RELIGION AS A CONTROL GUIDE: ON THE IMPACT OF RELIGION ON COGNITION

Religions commonly are taken to provide general orientation in leading one's life. We develop here the idea that religions also may have a much more concrete guidance function in providing systematic decision biases in the face of cognitive‐control dilemmas. In particular, we assume that the selective reward that religious belief systems provide for rule‐conforming behavior induces systematic biases in cognitive‐control parameters that are functional in producing the wanted behavior. These biases serve as default values under uncertainty and affect performance in any task that shares cognitive‐control operations with the religiously motivated rule‐conforming behavior the biases were originally developed for. Such biases therefore can be unraveled and objectified by means of rather simple tasks that are relatively well understood with regard to the cognitive mechanisms they draw on.     

A bio-inspired model of behavior considering decision-making and planning,spatial attention and basic motor commands processes

Cognitive architectures (CA) are an IA approach to implement computer systems with human-like behavior. Fundamental exhibited human capabilities include planning and decision-making. In that regard, numerous AI systems successfully exhibit human-like behavior but are limited to either achieving specific objectives or are restrained to too heavily constrained environments, which makes them unsuitable in the presence of unforeseen situations where autonomy is required. To try to alleviate the problem, we present a bio-inspired computational model to solve the autonomous navigation problem of a computational entity in a controlled context. This proposal is the result of the interaction between planning and decision-making, spatial attention and the motor cognitive functions. The proposed model is based on neuroscientific evidence concerning the involved cognitive functions and is part of a more general cognitive architecture. In the case study developed to validate our idea, we can see that the processes previously identified play an important role to accomplish spatial navigation. In the case study presented, an agent achieves the navigation over an unexplored maze from an initial to a final position successfully. The reunited results motivate us to continue improving our model considering attentional information to influence the agent’s motor behavior.     

Bio-inspired cognitive architecture of episodic memory

Memory and learning are essential functions in human beings as they allow us to acquire and store in the brain representations of thoughts, experiences, and behaviors, which are required for problem-solving in our daily life and mainly for survival. Episodic memory is a type of memory that provides the ability to re-experience events in one’s life, and it is associated with their conscious recollection. Since episodic memory can represent our experiences about the environment, similar to a mental journey, it is desired in systems that attempt to create human-like behavior. Currently, the main problem is that state of the art proposals do not consider neuroscientific evidence like memory dynamics for forgetting or bottom-up inputs, and most of them do not consider episodic memory as a different memory but as part of general declarative memory. We consider these omissions to limit the generation of human-like behavior. In this work, we propose a bio-inspired cognitive architecture of episodic memory. Neuroscientific evidence provides us with the brain structures associated with this type of memory, the connections, and the operations these areas perform. We hypothesize that virtual entities endowed with our episodic memory cognitive architecture will plan and make decisions in a more human-like fashion. To test the capabilities of the proposal, we endowed a virtual creature with a distributed and concurrent implementation of our architecture, and it was given two tasks. The first task validated the functions of the memory independently, and in the second task, the creature used episodic memory to solve a planning problem. From the results of these experiments, we validate our proposal and show that it is possible to create a system that behaves as the human brain does.     

Planning paths to multiple targets: memory involvement and planning heuristics in spatial problem solving

For large numbers of targets, path planning is a complex and computationally expensive task. Humans, however, usually solve such tasks quickly and efficiently. We present experiments studying human path planning performance and the cognitive processes and heuristics involved. Twenty-five places were arranged on a regular grid in a large room. Participants were repeatedly asked to solve traveling salesman problems (TSP), i.e., to find the shortest closed loop connecting a start location with multiple target locations. In Experiment 1, we tested whether humans employed the nearest neighbor (NN) strategy when solving the TSP. Results showed that subjects outperform the NN-strategy, suggesting that it is not sufficient to explain human route planning behavior. As a second possible strategy we tested a hierarchical planning heuristic in Experiment 2, demonstrating that participants first plan a coarse route on the region level that is refined during navigation. To test for the relevance of spatial working memory (SWM) and spatial long-term memory (LTM) for planning performance and the planning heuristics applied, we varied the memory demands between conditions in Experiment 2. In one condition the target locations were directly marked, such that no memory was required; a second condition required participants to memorize the target locations during path planning (SWM); in a third condition, additionally, the locations of targets had to retrieved from LTM (SWM and LTM). Results showed that navigation performance decreased with increasing memory demands while the dependence on the hierarchical planning heuristic increased.     

The evolution of cognition—a hypothesis

Behavior may be controlled by reactive systems. In a reactive system the motor output is exclusively driven by actual sensory input. An alternative solution to control behavior is given by “cognitive” systems capable of planning ahead. To this end the system has to be equipped with some kind of internal world model. A sensible basis of an internal world model might be a model of the system's own body. I show that a reactive system with the ability to control a body of complex geometry requires only a slight reorganization to form a cognitive system. This implies that the assumption that the evolution of cognitive properties requires the introduction of new, additional modules, namely internal world models, is not justified. Rather, these modules may already have existed before the system obtained cognitive properties. Furthermore, I discuss whether the occurrence of such world models may lead to systems having internal perspective.     

A functional approach for research on cognitive control: Analysing cognitive control tasks and their effects in terms of operant conditioning

Cognitive control is an important mental ability that is examined using a multitude of cognitive control tasks and effects. The present paper presents the first steps in the elaboration of a functional approach, which aims to uncover the communalities and differences between different cognitive control tasks and their effects. Based on the idea that responses in cognitive control tasks qualify as operant behaviour, we propose to reinterpret cognitive control tasks in terms of operant contingencies and cognitive control effects as instances of moderated stimulus control. We illustrate how our approach can be used to uncover communalities between topographically different cognitive control tasks and can lead to novel questions about the processes underlying cognitive control.     

How navigation systems transform epistemic virtues: Knowledge,issues and solutions

In this paper, we analyse how GPS-based navigation systems are transforming some of our intellectual virtues and then suggest two strategies to improve our practices regarding the use of such epistemic tools. We start by outlining the two main approaches in virtue epistemology, namely virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism. We then discuss how navigation systems can undermine five epistemic virtues, namely memory, perception, attention, intellectual autonomy, and intellectual carefulness. We end by considering two possible interlinked ways of trying to remedy this situation: [i] redesigning the epistemic tool to improve the epistemic virtues of memory, perception, and attention; and [ii] the cultivation of cognitive diligence for wayfinding tasks scaffolding intellectual autonomy and carefulness.     

汉诺塔问题解决的认知过程及特点分析

以267名大学生为被试,对汉诺塔问题(Tower of Hanoi)解决的认知过程及特点进行了分析。相对于汉诺塔问题解决较差者(有多余移动步骤的被试)而言,以最少步数解决汉诺塔问题的被试其第一步计划时间较长,但平均计划时间却明显要短。汉诺塔问题解决较差者多在关键步骤上出错,从而导致多余的移动步数以及总体完成时间的延长。进一步分析表明,汉诺塔问题解决的这种认知活动主要反映的是与计划和抑制有关的总体计划协调能力以及空间短时记忆能力。     

Dissociable stages of problem solving (II): first evidence for process-contingent temporal order of activation in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex

In a companion study, eye-movement analyses in the Tower of London task (TOL) revealed independent indicators of functionally separable cognitive processes during problem solving, with processes of building up an internal representation of the problem preceding actual planning processes. These results imply that processes of internalization and planning should also be distinguishable in time and space with respect to concomitant brain activation patterns. To investigate this possibility, here we conducted analyses of fMRI data for left and right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) during problem solving in the TOL task by accounting for the trial-by-trial variability of onsets and durations of the different cognitive processing stages. Comparisons between stimulus-locked and response-locked modeling approaches affirmed that activation in left dlPFC was elicited particularly during early processes of internalization, comprising the extraction of goal information and the generation of an internal problem representation, whereas activation in right dlPFC was predominantly attributable to later processes of mental transformations on this representation, that is planning proper. Thus, present data corroborate the proposal that often observed bilateral dlPFC activation patterns during complex cognitive tasks such as problem solving may reflect functionally and, to some extent, even temporally separable processes with opposing lateralizations.     

Cognitive solutions for security and cryptography

This paper describes the new security solutions based on cognitive approaches and new computing paradigm called cognitive cryptography. This new security area establish a new generation of computational methods and security systems, focused on creation intelligent cryptographic algorithms and security protocols using cognitive information processing approaches. Such systems are designed for semantic evaluation of encrypted data, and allow to select the most appropriate techniques of its encryption. This paper presents a possible application of such techniques for different security tasks like authentication, secret sharing, secure data management etc. Additionally, some cryptographic solutions inspired by biological models will be presented.     

RT distributional analysis of cognitive-control-related brain activity in first-episode schizophrenia

Impairments in cognitive control are a defining feature of schizophrenia. Aspects of cognitive control include proactive control—the maintenance of task rules or goals to bias attention and maintain preparedness—and reactive control—the engagement of attention in reaction to changing cognitive demands. Proactive control is thought to be particularly impaired in schizophrenia. We sought to examine proactive and reactive control in schizophrenia, as measured by reaction time (RT) variability, and especially long RTs, which are thought to represent lapses in proactive control, during the Stroop paradigm. Furthermore, we sought to examine the neural underpinnings of lapses in proactive control and the subsequent engagement of reactive control in those with schizophrenia, as compared to healthy controls, using fMRI. We found that patients with schizophrenia displayed greater RT variability and more extremely long RTs than controls suggesting that proactive control was weaker in the schizophrenia than in the control group. All of the subjects engaged regions of the cognitive control network during long RTs, consistent with an engagement of reactive control following a failure in proactive control on these trials. The schizophrenia group, however, displayed significantly diminished activity in these regions relative to controls. Our results suggest increased failures in proactive control, but also impaired reactive control, in schizophrenia as compared to healthy subjects.     

The dual pathway to creativity model: Creative ideation as a function of flexibility and persistence

The dual pathway to creativity model argues that creativity—the generation of original and appropriate ideas—is a function of cognitive flexibility and cognitive persistence, and that dispositional or situational variables may influence creativity either through their effects on flexibility, on persistence, or both. This model is tested in a number of studies in which participants performed creative ideation tasks. We review work showing that cognitive flexibility, operationalised as the number of content categories surveyed, directly relates to idea originality, but that originality can also be achieved by exploring a few content categories in great depth (i.e., persistence). We also show that a global processing mode is associated with cognitive flexibility, but only leads to high originality in tasks that capitalise on cognitive flexibility. We finally show that activating positive mood states enhance creativity because they stimulate flexibility, while activating negative mood states can enhance creativity because they stimulate persistence. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.     

Differential contributions of set-shifting and monitoring to dual-task interference

It is commonly argued that complex behaviour is regulated by a number of “executive functions”, which work to coordinate the operation of disparate cognitive systems in the service of an overall goal. However, the identity, roles, and interactions of specific putative executive functions remain contentious, even within widely accepted tests of executive function. The authors present two experiments that use dual-task interference to provide further support for multiple distinct executive functions and to establish the differential contributions of those functions in two relatively complex executive tasks—random generation and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test. Results are interpreted in terms of process models of the complex executive tasks.     

Global-local processing impacts academic risk taking

Research has shown that academic risk taking—the selection of school tasks with varying difficulty levels—affords important implications for educational outcomes. In two experiments, we explored the role of cognitive processes—specifically, global versus local processing styles—in students’ academic risk-taking tendencies. Participants first read a short passage, which provided the context for their subsequent academic risk-taking decisions. Following which, participants undertook the Navon’s task and attended to either global letters or local letters only, i.e., were either globally or locally primed. The effects of priming on academic risk taking were then assessed using a perception-based measure (Experiment 1) and a task-based measure (Experiment 2). Experiment 1 provided preliminary evidence, which Experiment 2 confirmed, that globally focused individuals took more academic risk than did locally focused individuals after controlling for participants’ need for cognition (how much they enjoy effortful cognitive activities). Additionally, the inclusion of and comparisons with a control group in Experiment 2 revealed that locally focused participants drove the observed effects. The theory of predictive and reactive control systems (PARCS) provides a cogent account of our findings. Future directions and practical applications in education are discussed.     

Why neuroscience matters to cognitive neuropsychology

The broad issue in this paper is the relationship between cognitive psychology and neuroscience. That issue arises particularly sharply for cognitive neurospsychology, some of whose practitioners claim a methodological autonomy for their discipline. They hold that behavioural data from neuropsychological impairments are sufficient to justify assumptions about the underlying modular structure of human cognitive architecture, as well as to make inferences about its various components. But this claim to methodological autonomy can be challenged on both philosophical and empirical grounds. A priori considerations about (cognitive) multiple realisability challenge the thesis on philosophical grounds, and neuroscientific findings from developmental disorders substantiate that challenge empirically. The conclusion is that behavioural evidence alone is inadequate for scientific progress since appearances of modularity can be thoroughly deceptive, obscuring both the dynamic processes of neural development and the endstate network architecture of real cognitive systems.     

小学儿童执行功能与问题解决能力的关系

本研究选取小学二、四、六年级儿童为被试,采用计算机操作的方式,考察小学生执行功能中抑制、工作记忆和认知灵活性与4类伦敦塔问题解决表现之间的关系。结果表明在问题解决的计划方面,抑制能力较高的被试体现出良好的适应性解决能力,而工作记忆高的被试更能有效的利用资源;根据问题解决路径的不同划分了三大伦敦塔问题解决表现类型,工作记忆和抑制在问题解决中均起到重要作用。     

Learning Strategies and Transfer in the Domain of Programming

We report two studies involving an intelligent tutoring system for Lisp (the Camegie Mellon University Lisp Tutor). In Experiment 1, we developed a model, based on production system theories of transfer and analogical problem solving, that accounts for effects of instructional examples, the transfer of cognitive skills across programming problems, and practice effects. In Experiment 2, we analyzed protocols collected from subjects as they processed instructional texts and examples before working with the Lisp Tutor and protocols collected after subjects solved each programming problem. The results suggest that the acquisition of cognitive skills is facilitated by high degrees of metacognition, which includes higher degrees of monitoring states of knowledge, more self-generated explanation goals and strategies, and greater attention to the instructional structure. Improvement in skill acquisition is also strongly related to the generation of explanations connecting the example material to the abstract terms introduced in the text, the generation of explanations that focus on the novel concepts, and spending more time in planning diminishing returns. Finally, reflection on problem solutions that focus on understanding the abstractions underlying programs or that focus on understanding how programs work seems to be related to improved learning.     

The Stationary-Gaze Task Should Not Be Systematically Used as the Control Task in Studies of Postural Control

In studies of postural control, a control task is often used to understand significant effects obtained with experimental manipulations. This task should be the easiest task and (therefore) engage the lowest behavioral variability and cognitive workload. Since 1983, the stationary-gaze task is considered as the most relevant control task. Instead, the authors expected that free looking at small targets (white paper or images; visual angle: 12°) could be an easier task. To verify this assumption, 16 young individuals performed stationary-gaze, white-panel, and free-viewing 12° tasks in steady and relaxed stances. The stationary-gaze task led to significantly higher cognitive workload (mean score in the National Aeronotics and Space Administration Task Load Index questionnaire), higher interindividual body (head, neck, and lower back) linear variability, and higher interindividual body angular variability—not systematically yet—than both other tasks. There was more cognitive workload in steady than relaxed stances. The authors also tested if a free-viewing 24° task could lead to greater angular displacement, and hence greater body sway, than could the other tasks in relaxed stance. Unexpectedly, the participants mostly moved their eyes and not their body in this task. In the discussion, the authors explain why the stationary-gaze task may not be an ideal control task and how to choose this neutral task.     

Capacity estimates in working memory: Reliability and interrelationships among tasks

The concept of capacity has become increasingly important in discussions of working memory (WM), in so far as most models of WM conceptualize it as a limited-capacity mechanism for maintaining information in an active state, and as capacity estimates from at least one type of WM task—complex span—are valid predictors of real-world cognitive performance. However, the term capacity is also often used in the context of a distinct set of WM tasks, change detection, and may or may not refer to the same cognitive capability. We here develop maximum-likelihood models of capacity from each of these tasks—as well as from a third WM task that places heavy demands on cognitive control, the self-ordered WM task (SOT)—and show that the capacity estimates from change detection and complex span tasks are not correlated with each other, although capacity estimates from change detection tasks do correlate with those from the SOT. Furthermore, exploratory factor analysis confirmed that performance on the SOT and change detection load on the same factor, with performance on our complex span task loading on its own factor. These findings suggest that at least two distinct cognitive capabilities underlie the concept of WM capacity as it applies to each of these three tasks.