Martha Nussbaum: Anger and forgiveness: resentment,generosity, justice

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -     

价值相对主义就是价值虚无主义——苏格拉底论正义与定义

价值相对主义否认普遍价值和价值一般,只讲价值的相对性、随意性和主观性,其实质是价值虚无主义。从西方哲学史来看,探讨普遍定义的方法,始于苏格拉底,也是柏拉图相论的来源。苏格拉底的探索并非相对主义、怀疑主义、虚无主义、不可知论的,而是由怀疑开始而终于确定。     

法律的正义性价值——从富勒的两则虚拟案例谈起

《斯派伦辛探险者案件》与"怨毒告密者难题"是美国著名法学家富勒设计的两个虚拟案件,他试图以此来说明法与不法的界限以及法律与道德的关系.本文从法律及其正义价值的论辩性角度来推理这两个案例,抓住其中的"极端性"因素,进而分析富勒提出其著名的"法律的内在道德"理论的条件,并尝试着更深入地解读富勒的"程序自然法"理论的学术内涵.     

古希腊正义价值研究

正义是人类诉求的重要价值.西方正义价值的嬗变历程,是在古希腊先哲们奠定的基础上展开的.古希腊思想家们已经从价值论的高度,自觉或不自觉地从正义的界域、正义的主体、正义的本性以及正义的维度等方面,思考和回答了正义的重要问题,并对其后正义价值的孕育产生了深刻影响.     

Justice,Political Obligation and Public Reason: Rethinking Partisanship and Political Liberalism

In Partisanship and Political Liberalism in Diverse Societies I examine political parties and partisanship within the context of John Rawls’s (Political Liberalism, expanded edn. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2005a) theory of political liberalism. I argue that parties and partisanship are vital to Rawls’s political liberalism, since they offer a distinctive and crucial contribution to the process of public justification that is central to it, which combines the articulation of public reasons with the channelling into the public political realm of the particular values and conceptions of the good emerging from parties’ specific constituencies. Furthermore, I argue, partisanship generates a special kind of political obligations, and this further contributes to state legitimacy under conditions of reasonable pluralism. In this paper, I respond to three commentators who have raised important criticisms against my argument. More specifically, Section 1 provides a response to Lea Ypi’s argument that my normative account of partisanship wrongly presupposes that existing liberal societies are reasonably just. Section 2 answers Daniel Weinstock’s concerns regarding the plausibility and internal consistency of my account of partisan political obligations. Finally, Section 3 addresses Kevin Vallier’s criticisms, which challenge my account of public reason and propose an alternative one.