For the Love of Cybernetics

This narrative is a response to an invitation to share my story regarding cybernetics. I begin with an exploration of what “for the love of cybernetics” means to me. Tracing experiences and connections to cybernetics over the course of 50?years I explore how I observe and give voice to my relation with people and situations both personal and professional. I explore life and how it is enriched by knowing cybernetics. Recent projects to encourage systems and cybernetic literacy building on work with ocean, earth, air, and energy literacies are described.     

Re-inventing the already punctured wheel: reflections on a seminar with Humberto Maturana

Three central themes of Maturana's work - autopoiesis, the biology of cognition, and cybernetic ontology – are examined. Evidence is offered that Maturana's treatment of these themes is either unoriginal or flawed. The uncritical acceptance of Maturana's work by family therapists raises questions about the maturity of their discipline, especially in so far as many practitioners claim an understanding of cybernetics.     

My Scholarly Life in Cybernetics

This article narrates how I discovered cybernetics, who inspired me to make the contributions of which I am proud, and the ideas that led me to recognize the importance of understanding the social world we live in as a consequence of what we do in language. It took me some time before I recognized that circular causality and digitalization that made cybernetics the driver of the current revolution toward a computationally autonomous information society had serious limitations. When used to explain human involvements, the mathematics of cybernetics trivializes what we do to each other and blinds us to recognize how cybernetics transformed society. Studying conversations and discourses made me aware of how cybernetic vocabularies, guiding concepts, and computational metaphors were enacted. By contrast to (first- or second-order) cybernetics, I learned that a cybernetics that is practiced in conversations and acknowledges the social consequences of what it generates had to be reflexive. Shifting attention from causal circularities to reflexive circularities opens up huge new areas for exploring socially meaningful contributions and criticizing the epistemologies of mindless discursive practices (e,g., of claiming the superiority of artificial intelligence and the power of computers). Such claims merely entrap their believers into inaction.     

Cybersemiotics and the Question of Semiotic and Informational Thresholds

The present article discusses various suggestions for a philosophical framework for a transdisciplinary information science or a semiotic doctrine. These are: the mechanical materialistic, the pan-informational, the Luhmanian second order cybernetic approach, Peircian biosemiotics and finally the pan-semiotic approach. The limitations of each are analyzed. The conclusion is that we will not have to choose between either a cybernetic-informational or a semiotic approach. A combination of a Peircian-based biosemiotics with autopoiesis theory, second order cybernetics and information science is suggested in a five-leveled cybersemiotic framework. The five levels are 1) a level of Firstness, 2) a level of mechanical matter, energy and force as Secondness, 3) a cybernetic and thermodynamic level of information and signal, 4) a level of sign games in living systems, and 5) a level of conscious language games in self-conscious social humans.     

Beyond design: cybernetics,biological computers and hylozoism

The history of British cybernetics offers us a different form of science and engineering, one that does not seek to dominate nature through knowledge. I want to say that one can distinguish two different paradigms in the history of science and technology: the one that Heidegger despised, which we could call the Modern paradigm, and another, cybernetic, nonModern, paradigm that he might have approved of. This essay focusses on work in the 1950s and early 1960s by two of Britain’s leading cyberneticians, Stafford Beer and Gordon Pask, in the field of what one can call biological computing. My object is to get as clear as I can on what Beer and Pask were up to. At the end, I will discuss Beer’s hylozoist ontology of matter, mind and spirit. This material is not easy to get the hang of—but that is what one should expect from an unfamiliar paradigm. Presented at an international conference on the philosophy of technology, Copenhagen, 13–15 Oct 2005. Revised for submission to Synthese.     

When the Going Gets Tough,the Differentiated Keep Going: Cybernetic Self-Determination,Daily Obstacles,and Persistent Goal Pursuit

ABSTRACT. Cybernetic theories of self-regulation contend that an individual's goal system may work best to the extent it is differentiated. The present investigation pioneered an assessment of goal differentiation in relation to an important feature of goals—intrinsic motivation—and quantified the extent to which intrinsic motivation systematically increased from low- to mid- to high-level goals, the resulting individual difference termed cybernetic self-determination. In Study 1 (n = 106), it was found that frustrating daily events precipitated motivations to quit at low, but not high, levels of cybernetic self-determination. In Study 2 (n = 111), it was found that negative feedback was associated with reduced goal persistence at low, but not high, levels of cybernetic self-determination. The findings therefore converge on the idea that individual differences in cybernetic self-determination are consequential in buffering reactions to obstacles in daily life. Implications for personality, motivation, and self-regulation literatures are discussed.     

The Internet and Its Discontents—or Diamonds are a Girl’s BFF: Commentary on Danielle Knafo’s Paper “Guys and Dolls: Relational Life in the Technological Era”

In this discussion, I contrast Knafo’s worry about online inhumanity with a perspective informed by Katherine Hayles’s humanistic work on cybernetics, the posthuman, and the technological unconscious. Drawing upon my own writing about cyberobjects and reality, I argue that Knafo’s claim that “technology has invaded our intimate lives” is wildly overstated and that it hinges upon a curious manipulation of a false active/passive binary that is then used as a litmus test for perversion. I challenge Knafo’s “evolutionary” and materialist claims with reference to the intercourse of perversion and neoliberalism.     

In Search of a Reconciliation Between Semiotics,Thermodynamics and Metasystem Transition Theory

The disciplines of cybernetics, semiotics and thermodynamics investigate evolutionary processes quite independently from each other. The aim of this paper is to draw the parallels and point out the possibility and necessity of a reconciliation between these disciplines. The concept of metasystem transition has been proposed by Turchin as a quantum of evolution from a cybernetic point of view. Semiotic processes are of prime importance for the realisation of metasystem transitions in the course of evolution. From a thermodynamic point of view, the emergence of more complex, self-producing agents depends on the emergence of more advanced forms of semiosis. As an evolutionary consequence, more symbolic forms of semiosis that allow higher competence for abstraction and anticipation emerge.     

The Problem of Other Minds

This paper reimagines the traditional problem of other minds. On a Cartesian view, the problem involves humans’ inability to perceive other persons’ minds. Similarly, Gilbert Ryle claims that we cannot directly access another’s mind. The paper’s rethinking of the problem of other minds moves beyond these questions of perceptibility and accessibility. It asks whether there are certain groups of people whose minds are systematically misinterpreted, or even denied mentality. It argues that there are. This claim builds off recent work in philosophy and social psychology on epistemic injustice and the role of social categories in mental state attribution. The paper proposes the Problem of the Other’s Mind: the phenomenon of a (relatively) socially privileged person’s inability or lack of desire to understand the mind of a (relatively) socially underprivileged person.     

The League

About painting, cybernetics, and shared purpose, this article is partly a story, in part a memoir, an adventure in cybernetics, happening 30 years ago, in snow, in the small Swiss city of St. Gallen. A conference of the American Society for Cybernetics meets there. It is 1987. The author, a painter, searching for a new understanding of painting, encounters a convergence of the art of painting and the art of cybernetics through principles of second-order cybernetics in Pask, von Foerster and Maturana, dissolved in Kathleen Forsythe’s poetry. The form, as well as the content of this article, reflects cybernetics.     

A Cybernetic Theory of Psychopathology

Abstract

Cybernetics, the study of principles governing goal-directed, self-regulating systems, offers a useful approach to understanding psychopathology or psychological dysfunction, overcoming limitations of other naturalistic approaches. Whereas influential theories of psychopathology have relied on definitions of dysfunction rooted in evolution and fitness, we define psychopathology in terms of cybernetic dysfunction, failure to make progress toward important goals. Cybernetic function in organisms is not identical to evolutionary function, despite their causal phylogenetic relationship. We define psychopathology as persistent failure to move toward one’s goals, due to failure to generate effective new goals, interpretations, or strategies when existing ones prove unsuccessful. This definition allows a thorough integration of dimensional approaches to psychopathology and personality and provides a new perspective on the nosology of mental disorder. We review evidence that the major dimensions of psychopathology correspond to major trait dimensions of personality, but we assert that extremity on these dimensions is neither necessary nor sufficient for psychopathology, which requires cybernetic dysfunction. Drawing from psychological and neurobiological research on personality and psychopathology, we present a theory of the mechanisms underlying the five major dimensions of psychopathology, some of their subdimensions, and the general risk factor for psychopathology. We conclude by discussing implications of our theory for research, diagnosis, and mental health interventions.     

Mathematical models of foreign policy decision-making: Compensatory vs. noncompensatory

There are presently two leading foreign policy decision-making paradigms in vogue. The first is based on the classical or rational model originally posited by von Neumann and Morgenstern to explain microeconomic decisions. The second is based on the cybernetic perspective whose groundwork was laid by Herbert Simon in his early research on bounded rationality. In this paper we introduce a third perspective — thepoliheuristic theory of decision-making — as an alternative to the rational actor and cybernetic paradigms in international relations. This theory is drawn in large part from research on heuristics done in experimental cognitive psychology. According to the poliheuristic theory, policy makers use poly (many) heuristics while focusing on a very narrow range of options and dimensions when making decisions. Among them, the political dimension is noncompensatory. The paper also delineates the mathematical formulations of the three decision-making models.The authors thank Raymond Dacey for his helpful comments.     

Wittgenstein’s Picture Theory and the Distinction between Representing and Depicting

In this paper, I draw attention to the often-overlooked Tractarian distinction between representing (darstellen) and depicting (abbilden), provide a clear account of it and examine how it affects our understanding of the notions of ‘being a picture’, meaningfulness, truth, and falsity in the Tractatus. I also look at the recent debate in the literature on the notion of truth and show that Glock’s claim that the official theory of the Tractatus is to be accounted in terms of obtainment only and deflationary accounts such as Hacker’s derive from a failure to notice the distinction between representing and depicting (in the case of Glock) or a misconception of depicting (in the case of Hacker). Finally, I argue against the idea that either representing or depicting should be dispensed with. Both are necessary for Wittgenstein to account for every case of a proposition being a picture of reality.     

The dissemination and research of Laszlo's systems philosophy in China

Since the 1980s, the so‐called “new six‐theory” (Dissipative structure theory, Synergetics theory, Catastrophe theory, Chaos theory, Fractal theory, and Hypercycle theory), different from the traditional “systems theory,” “information theory,” and “cybernetics theory” (the “old three theory") has been introduced into China. With it, Laszlo's systems philosophy has been given close attention by Chinese scholars. The main elements of this work are analyzed in terms of the publication and research of Laszlo's work on systems philosophy, and more specifically on systems philosophy and the theory of knowledge, systems philosophy and general evolution theory, systems philosophy and the theory of value, and systems philosophy and metaphysics.     

Editor’s introduction: Innovative dynamical approaches to cognitive systems

This Editor’s Introduction to the Cognitive Systems Research special issue, “Innovative Dynamical Approaches to Cognitive Systems,” has three aims: First, the background and motivation for the topic are stated. Second, overviews of the contributing papers are presented. Third, based on the papers, speculations on future directions in dynamical approaches to the investigation of cognitive systems are presented. Here, the focus is on concepts, data analysis methods, and computational modeling.     

Explorations on the Notion of Legal Tolerance

This article builds on the notion of legal tolerance and analyzes the scope of its definition. It situates the notion in the complex set of relations occurring between the major systems of society. Generally, legal tolerance, as a concept, is understood in light of the possibilities of the legal system of influencing other major systems’ responses. On the other hand, tolerance is also the response of the legal system in respect to other major systems’ communications. Although there is a common understanding of tolerance as “under punishing bias” in criminology or as political tolerance in political science, ¹ 1. There is also a distinct field in political science, where the issue is political tolerance. In this view, political tolerance is defined as “Political tolerance typically refers to individual-level attitudes that permit groups to express opinions or maintain practices that a majority finds objectionable.” See Allison Harrell, The limits of tolerance in diverse societies: Hate speech and political tolerance norms among youth. Canadian Journal of Political Science 43 (2010), 407–432. See also C. W. Collier, A legal theory of tolerance and perspective. ARSP. Archiv. für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 84(1) (1998), 59–86. Still within criminology, an antonym for legal tolerance would be the notion of “Rationalité Pénale Moderne”; see Pires, Alvaro Pires, “Beccaria, l’utilitarisme et la rationalité pénale moderne,” in Christian Debuyst, Françoise Digneffe, Jean-Michel Labadie, and Alvaro P. Pires, eds., Histoire des savoirs sur le crime et la peine. Tome II : La rationalité pénale et la naissance de la criminologie, Première partie: “La formation de la rationalité pénale moderne au XVIIIe siècle,” (Les Presses de l’Université de Montréal, Les Presses de l’Université d’Ottawa, De Boeck Université, 1998), chapter 3, 83–143. Collection: Perspectives criminologiques. the focus of this article is different. The central points here are, first, the analysis of legal tolerance as part of systemic communications and, second, the historicity of the transformations of the nation-state in its ability to cope with the growth of separate, distinct and partial systems of society. Tolerance seems relational and raises questions such as: “How much can the legal system tolerate?” And also, “Which societal topics belong to the social system's domain-matter?” These questions are relevant given that the concept of legal tolerance depends on the possibilities of a given system to steer, to direct or to influence other major systems’ behavior, or to resist, respond or to address other systems, which are in its environment.

The concept of legal tolerance requires an analysis of a cluster of related definitions to assess the implications of the concept. These definitions are the following: (1) The concepts that result from the historical process of structuration and that explain the emergence of social systems. (2) The definition of reflexivity and its relation with the “second order cybernetics dilemma.” This is the place where heuristic and epistemological problems are found. Such problems result from both the problem of representation and from the ontological status of the real. This analysis will show why reflexivity is a key concept to explaining the transformations suffered by such systems. Then, legal tolerance is a newer development in respect to the idea of planning. As an alternative to hard planning, legal tolerance creates a fostering environment. Instead of a single system directing other systems, legal tolerance is relational and created collectively by the organizational national state using its (limited) power of legal creation. Legal tolerance also stems from the concerned subsystems of the society (economy, law, politics, science, along with others) by means of a variety of legislative products, public policies, alliances, and legal and other scientific communications that emerge as coordinating mechanisms among the alluded major subsystems.     

On misunderstanding science

Abstract

The paper examines the differences between Kuhn's account, in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, of the sciences as necessarily communal activities with internally set standards of procedure and achievement, and that view of the sciences which calls itself ‘Scientific Realism’ and regards them as striving toward, and perhaps asymptotically approaching, some external and objective reality that bestows truth or falsity on scientific theories.

The main argument turns on Poincaré's demonstration that Newton's Second Law (f = ma) is not a testable, provable proposition with a truth value, but something that is simply adopted. It is adopted in the light of experience, certainly, but there is no logical necessity in the adoption. My suggestion is that it is a ‘way of looking’ and ‘a method of analysis’ and that the necessity of its adoption by any individual lies in its being a necessary condition of entry into the scientific community. That community itself adopts ways of looking or methods of analysis for their fruitfulness in dealing with old problems and defining new ones.

Incoherences in the ‘approach’ account of scientific progress are looked at, and the individualistic assumptions that motivate it. These require the sciences to be presented as the source and basis of agreement and community amongst separated individuals. This picture and its requirement inverts reality as well as Kuhn's account, which makes community and agreement the starting point. The notion of reality as a transcendental convergence point becomes redundant.

The old problem of the incommensurability of paradigms is discussed by relating them to the notions of ways of looking and methods of analysis. These may be incompatible in that one cannot look at things in two different ways at once, but at the same time they cannot be measured on any common scale.     

Leaping Ahead of Heidegger: Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity in Being and Time

Abstract

This article challenges Honneth’s reading of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right in The Pathologies of Individual Freedom: Hegel’s Social Theory (2001/2010). Focusing on Hegel’s method, I argue that this text hardly offers support for the theory of mutual recognition that Honneth purports to derive from it. After critically considering Honneth’s interpretation of Hegel’s account of the family and civil society, I argue that Hegel’s text does not warrant Honneth’s tacit identification of mutual recognition with symmetrical instances of mutual recognition, let alone his subsequent projection of symmetrical forms of mutual recognition onto the various spheres of the Philosophy of Right as a whole. I conclude by indicating an alternative way in which Hegel’s text might be used to understand contemporary society.