Anxiety and unrealistic optimism

Substantial evidence suggest that people tend to be unrealistically optimistic that positive events will happen to them and that negative events will not. However, recent research indicates that under certain conditions they may be unrealistically pessimistic. Variations in the levels of optimism and pessimism experienced towards events are generally given cognitive explanations. A relation between optimism and pessimism and anxiety, a variable related to emotion as well as cognition, was investigated in the present study. An inverse correlation was found between how anxious female students in England felt about certain negative events and how unrealistically optimistic they were about the occurrence of those events. It was concluded that the degree of anxiety experienced toward a negative event may affect the level of unrealistic optimism or pessimism toward it.     

Unrealistic optimism about future life events: a cautionary note

A robust finding in social psychology is that people judge negative events as less likely to happen to themselves than to the average person, a behavior interpreted as showing that people are "unrealistically optimistic" in their judgments of risk concerning future life events. However, we demonstrate how unbiased responses can result in data patterns commonly interpreted as indicative of optimism for purely statistical reasons. Specifically, we show how extant data from unrealistic optimism studies investigating people's comparative risk judgments are plagued by the statistical consequences of sampling constraints and the response scales used, in combination with the comparative rarity of truly negative events. We conclude that the presence of such statistical artifacts raises questions over the very existence of an optimistic bias about risk and implies that to the extent that such a bias exists, we know considerably less about its magnitude, mechanisms, and moderators than previously assumed.     

Unrealistic Pessimism

Abstract

Various data suggest that individuals tend to be unrealistically optimistic about the future. People believe that negative events are less likely to happen to them than to others. The present study examined if the optimistic bias could be demonstrated if a threat is not (as it has been researched up to the present) potential, incidental, and familiar, but real, common, and unfamiliar. The present research was conducted after the explosion at the atomic power station in Chernobyl, and it was concerned with the perception of threat to one's own and to others' health due to consequences of radiation. The female subjects believed that their own chance of experiencing such health problems were better than the chances of others. Thus, in these specific conditions, unrealistic optimism was not only reduced but the reverse effect was obtained: unrealistic pessimism.     

What is unrealistic optimism?

Here we consider the nature of unrealistic optimism and other related positive illusions. We are interested in whether cognitive states that are unrealistically optimistic are belief states, whether they are false, and whether they are epistemically irrational. We also ask to what extent unrealistically optimistic cognitive states are fixed. Based on the classic and recent empirical literature on unrealistic optimism, we offer some preliminary answers to these questions, thereby laying the foundations for answering further questions about unrealistic optimism, such as whether it has biological, psychological, or epistemic benefits.     

Risk perception and behavior: Pessimism,realism, and optimism about aids-related health behavior

Abstract

This study investigates the perceived risk of becoming infected with HIV for heterosexuals with multiple sexual partners, examines cognitive and motivational antecedents of biases in risk perception, and relates these biases to behavior. We obtained a moderate degree of optimism in a longitudinal study based on a sample of 535 visitors of a STD clinic. Further analyses—after classifying subjects as “pessimists”, “realists”, or “optimists”—revealed that pessimists were extremely pessimistic and optimists remarkably optimistic. Optimism increased with perceived control and decreased with prior experience, supporting a cognitive explanation of optimism. The data also provided some support for a motivational explanation: optimists who scored higher on a defensive coping style were more optimistic about their risks. Contrary to other findings, we found a positive relation between optimism and intentions to reduce risks. Furthermore, results revealed that optimists showed lower levels of subsequent behavioral risk. It was concluded that optimists were not unrealistically optimistic about their personal vulnerability. but rather that pessimists were unrealistically pessimistic. Previous behavior was found to be the best predictor of subsequent behavior. Although measures of perceived risk were also related to subsequent behavior, their predictive power was rather modest.     

Egocentrism and focalism in unrealistic optimism (and pessimism)

People tend to overestimate their comparative likelihood of experiencing a rosy future. The present research suggests that one reason for this error is that when people compare their likelihood of experiencing an event with that of the average person, they focus on their own chances of experiencing the event and insufficiently consider the likelihood of the average person experiencing the event. As a consequence, people tend to think that they are more likely than the average person to experience common events and less likely than the average person to experience rare events. This causes unrealistic optimism in the case of common desirable events and rare undesirable events, but unrealistic pessimism in the case of rare desirable events and common undesirable events (Studies 1 and 2). Study 2 further suggests that both egocentrism and focalism underlie these biases. These results suggest that unrealistic optimism is not as ubiquitous as once thought.     

Changes in optimism and pessimism in response to life events: Evidence from three large panel studies

Although individuals vary in how optimistic they are about the future, one assumption that researchers make is that optimism is sensitive to changes in life events and circumstances. We examined how optimism and pessimism changed across the lifespan and in response to life events in three large panel studies (combined N = 74,886). In the American and Dutch samples, we found that optimism increased across younger adulthood, plateaued in midlife, and then decreased in older adulthood. In the German sample, there were inconsistent results with respect to age differences and mean level changes in optimism. Associations between life events and changes in optimism/pessimism were inconsistent across samples. We discuss our results in the context of life events and lifespan development.     

Comparative optimism about health and nonhealth events in 8- and 9-year-old children.

Comparative optimism has been studied extensively in adults and is a significant component of social- cognitive models about health. In contrast, little is known about comparative optimism in children or about the wider social- cognitive processes that underpin their health-related behavior. This study investigated comparative optimism for health- and nonhealth-related topics in 101 children 8 or 9 years of age, the youngest ages that have been investigated so far. Children were shown to be unrealistically optimistic for health and nonhealth events. The implications of these findings for understanding comparative optimism in children are discussed.     

Self-Favoring Biases, Self-Presentation, and the Self-Other Asymmetry in Social Comparison

ABSTRACT The relationship between self-favoring biases in social comparison, favorable self-presentation, and well-being and the self-other asymmetry effect was examined. Participants gave comparative chance estimations and trait ratings for positive and negative future events and traits. One-half of the participants compared themselves to the average other, while the remainder compared the average other to themselves. All participants completed measurements of two types of desirable responding (self-deception and impression management) and of subjective well-being. Participants who compared themselves to another showed stronger unrealistic optimism and illusory superiority effects for positive (but not for negative) future events und traits than participants comparing another to themselves, demonstrating a self-other asymmetry effect. Unrealistic optimism and illusory superiority concerning positive attributes were related to self-deception, while unrealistic optimism and illusory superiority concerning negative attributes were related to impression management. The relative independence of “positive” and “negative” self-favoring biases was further demonstrated by their differential relationship with self-esteem and subjective well-being.     

The differential effect of realistic and unrealistic counterfactual thinking on regret

Research has established that realistic counterfactual thinking can determine the intensity and the content of people's affective reactions to decision outcomes and events. Not much is known, however, about the affective consequences of counterfactual thinking that is unrealistic (i.e., that does not correspond to the main causes of a negative outcome). In three experiments, we investigate the influence of realistic and unrealistic counterfactuals on experienced regret after negative outcomes. In Experiment 1, we found that participants who thought unrealistically about a poor outcome reported less regret than those who thought realistically about it. In Experiments 2a and 2b, we replicated this finding and we showed that the decrease in regret was associated with a shift in the causal attributions of the poor outcome. Participants who thought unrealistically attributed it more to external circumstances and less to their own behaviours than those who thought realistically about it. We discuss the implications of these findings for the role of counterfactuals as self-serving biases and the functionality of regret as a counterfactual emotion.     

A pessimistic view of optimistic belief updating

Received academic wisdom holds that human judgment is characterized by unrealistic optimism, the tendency to underestimate the likelihood of negative events and overestimate the likelihood of positive events. With recent questions being raised over the degree to which the majority of this research genuinely demonstrates optimism, attention to possible mechanisms generating such a bias becomes ever more important. New studies have now claimed that unrealistic optimism emerges as a result of biased belief updating with distinctive neural correlates in the brain. On a behavioral level, these studies suggest that, for negative events, desirable information is incorporated into personal risk estimates to a greater degree than undesirable information (resulting in a more optimistic outlook). However, using task analyses, simulations, and experiments we demonstrate that this pattern of results is a statistical artifact. In contrast with previous work, we examined participants’ use of new information with reference to the normative, Bayesian standard. Simulations reveal the fundamental difficulties that would need to be overcome by any robust test of optimistic updating. No such test presently exists, so that the best one can presently do is perform analyses with a number of techniques, all of which have important weaknesses. Applying these analyses to five experiments shows no evidence of optimistic updating. These results clarify the difficulties involved in studying human ‘bias’ and cast additional doubt over the status of optimism as a fundamental characteristic of healthy cognition.     

In search of realistic optimism. Meaning, knowledge, and warm fuzziness

Is it better to be realistic or optimistic? A realistic outlook improves chances to negotiate the environment successfully, whereas an optimistic outlook places priority on feeling good. But are realistic and optimistic outlooks necessarily in conflict? The author suggests that the fuzzy nature of accuracy typically places only loose boundaries on what it means to be realistic. As a result, there are many forms of optimism that do not, in principle, yield unrealistic assessments. Nevertheless, there remain numerous "optimistic biases" that do involve self-deception, or convincing oneself of desired beliefs without appropriate reality checks. The author describes several ways that realistic and unrealistic optimism can be differentiated and explores the impact of this distinction for current views of optimism. This critique reveals how positive psychology may benefit from a focus on personal meaning and knowledge as they relate to making the most of life.     

Accuracy, error, and bias in predictions for real versus hypothetical events

Participants made predictions about performance on tasks that they did or did not expect to complete. In three experiments, participants in task-unexpected conditions were unrealistically optimistic: They overestimated how well they would perform, often by a large margin, and their predictions were not correlated with their performance. By contrast, participants assigned to task-expected conditions made predictions that were not only less optimistic but strikingly accurate. Consistent with predictions from construal level theory, data from a fourth experiment suggest that it is the uncertainty associated with hypothetical tasks, and not a lack of cognitive processing, that frees people to make optimistic prediction errors. Unrealistic optimism, when it occurs, may be truly unrealistic; however, it may be less ubiquitous than has been previously suggested.     

Social acceptance of comparative optimism and realism

Studies of optimism and realism (the accuracy of people's outlook on the future) seek to understand the respective effects of these elements on social approbation. Two experiments examined how comparative optimism (vs. pessimism) and realism (vs. unrealism) interacted to influence the targets' social acceptance based on their perceptions about the future. The results showed that realism, or accuracy of prediction, increased the positive social effects of a comparatively optimistic outlook on the future. In contrast, targets who exhibited comparative pessimism were more socially acceptable when their predictions were unrealistic rather than realistic. This phenomenon was examined by also considering the polarity of the events about which judgments were expressed. These results contribute to the body of research about the relationship between optimism and pessimism and the relationship between optimism and realism.     

Comparative optimism for severity of negative health outcomes

People tend to be comparatively optimistic (i.e., believe that negative outcomes are less likely for themselves than for typical others) regarding their susceptibility to negative health outcomes. The present study investigates the extent to which perceptions of the severity of these health outcomes show similar comparative optimism. A student sample (study 1; N = 200) and a healthy non-student adult sample (study 2; N = 257) completed self-report measures of susceptibility, severity, worry, control and experience in relation to negative health outcomes. Participants in both studies demonstrated significant levels of comparative optimism for both perceived likelihood and severity of health outcomes. Comparative optimism concerning severity was very strongly associated (r = 0.85 to 0.89) with comparative optimism concerning susceptibility. In addition to being comparatively optimistic over their chances of experiencing negative health outcomes, people are also comparatively optimistic regarding how severe the health outcomes will be.     

Optimism across cultures: In response to the severe acute respiratory syndrome outbreak

Based on our early research, we predicted that the Chinese may be more optimistic and less pessimistic than North Americans in response to negative life events. A survey was conducted to investigate optimism cross culturally in the context of the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreaks in Canada and China. Chinese students in Beijing and European Canadians in Toronto answered questions about their perceptions of SARS. No significant cultural difference was found on dispositional optimism, as measured by the Revised Life Orientation Test (LOT-R). Unrealistic optimism was measured in the context of SARS. Both groups demonstrated unrealistic optimism (i.e. reporting that the self was less likely than an average person to get infected with SARS). Such optimistic bias was stronger among Chinese than among Canadians. Compared to the actual infection rates in Beijing and Toronto, both Chinese and Canadian participants overestimated their own chances of getting infected, indicating that they were being pessimistic. Indeed, Chinese were less pessimistic than Canadians. In addition, even though the Chinese reported more inconvenience brought by SARS than did Canadians, they also reported more positive changes brought by SARS, reflecting the Chinese dialectical views of events. Implications for research on optimism in context are discussed.     

Unrealistic Optimism and Positive-Negative Asymmetry: A Conceptual and Cross-cultural Study of Interrelationships between Optimism,Pessimism, and Realism

Using a variant of Weinstein's (1980) technique for the measurement of unrealistic optimism, subjects were classified as optimistic, realistic, or pessimistic about their chances of being confronted in the future with problems such as divorce, nervous breakdown, etc. On the basis of previous theory and research on cognition and affect, it was hypothesized that, across problems, subjects would alternate optimism with realism rather than with pessimism. Cross-cultural data obtained from 19 samples of Belgian, Moroccan, and Polish subjects not only confirmed the hypothesis but also showed high agreement about the nature of the problems that were selectively associated with optimism, realism and pessimism.     

In Defense of “Denial”: Difficulty Knowing When Beliefs Are Unrealistic and Whether Unrealistic Beliefs Are Bad

Bioethicists often draw sharp distinctions between hope and states like denial, self-deception, and unrealistic optimism. But what, exactly, is the difference between hope and its more suspect cousins? One common way of drawing the distinction focuses on accuracy of belief about the desired outcome: Hope, though perhaps sometimes misplaced, does not involve inaccuracy in the way that these other states do. Because inaccurate beliefs are thought to compromise informed decision making, bioethicists have considered these states to be ones where intervention is needed either to correct the person’s mental state or to persuade the person to behave differently, or even to deny the person certain options (e.g., another round of chemotherapy). In this article, we argue that it is difficult to determine whether a patient is really in denial, self-deceived, or unrealistically optimistic. Moreover, even when we are confident that beliefs are unrealistic, they are not always as harmful as critics contend. As a result, we need to be more permissive in our approach to patients who we believe are unrealistically optimistic, in denial, or self-deceived—that is, unless patients significantly misunderstand their situation and thus make decisions that are clearly bad for them (especially in light of their own values and goals), we should not intervene by trying to change their mental states or persuade them to behave differently, or by paternalistically denying them certain options (e.g., a risky procedure).     

Effect of anxiety on optimism

A quasi-experimental study was designed to investigate the possibility that people's optimism is reduced if they experience a specific form of negative affect, namely, anxiety. The level of optimism held by two groups of English students toward a range of life events was examined. Students taking examinations, the experimental group, were in an anxious state. Students who had completed their examinations, the control group, were less anxious. Those in the anxious group were less optimistic about the likelihood of both negative and positive events happening to them than were those in the control group. They were also less optimistic about the likelihood of events happening to others and of events happening to them in comparison with others. It was concluded that negative affect in general, and anxiety in particular, may have a global effect upon optimism: It may reduce optimism toward a broad range of judgments.