Durkheim's sociology of scientific knowledge

Durkheim's thinking on scientific knowledge reveals several contradictions, resulting from the relativist implications of his substantive theory of culture and the positivist assumptions of his metatheoretical definition of scientific methods in sociology. In his explanations of historical and cross-cultural differences in „truthful”︁ representations of reality, Durkheim suggests that logical and conceptual structures of knowledge are determined by social morphology, and that the validity of any truth-claim is limited to cultural contexts in which designated criteria of validation are normatively maintained. However, in epistemological works such as The Rules, Durkheim suggests that social factors are of little importance in constructing scientific knowledge, and that truths of science mirror external reality and so their validity transcends cultural boundaries.     

Discrepancies between scientific theory and practice in relation to physiological hypotheses

We give anecdotal accounts from our own experience of scientific theories which have been generally accepted as the ‘ruling opinion’ long after sufficient evidence has been collected for their disproof. This has led us to the opinion that the normal scientific process, of working hypothesis followed by experimental test aimed at disproof, is being replaced by the ‘ruling opinion’ followed by experiment aimed at confirmation. The apparently widespread adoption of this procedure may be postulated to arise in part from the need for workers entering a new field of study to obtain grants and to get their results published.     

科学知识社会学相对主义知识观批判

“The Strong Programme” is put forward as a metaphysical theory of sociology by the Edinburgh School (SSK) to study the social causes of knowledge. Barry Barnes and David Bloor are the proponents of the School. They call their programme “the Relativist View of Knowledge” and argue against rationalism in the philosophy of science. Does their relativist account of knowledge present a serious challenge to rationalism, which has dominated 20th century philosophy of science? I attempt to answer this question by criticizing the main ideas of SSK and defending rationalism theories in modern philosophy of science.     

Conventionalism,scientific discovery and the sociology of knowledge*

In this paper the basic aim of the so‐called ‘strong programme’ in the sociology of knowledge is examined. The ‘strong programme’ is considered (and rightly so) as an extreme version of the anti‐realist view of science. While the problem of scientific realism has normally been dealt with from the point of view of the ‘context of justification’ of theories, the paper focuses on the issues raised by law‐discovery. In this context Herbert Simon's views about the existence of a ‘logic of scientific discovery’ are discussed and criticized. The main thesis of the paper is that if the structure of both discovery and prediction is properly understood, then the basic anti‐realist claims become untenable. A fortiori, the ‘strong programme’ appears to be unable to explain some basic features of the structure of science.     

Virtues and vices in scientific practice

Synthese - The role intellectual virtues play in scientific inquiry has raised significant discussions in the recent literature. A number of authors have recently explored the link between virtue...     

Links among theory, research, and practice: cornerstones of clinical scientific progress

Discusses how explicit links among clinical theory, research, and practice are necessary if a clinical discipline is to survive in the managed care marketplace of today. Robust links among theory, research, and practice enable the elaboration of a systematic body of clinical knowledge that is practical in its deployment, effective in its methods, and compelling in its rationale. Moreover, theoretical advances are increasingly necessary, in that they allow scientists to categorize and prioritize the growing amount of empirically derived information, determine how pieces of multilevel data fit together, identify knowledge gaps, and set priorities for future studies. As shown by some of the articles in this special section, evolving theories of behavior have several characteristics in common; namely that they are developmental, transactional, contextual, adaptational, multilevel, and multidetermined. Concerns may be raised, however, as to whether current research methods are fully adequate to test these newer, more complex, multilevel theories or the clinical phenomena they seek to characterize. To address these difficulties, as well as to increase the pace of scientific advances that may result from propitious links among theory, research, and practice, I offer several recommendations to clinical psychology in general and to clinical child psychological research in particular.     

On logic,methodology and practice of applied sociology

Applied sociology will be understood in the following discussion as a unique and original form of sociology; i.e., in its logic and practice distinguished from traditional sociology it is understood as an explanatory body of knowledge and an intellectual discourse about intentional/purposeful social action and behavior. The application of sociology proper to such substantive fields as family, art, law and sport, commonly called applied sociology, which reproduce the body of sociological knowledge just a second time, is not part of such understanding. Applied sociology in its original sense has its own logic in which purpose, implementation and the process of social-problem solution are crucial. It will in the end lead to an applied action or implementation theory. It is, to paraphrase Lazarsfeld, the methodology of “sociology in action” (1960).     

The influences of evolutionary theory on Pareto's sociology

This paper argues that the influence of evolutionary theory on the sociology of Vilfredo Pareto has been generally misunderstood or overlooked, largely on account of Pareto's own contemptuous rejection of “finalist” Darwinian evolution. But the sources of Pareto's evolutionary ideas were French, not English. Neo-Lamarckian notions of inheritance and the related concept of degeneration helped support Pareto's explanation of social evolution, especially as it is developed in his early sociological works. Understanding these influences helps explain Pareto's peculiarly pessimistic account of the mechanism of social change in modern society.     

Containment in theory and practice

Abstract

This article selects the term ‘containment’ as a vehicle for an exploration of multi-professional work and communication in the general practice setting. The term was selected because of its widespread use by and relevance to the different professionals who work in general practice. It is sufficiently elastic to be applied to one-to-one work between patients and GPs, counsellors, nurses or complementary therapists, and to a multi-professional teamwork process.

The exploration of the concept in use at Marylebone Health Centre is complicated by the multi-professional nature of the team and then-wide range of belief systems and language groups. In the process of exploring the term, members of the team had to cope with their discovery that it was being used in contradictory ways. They decided that a new and more grounded definition in shared and ordinary (nonprofessional) language was needed, if the term were to become a vehicle for inter-professional collaboration and if unhelpful, anti-task social defences were to be minimised.     

Family theory and the scientific method

The evolution of family interactional research reveals a transformation from the theoretical concerns of a novel cybernetic paradigm to methodological problems of a prior mechanistic one. This change can be understood, within a cybernetic perspective, as an example of the characteristic functioning of adaptive systems attempting to maintain themselves unchanged under changed circumstances. A turn to a focus on method results in theoretical self-correction and the implicit retention of a mechanistic paradigm. This eliminates those most novel aspects of family interactional research that suggested the beginning of a cybernetic paradigm. A mechanistic methodology for family interaction research can be understood as an analogue to ritual in social systems. A primary attribute of ritual, sanctity, self-reflexively defines certain basic premises as unquestionable. By this, it regulates the beliefs of those who act it out, and eliminates the most radical novelty that confronts these beliefs. The evolution of family interactional research and its changing relationship to its methodology is an example of this process, the introduction and rejection of novelty by self-regulating systems. In this case, a challenge to the basic premises of a mechanistic paradigm is subverted, using its method as the arbitrator of validity in family interactional research.     

Countertransference evolution in theory and practice

A framework is suggested for conceptualizing countertransference, based on expansion of the concept emerging subsequent to Freud's original view of the phenomenon: from Ucs to Cs, from reactions to transference to all reactions, from the analyst's neurosis to the analyst's functioning, from self-analysis to self-scrutiny, from obstacle to contribution. Particular attention is called to the advantages of maintaining the distinction between the patient's transference and the analyst's countertransference; the importance for successful psychoanalytic work of being aware of the subtleties of countertransference in work with neurotic patients, especially in contrast to the blatant countertransference experiences more disturbed patients thrust upon the analyst; the need for further investigation of the relations between the analyst's empathy, regression, and countertransference; the lack of understanding of and information about the homosexual countertransference, based on insufficient knowledge of the mechanisms of resistance to self-analysis, among other reasons; and the need for more reliable information about the limits of and indications for using countertransference responses in particular kinds of clinical situations, whether for informing the patient as to the analyst's responses to him, for informing the analyst in the interpretive process, or in formulating reconstructions. A clinical example provides an illustration of the complexity of countertransference-transference interaction and of the impact of countertransference on the transference.     

Mediational screening in theory and in practice

Pillow et al.'s (1991) argument for mediational selection omits discussion of what may be the strategy's greatest advantage, the early identification of risk. The theoretical benefits to prevention of identifying developmental processes are briefly noted here. At the same time, practical limitations of mediational selection are noted, particularly in relation to establishing and interpreting the correlation found between mediational and outcome variables. It is concluded that mediational selection is one, but only one, selection strategy worthy of consideration in prevention research.     

Inference,practice and theory

Reichenbach held that all scientific inference reduces, via probability calculus, to induction, and he held that induction can be justified. He sees scientific knowledge in a practical context and insists that any rational assessment of actions requires a justification of induction. Gaps remain in his justifying argument; for we can not hope to prove that induction will succeed if success is possible. However, there are good prospects for completing a justification of essentially the kind he sought by showing that while induction may succeed, no alternative is a rational way of trying.Reichenbach's claim that probability calculus, especially via Bayes' Theorem, can help to exhibit the structure of inference to theories is a valuable insight. However, his thesis that the weighting of all hypotheses rests only on frequency data is too restrictive, especially given his scientific realism. Other empirical factors are relevant. Any satisfactory account of scientific inference must be deeply indebted to Reichenbach's foundation work.     

Group-as-a-whole systems theory and practice

Group-as-a-whole systems theory is presented and applied to the practice of group psychotherapy. The individual and the group are conceptualized as two isomorphic systems in a hierarchy of living systems. The basic component of the group-as-a-whole is its subgroups, which exist independent of individuals whose subgroup memberships may change while subgroups remain stable. Subgroups come together around similarities and separate on differences, and contain differences for the group-as-a-whole to integrate in relationship to primary and secondary goals. The primary goals of system survival and maturation take precedence over the secondary goals, which relate to the environment. Goal achievement and individual change is explained as a function of group dynamics. In a therapy group, the dynamics of each phase of group-as-a-whole development serve as a major therapeutic force. Within each member, salient developmental issues are aroused, which resonate with the issues that the group is in the process of mastering. The task of the group-as-a-whole therapist is to facilitate the developmental process at both the group and the individual level. Therapeutic interventions are designed to facilitate the discrimination and integration of information at the boundaries between systems and subsystems: within the individual member system (intrapersonal) and between individual member systems (interpersonal), within the group-as-a-whole system, within subgroups, between subgroups, and between all systems in the relevant hierarchy and their environments.