Models for normal intuitionistic modal logics

Kripke-style models with two accessibility relations, one intuitionistic and the other modal, are given for analogues of the modal systemK based on Heyting's prepositional logic. It is shown that these two relations can combine with each other in various ways. Soundness and completeness are proved for systems with only the necessity operator, or only the possibility operator, or both. Embeddings in modal systems with several modal operators, based on classical propositional logic, are also considered. This paper lays the ground for an investigation of intuitionistic analogues of systems stronger thanK. A brief survey is given of the existing literature on intuitionistic modal logic.     

Incompleteness and the Barcan formula

A (normal) system of prepositional modal logic is said to be complete iff it is characterized by a class of (Kripke) frames. When we move to modal predicate logic the question of completeness can again be raised. It is not hard to prove that if a predicate modal logic is complete then it is characterized by the class of all frames for the propositional logic on which it is based. Nor is it hard to prove that if a propositional modal logic is incomplete then so is the predicate logic based on it. But the interesting question is whether a complete propositional modal logic can have an incomplete extension. In 1967 Kripke announced the incompleteness of a predicate extension of S4. The purpose of the present article is to present several such systems. In the first group it is the systemswith the Barcan Formula which are incomplete, while those without are complete. In the second group it is thosewithout the Barcan formula which are incomplete, while those with the Barcan Formula are complete. But all these are based on propositional systems which are characterized by frames satisfying in each case a single first-order sentence.     

Modal Deduction in Second-Order Logic and Set Theory - II

In this paper, we generalize the set-theoretic translation method for poly-modal logic introduced in [11] to extended modal logics. Instead of devising an ad-hoc translation for each logic, we develop a general framework within which a number of extended modal logics can be dealt with. We first extend the basic set-theoretic translation method to weak monadic second-order logic through a suitable change in the underlying set theory that connects up in interesting ways with constructibility; then, we show how to tailor such a translation to work with specific cases of extended modal logics.     

Negation in the Context of Gaggle Theory

We study an application of gaggle theory to unary negative modal operators. First we treat negation as impossibility and get a minimal logic system Ki that has a perp semantics. Dunn's kite of different negations can be dealt with in the extensions of this basic logic K_i. Next we treat negation as “unnecessity” and use a characteristic semantics for different negations in a kite which is dual to Dunn's original one. K_u is the minimal logic that has a characteristic semantics. We also show that Shramko's falsification logic FL can be incorporated into some extension of this basic logic K_u. Finally, we unite the two basic logics K_i and K_u together to get a negative modal logic K_-, which is dual to the positive modal logic K₊ in [7]. Shramko has suggested an extension of Dunn's kite and also a dual version in [12]. He also suggested combining them into a “united” kite. We give a united semantics for this united kite of negations.     

Toward model-theoretic modal logics

Adding certain cardinality quantifiers into first-order language will give substantially more expressive languages. Thus, many mathematical concepts beyond first-order logic can be handled. Since basic modal logic can be seen as the bisimular invariant fragment of first-order logic on the level of models, it has no ability to handle modally these mathematical concepts beyond first-order logic. By adding modalities regarding the cardinalities of successor states, we can, in principle, investigate modal logics of all cardinalities. Thus ways of exploring model-theoretic logics can be transferred to modal logics.     

Line-based affine reasoning in Euclidean plane

We consider the binary relations of parallelism and convergence between lines in a 2-dimensional affine space. Associating with parallelism and convergence the binary predicates P and C and the modal connectives [P] and [C], we consider a first-order theory based on these predicates and a modal logic based on these modal connectives. We investigate the axiomatization/completeness and the decidability/complexity of this first-order theory and this modal logic.     

Proof by Assumption of the Possible in Prior Analytics, 1.15; How Not to Blend Modal Frameworks

The present paper aims to show that the reconstruction of the formal framework of the proofs in Pr. An. 1.15, as proposed by Malink and Rosen 2013 (‘Proof by Assumption of the Possible in Prior Analytics 1.15’, Mind, 122, 953-85) is due to affront a double impasse. Malink and Rosen argue convincingly that Aristotle operates with two different modal frameworks, one as found in the system of modal logic presented in Prior Analytics 1.3 and 8-22, and one occurring in many of Aristotle’s works, such as the Physics, De Caelo and the Metaphysics. However, they misconstrue the latter framework. More precisely, they misconstrue the domain of significance of what they call the ‘Principle of Necessitation’. As a consequence, bringing the two frameworks into one results into a contradictory modal logic. On the other hand, if the Principle of Necessitation is rectified, the proofs put forward by Malink and Rosen in the same paper are no longer available.     

Modal Logic As Dialogical Logic

The title reflects my conviction that, viewed semantically,modal logic is fundamentally dialogical; this conviction is based on the key role played by the notion of bisimulation in modal model theory. But this dialogical conception of modal logic does not seem to apply to modal proof theory, which is notoriously messy. Nonetheless, by making use of ideas which trace back to Arthur Prior (notably the use of nominals, special proposition symbols which name worlds) I will show how to lift the dialogical conception to modal proof theory. I argue that this shift to hybrid logic has consequences for both modal and dialogical logic, and I discuss these in detail.     

Squares in Fork Arrow Logic

In this paper we show that the class of fork squares has a complete orthodox axiomatization in fork arrow logic (FAL). This result may be seen as an orthodox counterpart of Venema's non-orthodox axiomatization for the class of squares in arrow logic. FAL is the modal logic of fork algebras (FAs) just as arrow logic is the modal logic of relation algebras (RAs). FAs extend RAs by a binary fork operator and are axiomatized by adding three equations to RAs equational axiomatization. A proper FA is an algebra of relations where the fork is induced by an injective operation coding pair formation. In contrast to RAs, FAs are representable by proper ones and their equational theory has the expressive power of full first-order logic. A square semantics (the set of arrows is U×U for some set U) for arrow logic was defined by Y. Venema. Due to the negative results about the finite axiomatizability of representable RAs, Venema provided a non-orthodox finite axiomatization for arrow logic by adding a new rule governing the applications of a difference operator. We address here the question of extending the type of relational structures to define orthodox axiomatizations for the class of squares. Given the connections between this problem and the finitization problem addressed by I. Németi, we suspect that this cannot be done by using only logical operations. The modal version of the FA equations provides an orthodox axiomatization for FAL which is complete in view of the representability of FAs. Here we review this result and carry it further to prove that this orthodox axiomatization for FAL also axiomatizes the class of fork squares.     

Generic generalized Rosser fixed points

To the standard propositional modal system of provability logic constants are added to account for the arithmetical fixed points introduced by Bernardi-Montagna in [5]. With that interpretation in mind, a system LR of modal propositional logic is axiomatized, a modal completeness theorem is established for LR and, after that, a uniform arithmetical (Solovay-type) completeness theorem with respect to PA is obtained for LR. This paper supersedes: Franco Montagna, Extremely undecidable sentences and generic generalized Rosser's fixed points, Rapporto Matematico, No. 95, Siena, 1983.     

Three-Valued Temporal Logic <Emphasis Type="Italic">Q</Emphasis><Subscript><Emphasis Type="Italic">t</Emphasis></Subscript> and Future Contingents

Prior’s three-valued modal logic Q was developed as a philosophically interesting modal logic. Thus, we should be able to modify Q as a temporal logic. Although a temporal version of Q was suggested by Prior, the subject has not been fully explored in the literature. In this paper, we develop a three-valued temporal logic Q _t and give its axiomatization and semantics. We also argue that Q _t provides a smooth solution to the problem of future contingents. Presented by Daniele Mundici     

‘Now’ and ‘Then’ in Tense Logic

According to Hans Kamp and Frank Vlach, the two-dimensional tense operators “now” and “then” are ineliminable in quantified tense logic. This is often adduced as an argument against tense logic, and in favor of an extensional account that makes use of explicit quantification over times. The aim of this paper is to defend tense logic against this attack. It shows that “now” and “then” are eliminable in quantified tense logic, provided we endow it with enough quantificational structure. The operators might not be redundant in some other systems of tense logic, but this merely indicates a lack of quantificational resources and does not show any deep-seated inability of tense logic to express claims about time. The paper closes with a brief discussion of the modal analogue of this issue, which concerns the role of the actuality operator in quantified modal logic.     

The <Emphasis Type="Italic">γ</Emphasis>-admissibility of Relevant Modal Logics I — The Method of Normal Models

The admissibility of Ackermann’s rule γ is one of the most important problems in relevant logic. While the γ-admissibility of normal modal logics based on the relevant logic R has been previously discussed, the case for weaker relevant modal logics has not yet been considered. The method of normal models has often been used to prove the γ-admissibility. This paper discusses which relevant modal logics admit γ from the viewpoint of the method of normal models.     

Modal Logic for Other-World Agnostics: Neutrality and Halldén Incompleteness

The logic of ‘elsewhere,’ i.e., of a sentence operator interpretable as attaching to a formula to yield a formula true at a point in a Kripke model just in case the first formula is true at all other points in the model, has been applied in settings in which the points in question represent spatial positions (explaining the use of the word ‘elsewhere’), as well as in the case in which they represent moments of time. This logic is applied here to the alethic modal case, in which the points are thought of as possible worlds, with the suggestion that its deployment clarifies aspects of a position explored by John Divers un-der the name ‘modal agnosticism.’ In particular, it makes available a logic whose Halldén incompleteness explicitly registers the agnostic element of the position – its neutrality as between modal realism and modal anti-realism.     

Completeness of S4 for the Lebesgue Measure Algebra

We prove completeness of the propositional modal logic S4 for the measure algebra based on the Lebesgue-measurable subsets of the unit interval, [0, 1]. In recent talks, Dana Scott introduced a new measure-based semantics for the standard propositional modal language with Boolean connectives and necessity and possibility operators, ^[¯]\Box and \Diamond\Diamond. Propositional modal formulae are assigned to Lebesgue-measurable subsets of the real interval [0, 1], modulo sets of measure zero. Equivalence classes of Lebesgue-measurable subsets form a measure algebra, M\mathcal M, and we add to this a non-trivial interior operator constructed from the frame of ‘open’ elements—elements in M\mathcal M with an open representative. We prove completeness of the modal logic S4 for the algebra M\mathcal M. A corollary to the main result is that non-theorems of S4 can be falsified at each point in a subset of the real interval [0, 1] of measure arbitrarily close to 1. A second corollary is that Intuitionistic propositional logic (IPC) is complete for the frame of open elements in M\mathcal M.     

An axiomatization of the modal theory of the veiled recession frame

The veiled recession frame has served several times in the literature to provide examples of modal logics failing to have certain desirable properties. Makinson [4] was the first to use it in his presentation of a modal logic without the finite model property. Thomason [5] constructed a (rather complicated) logic whose Kripke frames have an accessibility relation which is reflexive and transitive, but which is satisfied by the (non-transitive) veiled recession frame, and hence incomplete. In Van Benthem [2] the frame was an essential tool to find simple examples of incomplete logics, axiomatized by a formula in two proposition letters of degree 2, or by a formula in one proposition letter of degree 4 (the degree of a modal formula is the maximal number of nested occurrences of the necessity operator in ). In [3] we showed that the modal logic determined by the veiled recession frame is incomplete, and besides that, is an immediate predecessor of classical logic (or, more precisely, the modal logic axiomatized by the formula pp), and hence is a logic, maximal among the incomplete ones. Considering the importance of the modal logic determined by the veiled recession frame, it seems worthwhile to ask for an axiomatization, and in particular, to answer the question if it is finitely axiomatizable. In the present paper we find a finite axiomatization of the logic, and in fact, a rather simple one consisting of formulas in at most two proposition letters and of degree at most three.The paper was written with support of the Netherlands organization for the Advancement of Pure Research (Z.W.O.).     

The preservation of coherence

It is argued that the preservation of truth by an inference relation is of little interest when premiss sets are contradictory. The notion of a level of coherence is introduced and the utility of modal logics in the semantic representation of sets of higher coherence levels is noted. It is shown that this representative role cannot be transferred to first order logic via frame theory since the modal formulae expressing coherence level restrictions are not first order definable. Finally, an inference relation, calledyielding, is introduced which is intermediate between the coherence preservingforcing relation introduced elsewhere by the authors and the coherence destroying, inference relation of classical logic.     

Topological Separation Principles And Logical Theories

This paper is dedicated to Newton da Costa, who,among his many achievements, was the first toaim at dualising intuitionism in order to produce paraconsistent logics,the C-systems. This paper similarly dualises intuitionism to aparaconsistent logic, but the dual is a different logic, namely closed setlogic. We study the interaction between the properties of topologicalspaces, particularly separation properties, and logical theories on thosespaces. The paper begins with a brief survey of what is known about therelation between topology and modal logic, intuitionist logic and paraconsistentlogic in respect of the incompleteness and inconsistency of theories.Necessary and sufficient conditions which relate the T ₁-property to theproperties of logical theories, are obtained. The result is then extendedto Hausdorff and Normal spaces. In the final section these methods areused to vary the modelling conditions for identity.     

Paraconsistent logic from a modal viewpoint

In this paper we study paraconsistent negation as a modal operator, considering the fact that the classical negation of necessity has a paraconsistent behavior. We examine this operator on the one hand in the modal logic S5 and on the other hand in some new four-valued modal logics.     

Syntactical results on the arithmetical completeness of modal logic

In this paper the PA-completeness of modal logic is studied by syntactical and constructive methods. The main results are theorems on the structure of the PA-proofs of suitable arithmetical interpretationsS of a modal sequentS, which allow the transformation of PA-proofs ofS into proof-trees similar to modal proof-trees. As an application of such theorems, a proof of Solovay's theorem on arithmetical completeness of the modal system G is presented for the class of modal sequents of Boolean combinations of formulas of the form p _i,m _i=0, 1, 2, ... The paper is the preliminary step for a forthcoming global syntactical resolution of the PA-completeness problem for modal logic.