共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 46 毫秒
1.
Seahwa Kim 《Erkenntnis》2009,70(3):419-426
In his 2003 paper, “Does the Existence of Mathematical Objects Make a Difference?”, Alan Baker criticizes what he terms the
‘Makes No Difference’ (MND) argument by arguing that it does not succeed in undermining platonism. In this paper, I raise
two objections. The first objection is that Baker is wrong in claiming that the premise of the MND argument lacks a truth-value.
The second objection is that the theory of counterlegals which he appeals to in his argument is incompatible with actual scientific
practice. I conclude that we ought not to accept Baker’s claim.
相似文献
Seahwa KimEmail: Email: |
2.
Luca Incurvati 《Erkenntnis》2008,69(2):261-274
Leon Horsten has recently claimed that the class of mathematical truths coincides with the class of theorems of ZFC. I argue
that the naturalistic character of Horsten’s proposal undermines his contention that this claim constitutes an analogue of
a thesis that Daniel Isaacson has advanced for PA. I argue, moreover, that Horsten’s defence of his claim against an obvious
objection makes use of a distinction which is not available to him given his naturalistic approach. I suggest a way out of
the objection which is in line with the naturalistic spirit of Horsten’s proposal but which further weakens the analogy with
Isaacson’s Thesis. I conclude by evaluating the prospects for providing an analogue of Isaacson’s Thesis for ZFC.
相似文献
Luca IncurvatiEmail: |
3.
Victoria S. Harrison 《Philosophia》2008,36(1):97-110
Internalist pluralism is an attractive and elegant theory. However, there are two apparently powerful objections to this approach
that prevent its widespread adoption. According to the first objection, the resulting analysis of religious belief systems
is intrinsically atheistic; while according to the second objection, the analysis is unsatisfactory because it allows religious
objects simply to be defined into existence. In this article, I demonstrate that an adherent of internalist pluralism can
deflect both of these objections, and in the course of so arguing, I deploy a distinction between “conceptual-scheme targetability”
and “successful conceptual-scheme targeting”.
相似文献
Victoria S. HarrisonEmail: |
4.
Timothy Chappell 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(3):255-265
I discuss Bernard Williams’ ‘integrity objection’ – his version of the demandingness objection to unreasonably demanding ‘extremist’
moral theories such as consequentialism – and argue that it is best understood as presupposing the internal reasons thesis.
However, since the internal reasons thesis is questionable, so is Williams’ integrity objection. I propose an alternative
way of bringing out the unreasonableness of extremism, based on the notion of the agent’s autonomy, and show how an objection
to this proposal can be outflanked by a strategy that also outflanks the ‘paradox of deontology.’
相似文献
Timothy ChappellEmail: |
5.
Anna Mahtani 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(2):171-180
Timothy Williamson claims that margin for error principles govern all cases of inexact knowledge. I show that this claim is
unfounded: there are cases of inexact knowledge where Williamson’s argument for margin for error principles does not go through.
The problematic cases are those where the value of the relevant parameter is fixed across close cases. I explore and reject
two responses to my objection, before concluding that Williamson’s account of inexact knowledge is not compelling.
相似文献
Anna MahtaniEmail: |
6.
Rebecca Roman Hanrahan 《Philosophia》2009,37(2):281-306
David Chalmers supports his contention that there is a possible world populated by our zombie twins by arguing for the assumption
that conceivability entails possibility. But, I argue, the modal epistemology he sets forth, ‘modal rationalism,’ ignores
the problem of incompleteness and relies on an idealized notion of conceivability. As a consequence, this epistemology can’t
justify our quotidian judgments of possibility, let alone those judgments that concern the mind/body connection. Working from
the analogy that the imagination is to the possible as perception is to the actual, I set forth a competing epistemology,
‘modal empiricism.’ This epistemology survives the incompleteness objection and allows some of our everyday modal judgments
to be justified. But this epistemology can’t justify the claim that Zombie World is possible, which leaves Chalmers’s property
dualism without the support it needs.
相似文献
Rebecca Roman HanrahanEmail: |
7.
Glen A. Hoffmann 《Philosophia》2007,35(2):161-170
According to Field’s influential incompleteness objection, Tarski’s semantic theory of truth is unsatisfactory since the definition
that forms its basis is incomplete in two distinct senses: (1) it is physicalistically inadequate, and for this reason, (2)
it is conceptually deficient. In this paper, I defend the semantic theory of truth against the incompleteness objection by
conceding (1) but rejecting (2). After arguing that Davidson and McDowell’s reply to the incompleteness objection fails to
pass muster, I argue that, within the constraints of a non-reductive physicalism and a holism concerning the concepts of truth,
reference and meaning, conceding Field’s physicalistic inadequacy conclusion while rejecting his conceptual deficiency conclusion
is a promising reply to the incompleteness objection.
相似文献
Glen A. HoffmannEmail: |
8.
Stewart Cohen 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):121-125
I raise several objections to Sosa’s account of knowledge as aptness. I argue that aptness is neither necessary nor sufficient
for knowledge. I also raise some objection to Sosa’s treatment of dreaming skepticism.
相似文献
Stewart CohenEmail: |
9.
Kious BM 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2008,29(4):213-234
There is currently much concern over the use of pharmaceuticals and other biomedical techniques to enhance athletic performance—a
practice we might refer to as doping. Many justifications of anti-doping efforts claim that doping involves a serious moral
transgression. In this article, I review a number of arguments in support of that claim, but show that they are not conclusive,
suggesting that we do not have good reasons for thinking that doping is wrong.
相似文献
Brent M. KiousEmail: |
10.
Rolf Loeber Dustin A. Pardini Alison Hipwell Magda Stouthamer-Loeber Kate Keenan Mark A. Sembower 《Journal of abnormal child psychology》2009,37(6):777-791
Relatively little is known about the factor structure of disruptive behavior among preadolescent girls. The present study
reports on exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses of disruptive girl behavior over four successive data waves as rated
by parents and teachers in a large, representative community sample of girls (N = 2,451). Five factors were identified from parent ratings (oppositional behavior/conduct problems, inattention, hyperactivity/impulsivity,
relational aggression, and callous-unemotional behaviors), and four factors were identified derived from teacher ratings (oppositional
behavior/conduct problems/callous-unemotional behaviors, inattention, hyperactivityimpulsivity, and relational aggression).
There was a high degree of consistency of items loading on equivalent factors across parent and teacher ratings. Year-to-year
stability of factors between ages five and 12 was high for parent ratings (ICC = 0.70 to 0.88), and slightly lower for teacher
ratings (ICC = 0.56 to 0.83). These findings are discussed in terms of possible adjustment to the criteria for children's
disruptive behavior disorders found in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders.
相似文献
Rolf Loeber (Corresponding author)Email: |
Dustin A. PardiniEmail: |
Alison HipwellEmail: |
Magda Stouthamer-LoeberEmail: |
Kate KeenanEmail: |
Mark A. SembowerEmail: |
11.
Nathan Salmon 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(2):263-280
Jeffrey King’s principal objection to the direct-reference theory of demonstratives is analyzed and criticized. King has responded
with a modified version of his original argument aimed at establishing the weaker conclusion that the direct-reference theory
of demonstratives is either incomplete or incorrect. It is argued that this fallback argument also fails.
相似文献
Nathan SalmonEmail: |
12.
Peter Godfrey-Smith 《Philosophical Studies》2009,145(2):273-295
13.
Patrick Toner 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(3):281-297
In this paper, I develop an ontological position according to which substances such as you and I have no substantial parts.
The claim is not that we are immaterial souls. Nor is the claim that we are “human atoms” co-located with human organisms.
It is, rather, that we are macrophysical objects that are, in the relevant sense, simple. I contend that despite initial appearances,
this claim is not obviously false, and I defend it by showing how much work it can do.
相似文献
Patrick TonerEmail: |
14.
This Husserlian transcendental-phenomenological investigation of interkinaesthetic affectivity first clarifies the sense of
affectivity that is at stake here, then shows how Husserl’s distinctive approach to kinaesthetic experience provides evidential
access to the interkinaesthetic field. After describing several structures of interkinaesthetic-affective experience, I indicate
how a Husserlian critique of the presupposition that we are “psychophysical” entities might suggest a more inclusive approach
to a biosocial plenum that includes all metabolic life.
相似文献
Elizabeth A. BehnkeEmail: |
15.
George Sher 《Philosophia》2008,36(2):223-226
In his response to my essay “Out of Control,” Neil Levy contests my claims that (1) we are often responsible for acts that
we do not consciously choose to perform, and that (2) despite the absence of conscious choice, there remains a relevant sense
in which these actions are within our control. In this reply to Levy, I concede that claim (2) is linguistically awkward but
defend the thought that it expresses, and I clarify my defense of claim (1) by distinguishing my position from attributionism.
相似文献
George SherEmail: |
16.
Peter A. Graham 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(1):65-82
David Lewis has offered a reply to the standard argument for the claim that the truth of determinism is incompatible with
anyone’s being able to do otherwise than she in fact does. Helen Beebee has argued that Lewis’s compatibilist strategy is
untenable. In this paper I show that one recent attempt to defend Lewis’s view against this argument fails and then go on
to offer my own defense of Lewis’s view.
相似文献
Peter A. GrahamEmail: |
17.
In this introduction we discuss the motivation behind the workshop “Towards a New Epistemology of Mathematics” of which this
special issue constitutes the proceedings. We elaborate on historical and empirical aspects of the desired new epistemology,
connect it to the public image of mathematics, and give a summary and an introduction to the contributions to this issue.
相似文献
Bernd BuldtEmail: |
Benedikt L?we (Corresponding author)Email: |
Thomas MüllerEmail: |
18.
Kelly Trogdon 《Philosophical Studies》2009,143(2):147-165
A major stumbling block for non-reductive physicalism is Kim’s disjunctive property objection. In this paper I bring certain
issues in sparse ontology to bear on the objection, in particular the theses of priority monism and priority pluralism. Priority pluralism (or something close to it, anyway) is a common ontological background assumption, so in the first part
of the paper I consider whether the disjunctive property objection applies with equal force to non-reductive physicalism on
the assumption that priority monism is instead true. I ultimately conclude that non-reductive physicalism still faces a comparable
problem. In the second part, I argue, surprisingly enough, that what I call ‘fine-grained reductionism’, a particular version
of which Kim proposes as an alternative to non-reductive physicalism, may work better in the monist framework than the pluralist
one. I conclude that issues in sparse ontology, therefore, are more relevant to the debate about physicalism than one may
have thought.
相似文献
Kelly TrogdonEmail: |
19.
Mikel Burley 《Philosophia》2006,34(4):411-416
This Article critically discusses Clifford Williams’ claim that the A-theory and B-theory of time are indistinguishable. I
examine three considerations adduced by Williams to support his claim that the concept of time essentially includes transition
as well as extension, and argue that, despite its prima facie plausibility, the claim has not been adequately justified. Williams
therefore begs the question against the B-theorist, who denies that transition is essential. By Williams’ own lights, he ought
to deny that the B-theory is a (realist) theory of time; and thus his claim that A-time and B-time do not differ significantly
should be rejected.
相似文献
Mikel BurleyEmail: |
20.
Daniel E. Flage 《Philosophia》2009,37(3):379-380
This note is a reply to some of Giovanni Grandi’s comments on my paper “Berkeley’s Contingent Necessities.”
相似文献
Daniel E. FlageEmail: |