When unfair treatment helps performance

Human beings are responsive to fairness violations. People reject unfair offers and go out of their way to punish those who behave unfairly. However, little is known regarding when unfair treatment can either help or harm performance. We found that basketball players were more likely to make free throws after being awarded a foul specific to unfair treatment (Study 1). Similarly, hockey players were more likely to score during a penalty shot compared to a shootout (Study 2). A laboratory experiment showed that participants were more accurate at golf putting after a previous attempt had been unfairly nullified (Study 3). However, a final experiment revealed that when the task was more demanding, unfair treatment resulted in worse performance (Study 4). Moreover, this effect was mediated by feelings of anger and frustration. These results suggest that performance is sensitive to perceptions of fairness and justice.     

Coupling and decoupling of unfairness and anger in ultimatum bargaining

Although previous research has demonstrated the importance of emotions in ultimatum bargaining, this research provides a more direct, convergent test of the role of anger in explaining rejections of unfair offers in ultimatum bargaining. First, using appraisal theory of emotions, this research examines the extent to which the cognitive appraisal of unfairness leads to the emotion of anger, which in turn, drives punitive behavior (i.e., rejection of offers). Second, this research explores the possibility of decoupling the emotion of anger from its antecedent appraisal of unfairness in order to attenuate responders' inclination to reject unfair offers. Third, following the current research tradition that goes beyond a valence‐based approach, we differentiate between the negative emotions of anger and sadness and examine whether it is the specific emotion of anger that is relevant to the cognitive appraisal of unfairness or the general negative valence of the emotion. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Lex talionis: Testosterone and the law of retaliation

Research examining both the organizing and activating effects of testosterone in one-shot bargaining contexts has been vexed by inconsistencies. Some research finds that high-testosterone men are more likely to reject unfair offers in an ultimatum game and exogenous administration of testosterone to men leads to less generous offers. In contrast, other research finds that higher prenatal exposure to testosterone predicts more generous dictator game offers and administering testosterone to women leads to more generous ultimatum game offers. The current research seeks to resolve these inconsistencies by examining how the organizing effects of testosterone affect bargaining behavior. Because testosterone is associated with status seeking and concerns with social reputation, we hypothesized that testosterone would predict aggressive bargaining but only after provocation. Two studies found that prenatal testosterone exposure, as measured by 2D:4D ratio, led to aggressive responses for both males and females, but only after they received unfair offers. Furthermore, perceptions of fairness violations moderated but did not mediate the effect of testosterone on retributional responding. These results suggest that the organizing effects of testosterone have consistent effects on bargaining behavior for both males and females but its predictive ability requires some form of provocation to emerge.     

An attribution-emotion-action interpretation of the “evil eye” in everyday conflict situations

An attribution-emotion-action model was used to examine individuals’ willingness to seek for another person's face in conflict situations. To induce interpersonal conflict and frustration, participants were engaged in the ultimatum bargaining game (UBG) where they received predetermined offers. A simple UBG consists of two players, a Proposer and a Responder, who must decide how to divide a resource. Our findings confirm our predictions in that during the interpersonal conflict (i.e., betraying the norm of equality in the UBG), participants made more controllable based attributions, felt more frustrated (less sympathetic), and more likely requested to view the Proposer's photograph than when there is no conflict. Stated differently, in conflict situations, the likelihood of seeking another person's face increases when controllable attributions are made and when frustration is felt.     

Social Value Orientation Moderates the Effects of Intuition versus Reflection on Responses to Unfair Ultimatum Offers

We investigated whether social value orientation (SVO) moderates the effects of intuitive versus reflective information processing on responses to unfair offers. We measured SVO one week prior to an ultimatum game experiment in which participants had to accept or reject a series of 10 ultimatum offers including very low (unfair) ones. Before making these decisions, participants mentally contrasted their individual goals with the obstacle of pondering at length or acting in a hasty way; then they made the plan to adopt an intuitive or a reflective mode of processing (intuitive and reflective condition, respectively), or made no such plans (control condition). Participants with rather high (prosocial) SVO scores were more likely to accept unfair offers in the reflective than the intuitive condition. This effect also evinced for a subset of selfish individuals; however, the majority with rather low (selfish) scores made similar decisions in both conditions. This pattern of results suggests that SVO moderates the effects of intuitive versus reflective modes of processing on responses to low ultimatum offers. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Deception and Retribution in Repeated Ultimatum Bargaining

This paper investigates the dynamics of deception and retribution in repeated ultimatum bargaining. Anonymous dyads exchanged messages and offers in a series of four ultimatum bargaining games that had prospects for relatively large monetary outcomes. Variations in each party's knowledge of the other's resources and alternatives created opportunities for deception. Revelation of prior unknowns exposed deceptions and created opportunities for retribution in subsequent interactions. Results showed that although proposers and responders chose deceptive strategies almost equally, proposers told more outright lies. Both were more deceptive when their private information was never revealed, and proposers were most deceptive when their potential profits were largest. Revelation of proposers' lies had little effect on their subsequent behavior even though responders rejected their offers more than similar offers from truthful proposers or proposers whose prior deceit was never revealed. The discussion and conclusions address the dynamics of deception and retribution in repeated bargaining interactions.     

Procedural fairness in ultimatum bargaining: Effects of interactional fairness and formal procedure on respondents’ reactions to unequal offers1

Abstract: Ninety‐nine Japanese students received one of three offers in an ultimatum bargaining scenario: unfavorable and unequal; equal; or favorable but unequal. These offers were determined by either the other participant or by a computerized lottery. We also manipulated the arbitrariness of the role assignment procedure. Participants perceived the intentional small offer as more unfair in the interactional sense than the unintentional small offer, while they perceived the same offers as unfair in the distributive sense, regardless of intentionality. The intentional small offer was more likely to be rejected than the unintentional small offer. Participants perceived the arbitrary procedure of the role assignment as highly unfair, whereas the difference of arbitrariness in role assignment procedures had no significant impact on their reactions to the offer. Acceptance of the offer was strongly determined by interactional fairness, as well as by distributive fairness, and these types of fairness were influenced by different situational characteristics, such as intentionality, the size of the offer, and the equality of the offer.     

共情关怀对公平决策的影响——来自ERP的证据

本研究运用事件相关电位技术(event-related potential, ERP)和最后通牒博弈范式(ultimatum game, UG)考察了共情关怀对公平决策的影响。实验采用2 (状态共情关怀: 有共情关怀vs.无共情关怀) × 3 (分配公平性: 公平vs.劣势不公平vs.优势不公平)被试内设计, 共37名被试参与实验, 被试作为响应者选择是否接受提议者的分配提议。行为结果显示劣势不公平条件下, 有共情情境的接受率高于无共情情境; 优势不公平条件下呈现相反的结果。ERP结果显示: 对于他人提出的优势不公平提议, 无共情情境较有共情情境下诱发了更负的前部N1 (anterior N1, AN1), 有共情情境比无共情情境下诱发了更大的P2波幅; 有共情情境下, 他人提出的劣势不公平提议较优势不公平和公平提议诱发了更负的内侧额叶负波(medial frontal negativity, MFN); P3在公平条件下的波幅较劣势不公平条件下更大, 并未受到共情关怀的调节。这些结果表明共情关怀不仅调节了公平决策行为, 还调节了公平加工的早期注意和动机及之后的认知和情绪加工, 但由P3表征的高级认知过程仅受到公平性的调节而不受共情水平的影响。     

两人和三人最后通牒博弈任务中嗓音吸引力对决策的影响

本研究用两人和三人最后通牒博弈任务探究男性嗓音吸引力对决策的影响。实验1发现, 高吸引力的嗓音会提高被试对不公平分配方案的接受率。实验2发现, 即使分配方案对第三方接受者公平, 对被试不公平, 第三方接受者的高吸引力嗓音仍然会提高被试对方案的接受率。综上, 嗓音吸引力可以诱发类似面孔吸引力的“美貌津贴”效应。     

胜任需要挫败的“双刃剑”效应及干预策略：行为和认知神经科学视角

胜任需要挫败是指个体觉得自己很失败或者感觉不能胜任工作。随着知识经济的快速发展, 越来越多的新生代知识型员工在工作中遭受了短期或长期的胜任需要挫败。在经历胜任需要挫败后, 员工在后续的工作中会越挫越勇还是一蹶不振?如果员工会越挫越勇, 如何强化这一积极效应?如果员工会一蹶不振, 如何规避这一消极后果?已有研究无法清晰地解答这些问题。因此, 本研究基于自我决定理论, 综合运用行为实验、认知神经科学实验和现场实验的方法, 依次考察短期和长期的胜任需要挫败对后续任务自主动机的跨期影响, 进而探讨并检验组织层面的发展性反馈、自主性支持以及个体层面的成就目标导向等干预策略的有效性。研究结果拓展了胜任需要挫败和自主动机的相关研究, 有助于指导企业对员工的胜任需要挫败问题进行科学管理和干预, 有益于员工有效应对胜任需要挫败, 充分激发其自主工作动机。     

Fear and guilt in proposers: Using emotions to explain offers in ultimatum bargaining

We argue that offers in bargaining are guided by the emotions that proposers anticipate when contemplating their offers. In particular, we reason that positive offers may be driven by fear and guilt, where fear is more related to the perceived consequences of having one's offer rejected, and guilt is more related to concerns for the opponents' outcomes. Two studies on ultimatum bargaining corroborate this view. In Study 1, we used two well‐documented manipulations to affect the consequences of having one's offer rejected and the initial entitlements of one's opponent. Both factors affected offers: Offers were higher when the consequences of having one's offer rejected were lower, and when the initial entitlements of one's opponent were higher. In agreement with our predictions, the former effect was mediated by anticipated fear and the latter by anticipated guilt. In Study 2, we directly manipulated both mediators. The findings further corroborate our reasoning by showing that both feelings also have a direct effect on ultimatum offers. These findings highlight the potential contribution of studying specific emotions in bargaining behavior. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effects of feelings of guilt on the behaviour of uncooperative individuals in repeated social bargaining games: An affect-as-information interpretation of the role of emotion in social interaction

In two studies we found that feelings of guilt provoke individuals to cooperate in repeated social bargaining games (a prisoner's dilemma in Study 1 and an ultimatum game in Study 2). Feelings of guilt were either experimentally manipulated (Study 1) or assessed via self-report (Study 2) after participants had played one round of a social bargaining game. As predicted, individuals who experienced feelings of guilt (compared to individuals who felt no guilt) after pursuing a non-cooperative strategy in the first round of play, displayed higher levels of cooperation in the subsequent round of play (even one week later). Results are discussed in terms of an “affect-as-information” model, which suggests that non-cooperating individuals who experience the negative affective state associated with guilt in a social bargaining game may be using this feeling state as “information” about the future costs of pursuing an uncooperative strategy. Because in guilt the focus is on the specific, individuals are capable of ridding themselves of this emotional state through action (Lewis, 1993, p. 570)     

公平偏好的电生理测量：来自脑电、皮肤电和心电的证据

研究发现,人们普遍具有追求公平的偏好,即人们在追求个人收益时也会关注收益分配的公平性。随着电生理技术的发展,越来越多的研究者采用电生理技术对公平偏好进行深入探讨。本研究从脑电、皮肤电、心电等方面梳理公平偏好的电生理机制。脑电的研究发现,公平偏好相关的脑电主要涉及反馈相关负波和P300;皮肤电的研究发现,相比于公平分配,个体在不公平分配情况下其皮肤电的激活水平更高;心率的研究发现,相比于公平分配,个体遭遇不公平分配时其心率降低。研究公平偏好电生理机制有助于更深入地揭示公平偏好的产生根源与形成过程。未来可从公平偏好电生理的整合研究、公平偏好的脑成像与电生理的整合性探索,以及拓展公平偏好电生理的外部效度和研究范式等方面展开进一步探究。     

Counterfactual comparison modulates fairness consideration in the mini‐ultimatum game: An event‐related potentials study

Existing literature on the mini‐ultimatum game indicates that counterfactual comparison between chosen and unchosen alternatives is of great importance for individual's fairness consideration. However, it is still unclear how counterfactual comparison influences the electrophysiological responses to unfair chosen offers. In conjunction with event‐related potentials’ (ERPs) technique, the current study aimed to explore the issue by employing a modified version of the mini‐ultimatum game where a fixed set of two alternatives (unfair offer vs. fair alternative, unfair vs. hyperfair alternative, unfair offer vs. hyperunfair alternative) was presented before the chosen offer. The behavioral results showed that participants were more likely to accept unfair chosen offers when the unchosen alternative was hyperunfair than when the unchosen alternative was fair or hyperfair. The ERPs results showed that the feedback‐related negativity (FRN) elicited by unfair chosen offers was insensitive to the type of unchosen alternative when correcting for possible overlap with other components. In contrast, unfair chosen offers elicited larger P300 amplitudes when the unchosen alternative was hyperunfair than when the unchosen alternative was fair or hyperfair. These findings suggest that counterfactual comparison may take effect at later stages of fairness consideration as reflected by the P300.     

The salience of a recipient’s alternatives: Inter- and intrapersonal comparison in ultimatum games

The social utility model suggests that in social decision-making, both inter- and intrapersonal comparisons are important in assessing the utility of a decision outcome. In the ultimatum game both these comparisons play a role. This is especially true for recipients reacting to an unfair offer. We propose that the relative weights inter- and intrapersonal comparisons receive in ultimatum games depend on the way the decision is structured. In three studies we show that presenting recipients with a straightforward choice instead of the usual accept/reject question makes recipients more inclined to accept unfair offers. Moreover, the existence of an alternative outcome, i.e., the fact that refusal of the offer also leads to a substantial outcome, similarly raises the level of acceptances in a standard ultimatum game. Results are discussed in relation to the joint/separate evaluation disparity and the distinction between occurrences and non-occurrences.     

People avoid situations that enable them to deceive others

Information advantage enables people to benefit themselves by deceiving their counterparts. Using a modified ultimatum bargaining game with an exit option, we find that people are more likely to avoid settings enabling them to privately deceive their counterparts than settings which do not enable deception. This tendency is explained by people's reduced desire to become responsible for the other's outcomes when deception is possible. Results of three experiments show that people avoid entering a setting that enables deception by appearing fair while being unfair (Exp. 1–3). Experiment 2 showed that this tendency was reduced when interaction partners were displayed as competitive rather than cooperative. Experiment 3 showed a stronger tendency to avoid tempting situations that enable private deception than to approach situations in which one can privately benefit others. We conclude that when navigating through social space, people avoid situations enabling them to deceive others.     

Do tests facilitate decision‐making performance on a transfer task?

Testing can improve later recall of information. However, much less is known about the potential use of testing in promoting the transfer of learning. In this study, we investigated whether testing improves decision‐making performance on a transfer task in a sample of 98 university students using a between‐subjects design. After studying several statements about a fictional disease under different learning conditions (restudy, free recall, and multiple‐choice), participants were asked to recall this information and subsequently make medical decisions concerning the fictional disease (i.e., the transfer task). The present study found no advantage of testing conditions over restudy condition on the 30‐min delayed memory task. However, participants in the active retrieval practice (i.e., free recall) group performed significantly better on the transfer task over those in both restudy and multiple‐choice groups. These results suggest free‐recall tests promote the transfer of learning.     

Utilization of base-rate information during feeling-of-knowing judgments.

We examined whether subjects use base-rate information about item difficulty when making feeling-of-knowing judgments for items they failed to recall. First, the subjects attempted to recall the answers to general-information questions. Then, for those items they recalled incorrectly, half of the subjects received information about the normative probability of recall of each item while judging their feeling of knowing. The other subjects made their feeling-of-knowing judgments without receiving any base-rate information. Finally, all subjects had a forced-choice recognition test on those items to validate the accuracy of their feeling-of-knowing judgments. Relative to the no-base-rate information group, the base-rate group had lower feelings of knowing for normatively difficult items and higher feelings of knowing for normatively easier items. Subjects who had received base-rate information during the judgment state had greater feeling-of-knowing accuracy than subjects who did not receive base-rate information. However, even the predictions from subjects who received base-rate information were not significantly more accurate for predicting subsequent recognition than were the predictions derived from normative information alone.     

诚实-谦逊性和人际亲密性对公平规范执行的影响

采用2（诚实-谦逊性：高分组、低分组）×3（人际亲密性：家人、朋友、路人）×2（提议不公性：高不公提议、低不公提议）的混合实验设计,考察人际冲突情境下诚实-谦逊性与公平规范执行中人情效应的关系。研究结果发现,随着人际亲密性的增强,人们对互动同伴的互惠预期越高,更倾向于接受不公提议;高、低诚实-谦逊者付诸公平规范执行时均会考量双方彼此的人际亲密性,但高诚实-谦逊者存在更强的人情效应。结果表明,高诚实-谦逊者更在意维持有价值的人际关系,愿意宽容重要他人的违规行为。     

身体姿势启动的内隐权力感对公平决策的影响

已有研究表明, 扩张身体姿势可启动个体的权力感。基于具身认知的视角, 实验1考察身体姿势对免惩罚游戏的提议者进行金钱分配时的影响, 实验2和实验3分别考察最后通牒游戏、免惩罚游戏的回应者在蜷缩和扩张姿势下对各种分配类型方案的拒绝率。结果表明, 与蜷缩姿势相比, 扩张姿势使个体更倾向于在免惩罚游戏提议者角色时做出更多的利己不公平分配, 同时使个体更倾向于拒绝最后通牒游戏和免惩罚游戏中的不公平分配。本研究证明了扩张姿势启动的权力感可影响个体的公平决策。