Visual processing for action resists similarity of relevant and irrelevant object features

It has been suggested that the human brain processes visual information in different manners, depending on whether the information is used for perception or for action control. This distinction has been criticized for the lack of behavioral dissociations that unambiguously support the proposed two-visual-pathways model. Here we present a new and simple dissociation between vision for perception and vision for action: Perceptual judgments are affected by the similarity of relevant and irrelevant stimulus features, while object-oriented actions are not. This dissociation overcomes the methodological problems of previously proposed differences in terms of vulnerability to visual illusions or to variability in irrelevant object features, and it can also serve as an easily applicable behavioral indicator of underlying processing modes.     

Conscious Vision for Action Versus Unconscious Vision for Action?

David Milner and Melvyn Goodale’s dissociation hypothesis is commonly taken to state that there are two functionally specialized cortical streams of visual processing originating in striate (V1) cortex: a dorsal, action‐related “unconscious” stream and a ventral, perception‐related “conscious” stream. As Milner and Goodale acknowledge, findings from blindsight studies suggest a more sophisticated picture that replaces the distinction between unconscious vision for action and conscious vision for perception with a tripartite division between unconscious vision for action, conscious vision for perception, and unconscious vision for perception. The combination excluded by the tripartite division is the possibility of conscious vision for action. But are there good grounds for concluding that there is no conscious vision for action? There is now overwhelming evidence that illusions and perceived size can have a significant effect on action ( Bruno & Franz, 2009 ; Dassonville & Bala, 2004 ; Franz & Gegenfurtner, 2008 ; McIntosh & Lashley, 2008 ). There is also suggestive evidence that any sophisticated visual behavior requires collaboration between the two visual streams at every stage of the process ( Schenk & McIntosh, 2010 ). I nonetheless want to make a case for the tripartite division between unconscious vision for action, conscious vision for perception, and unconscious vision for perception. My aim here is not to refute the evidence showing that conscious vision can affect action but rather to argue (a) that we cannot gain cognitive access to action‐guiding dorsal stream representations, and (b) that these representations do not correlate with phenomenal consciousness. This vindicates the semi‐conservative view that the dissociation hypothesis is best understood as a tripartite division.     

A double dissociation between action and perception in the context of visual illusions: opposite effects of real and illusory size

The idea that there are two distinct cortical visual pathways, a dorsal action stream and a ventral perception stream, is supported by neuroimaging and neuropsychological evidence. Yet there is an ongoing debate as to whether or not the action system is resistant to pictorial illusions in healthy participants. In the present study, we disentangled the effects of real and illusory object size on action and perception by pitting real size against illusory size. In our task, two objects that differed slightly in length were placed within a version of the Ponzo illusion. Even though participants erroneously perceived the physically longer object as the shorter one (or vice versa), their grasping was remarkably tuned to the real size difference between the objects. These results provide the first demonstration of a double dissociation between action and perception in the context of visual illusions and together with previous findings converge on the idea that visually guided action and visual perception make use of different metrics and frames of reference.     

Object processing in visual perception and action in children and adults

We investigated whether 6- and 7-year-olds and 9- and 10-year-olds, as well as adults, process object dimensions independent of or in interaction with one another in a perception and action task by adapting Ganel and Goodale's method for testing adults (Nature, 2003, Vol. 426, pp. 664-667). In addition, we aimed to confirm Ganel and Goodale's results in adults to reliably compare their processing strategies with those of children. Specifically, we tested the abilities of children and adults to perceptually classify (perception task) or grasp (action task) the width of a rectangular object while ignoring its length. We found that adults process object dimensions in interaction with one another in visual perception but independent of each other in action, thereby replicating Ganel and Goodale's results. Children processed object dimensions interactively in visual perception, and there was also some evidence for interactive processing in action. Possible reasons for these differences in object processing between children and adults are discussed.     

Visual size perception and haptic calibration during development

It is still unclear how the visual system perceives accurately the size of objects at different distances. One suggestion, dating back to Berkeley’s famous essay, is that vision is calibrated by touch. If so, we may expect different mechanisms involved for near, reachable distances and far, unreachable distances. To study how the haptic system calibrates vision we measured size constancy in children (from 6 to 16 years of age) and adults, at various distances. At all ages, accuracy of the visual size perception changes with distance, and is almost veridical inside the haptic workspace, in agreement with the idea that the haptic system acts to calibrate visual size perception. Outside this space, systematic errors occurred, which varied with age. Adults tended to overestimate visual size of distant objects (over‐compensation for distance), while children younger than 14 underestimated their size (under‐compensation). At 16 years of age there seemed to be a transition point, with veridical perception of distant objects. When young subjects were allowed to touch the object inside the haptic workspace, the visual biases disappeared, while older subjects showed multisensory integration. All results are consistent with the idea that the haptic system can be used to calibrate visual size perception during development, more effectively within than outside the haptic workspace, and that the calibration mechanisms are different in children than in adults.     

Getting the closer object? An information‐based dissociation between vision for perception and vision for movement in early infancy

In human adults two functionally and neuro‐anatomically separate systems exist for the use of visual information in perception and the use of visual information to control movements (Milner & Goodale, 1995 , 2008 ). We investigated whether this separation is already functioning in the early stages of the development of reaching. To this end, 6‐ and 7‐month‐old infants were presented with two identical objects at identical distances in front of an illusory Ponzo‐like background that made them appear to be located at different distances. In two further conditions without the illusory background, the two objects were presented at physically different distances. Preferential reaching outcomes indicated that the allocentric distance information contained in the illusory background affected the perception of object distance. Yet, infants' reaching kinematics were only affected by the objects' physical distance and not by the perceptual distance manipulation. These findings were taken as evidence for the two‐visual systems, as proposed by Milner and Goodale ( 2008 ), being functional in early infancy. We discuss the wider implications of this early dissociation.     

The Ebbinghaus illusion deceives adults but not young children

The sensitivity of size perception to context has been used to distinguish between ‘vision for action’ and ‘vision for perception’, and to study cultural, psychopathological, and developmental differences in perception. The status of that evidence is much debated, however. Here we use a rigorous double dissociation paradigm based on the Ebbinghaus illusion, and find that for children below 7 years of age size discrimination is much less affected by surround size. Young children are less accurate than adults when context is helpful, but more accurate when context is misleading. Even by the age of 10 years context‐sensitivity is still not at adult levels. Therefore, size contrast as shown by the Ebbinghaus illusion is not a built‐in property of the ventral pathway subserving vision for perception but a late development of it, and low sensitivity to the Ebbinghaus illusion in autism is not primary to the pathology. Our findings also show that, although adults in Western cultures have low context‐sensitivity relative to East Asians, they have high context‐sensitivity relative to children. Overall, these findings reveal a gradual developmental trend toward ever broader contextual syntheses. Such developments are advantageous, but the price paid for them is that, when context is misleading, adults literally see the world less accurately than they did as children.     

The Comparative Psychology of Avian Visual Cognition

How do small-brained, highly mobile animals like birds so readily perceive the visual world? Despite the computational complexity of vision, recent behavioral tests have suggested that these evolutionarily distant animals may use visual mechanisms that operate in the same manner as the visual mechanisms of primates. This article reviews new evidence regarding the processes of early vision and object perception in pigeons and considers speculations about the similarities and differences between avian and primate visual cognition.     

Grasping the diagonal: controlling attention to illusory stimuli for action and perception

Since the pioneering work of [Aglioti, S., DeSouza, J. F., & Goodale, M. A. (1995). Size-contrast illusions deceive the eye but not the hand. Current Biology, 5(6), 679-685] visual illusions have been used to provide evidence for the functional division of labour within the visual system-one system for conscious perception and the other system for unconscious guidance of action. However, these studies were criticised for attentional mismatch between action and perception conditions and for the fact that grip size is not determined by the size of an object but also by surrounding obstacles. Stoettinger and Perner [Stoettinger, E., & Perner, J., (2006). Dissociating size representations for action and for conscious judgment: Grasping visual illusions without apparent obstacles. Consciousness and Cognition, 15, 269-284] used the diagonal illusion controlling for the influence of surrounding features on grip size and bimanual grasping to rule out attentional mismatch. Unfortunately, the latter objective was not fully achieved. In the present study, attentional mismatch was avoided by using only the dominant hand for action and for indicating perceived size. Results support the division of labour: Grip aperture follows actual size independent of illusory effects, while finger-thumb span indications of perceived length are clearly influenced by the illusion.     

Action history influences eye movements

Recent research has revealed that simple actions can have a profound effect on subsequent perception – people are faster to find a target that shares features with a previously acted on object even when those features are irrelevant to their task (the action effect). However, the majority of the evidence for this interaction between action and perception has come from manual response data. Therefore, it is unknown whether action affects early visual search processes, if it modulates post-attentional-selection processes, or both. To investigate this, we tracked participants’ spontaneous eye movements as they performed an action effect task. In two experiments we found that participants looked more quickly to the colour of an object they had previously acted on, compared to if they had viewed but not acted on the object, showing that action influenced early visual search processes. Additionally, there was evidence for post-selection effects as well. The results suggest that prior action affects both pre-selection and post-selection processes – spontaneously guiding attention to, and maintaining it on, objects that were previously important to the observer.     

类别空间关系加工系统和数量空间关系加工系统的分离 ——来自多领域的研究证据

Kosslyn认为人类的空间关系加工系统分为类别空间关系加工子系统和数量空间关系加工子系统,这两个子系统不仅存在功能上的分离,并且存在大脑神经水平的分离,这种神经水平的分离表现为两种空间关系加工的大脑半球偏向,即类别空间关系加工的左半球偏向与数量空间关系加工的右半球偏向。对两种空间关系加工的研究,涉及的领域从低水平的空间知觉,至表象、记忆、语言、行动及物体识别等,涉及的研究方法包括半视野速示法,神经网络模拟,PET, fMRI, ERP, rTMS,脑损伤病人的研究及比较动物研究。综合现有研究,虽然大多数研究中得到的脑半球偏向为两种加工子系统在神经水平的分离提供了证据,但不同研究中脑半球偏向的获得是相当不稳定的,并且受到研究方法因素的影响。尽管造成神经水平的分离似乎与大脑左右半球对具有不同感受野特征的神经元输出的偏向有一定的关系,但这仍需要进一步的研究证据     

Relative brightness in natural images can be accounted for by removing blurry content

One critical question regarding visual cognition concerns how the physical properties of the visual world are represented in early vision and then relayed to high-level vision. Here, we posit a simple theory: Processes that encode object appearance reduce their response to spatial content that is coarser than the size of the attended object. We show that a filtering procedure based on this theory can account for the relative brightness levels of test patches placed in images of natural scenes and for many hard-to-explain brightness illusions. The implication is that the perception of brightness differences in most brightness illusions actually corresponds to physical differences present in the images. Portions of the visual system may encode these physical differences by means of neural processes that adaptively reduce their response to low-spatial-frequency content.     

Grasping visual illusions: no evidence for a dissociation between perception and action

Neuropsychological studies prompted the theory that the primate visual system might be organized into two parallel pathways, one for conscious perception and one for guiding action. Supporting evidence in healthy subjects seemed to come from a dissociation in visual illusions: In previous studies, the Ebbinghaus (or Titchener) illusion deceived perceptual judgments of size, but only marginally influenced the size estimates used in grasping. Contrary to those results, the findings from the present study show that there is no difference in the sizes of the perceptual and grasp illusions if the perceptual and grasping tasks are appropriately matched. We show that the differences found previously can be accounted for by a hitherto unknown, nonadditive effect in the illusion. We conclude that the illusion does not provide evidence for the existence of two distinct pathways for perception and action in the visual system.     

The neural basis of haptic object processing.

We review the organization of the neural networks that underlie haptic object processing and compare that organization with the visual system. Haptic object processing is separated into at least two neural pathways, one for geometric properties or shape, and one for material properties, including texture. Like vision, haptic processing pathways are organized into a hierarchy of processing stages, with different stages represented by different brain areas. In addition, the haptic pathway for shape processing may be further subdivided into different streams for action and perception. These streams may be analogous to the action and perception streams of the visual system and represent two points of neural convergence for vision and haptics.     

Grasping spheres,not planets

Memory for objects helps us to determine how we can most effectively and appropriately interact with them. This suggests a tightly coupled interplay between action and background knowledge. Three experiments demonstrate that grasping circumference can be affected by the size of a visual stimulus (Experiment 1), whether that stimulus appears to be graspable (Experiment 2), and the presence of a label that renders that object ungraspable (Experiment 3). The results are taken to inform theories on conceptual representation and the functional distinction that has been drawn between the visual systems for perception and action.     

Visual illusions affect both movement planning and on-line control: a multiple cue position on bias and goal-directed action

Over the last decade, there has been an interest in the impact of visual illusions on the control of action. Much of this work has been motivated by Milner and Goodale's two visual system model of visual processing. This model is based on a hypothesized dissociation between cognitive judgments and the visual control of action. It holds that action is immune to the visual context that provides the basis for the illusion-induced bias associated with cognitive judgments. Recently, Glover has challenged this position and has suggested that movement planning, but not movement execution is susceptible to visual illusions. Research from our lab is inconsistent with both models of visual-motor processing. With respect to the planning and control model, kinematic evidence shows that the impact of an illusion on manual aiming increases as the limb approaches the target. For the Ebbinghaus illusion, this involved a decrease in the time after peak velocity to accommodate the 'perceived' size of the target. For the Müller-Lyer illusion, the influence of the figure's tails increased from peak velocity to the end of the movement. Although our findings contradict a strong version of the two visual systems hypothesis, we did find dissociations between perception and action in another experiment. In this Müller-Lyer study, perceptual decisions were influenced by misjudgment of extent, while action was influenced by misjudgment of target position. Overall, our findings are consistent with the idea that it is often necessary to use visual context to make adjustments to ongoing movements.     

Developmental bias for number words in the intraparietal sulcus

Children and adults show behavioral evidence of psychological overlap between their early, non‐symbolic numerical concepts and their later‐developing symbolic numerical concepts. An open question is to what extent the common cognitive signatures observed between different numerical notations are coupled with physical overlap in neural processes. We show that from 8 years of age, regions of the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) that exhibit a numerical ratio effect during non‐symbolic numerical judgments also show a semantic distance effect for symbolic number words. In both children and adults, the IPS showed a semantic distance effect during magnitude judgments of number words (i.e. larger/smaller number) but not for magnitude judgments of object words (i.e. larger/smaller object size). The results provide novel evidence of conceptual overlap between neural representations of symbolic and non‐symbolic numerical values that cannot be explained by a general process, and present the first demonstration of an early‐developing dissociation between number words and object words in the human brain.     

知觉与行为分离现象在二维铁钦纳错觉实验中的验

利用二维铁钦纳错觉图片对单手及双手抓握情境下的知觉与行为分离现象进行实验验证,并探讨注意引导等因素对分离现象的影响。实验包括知觉任务和行为任务两项内容,前者主要测量被试的主观错觉量,后者则探讨分离现象是否存在及其影响因素。在行为任务中,记录被试在中心（目标）圆尺寸“实际相同”和“知觉相同”等不同情境下的行为,以拇指和食指抓握图片中心圆的最大抓握孔径为行为指标。结果发现：单手抓握时,左、右手的行为虽然在一定程度上受到了错觉的影响,但均显示出分离现象;双手抓握时,右手受错觉影响的程度减少,分离现象增强,而左手的结果则比较混淆。因此,分离现象是存在的,但它的出现可能受到注意引导、注意分配倾向或双手协调能力等因素的影响。     

视觉预期的类型及神经机制

视觉预期是一种运用视觉信息的部分资源和先行资源对即将发生的事件进行预测的能力。为了人们更加清楚地认识视觉预期的内在加工过程,同时也有助于国内外研究者更为科学深入地探讨这种自上而下的加工,本文主要从婴幼儿和成人运动员两方面来阐述视觉预期的相关研究。首先从婴幼儿对物体相关属性和行为目标的视觉预期两方面探讨了视觉预期的类型,然后论述了成人视觉预期的神经机制。最后,指出今后的研究应加强视觉预期相关技术在临床诊断中的应用,注重环境在视觉预期中的作用,从神经网络角度研究视觉预期的神经基础。     

Grasp cueing shows obligatory attention to action goals

To understand the grounding of cognitive mechanisms in perception and action, we used a simple detection task to determine how long it takes to predict an action goal from the perception of grasp postures and whether this prediction is under strategic control. Healthy observers detected visual probes over small or large objects after seeing either a precision grip or a power grip posture. Although the posture was uninformative it induced attention shifts to the grasp-congruent object within 350 ms. When the posture predicted target appearance over the grasp-incongruent object, observers' initial strategic allocation of attention was overruled by the congruency between grasp and object. These results might help to characterize the human mirror neuron system and reveal how joint attention tunes early perceptual processes toward action prediction.