Some Ontological Consequences of Atomism

Is there a fundamental layer of objects in nature? And if so what sorts of things populate it? Among those who answer ‘yes’ to the first question, a common answer to the second is ‘atoms,’ where an atom is understood in the original sense of an object that is spatially unextended, indivisible, and wholly lacking in proper parts (whether actual or potential). Here I explore some of the ontological consequences of atomism. First, if atoms are real, then whatever motion they appear to undergo must be discrete (discontinuous). The link between atomism and discrete motion goes back at least to Aristotle and is admitted by some atomists, but the full significance of that admission has been neglected. I argue that a commitment to discrete motion in turn entails significant and sometimes counter‐intuitive results. I also examine the implications of these results for the philosophy of mind and for discussions of metaphysical naturalism.     

Metaphysics and methodology: Some prescriptions for social psychological research

By comparison with the physical sciences psychologists tend to pay little attention to ontology. This has had unfortunate consequences. Contemporary trends suggest a dual ontology, with psychology rooted in neurophysiology and social conversation. The notion of a ‘conversational skill’ bridges the two basic categories of psychological reality. The use of causal concepts in writing up psychological research is to be avoided since it enshrines a misunderstanding of the kind of necessity that is important in the normative control of social activity including conversing. Classical psychological experimental methodology needs radical revision since it is not appropriate to the investigation of collective semiotic structures. These points are illustrated with examples from recent empirical work by social constructivist psychologists.     

Richard (Routley) Sylvan: Writings on Logic and Metaphysics

Richard Sylvan (né Routley) was one of Australasia's most prolific and systematic philosophers. Though known for his innovative work in logic and metaphysics, the astonishing breadth of his philosophical endeavours included almost all reaches of philosophy. Taking the view that very basic assumptions of mainstream philosophy were fundamentally mistaken, he sought radical change across a wide range of theories. However, his view of the centrality of logic and recognition of the possibilities opened up by logical innovation in the fundamental areas of metaphysics resulted in his working primarily in these two, closely connected fields. It is this work in logic and metaphysics that is the main focus of what follows.     

Revising Process Metaphysics in Response to Ian Barbour's Critique

In Religion in an Age of Science , Ian Barbour concludes that the contemporary evolutionary worldview with its emphasis on the interplay of law and chance, relationality and autonomy, can be properly accounted for only by something like the process-relational metaphysics of Alfred North Whitehead. At the same time, he expresses serious reservations about certain features of Whitehead's scheme, notably, his perceived inability to account for the ongoing identity of the human self and for the fact of multilevel organization within organisms and in the world of inanimate compounds. In this article, I suggest that both of these difficulties can be resolved if one adopts a revisionist understanding of the Whiteheadian category of society according to which democratically organized societies possess an ontological unity and exercise a corporate agency proper to their own level of existence and activity. Furthermore, if one applies this revisionist understanding of societies to the Whiteheadian doctrine of God, a Trinitarian understanding of God becomes possible within the overall parameters of process-relational metaphysics. In this way, traditional belief in the doctrine of the Trinity can be reconciled with a scientifically credible worldview.     

Introduction: The Role of Process Metaphysics in Our World of Science

This article applies the analytic rigor of philosophy to the vexed topic of business strategy, and uses the objective, public evidence of business strategy as an existence proof for the possibility of free will and purpose in the private realm of subjective intentionality. The first part distinguishes three types of intentionality in philosophy—purposive intentionality, referential intentionality, and the problematic intentionality of a godlike, miraculous “inner intender.” After rejecting this third type of intentionality, and noting that its rejection saves the first two types of intentionality from guilt by association, the second part draws parallels with three types of strategy in business: purposive, referential, and godlike. The first defines the goals and objectives of a company; the second picks out and targets consumers in market driven strategy; and the third, with the help of philosophical reflections, demands a rethinking of the function of leadership without reliance on a single, godlike leader. In the third part of this article, the existence proof from the public world of business is used to shed light on the possibility of intentionality in the private world of subjective intentionality. Finally, the article draws conclusions for its three audiences: for the philosophers, with credit to Nietzsche who saw it all, a greater clarity about intentionality and free will; for business people, greater clarity about the importance of purposiveness and strategic intent; and for business philosophers, a demonstration showing how—through strategy and intentionality—we can both create value and give meaning to the lives of our employees, ourselves, and our customers.     

Impossible Antecedents and Their Consequences: Some Thirteenth-Century Arabic Discussions

The principle that a necessarily false proposition implies any proposition, and that a necessarily true proposition is implied by any proposition, was apparently first propounded in twelfth century Latin logic, and came to be widely, though not universally, accepted in the fourteenth century. These principles seem never to have been accepted, or even seriously entertained, by Arabic logicians. In the present study, I explore some thirteenth century Arabic discussions of conditionals with impossible antecedents. The Persian-born scholar Afdal al-Dīn al-Khūnajī (d.1248) suggested the novel idea that two contradictory propositions may follow from the same impossible antecedent, and closely related to this point, he suggested that if an antecedent implies a consequent, then it will do so no matter how it is strengthened. These ideas led him, and those who followed him, to reject what has come to be known as ‘Aristotle's thesis’ that no proposition is implied by its own negation. Even these suggestions were widely resisted. Particularly influential were the counter-arguments of Naīr al-Dīn al-Tūī (d.1274).     

Structuralism and Metaphysics

I consider different versions of a structuralist view of mathematical objects, according to which characteristic mathematical objects have no more of a 'nature' than is given by the basic relations of a structure in which they reside. My own version of such a view is non-eliminative in the sense that it does not lead to a programme for eliminating reference to mathematical objects. I reply to criticisms of non-eliminative structuralism recently advanced by Keränen and Hellman. In replying to the former, I rely on a distinction between 'basic' and 'constructed' structures. A conclusion is that ideas from the metaphysical tradition can be misleading when applied to the objects of modern mathematics.     

Spinoza on Ingenium and Exemplarity: Some Consequences for Educational Theory

Studies in Philosophy and Education - This article turns to the neglected pedagogical concept of ingenium in order to address some shortcomings of the admiration–emulation model of Linda...     

Some Hedonic Consequences of Perspective‐Taking in Recommending

What do people enjoy about making recommendations? Although recommendation recipients can gain useful information, the value of these exchanges for the information provider is less clear in comparison. In this article we test whether a common recommendation heuristic—egocentric projection—also has hedonic consequences, by conducting experiments that compare recommendations (suggestions for another person) to reviews, in which people merely express their own preferences. Over five studies, people preferred reviewing over recommending. Recommenders enjoyed themselves less when they had to take their recipients' perspective, to the extent that the recipients' tastes were different from their own. These results suggest that self‐expression can be intrinsically rewarding for recommendation makers, and that recommendation seekers can elicit more information by asking for reviews instead.     

葛洪与玄学

玄学是魏晋时期兴起的一种影响深远的社会思潮,两晋之际玄学在理论上发展到极至,其影响开始渗入社会生活的各个方面。葛洪早年深受儒家学说熏陶,又是官方道教理论的创立者,无论是为了维护传统的儒家思想,还是出于为官方道教建立理论的需要,葛洪在主观上都反对玄学所促发的行为方式。但客观上,葛洪却不自觉地受了玄学的影响。本文力图通过分析葛洪思想中玄学的成分,来揭示玄学对当时士人的巨大影响力。