D. W. Winnicott,transitional objects and the creation of the divine

Religious expressions and religious behaviours are often considered to be mainly mental or spiritual phenomena, to a large degree divorced from or threatened by physical or material forms that may accompany their expression. This paper asks whether the diminution of the material or the condemnation of idols, icons and religious art loses sight of possible benefits that involvement with these forms of material divinity has for believers. Using the concept of transitional objects and transitional phenomena developed by D. W. Winnicott, a mid-twentieth-century psychoanalyst, I argue that idols, icons and religious art often represent transitional objects that form psychological bridges, intermediaries or anticipated “transitions” from humans to unseen divinities who require materialisation in some form to be maintained actively in the believer’s mind. In the process of creating or designing these material forms, the forms themselves often come to be considered “divine”. Illustrations are provided.     

Response to: divine responsibility without divine freedom

Michael Bergmann and Jan Cover summarize the essence of their paper as follows: “We argue that divine responsibility is sufficient for divine thankworthiness and consistent with the absence of divine freedom. We do this while insisting on the view that both freedom and responsibility are incompatible with causal determinism.” In this response I argue that while it makes sense for believers to be thankful that God exists, it makes no sense for them to thank him for doing the best act he can, given the circumstances.     

Evil and divine sovereignty

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion - Since at least the tenth century, some theists have argued that God’s sovereignty as creator exempts God from moral evaluation, and so any...     

The antinomy of divine necessity

This paper arose out of a discussion of a paper, Necessity and Explanation, presented by Robert Prévost (University of Texas at Arlington) at the Spring 1986 meeting of the North Texas Philosophical Association. An earlier version was presented to the 1987 meeting of the Society for Philosophy of Religion. I particularly want to thank Professor Billy Joe Lucas (Manhattanville College) for his very helpful comments on that earlier draft.     

The deadlock of absolute divine simplicity

In this article, I explain how and why different attempts to defend absolute divine simplicity fail. A proponent of absolute divine simplicity has to explain why different attributions do not suppose a metaphysical complexity in God but just one superproperty, why there is no difference between God and His super-property and finally how a absolute simple entity can be the truthmaker of different intrinsic predications. It does not necessarily lead to a rejection of divine simplicity but it shows that we may consider another conception of divine simplicity compatible with some metaphysical complexity in God.     

On the limits of divine power

This paper considers the question of whether there are truths independent of God's power. It defends a traditional conception of divine power, according to which God's power does not extend to logically necessary truths, such as those of logic and mathematics, against Cartesian voluntarism, here taken as the doctrine that every truth falls within the compass of God's creative will. The paper argues that the voluntarist position is internally inconsistent. It concludes that if God is an absolute, unconditioned reality, then there must be truths that are independent of God's power.     

Divine authority and divine perfection

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -     

On the autonomy of the divine

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -