The generation and resemblance heuristics in face recognition: cooperation and competition

Like all probabilistic decisions, recognition memory judgments are based on inferences about the strength and quality of stimulus familiarity. In recent articles, B. W. A. Whittlesea and J. Leboe (2000; J. Leboe & B. W. A. Whittlesea, 2002) proposed that such memory decisions entail various heuristics, similar to well-known heuristics in overt decision making. Using verbal stimulus materials, Whittlesea and Leboe illustrated 3 separate memory heuristics: fluency, generation, and resemblance. In the present investigation, the authors examined the generation and resemblance heuristics in face recognition. In 12 experiments, people memorized faces and later performed exclusion (source memory) tasks. Every experiment contained natural groups of facial photographs (e.g., Caucasian vs. Asian faces), but such groups were not always valid source-memory predictors. Instead, across experiments, the potential utility of generation and resemblance strategies was systematically varied. People were quite sensitive to such variations, changing from one heuristic to another as needed. However, they also combined heuristics, both improving and damaging performance across conditions. The relevance of recognition decision heuristics to eyewitness memory is considered.     

Remembering pride and shame: Self-enhancement and the phenomenology of autobiographical memory

People's self-images are grounded in autobiographical memories and, in particular, in the phenomenological experience associated with remembering. The desire to increase or maintain the positivity of the self-image (i.e., the self-enhancement motive) might thus play an important role in shaping memory phenomenology. This study examined this hypothesis by asking participants to recall positive and negative events that involve self-evaluations (i.e., pride and shame) and positive and negative events that involve evaluations about others (i.e., admiration and contempt); various phenomenological characteristics (e.g., sensory details, feeling of re-experiencing) were assessed using rating scales. The results show a positivity bias (i.e., subjectively remembering positive events with more details than negative events) for events that involve self-evaluations but not for events that involve evaluations of others. In addition, this bias was stronger for people high in self-esteem. It is concluded that biases affecting the phenomenology of autobiographical memory are part of the arsenal of psychological mechanisms people use to maintain a positive self-image.     

Remembering pride and shame: self-enhancement and the phenomenology of autobiographical memory

People's self-images are grounded in autobiographical memories and, in particular, in the phenomenological experience associated with remembering. The desire to increase or maintain the positivity of the self-image (i.e., the self-enhancement motive) might thus play an important role in shaping memory phenomenology. This study examined this hypothesis by asking participants to recall positive and negative events that involve self-evaluations (i.e., pride and shame) and positive and negative events that involve evaluations about others (i.e., admiration and contempt); various phenomenological characteristics (e.g., sensory details, feeling of re-experiencing) were assessed using rating scales. The results show a positivity bias (i.e., subjectively remembering positive events with more details than negative events) for events that involve self-evaluations but not for events that involve evaluations of others. In addition, this bias was stronger for people high in self-esteem. It is concluded that biases affecting the phenomenology of autobiographical memory are part of the arsenal of psychological mechanisms people use to maintain a positive self-image.     

Recalling more childhood events leads to judgments of poorer memory: Implications for the recovered/false memory debate

Dissociative disorders that are believed to develop from childhood sexual abuse are often considered to include amnesia for childhood events, particularly the events that involve the abuse itself. One unresolved issue is the extent to which memory recovery attempts can contribute to claims of having amnestic symptoms. Experiments with undergraduate subjects reveal that requiring more reports of childhood events will increase judgments of having poorer memory of one’s childhood. The results are consistent with the use of heuristics when one is reasoning under conditions of uncertainty, as experienced difficulty in remembering more experiences is attributed to the incompleteness of childhood memory. The findings challenge the validity of reports of childhood amnesia that follow memory recovery attempts.     

Moods and Memories: Elation, depression, and the remembering of the events of one's life

Three experiments investigated the influence of current mood states on the remembering of past events of one's own life. In the first and the second experiment, participants were induced to experience either the mood state of elation or the mood state of depression. They then reported events and experiences that had occurred during the previous week. In the first and the second experiments, using converging methods for assessing memory for past events, participants differentially reported past events and experiences whose affective quality was congruent with their current mood states: participants in elated mood states preferentially reported pleasant events and happy experiences, and participants in depressed mood states preferentially reported unpleasant events and unhappy experiences. Additional evidence from the second experiment suggests that the differential remembering of affectively positive or affectively negative events requires that, at the time of the remembering of these events, participants actually experience the mood states of elation or depression and not simply attempt to remember past events that could account for elation or depression. In the third experiment, designed to assess the plausibility of “experimental demand” interpretations of these findings, participants who experienced ostensibly effective mood inductions that were actually ineffective failed to manifest differential remembering of affectively positive and affectively negative events. Implications of this series of experiments for understanding the mechanisms that may link moods and memories, as well as the intrapersonal and the interpersonal consequences of mood states, are discussed.     

Remembering the past and imagining the future: examining the consequences of mental time travel on memory

Cognitive, neuropsychological, and neuroimaging evidence suggests that remembering the past and imagining the future rely on overlapping processes in episodic memory. The three experiments reported here examine the consequences of remembering the past and imagining the future on the accessibility of other information in memory. Participants first studied events associated with a specific context and then either (a) retrieved past autobiographical events associated with that same context or (b) imagined future autobiographical events associated with that same context. Replicating and extending evidence of retrieval-induced forgetting, remembering autobiographical events from the past caused participants to forget the related studied events. However, imagining future autobiographical events failed to cause participants to forget the related studied events. These results suggest an important difference in the memorial consequences of remembering and imagining.     

Remembering the past and imagining the future: Examining the consequences of mental time travel on memory

Cognitive, neuropsychological, and neuroimaging evidence suggests that remembering the past and imagining the future rely on overlapping processes in episodic memory. The three experiments reported here examine the consequences of remembering the past and imagining the future on the accessibility of other information in memory. Participants first studied events associated with a specific context and then either (a) retrieved past autobiographical events associated with that same context or (b) imagined future autobiographical events associated with that same context. Replicating and extending evidence of retrieval-induced forgetting, remembering autobiographical events from the past caused participants to forget the related studied events. However, imagining future autobiographical events failed to cause participants to forget the related studied events. These results suggest an important difference in the memorial consequences of remembering and imagining.     

Aging, source memory, and misrecollections

The authors propose an illusory recollection account of why cognitive aging is associated with episodic memory deficits. After listening to statements presented by either a female or a male speaker, older adults were prone to misrecollecting past events. The authors' illusory recollection account is instantiated in a new illusory recollection signal detection model that provides a better fit of older adults' data than does the standard signal detection model. They observed that age-related differences in source memory (as measured by source d' scores) virtually disappear after accounting for the occurrence of illusory recollections. These data suggest that age-related source memory impairments are not due to older adults' remembering less diagnostic source information and having to guess more. Instead, older adults appear to misremember past events more often than younger adults.     

Investigating the Awareness of Remembering

ABSTRACT— There is a marked lack of consensus concerning the best way to learn how conscious experiences arise. In this article, we advocate for scientific approaches that attempt to bring together four types of phenomena and their corresponding theoretical accounts: behavioral acts, cognitive events, neural events, and subjective experience. We propose that the key challenge is to comprehensively specify the relationships among these four facets of the problem of understanding consciousness without excluding any facet. Although other perspectives on consciousness can also be informative, combining these four perspectives could lead to significant progress in explaining a conscious experience such as remembering. We summarize some relevant findings from cognitive neuroscience investigations of the conscious experience of memory retrieval and of memory behaviors that transpire in the absence of the awareness of remembering. These examples illustrate suitable scientific strategies for making progress in understanding consciousness by developing and testing theories that connect the behavioral expression of recall and recognition, the requisite cognitive transactions, the neural events that make remembering possible, and the awareness of remembering.     

Delayed rule following

Although the elements of a fully stated rule (discriminative stimulus [S(D)], some behavior, and a consequence) can occur nearly contemporaneously with the statement of the rule, there is often a delay between the rule statement and the S(D). The effects of this delay on rule following have not been studied in behavior analysis, but they have been investigated in rule-like settings in the areas of prospective memory (remembering to do something in the future) and goal pursuit. Discriminative events for some behavior can be event based (a specific setting stimulus) or time based. The latter are more demanding with respect to intention following and show age-related deficits. Studies suggest that the specificity with which the components of a rule (termed intention) are stated has a substantial effect on intention following, with more detailed specifications increasing following. Reminders of an intention, too, are most effective when they refer specifically to both the behavior and its occasion. Covert review and written notes are two effective strategies for remembering everyday intentions, but people who use notes appear not to be able to switch quickly to covert review. By focusing on aspects of the setting and rule structure, research on prospective memory and goal pursuit expands the agenda for a more complete explanation of rule effects.     

Remembering successes and failures: rehearsal characteristics influence recollection and distancing

We investigated the relationship between components of rumination, brooding and reflection, and autobiographical remembering by testing whether voluntary and involuntary rehearsal mediated rumination-related variation in the sensory-affective and metacognitive features of memory experience. We focused on achievement and failure memories as both are goal-related events, yet they represent distinct experiences in terms of valence and functionality. For failure memories, brooding was associated with intense recollection and reduced psychological distance. Brooding was related to enhanced distance of achievements, indicating the disruptive effects of brooding on remembering. Although reflection attenuated the recollective experience for both achievement and failure memories, it brought achievement memories to a subjective closer past. Structural equation modelling demonstrated the mediating role of involuntary remembering on the pattern of remembering experience.     

Transferring voice effects in recognition memory from remembering to knowing

In five experiments, we investigated the effects of voice congruency (same vs. different voices at study and at test) on remembering and knowing in recognition memory. With low- and medium-frequency three- or four-syllable words, a voice congruency effect occurred only in remembering. With nonwords, voice congruency effects occurred both in remembering and in knowing. With nonwords and divided attention at study, the voice congruency effect transferred almost completely from remembering to knowing. By showing a transfer of effects from remembering to knowing as encoding became more impoverished, these findings support a distinctiveness/fluency account of remembering and knowing as well as the theory that remembering and knowing indicate retrieval of events from episodic and semantic memory systems, respectively.     

Temporal accent structure and the remembering of filmed narratives.

Effects of temporal accent structure on the remembering of filmed narratives were examined by varying the placement and number of commercial breaks. Commercials either highlighted a story's underlying organization by occurring between major episode boundaries (i.e., at breakpoint locations) or obscured this structural arrangement by occurring within episodes (i.e., at nonbreakpoints). Relative to the accentuation of nonbreakpoints, results indicated that the attentional highlighting of episode boundaries yielded higher recall and recognition performance and better memory for temporal order information and details from the story's plot. Selective recall and recognition of breakpoint scenes was significantly higher than that of nonbreakpoints, suggesting that people use episode boundaries as referents for attending and remembering. These findings illustrate certain structural invariants across environmental events and ways in which event structure can be used in remembering.     

Retelling Is Not the Same as Recalling: Implications for Memory

ABSTRACT— In contrast to laboratory free recall (which emphasizes detailed and accurate remembering), conversational retellings depend upon the speaker's goals, the audience, and the social context more generally. Because memories are frequently retrieved in social contexts, retellings of events are often incomplete or distorted, with consequences for later memory. Selective rehearsal contributes to the memory effects, as does the schema activated during retelling. Retellings can be linked to memory errors observed in domains such as eyewitness testimony and flashbulb memories; in all of these situations, people retell events rather than engage in verbatim remembering.     

Autobiographical memory, autonoetic consciousness, and self-perspective in aging

In this study, the authors examined the effects of aging on autobiographical memory in 180 participants by means of a new method designed to assess across 5 lifetime periods the nature of memories-that is, specificity and spontaneity--and the phenomenal experience of remembering--that is, self-perspective and autonoetic consciousness--via the field/observer and remember/know paradigms respectively. Age-related differences were found for the specificity and spontaneity of memories and the phenomenal experience of remembering. There was an increase in observer and know responses with age, but a decrease in field and remember responses and in the ability to justify them by recalling sensory-perceptive, affective, or spatiotemporal specific details. This pattern confirms the existence of a semantic-episodic dissociation in autobiographical memory in aging. Moreover, the data support the view that older participants can subjectively "travel back in time" to relive personal events in the most distant past better than those in the recent past.     

Memory for time and place contributes to enhanced confidence in memories for emotional events

Emotion strengthens the subjective sense of remembering. However, these confidently remembered emotional memories have not been found be more accurate for some types of contextual details. We investigated whether the subjective sense of recollecting negative stimuli is coupled with enhanced memory accuracy for three specific types of central contextual details using the remember/know paradigm and confidence ratings. Our results indicate that the subjective sense of remembering is indeed coupled with better recollection of spatial location and temporal context, but not higher memory accuracy for colored dots placed in the conceptual center of negative and neutral scenes. These findings show that the enhanced subjective recollective experience for negative stimuli reliably indicates objective recollection for spatial location and temporal context, but not for other types of details, whereas for neutral stimuli, the subjective sense of remembering is coupled with all the types of details assessed. Translating this finding to flashbulb memories, we found that, over time, more participants correctly remembered the location where they learned about the terrorist attacks on 9/11 than any other canonical feature. Likewise, participants' confidence was higher in their memory for location versus other canonical features. These findings indicate that the strong recollective experience of a negative event corresponds to an accurate memory for some kinds of contextual details but not for other kinds. This discrepancy provides further evidence that the subjective sense of remembering negative events is driven by a different mechanism than the subjective sense of remembering neutral events.     

Priming,not inhibition,of related concepts during future imagining

Remembering the past and imagining the future both involve the retrieval of details stored in episodic memory and rely on the same core network of brain regions. Given these parallels, one might expect similar component processes to be involved in remembering and imagining. While a strong case can be made for the role of inhibition in memory retrieval, few studies have examined whether inhibition is also necessary for future imagining and results to-date have been mixed. In the current study, we test whether related concepts are inhibited during future imagining using a modified priming approach. Participants first generated a list of familiar places and for each place, the people they most strongly associate with it. A week later, participants imagined future events involving recombinations of people and places, immediately followed by a speeded response task in which participants made familiarity decisions about people’s names. Across two experiments, our results suggest that related concepts are not inhibited during future imagining, but rather are automatically primed. These results fit with recent work showing that autobiographically significant concepts (e.g., friends’ names) are more episodic than semantic in nature, automatically activating related details in memory and potentially fuelling the flexible simulation of future events.     

One-trial acquired likes and dislikes in humans: Disgust as a US,food predominance,and negative learning predominance

Self-reports were solicited by questionnaire on experiences in which likes or dislikes for anything except people were produced as a result of a single event. The same questionnaire also asked for cases of one-experience acquisition of, or loss of, fears. Analysis of 440 reports indicates that the learned taste aversion phenomenon accounts for most rapid acquired dislikes; foods were the subject of 77% of all rapid acquired dislikes. A new form of food “aversion” learning appeared (22 cases), in which the US is a disgusting stimulus rather than illness. This may be mediated by nausea, the same US as in illness-produced aversions. There were more than three times as many cases of one-trial dislikes as opposed to likes. This could result from a bias in remembering or sampling, a bias in the occurrence of events in the world, and/or a bias to learn more rapidly about negative events. In contrast to acquired likes and dislikes, foods were the subject of one-trial acquired fear in only 1 case out of 164.     

前瞻记忆的年老化效应:前瞻成分和回溯成分的调节作用

关注事件性前瞻记忆的年老化,采用基于双重任务的实验室研究范式,实验一控制线索与意向的关联性和线索的显著性操纵概念驱动加工和数据驱动加工过程,比较前瞻记忆的前瞻成分和回溯成分的年老化影响;实验二检验前瞻成分在前瞻记忆年老化中的作用。结果显示,线索与意向的关联性和线索与背景的区别性作为概念驱动加工和数据驱动加工的重要表现形式可以显著地促进老年人的前瞻记忆水平,前瞻记忆年老化主要存在于前瞻记忆的前瞻成分;前瞻成分较高的注意资源需求导致前瞻记忆的年龄差异主要受任务的认知需求水平所影响,当前瞻记忆是相对自动加工时,年龄差异小;当任务需要较多的控制加工时,年龄差异相对较大。本研究进一步揭示了导致前瞻记忆年龄差异的原因。