Not strange but not true: self-reported interest in a topic increases false memory

People are more likely to recall both true and false information that is consistent with their pre-existing stereotypes, schemata and desires. In addition, experts in a particular field are more likely to experience false memory in relation to their area of expertise. Here, we investigate whether level of interest, as distinct from level of knowledge, and in the absence of self-professed expertise, is associated with increased false memory. 489 participants were asked to rank 7 topics from most to least interesting. They were then asked if they remembered the events described in four news items related to the topic they selected as the most interesting and four items related to the topic selected as least interesting. In each case, three of the events depicted had really happened and one was fictional. A high level of interest in a topic increased true memories for the topic and doubled the frequency of false memories, even after controlling for level of knowledge. We interpret the results in the context of the source-monitoring framework and suggest that false memories arise as a result of interference from existing information stored in domain-related schemata.     

How does negative emotion cause false memories?

Remembering negative events can stimulate high levels of false memory, relative to remembering neutral events. In experiments in which the emotional valence of encoded materials was manipulated with their arousal levels controlled, valence produced a continuum of memory falsification. Falsification was highest for negative materials, intermediate for neutral materials, and lowest for positive materials. Conjoint-recognition analysis produced a simple process-level explanation: As one progresses from positive to neutral to negative valence, false memory increases because (a) the perceived meaning resemblance between false and true items increases and (b) subjects are less able to use verbatim memories of true items to suppress errors.     

Source misattributions may increase the accuracy of source judgments

Misattribution of remembered information from one source to another is commonly associated with false memories, but we demonstrate that it also may underlie memories that accord with past events. Participants imagined drawings of objects in four different locations. For each, a drawing of a similarly shaped object was seen in the same location, a different location, or not seen. When tested on memory for objects' origin (seen/imagined) and location, more false "seen" responses, but also more correct location responses, were given to imagined objects if a similar object had been seen, versus not seen, in the same location. We argue that misattribution of feature information (e.g., shape, location) from seen objects to similar imagined ones increased false memories of seeing objects but also increased correct location memories, provided the misattributed location matched the imagined objects' location. Thus, consistent with the source-monitoring framework, imperfect source-attribution processes underlie false and true memories.     

Driving without memory: The strength of schema-consistent false memories

Drivers’ memory for their recent trips has been shown to be surprisingly poor, with relatively low accuracy of both recall and recollection and substantial levels of false memories. Driving research has suggested that arousal, such as from risk, leads to more accurate memories. Memory research suggests that the typicality of objects and events makes them harder to remember accurately, compared to schema-inconsistent or atypical objects, and leads to greater likelihood of false memories. In contrast, it has been suggested that memory for actions is different to memory for objects, and that typical actions are remembered more accurately than atypical actions. The present research examined the role of typicality or schema consistency in the accuracy of memory for driving. Participants drove a 15 km route in their own cars and then answered questions about their drive. The results showed that atypical objects and actions were recalled with greater accuracy than typical objects and actions. The results also showed that false memories were most common for typical objects, but not for typical actions. We interpret these results in terms of both memory theory and implications for understanding skilled behaviour such as driving.     

Monitoring the future: object and source memory for real and imagined events

In these experiments a memory‐monitoring decision is made, whereby subjects must decide not only whether or not to‐be‐learned stimuli will be remembered—the focus of all of the past research into the Judgement of Learning (JOL)—but also whether they will be able to assess the source of those stimuli, as assessed by a new measure, Judgement of Source (JOS). In Experiment 1 subjects had to judge whether they would remember the occurrence and the source of items that were either seen or imagined. Although seen items were better remembered and sourced than imagined, subjects were unable to predict this outcome: they underestimated their ability to recall seen items and overestimated their ability to recall imagined items. In Experiment 2 subjects had to discriminate between self‐performed or other‐performed enacted or imagined events. We expected that the motor cues associated with overt performance should provide more sensory information than had the visual input in Experiment 1, and this should help subjects to discriminate between real and imagined items. As predicted, JOL magnitude showed that subjects were now able to predict accurately that they would recall more enacted events than imagined events. JOS magnitude showed that subjects incorrectly predicted that self‐enactment would assist source memory compared to imagination. However, it was the source of other‐focused events which was more accurately remembered. The results are discussed in terms of Koriat's (1997) view about cue utility in making JOLs. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Memory for media: investigation of false memories for negatively and positively charged public events

Despite a large body of false memory research, little has addressed the potential influence of an event's emotional content on susceptibility to false recollections. The Paradoxical Negative Emotion (PNE) hypothesis predicts that negative emotion generally facilitates memory but also heightens susceptibility to false memories. Participants were asked whether they could recall 20 "widely publicised" public events (half fictitious) ranging in emotional valence, with or without visual cues. Participants recalled a greater number of true negative events (M=3.31/5) than true positive (M=2.61/5) events. Nearly everyone (95%) came to recall at least one false event (M=2.15 false events recalled). Further, more than twice as many participants recalled any false negative (90%) compared to false positive (41.7%) events. Negative events, in general, were associated with more detailed memories and false negative event memories were more detailed than false positive event memories. Higher dissociation scores were associated with false recollections of negative events, specifically.     

Emotion's influence on memory for spatial and temporal context

Individuals report remembering emotional items vividly. It is debated whether this report reflects enhanced memory accuracy or a bias to believe emotional memories are vivid. We hypothesised emotion would enhance memory accuracy, improving memory for contextual details. The hallmark of episodic memory is that items are remembered in a spatial and temporal context, so we examined whether an item's valence (positive, negative) or arousal (high, low) would influence its ability to be remembered with those contextual details. Across two experiments, high-arousal items were remembered with spatial and temporal context more often than low-arousal items. Item valence did not influence memory for those details, although positive high-arousal items were recognised or recalled more often than negative items. These data suggest that emotion does not just bias participants to believe they have a vivid memory; rather, the arousal elicited by an event can benefit memory for some types of contextual details.     

Emotion's influence on memory for spatial and temporal context

Individuals report remembering emotional items vividly. It is debated whether this report reflects enhanced memory accuracy or a bias to believe emotional memories are vivid. We hypothesized emotion would enhance memory accuracy, improving memory for contextual details. The hallmark of episodic memory is that items are remembered in a spatial and temporal context, so we examined whether an item's valence (positive, negative) or arousal (high, low) would influence its ability to be remembered with those contextual details. Across two experiments, high-arousal items were remembered with spatial and temporal context more often than low-arousal items. Item valence did not influence memory for those details, although positive high-arousal items were recognized or recalled more often than negative items. These data suggest that emotion does not just bias participants to believe they have a vivid memory; rather, the arousal elicited by an event can benefit memory for some types of contextual details.     

Evaluating characteristics of false memories: Remember/know judgments and memory characteristics questionnaire compared

Subjects hearing a list of associates to a nonpresented lure word later often claim to have heard the lure (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). To examine the characteristics of such false memories, subjects completed a memory characteristics questionnaire (MCQ; Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988) or made remember/know (RK; Gardiner & Java, 1993) judgments for previously heard theme associates and nonpresented lures. MCQ ratings indicated that false memories for lures had less auditory detail and less remembered feelings and reactions than memories for presented words. In addition, rates of false recognition for lures were significantly lower than rates of correct recognition when items from various themes were intermixed instead of blocked at acquisition and subjects made MCQ ratings instead of RK judgments. This demonstrates that false memories can be affected both by how they are acquired and by how extensively they are examined at retrieval.     

False memories of fabricated political events

In the largest false memory study to date, 5,269 participants were asked about their memories for three true and one of five fabricated political events. Each fabricated event was accompanied by a photographic image purportedly depicting that event. Approximately half the participants falsely remembered that the false event happened, with 27% remembering that they saw the events happen on the news. Political orientation appeared to influence the formation of false memories, with conservatives more likely to falsely remember seeing Barack Obama shaking hands with the president of Iran, and liberals more likely to remember George W. Bush vacationing with a baseball celebrity during the Hurricane Katrina disaster. A follow-up study supported the explanation that events are more easily implanted in memory when they are congruent with a person's preexisting attitudes and evaluations, in part because attitude-congruent false events promote feelings of recognition and familiarity, which in turn interfere with source attributions.     

错误记忆的自我参照效应：易化的作用

采用DRM范式,设置三种参照对象条件（自我、他人和中性参照）,考察错误记忆是否存在自我参照效应。结果发现：（1）与正确记忆一样,错误记忆中亦存在自我参照效应;（2）无论是正确记忆还是错误记忆,自我参照条件下的回忆成分均显著多于他人参照和中性参照,但熟悉性成分在三种不同参照对象条件下没有显著差异;（3）当词表中学习项目由分组呈现变为随机呈现时,错误记忆的自我参照效应仍稳定存在。结果揭示,自我参照效在促进正确记忆的同时,亦可易化错误记忆效应。     

Psychopathic personality traits are linked to reduced false memories for negative events

Individuals scoring high on psychopathic personality traits process emotional material to a different extent than individuals with few psychopathic traits. Evidence exists that these individuals have impaired emotional memory. The question arises whether this emotional memory impairment has ramifications for the production of emotional false memories. In the present study, we investigated the production of false and true memories for emotional events in a community sample (N = 120) of individuals varying in psychopathic traits (evaluated with the Psychopathic Personality Inventory–Revised [PPI-R] questionnaire). The fearless dominance (FD) component of psychopathy interacted with the emotional impact of to-be-remembered events in the production of false memories, showing fewer negative false memories with increasing levels of FD. At the subjective level, negative false memories were not perceived as vivid memory experiences in high FD individuals. Concerning true memories, higher scores in cold-heartedness were related to fewer true memories for neutral and negative (but not positive) events. These results show that individuals with high psychopathy traits – in particular, FD – do not have a general emotional memory impairment but they process negative material in a different way than individuals with low psychopathic traits and thus are less susceptible to producing false memories for negative events.     

Assessing the effectiveness of warnings and the phenomenological characteristics of false memories

The phenomenology of false memories was investigated in three experiments in which participants heard two experimenters read lists of items that were related to critical nonpresented items. In Experiments 1, following a recognition memory test, participants rated the phenomenological characteristics of their memories immediately and after a 48-hour delay. False recognition was prevalent and on several dimensions participants rated their true memories as more vivid than their false memories. In Experiments 2 and 3, following the study phase, participants were warned about the phenomenological differences between true and false memories and were instructed to use this information to avoid reporting nonpresented items. This type of warning was ineffective at reducing false recall (Experiment 2) and false recognition (Experiment 3) relative to unwarned participants. Importantly, the inability of explicit warnings to impact illusory recollections demonstrates that the false memories cannot be attributed simply to a criterion shift.     

Distinguishing true from false memories in forensic contexts: Can phenomenology tell us what is real?

We studied the extent to which subjective ratings of memory phenomenology discriminate true‐ and false‐memory responses, and whether degree of gist‐based processing influences false memory and phenomenology, in a classic forensic task, the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale (GSS). Participants heard a narrative of a robbery followed by suggestive questions about the content of the narrative. They were asked to rate the items they recognized as studied using the Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ). Consistent with studies of word lists, there were phenomenological differences between true and false memory responses: memory phenomenology was richer for true than for false memories, which supports opponent‐process accounts of false memory such as fuzzy‐trace theory. Thus, phenomenology is a useful means for differentiating experienced from non‐experienced events in forensic contexts. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Assessing the effectiveness of warnings and the phenomenological characteristics of false memories

The phenomenology of false memories was investigated in three experiments in which participants heard two experimenters read lists of items that were related to critical nonpresented items. In Experiments 1, following a recognition memory test, participants rated the phenomenological characteristics of their memories immediately and after a 48-hour delay. False recognition was prevalent and on several dimensions participants rated their true memories as more vivid than their false memories. In Experiments 2 and 3, following the study phase, participants were warned about the phenomenological differences between true and false memories and were instructed to use this information to avoid reporting nonpresented items. This type of warning was ineffective at reducing false recall (Experiment 2) and false recognition (Experiment 3) relative to unwarned participants. Importantly, the inability of explicit warnings to impact illusory recollections demonstrates that the false memories cannot be attributed simply to a criterion shift.     

Eyewitness testimony and memory distortion

Abstract: Do memories change as we acquire new information? Recent research on memory distortion using implicit tests along with research using confidence is reviewed and new studies are presented. Two new studies asked misinformed subjects to provide reasons for their answers. In each study 15% to 27% of subjects said they remembered seeing items they had only read about. In another study subjects were asked to identify the source of misleading items they had seen in slides or read in misleading questions. Subjects were more likely to say they had seen in slides something they read about in the questions than they were to confuse information from two nearly identical sets of slides. Recent work shows that, not only is it possible to distort memory for events, it is possible to implant an entire memory for something that never happened. The evidence is now clear that we can become mentally tricked into making large as well as small changes in the way we recall the past.     

Memory for truths and falsehoods

Three experiments were carried out to determine whether recognition memory was more efficient for true statements (on the basis of the subjects’ stable body of knowledge) than for false statements. The first two experiments did not show any difference. In a third experiment, the distractors were structured to prevent subjects from responding on the basis of the familiarity of individual component words rather than on the basis of the complete sentences. This experiment showed a clear difference between sentence classes, with true sentences remembered more accurately and faster than false sentences. The data fit, in general, the hypothesis that true sentences are doubly represented in memory. The relation of these findings to the findings on the effects of encoding tasks is also noted.     

Comparing recollective experience in true and false autobiographical memories

This study investigated whether true autobiographical memories are qualitatively distinct from false autobiographical memories using a variation of the interview method originally reported by E. F. Loftus and J. Pickrell (1995). Participants recalled events provided by parents on 3 separate occasions and were asked to imagine true and false unremembered events. True memories were rated by both participants and observers as more rich in recollective experience and were rated by participants as more important, more emotionally intense, as having clearer imagery, and as less typical than false memories. Rehearsal frequency was used as a covariate, eliminating these effects. Imagery in true memories was most often viewed from the field perspective, whereas imagery in false memories was most often viewed from the observer perspective. More information was communicated in true memories, and true memories contained more information concerning the consequences of described events. Results suggest repeated remembering can make false memories more rich in recollective experience and more like true memories. Differences between true and false memories suggest some potentially distinct characteristics of false memories and provide insight into the process of false memory creation.