J. C. Wakefield, 1992a, 1992b, 1999; S. O. Lilienfeld & L. Marino, 1995)? Wakefield's (1992a) central concept of disorder as "harmful dysfunction" is discussed by placing it in the context of a complementary discussion of disease, illness, the sick role, and evolution (D. F. Klein, 1978). S. O. Lilienfeld and L. Marino (1995) contended that proper biological function cannot be determined. This argument obscures the key significance of involuntary impairment of evolved functions. The claim that the Roschian concept has no counterpart in reality is incorrect and does not support the conclusion that dysfunctions are irreducibly evaluative and therefore arbitrary. J. C. Wakefield's (1999) views in this area are supplemented. The role of monothetic and polythetic categorization, extremal terms, and the concept of normality in nosology is considered. This analysis refutes the implication that deviance and illness are equivalent. The resolution of this debate is practically relevant to emphasizing areas of research investment, such as therapeutics.     

Philosophy,Logic, Science,History

Analytic philosophy is sometimes said to have particularly close connections to logic and to science, and no particularly interesting or close relation to its own history. It is argued here that although the connections to logic and science have been important in the development of analytic philosophy, these connections do not come close to characterizing the nature of analytic philosophy, either as a body of doctrines or as a philosophical method. We will do better to understand analytic philosophy—and its relationship to continental philosophy—if we see it as a historically constructed collection of texts, which define its key problems and concerns. It is true, however, that analytic philosophy has paid little attention to the history of the subject. This is both its strength—since it allows for a distinctive kind of creativity—and its weakness—since ignoring history can encourage a philosophical variety of “normal science.”     

WOLTERSTORFF, RIGHTS, WRONGS, AND THE BIBLE

According to Wolterstorff, an accurate genealogy of rights begins, not with the late Middle Ages and the Enlightenment, but with the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures. The Gospel of Luke, Wolterstorff says, provides especially important witness, and he gives it considerable attention. Wolterstorff's careful analysis of Luke is both lexical and narratological. This paper argues that the lexical data of the Gospel of Luke does indeed lend some support to Wolterstorff's case. But the support is qualified since, in Luke, a critical word group—the dikaio -family—is used in a way that emphasizes relationship to God rather than obligations to neighbor. The most important narratives and teachings of the Gospel lend similarly qualified support to Wolterstorff's genealogy. The paper concludes that while nothing in the Gospel of Luke is incompatible with the observation and defense of human rights, the program Luke sketches has another focus that a comprehensive reading of that Gospel must keep in view.     

Nietzsche,Nature, Nurture

Nietzsche claims that we are fated to be as we are. He also claims, however, that we can create ourselves. To many commentators these twin commitments have seemed self‐contradictory or paradoxical. The argument of this paper, by contrast, is that, despite appearances, there is no paradox here, nor even a tension between Nietzsche's two claims. Instead, when properly interpreted these claims turn out to be intimately related to one another, so that our fatedness (and our acknowledgement of our fatedness) emerges as integral to our capacity to become self‐creators. The paper also offers, in the course of undermining a false alternative that is deeply entrenched in the philosophical tradition, a reading of Nietzsche's doctrine of amor fati that actually – and perhaps uniquely – makes full sense of section 276 of The Gay Science, the chief source for this aspect of his thought.     

KINDS, ESSENCES, POWERS

What is the new essentialist asking us to accept? Not that there are natural kinds, nor that there are intrinsic causal powers. These things could be accepted without a commitment to essentialism. They are asking us to accept something akin to the Kripke‐Putnam position: a metaphysical theory about kind‐membership in virtue of essential properties. But Salmon has shown that there is no valid argument for the Kripke‐Putnam position: no valid inference that gets us from reference to essence. Why then should we accept essentialism? A remaining reason is Ellis's argument by display: we should buy essentialism because of the benefits it will bring. But are these benefits real? The problem is that the putative benefits of essentialism – that the laws of nature are necessary, that the problem of induction is solved, and so on – look actually to be the assumptions of Ellis's theory. If that is the case, there is no real benefit to be gained from adopting the theory. The argument for essentialism is therefore underdetermined and it remains possible to accept natural kinds into one's ontology without accepting their corresponding essences.     

Reasons,Motivations, and Obligations

I argue against Reasons Internalism, the view that possession of a normative reason for the performance of an action entails that one can be motivated to perform that action, and Motivational Existence Internalism, the view that if one is obligated to perform an action, then one can be motivated to perform that action. My thesis is that these positions cannot accommodate the fact that reasonable moral agents are frequently motivated to act only because they believe their contemplated actions to be morally obligatory. The failure to accommodate this fact is reason to reject these two types of internalism about reasons.     

Responsibility,Reaction, and Value

Many writers accept the following thesis about responsibility: (R) For one to be responsible for something is for one to be such that it is fitting that one be the object of some reactive attitude with respect to that thing. This thesis bears a striking resemblance to a thesis about value that is also accepted by many writers: (V) For something to be good (or neutral, or bad) is for it to be such that it is fitting that it be the object of some pro-attitude (or indifference, or some contra-attitude). V has been the subject of intense debate in recent years, in part because of its incorporation into what has come to be called the “buck-passing” account of value. In particular, V is open to three challenges: that it is not necessarily the case that whatever is good is the fitting object of a pro-attitude; that it is not necessarily the case that whatever is the fitting object of a pro-attitude is good; and that, even if there is a strict equivalence between what is good and what is the fitting object of a pro-attitude, still the former is not to be analyzed in terms of the latter. The resemblance between V and R has not been previously commented on, but, once it is recognized, it is clear that R is open to challenges that resemble those to which V is vulnerable. This paper explores both the challenges to V and the parallel challenges to R and discusses responses that may be given to these challenges. The interrelation between V and R is then examined, and a general lesson is drawn concerning how to adjudicate disputes about the nature of moral responsibility.