The immersive spatiotemporal hallucination model of dreaming

The paper proposes a minimal definition of dreaming in terms of immersive spatiotemporal hallucination (ISTH) occurring in sleep or during sleep–wake transitions and under the assumption of reportability. I take these conditions to be both necessary and sufficient for dreaming to arise. While empirical research results may, in the future, allow for an extension of the concept of dreaming beyond sleep and possibly even independently of reportability, ISTH is part of any possible extension of this definition and thus is a constitutive condition of dreaming. I also argue that the proposed ISTH model of dreaming, in conjunction with considerations on the epistemic relationship between dreaming and dream reports, raises important questions about the extent to which dreams typically involve a detailed body representation—an assumption that plays an important role in philosophical work on dreaming. As a commonly accepted definition of dreaming is lacking in current dream research, the ISTH model, which integrates conceptual analysis and epistemological considerations with results from empirical research, is an important contribution to this field. By linking dreaming to felt presence, full-body illusions, and autoscopic phenomena such as out-of-body experiences in wakefulness and in the hypnagogic state, the ISTH model of dreaming also helps integrate dream research, both theoretically and experimentally, with the study of other altered states of consciousness involving hallucinations. It makes straightforward and investigable predictions by claiming that all of these experiences have amodal spatiotemporal hallucinations as their common denominator. Finally, it is theoretically relevant for the philosophical discussion on minimal phenomenal selfhood.     

Heidegger and hallucination

Can Heidegger account for hallucination? I argue that while Heidegger does not develop an account of hallucination, he gives us all the resources we need to develop such an account. I first discuss a prominent argument against the very possibility of such an account. I argue that this argument is mistaken. I then discuss Heidegger's brief remarks on hallucination. In analysing a particular case study, Heidegger claims that the subject hallucinates for two reasons. First, he fails to realize the distinction between the different ways entities are present to him. For this reason, he cannot encounter a particular entity as it is present. Second, he is unable to do anything about the fact and manner of the presence of that entity. He is ‘unable to move in his world freely’, as Heidegger puts it. I show how these remarks, when taken in combination with Heidegger's broader ontology, allow us to explain the possibility of hallucination in a distinctively Heideggerian way.     

Characterizing hallucination epistemically

According to the epistemic theory of hallucination, the fundamental psychological nature of a hallucinatory experience is constituted by its being ‘introspectively indiscriminable’, in some sense, from a veridical experience of a corresponding type. How is the notion of introspective indiscriminability to which the epistemic theory appeals best construed? Following M. G. F. Martin, the standard assumption is that the notion should be construed in terms of negative epistemics: in particular, it is assumed that the notion should be explained in terms of the impossibility that a hallucinator might possess a certain type of knowledge on a certain basis. I argue that the standard assumption is mistaken. I argue that the relevant notion of introspective indiscriminability is better construed in terms of positive epistemics: in particular, I argue that the notion is better explained by reference to the fact that it would be rational for a hallucinator positively to make a certain type of judgement, were that judgement made on a certain basis.     

Vehicle-representationalism and hallucination

This paper is a new defense of the view that visual hallucinations lack content. The claim is that visual hallucinations are illusory not because their content is nonveridical, but rather because they seem to represent when they fail to represent anything in the first place. What accounts for the phenomenal character of visual experiences is not the content itself (content-representationalism), but rather the vehicle of content (vehicle-representationalism), that is, not the properties represented by visual experience, but rather the relational properties of experience (or of the brain) of representing singular contents, namely particular instantiations of properties. I argue that the Russellian particular-involving proposition is the only appropriate model for the representational content of visual experience and hence that visual hallucinations are just like failed demonstrations.

     

Context binding and hallucination predisposition

Patients with schizophrenia and current auditory hallucinations exhibit a combination of deficits in context binding and intentional inhibition. Hallucinations also occur in the general population suggesting an underlying continuity of causal mechanisms, however, these experiences may also differ (e.g., in frequency), indicating some differences in aetiology. The aim of this study was to examine the frequency of hallucinatory experiences in healthy young adults and to assess whether difficulties in context binding characterize individuals highly predisposed to hallucinations. A modified version of the Launay–Slade hallucination scale-revised, including an assessment of the frequency of hallucination experiences, was completed by 615 undergraduates from which sub-samples of high (n = 25) and low (n = 27) scorers were drawn. Context memory ability was assessed using a voice–location binding task. The results showed that the frequency of hallucinations in high LSHS-R scorers was much less than that previously reported for individuals with schizophrenia. Furthermore, no group differences in context memory binding were observed, nor any association between hallucination frequency and context binding difficulties. The continuity model of hallucinations may overlook some important differences in hallucinatory experiences in the general population versus psychosis.     

On the explanatory power of hallucination

Pautz (Perceiving the world , 2010) has argued that the most prominent naive realist account of hallucination—negative epistemic disjunctivism—cannot explain how hallucinations enable us to form beliefs about perceptually presented properties. He takes this as grounds to reject both negative epistemic disjunctivism and naive realism. Our aims are two: First, to show that this objection is dialectically ineffective against naive realism, and second, to draw morals from the failure of this objection for the dispute over the nature of perceptual experience at large.

     

Perception,illusion, and hallucination

Patrick Suppes' set-theoretical approach to the analysis of theories, and Joseph D. Sneed's metatheory are briefly outlined. The notions of observation, illusion and hallucination are reconstructed according to these approaches. It is argued that the terms ‘perception’ and ‘truth’ are theoretical with respect to observation but nontheoretical with respect to illusion and hallucination. Hallucination is construed as a special kind of illusion.     

A case of auditory hallucination treated by satiation

Hallucinations can be construed as imagery paralleling obsessional thoughts. Satiation therapy, which has been successful with obsessional thoughts, was used to treat the feared auditory hallucinations of a long-stay mental hospital patient. The patient, treatment and outcome are described. The success of the treatment, suggests the validity of the formulation and the possibility of using other fear-reduction procedures for treating anxiety-provoking hallucinations.     

The clinical concept of analytic process: A conceptual investigation1

The authors discuss the term ‘analytic process’, confi rming the variability of the meanings ascribed to it. Although all the psychoanalysts of this and previous times acknowledge the existence of something called analytic process, as well as its importance, it has not been possible up to now to establish a consensual defi nition of it. The defi nitions are not only numberless, they also contradict one another. The possible advantages to analytic theory and practice proceeding from a uniform concept are incontrovertible. A review of the subject in the psychoanalytic literature has been performed. A conceptual study concerning the term, carried out among members of a psychoanalytic society affi liated to the IPA is presented, no consensual conceptualization for the term analytic process having been found. The subjects referred to the term as deriving from a variety of elements, some in common, but there was no agreement regarding the elements themselves. There was consensus regarding the role of the analytical relationship in the process, considered fundamental, as well as that of the extent to which the individual life experiences in that relationship defi ne the unique character acquired by the process within it.     

The concept of education

Studies in Philosophy and Education -     

The concept of placebo

This paper attempts to define the concept of placebo as it is used in the clinical context The author claims that X is a placebo if and only if X has such a property d_p, that whenever in a therapeutic situation T a stimulus S appears, then in attending conditions A, it will cause a beneficial reaction R in the patient. Formally, the same structure may be used to define any pharmacologically active drug. The main difference between the drug and a placebo is in the range of possible substitutions for X and the property d. For the active drug there is only one possible substitution for X and property d and it can be scientifically explained why, and how the drug works. In the case of a placebo a set of possible substitutions for X and d is open, and so far it is impossible to offer any scientifically valid explanation of the action mechanism of placebo.