Political ideology as motivated social cognition: Behavioral and neuroscientific evidence

Ideology is a potent motivational force; human beings are capable of committing atrocities (as well as acts of generosity and courage) and sacrificing even their own lives for the sake of abstract belief systems. In this article, we summarize the major tenets of a model of political ideology as motivated social cognition (Jost et al. in Psychol Bull 129:339–375, 2003a, Psychol Bull 129:389–393, 2003b, Person Soc Psychol Bull 33:989–1007, 2007), focusing on epistemic, existential, and relational motives and their implications for left-right (or liberal-conservative) political orientation. We review behavioral evidence indicating that chronically and temporarily activated needs to reduce uncertainty, ambiguity, threat, and disgust are positively associated with conservatism (or negatively associated with liberalism). Studies from neuroscience and genetics suggest that right- (vs. left-) wing orientation is associated with greater neural sensitivity to threat and larger amygdala volume, as well as less sensitivity to response conflict and smaller anterior cingulate volume. These findings and others provide converging evidence for Jost and colleagues’ model of ideology as motivated social cognition and, more broadly, reflect the utility of an integrative political neuroscience approach to understanding the basic cognitive, neural, and motivational processes that give rise to ideological activity.     

Vivisecting the religious mind: Religiosity and motivated social cognition

The relation between motivated social cognition and the religiosity dimensions, which Wulff (1991, 1997) described (Exclusion vs. Inclusion of Transcendence and Literal vs. Symbolic), was investigated in a Flemish speaking Belgian student sample (N=330). The Need for Closure Scale (NFC, Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) was used to measure motivated social cognition and the Post-Critical Belief Scale (Duriez et al., 2000) was used to measure Wulff's religiosity dimensions. Although NFC was expected to relate to the Literal vs. Symbolic dimension only, results also revealed a relation between NFC and the Exclusion vs. Inclusion of Transcendence dimension. However, whereas the former relationship is due to the NFC facets, Discomfort with Ambiguity and Closed-Mindedness, the latter relation can be attributed to the facets, Order and Structure and Predictability. Results obtained in a second Flemish speaking Belgian student sample (N=392) confirm these findings. Thus, apparently, whereas religious belief as such seems to be associated with a preference for order and structure as well as predictability, it is those who deal with religious content in a literal way who are incapable of dealing with alternative opinions.     

Conservatism as motivated avoidance of affect: Need for affect scales predict conservatism measures

We propose that individual differences in the motivation to avoid emotions are related to political conservatism. We argue that because conservatism is concerned with managing uncertainty and emphasizes ego-control, conservative ideologies match with the motivational concerns of those individuals who find emotions to be uncertainty-enhancing and dysfunctional. In a group of 267 participants, positive associations were found between emotion avoidance and right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, and support for conservative policies. Negative associations were found between emotion approach and conservatism measures.     

Automatic social behavior as motivated preparation to interact

The authors propose that automatic social behavior may result from perceivers preparing to interact with primed social group members. In Study 1, participants primed with a disliked outgroup (gay men) showed evidence of interaction preparation (aggression) rather than direct stereotypic trait expression (passivity). In Study 2, participants with implicit positive attitudes toward the elderly walked more slowly after "elderly" priming, but participants with negative attitudes walked more quickly, results consistent with a preparatory account; the reverse was found priming "youth." Study 3 demonstrated that the accessibility of a primed category follows a pattern more consistent with that of goal-related constructs (including post-goal-fulfillment inhibition) than that of semantically primed constructs. Implications for the function of stored knowledge are discussed.     

Individual differences in motivated social cognition: the case of self-serving information processing

Three experiments examined the hypothesis that people show consistency in motivated social cognitive processing across self-serving domains. Consistent with this hypothesis, Experiment 1 revealed that people who rated a task at which they succeeded as more important than a task at which they failed also cheated on a series of math problems, but only when they could rationalize their cheating as unintentional. Experiment 2 replicated this finding and demonstrated that a self-report measure of self-deception did not predict this rationalized cheating. Experiment 3 replicated Experiments 1 and 2 and ruled out several alternative explanations. These experiments suggest that people who show motivated processing in ego-protective domains also show motivated processing in extrinsic domains. These experiments also introduce a new measurement procedure for differentiating between intentional versus rationalized cheating.     

Methodological conservatism and social epistemology

This paper defends two principles of methodological conservatism on the grounds that they help to promote an effective social structure for a knowledge‐seeking community. Conservatism has some prima facie justification because it provides for an effective division of cognitive labor, it promotes the effective use of scientific resources, and it provides for a certain amount of stability. However, the principles I defend in this paper should not be treated as absolute or unconditional criteria of theory‐choice, since they can be overridden by other rules or maxims. Since the decision to override a principle of conservatism depends on various contextual factors, the appropriateness of conservatism can vary from context to context.     

The energetics of motivated cognition: a force-field analysis

A force-field theory of motivated cognition is presented and applied to a broad variety of phenomena in social judgment and self-regulation. Purposeful cognitive activity is assumed to be propelled by a driving force and opposed by a restraining force. Potential driving force represents the maximal amount of energy an individual is prepared to invest in a cognitive activity. Effective driving force corresponds to the amount of energy he or she actually invests in attempt to match the restraining force. Magnitude of the potential driving force derives from a combination of goal importance and the pool of available mental resources, whereas magnitude of the restraining force derives from an individual's inclination to conserve resources, current task demands, and competing goals. The present analysis has implications for choice of means to achieve one's cognitive goals as well as for successful goal attainment under specific force-field constellations. Empirical evidence for these effects is considered, and the underlying theory's integrative potential is highlighted. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Political conservatism and variety‐seeking

In this research, we document and explain a counterintuitive effect of political ideology on variety-seeking. Although political conservatives have a higher desire for control, which exerts a negative effect on variety-seeking, they also have a stronger motivation to follow social norms, which exerts a positive effect on variety-seeking. Three studies demonstrate that conservatism is positively related to variety-seeking due to social normative concerns and rule out an alternative explanation of heightened self-expressive motives among conservatives. This research provides preliminary evidence of how political ideology may explain differences in product choices.     

Chimpanzee social cognition

In the late 1970s, Premack and Woodruff asked whether chimpanzees had a theory of mind. The answer to this question has remained elusive. Whereas some authors argue that chimpanzees are capable of mental state attribution, others maintain that they simply learn certain cues in ertain situations. Recent studies challenge both views. On the one hand, chimpanzees know much more about seeing than cue-based explanations suggest; on the other hand, this knowledge does not necessarily entail understanding of the mental states of others. The hypothesis I put forward here is that chimpanzees learn cues in social situations but that they are also capable of knowledge abstraction to solve novel problems.     

Social spatial cognition: social distance dynamics as an identifier of social interactions

We suggest that socio-spatial behavior, which is an interaction between social and spatial cognition, can be viewed as a set of excursions that originate and end in close proximity to another individual(s). We present an extension of earlier studies that perceived spatial behavior in individual animals as a series of excursions originating from a particular location. We measured here the momentary distance between two individuals (social distance) to differentiate among eight possible types of social excursion originating in a state of proximity between excursion-participants. The defined excursion types are based on whether or not the excursion initiator also concludes the excursion, whether or not the excursion starts and ends at the same location, and the dynamics of the distance between excursion participants. We validated this approach to socio-spatial behavior as a set of excursions using it to analyze the behavior of the two sexes in rodents, of normal vs. stereotyped rats, as well as of different rodent species. Each of these groups displays a prevalent excursion type that reflects a distinct social dynamics. Our approach offers a useful and comprehensive tool for studying socio-spatial cognition, and can also be applied to distinguish among different social situations in rodents and other animals.

     

In genes we trust: the biological component of psychological essentialism and its relationship to mechanisms of motivated social cognition

Three studies analyzed the biological component of psychological essentialism (laypeople's belief that social categories have an underlying nature/natural foundation) as it pertains to mechanisms of motivated social cognition. A new scale assessing the belief in genetic determinism is introduced as a measure of the biological component of essentialism. Results speak to the reliability and validity of the scale and show that essentialist beliefs are associated with basic social-cognitive motives and are also related to processes of stereotyping and prejudice. An experimental study found that rendering essentialist information salient elicits increased levels of prejudice and in-group bias, particularly in persons holding chronic essentialist beliefs.     

Infant social attention predicts preschool social cognition

Recent research examining infants' understanding of intentional action claims to be studying the early origins or precursors of children's later theories of mind If these infant understandings are continuous with later preschool achievements, there should be empirical connections between the two. We provide initial evidence that infants' social attention predicts later social cognition. Specifically, 14-month-olds' habituation to human intentional action significantly predicts later preschool mentalistic construal of persons, as measured on a Theory of Mind Scale.     

Aging and motivated cognition: the positivity effect in attention and memory

As people get older, they experience fewer negative emotions. Strategic processes in older adults' emotional attention and memory might play a role in this variation with age. Older adults show more emotionally gratifying memory distortion for past choices and autobiographical information than younger adults do. In addition, when shown stimuli that vary in affective valence, positive items account for a larger proportion of older adults' subsequent memories than those of younger adults. This positivity effect in older adults' memories seems to be due to their greater focus on emotion regulation and to be implemented by cognitive control mechanisms that enhance positive and diminish negative information. These findings suggest that both cognitive abilities and motivation contribute to older adults' improved emotion regulation.     

Mutual gaze and social cognition

I examine the role of mutual gaze in social cognition. I start by discussing recent studies of joint visual attention in order to show that social cognition is operative in infancy prior to the emergence of theoretical skills required to make judgments about other people's states of mind. Such social cognition depends on the communicative potential inherent in human bodies. I proceed to examine this embodied social cognition in the context of Merleau-Ponty's views on vision. I expose some inner difficulties within Merleau-Ponty's position as well as to point out the ways of resolving them by means of combined insights from developmental psychology and the analyses of self-other relations from philosophies of dialogue.     

Some social features of cognition

This paper describes and assesses a number of dispositions which are instrumental in allowing us to take on the opinions of others unselfconsciously. It is argued that these dispositions are in fact reliable in the environments in which they tend to come into play. In addition, it is argued that agents are, by their own lights, justified in the beliefs they arrive at as a result of these processes. Finally, these processes are argued to provide a basis for rejecting the claim that fixation of belief is radically holistic.