Is vision metric? Comment on Lappin and Love (1992)

In a recent paper, Lappin and Love (1992) showed that depth judgments, based on planar motion of a stimulus, are remarkably precise. This led them to the conclusion that perception of planar motion allows acquiring metric information about visual space. We show, however, that Lappin and Love’s stimuli contained 2-D cues in the frontal plane that could subserve the subjecfs judgments.     

Is Psychoanalytic Education Effective? Comment on Damsa et al. (2010)

While a growing body of empirical data attests increasingly to the efficacy of psychoanalytic treatment, what data do we have that attests to the effectiveness of psychoanalytic education? In this comment on Damsa et al. (2010), I briefly address that question and suggest that—if we are to truly generate passionate interest in psychoanalysis among psychiatric residents and other mental health professionals in training—perhaps we need to begin by researching the largely unresearched process of psychoanalytic education and supervision.     

Is a repressive-defensive coping style really so bad? Comment on DeNeve and Cooper (1998)

This comment refers to the meta-analysis of K. M. DeNeve and H. Cooper showing that repressive defensiveness compared with 136 other personality traits was most strongly, but negatively, related to subjective well-being. It is shown that for theoretical and empirical reasons the relationship cannot be negative.     

Is obsessive-compulsive disorder a disturbance of security motivation? Comment on Szechtman and Woody (2004)

H. Szechtman and E. Woody (2004) proposed that obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is caused by a malfunctioning brain security motivation system. In the current article, the authors' review of the model suggests that it is limited in the following ways: (a) It is built on a selective review of the empirical literature, (b) it offers no explanation for many important OCD phenomena, (c) it fails to distinguish OCD from generalized anxiety disorder, (d) some of the model's predictions are ambiguous or unfalsifiable, and (e) other predictions are refuted by previously published research. Models proposing that OCD is caused by a single dysfunctional mechanism, such as the security motivation model, have difficulty explaining the complexity and heterogeneity of OCD.     

Is absolute identification always relative? Comment on Stewart, Brown, and Chater (2005)

N. Stewart, G. D. A. Brown, and N. Chater's relative judgment model includes three core assumptions that enable it to predict accurately the vast majority of "classical" phenomena in absolute identification choices, but not the time taken to make them, including sequential effects, such as assimilation and contrast. These core assumptions, coupled with the parameter values used in the above-mentioned article, lead to the prediction that identification accuracy is low when a large stimulus on 1 trial is followed by a small stimulus on the next trial and vice versa. Data do not support this prediction. The authors identify a set of parameters that allow the model to better fit the data, but problems remain when the data are analyzed with a version of the discrimination measure (d') from signal detection theory. The fundamental problem is that the model fits data on average but at the expense of making incorrect predictions in detail.     

Is theism capable of accounting for any natural evil at all?

Received wisdom has it that a plausible explanation or theodicy for Gods permission of at least some instances of natural evil is not beyond the reach of the theist. In this paper I challenge this assumption, arguing instead that theism fails to account for any instance, kind, quantity, or distribution of natural evil found in the world. My case will be structured around a specific but not idiosyncratic conception of natural evil as well as an examination of three prominent theodicies for natural evil. In contrast, however, to much contemporary discussion, my assessment of these theodicies will be grounded in the prior conviction that a successful theodicy for moral evil is available.     

Is the handedness gene on the X chromosome? Comment on Jones and Martin (2000).

G. V. Jones and M. Martin (2000) argued, contrary to M. C. Corballis (1997), that a gene for handedness might plausibly be located in homologous, noncombining regions of the X and Y chromosomes. The specific model they proposed is unlikely to be correct, but a case can be made for an X-linked gene that has no homologue on the Y chromosome and that is subjected to X-inactivation in females. An X-linked gene predicts no overall sex difference in the incidence of left-handedness; the slight preponderance of left-handers among males might then be attributed to a higher incidence of pathologically induced left-handedness.     

Is that all there is?

I take issue with two suggestions of Joel Feinberg's: first, that it is incoherent to suppose that human life as such is absurd, and, second, that a particular human life may be absurd and yet saved from being tragic by being fulfilled. I also argue that human life as such may well be absurd and I consider various responses to this.     

Should scientists think? Comment on Machado and Silva (2007)

The author has previously claimed that neural activity in a medial frontal brain area represents conscious motor intentions. A. Machado and F. J. Silva attempted to challenge this claim by arguing that such intentions are not necessarily causally effective and must be caused by something else, so that they therefore cannot be the unmoved first movers in action. The author's reply is that he made no such claims about the causal status and origin of conscious intentions. In fact, he has elsewhere presented empirical evidence in support of the idea that intentions are not necessarily causal. But this does not stop researchers from studying the neural basis for the conscious impression that one intends and wills one's actions. One can feel and attend to such intentions, be they causal or not. The author's claim is that there is neural activity in the medial frontal wall that reflects such conscious feelings. Other recent empirical evidence that supports this view is described.     

Mixture or homogeneous? Comment on Bauer and Curran (2003)

D. J. Bauer and P. J. Curran (2003) raised some interesting issues with respect to mixture models of growth curves. Many useful lessons can be learned from their work, and more can be learned by extending the inquiry in related directions. These lessons involve the following issues: (a) what a mixture distribution looks like, (b) the meaning of the term homogeneous distribution, (c) the importance of model checking, (d) advantages and disadvantages of using mixtures and similar procedures to approximate complicated distributions, and (e) intrinsic versus nonintrinsic transformability.     

Is analytical psychology a religion? Rationalist and romantic approaches to religion and modernity

The relationship between analytical psychology and religion is part of the larger issue of the relationship between modernity and religion. There are three main views on the issue. The fundamentalist position sets religion against modernity and opts for religion over modernity. What I call the 'rationalist' position likewise sets religion against modernity but opts for modernity over religion. By contrast to both views, what I call the 'romantic' position reconciles religion with modernity. Rationalists maintain that religion can exist only in so far as it serves as an explanation of the physical world, which the rise of science now precludes. Romantics maintain that religion, while serving as an explanation of the physical world till dislodge by science, is at heart anything but an explanation. The toppling of the religions explanation by the scientific one, far from dooming religion, prods religion into making explicit what it has in fact been all along. By this categorization, Jung is overwhelmingly a romantic. For him, the function of religion has always been more psychological than explanatory, and the rise of science does not preclude the continuing existence of religious myths as a psychological rather than an explanatory phenomenon. For those for whom science does spell the demise of religion, secular myths can replace religious ones, and those secular myths are more secular versions of religions myths than secular alternatives to religions myths. Yet even if for Jung religion can still exist today because religion is in fact psychology, it does not follow that psychology is therefore a religion.     

Do perceived differences in religion matter at work?

Over 90% of the United States population affiliates with an organised religion. There has been, however, very little research regarding religion in work organisations. This study focuses on the effects of individual perceptions of religious dissimilarity, as a characteristic of deep-level diversity, on perceived cohesion. A scale is developed to measure individual perceptions of the dissimilarity of religion. Two different studies are used to establish reliability and validity of this scale. In addition, some implications of the negative relationship between individual perceptions of religious dissimilarity and perceived cohesion for organisations are discussed.     

Is empathy associated with more prosocial behaviour? A meta-analysis

Empathy is an important prerequisite for prosocial behaviour (PB). However, different concepts and methodological tools have been used in research on the relationship between empathy and PB, leading to ambiguous results. This study used a meta-analysis to explore this relationship and to identify the moderating variables. After a literature search, 62 studies and 146 samples with 71,310 participants were included. Our random effects model revealed a positive correlation of PB with both cognitive empathy (r = .32) and affective empathy (r = .30). In addition, the relationship between empathy and PB is moderated by culture, publication type, education level, and empathy measures. Our conclusion is that there is a significant correlation between empathy and PB that is influenced by sample characteristics and methodological factors.     

Intimate partner aggression--what have we learned? Comment on Archer (2000)

This commentary on J. Archer (2000) identifies limitations at the level of the primary data, the formal meta-analysis, and the interpretations of the results. Highlighted are concerns with the conceptual dichotomy that is the foundation of the analysis, how aggression was conceptualized and defined, and the methodological problems in the studies included in the database that were not neutralized by the meta-analysis. These include inadequate measurement of contextual factors and injury outcomes, scaling issues, and sampling concerns. The authors question the degree to which the field is advanced by this meta-analysis when the results are placed in the context of these limitations. Following American Association for the Advancement of Science directives (I. Lerch, 1999), the authors believe that inadequate attention was paid to the policy implications of the conclusions raising the potential to undermine societal efforts to eradicate violence against women.     

Is analytical psychology a religion? In statu nascendi

This paper elucidates and discusses Jung's conceptions of the relation between psychology, psychotherapy and religion.     

Is Confucianism a religion? Modern Confucian theories on the ethical nature of classical discourses

When dealing with the study of diverse Confucian traditions in eastern Asia, we are often confronted by the issue of the religious dimension of Confucianism and how can it be compared to the Western (or ‘general’) connotations of the term. Proceeding from the basic question as to how Confucianism sees itself, the paper focuses on the approaches of two representatives of the Modern Confucian intellectual movement, namely Mou Zongsan and Xu Fuguan. In addition, we shall also take into consideration the various contemporary Confucian interpretations of the previously delineated problems, for instance Liu Shu-hsien’s or Chen Lai’s. Based on these discourses, the paper clarifies the reasons for Modern Confucian interpretations, according to which Confucianism is not a religion in the Western sense but a discourse that represents both a practical moral teaching and an abstract philosophy of immanent transcendence.     

Do people need self-esteem? Comment on Pyszczynski et al. (2004)

In spite of impressive empirical evidence consistent with aspects of terror management theory (TMT) reviewed by T. Pyszczynski, J. Greenberg, S. Solomon, J. Arndt, and J. Schimel (2004), several fundamental assumptions of the theory remain untested or lack support. Specifically, Pyszczynski et al. (2004) have not demonstrated that (a) people need self-esteem, (b) pursuing self-esteem is an effective means for reducing anxiety, (c) pursuing self-esteem helps people achieve their important goals, (d) having or pursuing self-esteem is the only way to deal with anxiety to achieve important goals, or (e) death is the real issue driving the pursuit of self-esteem. The authors suggest there is a different paradigm for thinking about death, one in which awareness of one's mortality serves as a precious reminder of the limited time one has to accomplish one's most important goals. All of these questions can be addressed with empirical research.