What is Social Equality? An Analysis of Status Equality as a Strongly Egalitarian Ideal

What kind of equality should we value and why? Current debate centres around whether distributive equality is valuable. However, it is not the only (potentially) morally significant form of equality. David Miller and T. M. Scanlon have emphasised the importance of social equality—a strongly egalitarian notion distinct from distributive equality, and which cannot be reduced to a concern for overall welfare or the welfare of the worst-off. However, as debate tends to focus on distribution, social equality has been neglected and we do not have a clear understanding of what it is and why it might be valuable. This paper aims to address this gap.     

Narratives of Support and Resistance: A Political Psychological Analysis of the Implementation of UNSCR 1325 in Bosnia and Herzegovina

This article presents an analysis of norm change, and, more specifically, how gender equality norms are negotiated in Bosnia. The immediate reason for asking these questions is the adoption of the United Nations Security Council resolution 1325 in 2000 on women, peace, and security and the massive global effort to change gender equality norms in order to improve peacebuilding efforts. We argue that implementation of the United Nations' Women Peace and Security (WPS) agenda rests on localization of gender equality norms. Our contention is that this process takes place on different levels. Based on a series focus‐group interviews in Bosnia we offer depth to what a localization process can look like. We discuss what this means for the WPS agenda in Bosnia, for norm change, and for political psychological scholarship.     

INEQUALITY,INJUSTICE AND LEVELLING DOWN

The levelling down objection is the most serious objection to the principle of equality, but we think it can be conclusively defeated. It is serious because it pits the principle of equality squarely against the welfares of the persons whose welfares or resources are equalized. It suggests that there is something perverse about the principle of equality. In this paper, we argue that levelling down is not an implication of the principle of equality. To show this we offer a defence of, and partial elaboration of, what we call a common good conception of the principle of equality, which principle favours states in which everyone is better off to those in which everyone is worse off. We contrast this with what we call a purely structural conception of the principle of equality. The common good conception of equality involves two basic components: (1) in each circumstance there exists an ideal egalitarian distribution, which distributes equally all the available good in the distribution with the highest average welfare and (2) in evaluating how just the world is, it will matter how far the actual distribution is from the ideal distribution. The ideal egalitarian distribution in the circumstance is Pareto optimal and the approximation rule implies that Pareto superior states are less unjust than Pareto inferior states. 1     

论病人的“选医权”

选医权是病人的一项基本权力,它能消除医患间事实上的不平等,具有公平的法律价值,能够保证起点公平、过程公平和结果公平。在实施选医权的过程中,病人要正确行使权力,不能滥用权力,履行自己应尽的义务;医院和医生必须为保证病人选医权履行相应的义务。     

From Bodo Ethics to Distributive Justice

Concern with material equality as the central form of distributive justice is a very modern idea. Distributive justice for Aristotle and many other writers for millennia after him was a matter of distributing what each ought to get from merit or desert in some sense. Many, such as Hume, thought material equality a pernicious idea. In the medieval village life of Bodo, villagers knew enough about each other to govern relations through norms, including, when necessary, a norm of charity. In more complex modern societies, economic destitution cannot so well be handled by individual charity, but now it can be handled by states. Hence, we begin to conceive of the idea of distributive justice as driven essentially by concern for material equality. The difference in state capacities is largely epistemological: states today can know much more about their citizens.     

Of Mice and Men: Equality and Animals

Can material Egalitarianism (requiring, for example, the significant promotion of fortune) include animals in the domain of the equality requirement? The problem can be illustrated as follows: If equality of wellbeing is what matters, and normal mice are included in this egalitarian requirement, then normal mice have a much stronger claim to resources than almost any human. This is because normal mice have a much stronger claim to resources than almost any human. This is because their wellbeing is much lower than that of normal humans. Thus, equality of wellbeing requires a massive shift of resources away from most humans to mice. This view, however, seems crazy. I explore this problem and propose a solution.     

Equality of opportunity and complex equality: The special place of schooling

This paper is an engagement with Equality by John Baker, Kathleen Lynch, Judy Walsh and Sara Cantillon. It identifies a dilemma for educational egalitarians, which arises within their theory of equality, arguing that sometimes there may be a conflict between advancing equality of opportunity and providing equality of respect and recognition, and equality of love care and solidarity. It argues that the latter values may have more weight in deciding what to do than traditional educational egalitarians have usually thought.     

Why Are You Betraying Your Class?

Abstract: Social justice concerns us on two counts: One, what is social justice? Two, given that we know the answer to one, then the question is: how can social justice be implemented? Answering the first question requires hitting the right balance between two values: liberty and equality. My concern here, however, is with the second question, the question of implementation rather than with what social justice consists of. I assume that the right balance between liberty and equality is somehow a given. To implement the structural changes that a just society requires calls for a historical agent that can bring about such changes. The working class was a good candidate to be such a historical agent. The working class was suitable for this historical task because it was the class that had the most to gain from a just society and it was a very large class of people. The working class was singled out for this task not for being a particularly virtuous class but by being the class that had the most to gain from a change in the status quo. But the working class is rapidly disappearing; in the developed countries, it has shrunk considerably. Thus, the implementation of social justice is now left without an effective historical agent to carry it through.     

Three Meanings of Equality: The ‘Arab Problem’ in Israel

If justice means equal participation and inclusion, as authors such as Axel Honneth or Nancy Fraser have argued, the question still remains: inclusion in what, and of whom? This question has not been investigated with sufficient attention. Drawing on the example of the experience of Palestinians and Israeli Arabs, I address this issue by distinguishing different meanings of equality which correspond to different types of political struggles. In so doing, I re-examine Honneth’s claim that the critical theory of recognition has no room for cultural groups as referents of a potential ‘fourth principle of recognition’ beyond legal equality, the merit principle, and love. It is argued that Honneth’s critique of collective rights neglects crucial differences between the types of groups that exist in modern states, and between the different kinds of struggles for equality waged by those groups.     

Notes on contributors

In this critical discussion of Simon Caney's global political theory, I focus on two broad areas. In the first area, I consider Caney's suggestions concerning global equality of opportunity and note several problems with how we might develop these ideas. Some of the problems concern aggregation, while others point to difficulties with what equality of opportunity means in a culturally plural world, where different societies might value, construct, and rank goods in different ways. In the second broad area of criticism I argue that Caney has been unfair to contractarians and I rally to their defense.     

Equality of Education and Citizenship: Challenges of European Integration

What kind of equality among Europeans does equal citizenship require, especially regarding education? In particular, is there good reason to insist of equality of education among Europeans—and if so, equality of what? To what extent should the same knowledge base and citizenship norms be taught across state borders and religious and other normative divides? At least three philosophical issues merit attention: (a) The requirements of multiple democratic citizenships beyond the nation state; (b) how to respect diversity while securing such equality and inculcating commitments to justice and norms of citizenship, and (c) The multiple reasons for equality of various kinds among political equals living in a Union as compared to a unitary state. The article responds on the basis of several arguments in favour of certain kinds of equality. All Union citizens must enjoy a high minimum level of education, and all pupils must be informed concerning the various ways of life prevalent in Europe. Furthermore, there must be standards for securing equality of opportunity across the EU, though it is difficult to measure under multiculturalism. Citizens must also be socialised to certain ‘citizenship norms’. This shared basis to be taught in schools should avoid contested religious or philosophical premises as far as possible. Yet the school system should socialise pupils to three commitments: to the just domestic and European institutions and hence the legislation they engender, to principles that justify these institutions; and to a political theory that grounds these principles in a conception of the proper role of individuals, of member states and of the Union. I also argue that equality of result is not a plausible normative requirement among Europeans, while equality of opportunity is. The paper concludes with some comments on the lessons to be drawn for ‘Global’ citizenship.     

关于晚期恶性肿瘤放弃治疗的思考

晚期恶性肿瘤的放弃治疗,关键是明确四个方面问题:对于某些晚期恶性肿瘤病人为什么要放弃治疗,应该放弃哪些治疗,什么时候开始放弃治疗,如何进行放弃治疗.意义就在于尊重生命,合理分配和利用医疗资源,体现社会公平的原则.     

Are prosocials unique in their egalitarianism? The pursuit of equality in outcomes among individualists

The present research aims to elucidate to what extent the motive to ensure equality in outcomes is general and to what extent it interacts with other important motives such as maximizing own or collective gains. Because individuals may have different considerations and motivations in decision-making situations, it is likely that people with a different social value orientation will respond differently to an unequal distribution of outcomes. Contrary to expectations, not only prosocials care about equality in outcomes. In Study 1, the authors found that individualists choose to forego personal gains, despite obvious selfish reasons to cooperate, when outcomes were distributed unequally. In a second experiment, this finding was replicated and shows that individualists, just as prosocials, demand equality in outcomes in interdependent situations. The studies suggest that typifying individualists as solely being concerned about enhancing personal outcomes is too limited and that fairness norms may trump social value orientation.     

The Effect of Equity,Equality, and Reward Level on the Stability of Students' Premarital Relationships

Abstract

The purpose of the study was to examine to what degree equity, equality, and reward level discriminate between stable and unstable premarital relationships. Questionnaires were administered to 131 American students to ascertain the level of equity, equality, and rewards in their current premarital relationships. They were tested 3 months and again 7 months after initial contact. The results demonstrate that only reward level successfully discriminated between stable and unstable relationships. In addition, equity and equality did not discriminate between groups after controlling for reward level.     

Unity in nominal equational reasoning: The algebra of equality on nominal sets

There are currently no fewer than four dedicated logics for equality reasoning over nominal sets: nominal algebra, nominal equational logic, nominal equational logic with equality only, and permissive-nominal algebra.In this survey and research paper we present these logics side-by-side in a common notation, survey their similarities and differences, discuss their proof- and model-theories, and discuss in detail what the implications of those differences are for mathematical reasoning in each of them.     

Is Equality Essentially Comparative?

Larry Temkin has shown that Derek Parfit’s well-known Mere Addition Paradox suggests a powerful argument for the intransitivity of the relation “better than.” The crux of the argument is the view that equality is essentially comparative, according to which the same inequality can be evaluated differently depending on what it is being compared to. The comparative view of equality should be rejected, I argue, and hence so too this argument for intransitivity.

Equality as Comparative Fairness

The goal of this article is modest. It is simply to help illuminate the nature of egalitarianism. More particularly, I aim to show what certain egalitarians are committed to, and to suggest that equality, as these egalitarians understand it, is an important normative ideal that cannot simply be ignored in moral deliberations. In doing this, I distinguish between equality as universality, equality as impartiality, and equality as comparability, and also between instrumental and non‐instrumental egalitarianism. I then characterise the version of egalitarianism with which I am concerned, which I call equality as comparative fairness. I discuss the relations between equality, fairness, luck, and responsibility, and defend egalitarianism against rival views that focus on subsistence, sufficiency, or compassion. I also defend egalitarianism against the Levelling Down and Raising Up Objections, and present several key examples to illustrate egalitarianism's distinct appeal, in contrast to prioritarianism's. I conclude by considering two common questions about my view: first, whether my ultimate concern is really with comparative fairness, rather than equality, so that my view is not, in fact, a substantive, non‐instrumental version of egalitarianism, and second, whether my view ultimately reduces to a theory about desert.     

Causal models frame interpretation of mathematical equations

We offer evidence that people can construe mathematical relations as causal. The studies show that people can select the causal versions of equations and that their selections predict both what they consider most understandable and how they expect variables to influence one another. When asked to write down equations, people have a strong preference for the version that matches their causal model. Causal models serve to structure equations by determining the preferred order of variables: Causes should be on one side of an equality, and a single effect should appear on the other.     

Cruelty to Compassion: the Poetry of Teaching Transformation

Two complementary bodies of literature either claim explicitly or imply that human cruelty is rooted in asymmetrical relationships. The first describes and analyzes various forms of domination and acquiescence, including colonialism, racism, imperialism, sexism, and interpersonal power dynamics, among others. The second attempts to describe what would constitute the antidote, namely symmetrical relationships of mutuality and equality. Both of these literatures counsel abandoning asymmetrical relationships in favor of the symmetrical. To the contrary, this paper argues that it is only in the context of asymmetrical relationships that humans can learn the basics of equality and mutual regard that undergird democracy. More particularly, the moral use of asymmetrical relations would be to help the young acquire, inter alias, the kinds of self-awareness and self-understanding that would enable them to function as responsible parties in symmetrical relations.