Does violence beget violence? A critical examination of the literature

Critically examines the "violence breeds violence" hypothesis broadly defined. Organized into seven sections, the literature review includes (a) the abuse breeds abuse hypothesis; (b) reports of small numbers of violent/homicidal offenders; (c) studies examining the relationship of abuse and neglect to delinquency, (d) to violent behavior, and (e) to aggressive behavior in infants and young children; (f) abuse, withdrawal, and self-destructive behavior; and (g) studies of the impact of witnessing or observing violent behavior. A detailed discussion of methodological considerations and shortcomings precedes the review. The author concludes that existing knowledge of the long-term consequences of abusive home environments is limited and suggests that conclusions about the strength of the cycle of violence be tempered by the dearth of convincing empirical evidence. Recommendations are made for further research.     

The problem of religious evil: Does belief in god cause evil?

Daniel Kodaj has recently developed a pro-atheistic argument that he calls “the problem of religious evil.” This first premise of this argument is “belief in God causes evil.” Although this idea that belief in God causes evil is widely accepted, certainly in the secular West, it is sufficiently problematic as to be unsuitable as a basis for an argument for atheism, as Kodaj seeks to use it. In this paper I shall highlight the problems inherent in it in three ways: by considering whether it is reasonable to say that “belief in God” causes evil; whether it is reasonable to say that belief in God “causes” evil; and whether it is reasonable to say that belief in God causes “evil.” In each case I will argue that it is problematic to make such claims, and accordingly I will conclude that the premise “belief in God causes evil” is unacceptable as it stands, and consequently is unable to ground Kodaj’s pro-atheistic argument.     

Does intention involve belief?

Cognitivists think that intention necessarily involves belief; noncognitivists deny this claim. I argue that both sides of the debate have so far overlooked that the beliefs involved in intention are first‐personal beliefs and therefore relevantly different from ordinary beliefs that stand in need of justification through evidence. This move substantially changes the cognitivist thesis, and in such a way that the noncognitivist objections can be avoided. In Section 2, I lay out the intuitions behind cognitivism and the arguments against it that motivate noncognitivist positions. Section 3 discusses and dismisses Velleman's cognitivist response to these arguments. In Section 4, I introduce the distinction between “ordinary” and “first‐personal beliefs.” In Section 5, I argue that intention invariably involves a first‐personal belief that one will do what one intends to do. Finally, in Section 6, I return to the noncognitivist objections and show how my proposal answers them.     

Can religious and secular belief be rationally combined?

Sometimes the cognitive part of the human mind is modelled in a simplified way by degrees of belief. E.g., in philosophy of science and in formal epistemology agents are often identified by their credences in a set of claims. This line of dealing with the individual mind is currently expanded to groups by attempts of finding adequate ways of pooling individual degrees of belief into an overall group credence or, more abstractly speaking, into a collective mind. In this paper, we model religious people’s minds as such a collective mind. Religious people are therein identified with a set of degrees of beliefs containing religious and secular credences. E.g., within a religious context a person may be sure that some statement is true, whereas the same person lacks non-religious support for such a credence and hence may doubt the truth of that statement within a secular context. We will also present two results on the adequacy of this model.     

Is `God exists' a `hinge proposition' of religious belief?

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -     

Does religious diversity make us unhappy?

I investigate the effect of religious diversity on well-being using the World Values Survey data across 77 countries. Religious diversity is measured as fractionalisation or polarisation. People are unhappy in religiously diverse societies. One explanation is that people have a need to belong and like to live among like-minded individuals. Another explanation is that religion creates bonding social capital as opposed to bridging social capital. Directions for further research are discussed.     

The three-systems-model of fear and emotion—A critical examination

The ‘Three-Systems-Model’ of fear and emotion (Lang, 1968; Rachman. 1978b) is reviewed and discussed. The paper is centered on four topics relevant to such a view of fear; The definitional focus; Measurement and quantification of components; Implications for etiology; Implications for treatment of phobias. Definitional problems with the radical operationalist view implied by the Tree-Systems-Model are identified and discussed. In addition problems with measurement and quantification of the various components are discussed. Implications for etiology of phobic fears are noted. Finally, it is suggested that treatment methods be individually tailored to the particular component response-profile displayed by each patient, and that the identification of such a profile is included in standard behavioral diagnosis procedures when fear is clinically assessed.     

Does short-term fasting promote changes in state body image?

Fasting, or going a significant amount of time without food, is a predictor of eating pathology in at-risk samples. The current study examined whether acute changes in body image occur after an episode of fasting in college students. Furthermore, it evaluated whether individual difference variables might inform the relationship between fasting and shifts in body image. Participants (N = 186) included male (44.7%) and female college students who completed the Body Image States Scale (BISS) and other eating-related measures before a 24-h fast. Participants completed the BISS again after fasting. While no overall changes in BISS scores emerged during the study, some individuals evidenced body image improvement. Baseline levels of disinhibition and self-reported fasting at least once per week uniquely predicted improvement in body image. Individual difference variables may play a role in how fasting could be reinforced by shifts in body image.     

Does Taves reconsider experience enough? A critical commentary on religious experience reconsidered

Three problems beset Ann Taves' thought-provoking book. The first is her failure to recognize that her focus on “experiences deemed religious” makes just as many metaphysical claims as does the focus on “religious experiences” that she seeks to replace. Second, her building-block definition of religion drops her into the middle of controversies over the nature of religion, rather than rescuing her from them. Third, her approach embodies a peculiarly North American cultural ambiguity about religion: on the one hand, it contains an abstract democratic affirmation of the importance of studying people's beliefs and practices on their own terms; on the other hand, it pairs to this a concrete sense of horror at what those beliefs and practices actually are.     

Is belief evaluation truth sensitive? A reply to Turri

Synthese - A key question about the value of truth in epistemology is whether the truthfulness of some proposition is (or should be) a factor in our evaluation of beliefs. The traditional...     

Are high-IQ individuals deficient in common sense? A critical examination of the ‘clever sillies’ hypothesis

A controversial hypothesis [Charlton (2009). Clever sillies: Why high-IQ people tend to be deficient in common sense. Medical Hypotheses, 73, 867–870] has recently been proposed to account for why individuals of high-IQ and high social status tend to hold counter-intuitive views on social phenomena. It is claimed that these ‘clever sillies’ use their high general intelligence and Openness to Experience to overanalyze social problems for which socially intelligent/common sense responses would seemingly be more appropriate. The first three sections of this review will consider i) the relationship between general and social intelligence; ii) the role of situational effects on the direction of the correlation between IQ and political attitudes; iii) the behavioral ecology of competitive altruism. While there is no hard evidence for Charlton's hypothesis, sophisticated although ultimately non-rational subjective analyses of social phenomena (i.e. ones that are disconfirmed by data, or reject empiricism) do seem to be favored by individuals in certain high-IQ knowledge work sectors. It is suggested that these function as costly signals of altruism, and that their popularity can best be understood in light of the theory that social attitudes are fundamentally influenced by perceptions of dominance and counter-dominance, with the latter playing an especially significant role in influencing the values systems of contemporary societies where the degree of conspicuous inequality is significantly evolutionarily novel.     

“Does degree of asymmetry relate to performance?” A critical review

In a recent paper, Chiarello, Welcome, Halderman, and Leonard (2009) reported positive correlations between word-related visual field asymmetries and reading performance. They argued that strong word processing lateralization represents a more optimal brain organization for reading acquisition. Their empirical results contrasted sharply with those of another such large-scale study, by Boles, Barth, and Merrill (2008). We reported negative correlations between asymmetry and performance when both were measured using the same visual lexical tasks. Most recently, within-task negative correlations were also reported by Hirnstein, Leask, Rose, and Hausmann (2010). Here two major differences between studies are explored. Task purity refers to the influence of the same mental processes on both the asymmetry and performance measures, and is arguably maximal in studies measuring both within the same task. The other difference concerns the measurement of asymmetry. Linear corrections for ceiling and floor effects were used by Chiarello et al. and Hirnstein et al., while we used a more appropriate nonlinear one. Their results are difficult to interpret for those reasons. The operation of a third variable to which both asymmetry and performance are positively correlated could also be a factor in the Chiarello et al. findings. The Boles et al. findings reflect a negative correlation between an asymmetric visual lexical process and performance measured within the same task.     

Does repressive coping promote resilience? Affective-autonomic response discrepancy during bereavement

Traditional theories of coping emphasize the value of attending to and expressing negative emotion while recovering from traumatic life events. However, recent evidence suggests that the tendency to direct attention away from negative affective experience (i.e., repressive coping) may promote resilience following extremely aversive events (e.g., the death of a spouse). The current study extends this line of investigation by showing that both bereaved and nonbereaved individuals who exhibited repressive coping behavior--as measured by the discrepancy between affective experience and sympathetic nervous system response--had fewer symptoms of psychopathology, experienced fewer health problems and somatic complaints, and were rated as better adjusted by close friends than those who did not exhibit repressive coping. Results are discussed in terms of recent developments in cognitive and neuroimaging research suggesting that repressive coping may serve a protective function.