Causal Analysis to Enhance Creative Problem-Solving: Performance and Effects on Mental Models

In recent years, it has become apparent that knowledge is a critical component of creative thought. One form of knowledge that might be particularly important to creative thought relies on the mental models people employ to understand novel, ill-defined problems. In this study, undergraduates were given training in the use of causal relationships in applying mental models in creative problem-solving. A pre-post design was used to assess the effects of this training on mental models and creative problem-solving. It was found that causal analysis training resulted in the acquisition of better mental models (in terms of subjective and objective attributes) and better solutions (in terms of quality, originality, and elegance) to problems calling for creative thought among high-ability participants. The implications of these findings for understanding the role of mental models in creative problem-solving are discussed.     

Persuasion and the contexts of dissuasion: Causal models and informal arguments

This paper develops the view that in arguing informally individuals construct a dual representation in which there is a coupling of arguments and the structure of the qualitative (mental) causal model to which these refer. Invited to consider a future possibility, individuals generate a causal model and mentally simulate the consequences of certain actions. Their arguments refer to the causal paths in the model. Correspondingly, faced with specific arguments about a policy option they generate a model with particular causal paths and mentally simulate the outcomes. The results of Experiment 1 are consistent with this notion. Decisions on the percentage of funds to be allocated to genetically modified (GM) crop research depended on the structure of the arguments elicited in response to imagining a future state of affairs. Specifically, the presence of a dissuasive argument eliminated the impact of any persuasive argument. The non-monotonic properties of everyday informal argument can then be seen as a corollary of change to causal structure in the model. The dual representation view predicts that the impact of a dissuasive argument will depend on the structure of the causal model. Experiment 2 tested and confirmed this prediction by requiring individuals to judge the relative persuasiveness of two cases referring either to a model with two independent causal paths or to a model in which one causal path depended on the other. In contrast to Experiment 1, prior opinion on GM crop research did not affect allocation decisions. An advisory role in contrast to a participant role may encourage a more decontextualised mode of thinking. According to the dual representation view, ease of mental simulation should exert wide-ranging effects on judgements and the rhetoric of arguments should also be important. The paper concludes with a discussion of some of these expectations.     

Determination,realization and mental causation

How can mental properties bring about physical effects, as they seem to do, given that the physical realizers of the mental goings-on are already sufficient to cause these effects? This question gives rise to the problem of mental causation (MC) and its associated threats of causal overdetermination, mental causal exclusion, and mental causal irrelevance. Some (e.g., Cynthia and Graham Macdonald, and Stephen Yablo) have suggested that understanding mental-physical realization in terms of the determinable/determinate relation (henceforth, ‘determination’) provides the key to solving the problem of MC: if mental properties are determinables of their physical realizers, then (since determinables and determinates are distinct, yet don’t causally compete) all three threats may be avoided. Not everyone agrees that determination can do this good work, however. Some (e.g., Douglas Ehring, Eric Funkhauser, and Sven Walter) object that mental-physical realization can’t be determination, since such realization lacks one or other characteristic feature of determination. I argue that on a proper understanding of the features of determination key to solving the problem of MC these arguments can be resisted.     

Early Intervention and the Development of Self-Regulation

Self-regulation is the key mediator between genetic predisposition, early experience, and adult functioning. This paper argues that all the key mechanisms underpinning the enduring effects of early relationship experiences interface with individuals' capacity to control (a) their reaction to stress, (b) their capacity to maintain focused attention, and (c) their capacity to interpret mental states in themselves and others. These three mechanisms together function to assist the individual to work closely and collaboratively with other minds. The paper proposes a reformulation of attachment theory constructs in terms of the quality of interpersonal interpretive functioning and the interpersonal strategies adopted by individuals to maintain optimal psychological distance between themselves and others, given their particular level of interpretive capacity.     

Attributions for recovery and adherence to rehabilitation following anterior cruciate ligament reconstruction: A prospective analysis

Abstract

The relationship between causal attributions for recovery and adherence was examined in a sample of 80 individuals (25 females and 55 males) undergoing rehabilitation following anterior cruciate ligament reconstruction. Participants estimated their speed of recovery and then rated their open-ended attributions for recovery on the Revised Causal Dimension Scale (McAuley, Duncan and Russell, 1992). Adherence was assessed in terms of attendance at rehabilitation sessions and practitioner ratings for the remainder of the rehabilitation period. Participants who perceived themselves as recovering rapidly attributed their recovery to more stable and personally controllable factors than participants who perceived themselves as recovering slowly. Causal dimension ratings predicted attendance at rehabilitation sessions, but not practitioner ratings of adherence. The results, which further demonstrate the relevance of causal attributions to health behavior, are compared with previous cross-sectional findings.     

Shoemaker's Analysis of Realization: A Review

Sydney Shoemaker has been arguing for more than a decade for an account of the mind–body problem in which the notion of realization takes centre stage. His aim is to provide a notion of realization that is consistent with the multiple realizability of mental properties or events, and which explains: (i) how the physical grounds the mental; and (ii) why the causal work of mental events is not screened off by that of physical events. Shoemaker's proposal consists of individuating properties in terms of causal powers, and defining realization as a relation of inclusion between sets of causal powers. Thus, as the causal powers that define a mental property are a subset of the causal powers that characterize a physical property, it can be said that physical properties realize mental properties. In this paper we examine the physicalist credentials of Shoemaker's mind–body theory in relation to three important issues: the direction of the relation of dependence that the theory is committed to; the possibility of mental properties existing without being anchored by physical properties; and the compatibility of the theory with the causal closure of the physical world. We argue that Shoemaker's theory is problematic in all three respects. After that we consider whether the theory should count as a mind–body theory at all, given that it seems to be committed to a distorted view of mental properties.     

Great oaks from giant acorns grow: How causal‐impact judgments depend on the strength of a cause

Causal impact is maximal when weak causes have strong effects. Do people understand this logic when they assess causal impact? In four experiments, participants judged the causal impact of strong or weak dietary treatments leading to strong or weak health effects in fictitious health studies. Rather than following the ratio of effect strength to treatment strength, judgments were influenced by three aspects of the detectability of a cause–effect relation. First, because detectability depends on the effect being strong more than on the cause being subtle, causal judgments were mainly determined by effect strength, whereas the strength of the causal treatment necessary to induce an effect was often neglected. Second, if causal input was not ignored, judgments increased when the maximal covariation between a strong causal treatment and a strong effect rendered the causal link most detectable. Or, third, causal judgments increased when a plausible causal schema facilitated detection. Consistent with sampling models of judgment and decision making, causal‐impact ratings were driven by an uncritical assessment of a detectable difference in a study sample. However, ratings were insensitive to the logical implications of the underlying causal treatment that was necessary to induce a detectable effect. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

An information-processing approach to attribution of responsibility

The research literature on defensive attribution of responsibility is reviewed within the framework of a nonmotivational information-processing model which proposes that attributed responsibility is a function of the difference between the perceived contingent probability (congruence) of an outcome, given a perpertrator's behavior, and the noncontingent probability (prior expectancy) of that outcome. Results of previous research on effects of the characteristics of outcomes, perpetrator, and victim on responsibility ratings are reinterpreted in terms of the influence these factors have on estimates of congruence and prior expectancy. Secondary analyses of data from a recent study of causal reasoning resulted in a correlation of .78 between attribution of responsibility and a simple additive model of estimated contingent and prior probabilities of an accident.     

Effect of counterfactual and factual thinking on causal judgements

The significance of counterfactual thinking in the causal judgement process has been emphasized for nearly two decades, yet no previous research has directly compared the relative effect of thinking counterfactually versus factually on causal judgement. Three experiments examined this comparison by manipulating the task frame used to focus participants' thinking about a target event. Prior to making judgements about causality, preventability, blame, and control, participants were directed to think about a target actor either in counterfactual terms (what the actor could have done to change the outcome) or in factual terms (what the actor had done that led to the outcome). In each experiment, the effect of counterfactual thinking did not differ reliably from the effect of factual thinking on causal judgement. Implications for research on causal judgement and mental representation are discussed.     

An Inferential Model of Scientific Understanding

In this article I argue that two current accounts of scientific understanding are incorrect and I propose an alternative theory. My new account draws on recent research in cognitive psychology which reveals the importance of making causal and logical inferences on the basis of incoming information. To understand a phenomenon we need to make particular kinds of inferences concerning the explanations we are given. Specifically, we come to understand a phenomenon scientifically by developing mental models that incorporate the correct causal and logical properties responsible for the causes or logical properties of the phenomenon being explained.     

Psychological distance and judgments of causal impact

When assessing causal impact, individuals have to consider two pieces of information: the magnitude of the cause that resulted in an effect, and the magnitude of the resulting effect. In the present research, participants judged the causal impact of cause–effect relationships in which the magnitude of causes and effects varied independently. Participants mainly relied on effect magnitude, rating causal impact to be much higher when strong (vs. weak) effects emerged. When participants took cause magnitude into account (which they did, but to a lesser extent), their judgments reflected a covariation rule (i.e., causal impact being maximal for strong causes generating strong effects) rather than a ratio rule (i.e., causal impact being maximal for weak causes generating strong effects). These distinct views on causal impact were moderated by psychological distance: Effect magnitude dominated judgments of proximal events, whereas cause magnitude had relatively more impact on causal judgments of distal events.     

Creating Mr. Right and Ms. Right: Interpersonal ideals and personal change in newlyweds

Based on research on exchanging information during conflict (e.g., Levinger, 1983) and the energizing effects of negative feelings (e.g., Lewin, 1951; Gottman & Krokoff, 1989), this study explores circumstances in which individuals change, over the years, in fulfillment of their spouses’unmet ideals for them. In a longitudinal study of over 200 African American newlywed couples and White newlywed couples, respondents’ratings were combined to form an index of individuals’change in fulfillment of their partners’initially unmet ideals for them. Predictions were that individuals would change more when they listen and try to understand their partners’feelings during conflict or when they have negative feelings about the functioning of the relationship. Results were that high openness to information exchange during conflict predicted high change for White husbands, White wives, and African American wives, and negative feelings about relationship functioning predicted high change for White wives, African American wives, and African American husbands.     

The Causal Exclusion Argument

Jaegwon Kim’s causal exclusion argument says that if all physical effects have sufficient physical causes, and no physical effects are caused twice over by distinct physical and mental causes, there cannot be any irreducible mental causes. In addition, Kim has argued that the nonreductive physicalist must give up completeness, and embrace the possibility of downward causation. This paper argues first that this extra argument relies on a principle of property individuation, which the nonreductive physicalist need not accept, and second that once we get clear on overdetermination, there is a way to reject the exclusion principle upon which the causal exclusion argument depends, but third that this should not lead to the belief that mental causation is easily accounted for in terms of counterfactual dependencies.     

读心的比较研究：非人灵长类与人类在心理理论上的异同点及其解释

利用非人灵长类开展比较研究是探索心理理论本质、起源和进化动因的重要途经。大量实证研究显示非人灵长类可以表现出一些基础心理理论成分,包括联合注意、意图理解和一级观点采择,这表明心理理论在灵长类动物的进化谱系中具有进化连续性。然而,非人灵长类无法像人类一样达成二级观点采择和错误信念理解,潜心智化假说、替代表征假说、最小限度心理理论假说和意识关系假说试图对此差异进行解释。尽管视角与具体内容不同,但这些假说都强调,非人灵长类无法对其他个体关于外部世界的心理信念形成表征,信念表征是非人灵长类与人类读心能力的重要分界点。未来研究需要重点澄清共享意图、语言机制以及社会生态环境因素与心理理论产生的相互影响作用。     

Construal Levels and Psychological Distance: Effects on Representation,Prediction, Evaluation,and Behavior

Construal level theory (CLT) is an account of how psychological distance influences individuals’ thoughts and behavior. CLT assumes that people mentally construe objects that are psychologically near in terms of low‐level, detailed, and contextualized features, whereas at a distance they construe the same objects or events in terms of high‐level, abstract, and stable characteristics. Research has shown that different dimensions of psychological distance (time, space, social distance, and hypotheticality) affect mental construal and that these construals, in turn, guide prediction, evaluation, and behavior. The present paper reviews this research and its implications for consumer psychology.     

Construing Consumer Decision Making

Understanding how consumers represent outcomes and weigh different decision criteria is critical to consumer behavior research. Construal‐level theory articulates how psychological distance alters the mental representation of inputs and the effective weight given to “high‐level” and “low‐level” criteria. Trope, Liberman, and Wakslak (2007) provide a review of this literature. In this commentary, we illustrate the relevance of construal‐level theory to issues in consumer psychology, particularly consumer decision making. We highlight specific questions that researchers could address by considering consumer behavior within the framework of changes in construal. We focus our discussion on how construal levels affect consideration sets and how shifts in weight from high‐level to low‐level features might lead to consumer regret and dissatisfaction. Construal level can help us understand follow‐through on stated intentions for “really new” products and illuminate public‐policy issues such as consumer saving for retirement and nonredemption of rebates. We identify open issues related to how construal levels for the same object evolve over time and whether resources differ in terms of how susceptible they are to psychological distance effects.     

Bohm's Metaphors, Causality, and the Quantum Potential

David Bohm's interpretation of quantum mechanics yields a quantum potential, Q. In his early work, the effects of Q are understood in causal terms as acting through a real (quantum) field which pushes particles around. In his later work (with Basil Hiley), the causal understanding of Q appears to have been abandoned. The purpose of this paper is to understand how the use of certain metaphors leads Bohm away from a causal treatment of Q, and to evaluate the use of those metaphors.     

Psychological distance reduces the effect of internalized stigma on mental health treatment decisions

Although stigma is a major barrier to treatment for those with mental health concerns, it is poorly understood when stigma is more or less influential in mental health treatment decisions. In the current work, we examined whether psychological distance—the removal of an event from direct experience—reduced the influence of internalized stigma on willingness to seek treatment. Specifically, we tested the hypothesis that psychological distance versus proximity (e.g., seeking treatment in three months vs. in two days, respectively) decreases the negative influence of stigma on willingness to seek treatment. We focused on a population for whom mental health treatment decisions are personally-relevant: individuals who had previously sought mental health treatment. Experiment 1 showed that the extent to which these individuals internalized (i.e., personally endorsed) stigma about mental illness predicted lower intentions to make an appointment with a mental health care provider for themselves (but not another person). Experiment 2 replicated this result using a different measure of psychological distance (temporal distance) and extended this finding to behavior (time spent reading mental health resources). Overall, this research demonstrated that internalized stigma disrupts mental health treatment-seeking intentions and behaviors when they are psychologically proximal, but not when they are distant. Potential applications of these results are discussed.     

Situational constraint and type of causal explanation: The effects on perceived “mental illness” and social rejection

The present study investigated the effects of situational constraint and type of causal explanation on the degree to which described behavior would be perceived as evidencing “mental illness” and the degree to which it would lead to social rejection.Results showed that both of these variables influenced the degree of attributed “mental illness”, the degree of attributed psychological disturbance, and the degree of social rejection. Behavior inappropriate to a situation was rated higher on all three of these variables. Behavior attributed to external pressures received lower ratings on these variables than that attributed to internal causes, to organic causes, or for which no apparent explanation was available.     

Differences in attributions of mental illness and social distance for portrayals of four mental disorders

For individuals with mental illness, others' perceptions of mental illness often limit integration into communities. Perceptions of mental illness manifest as social stigma in the form of social distance and may depend on individuals' attributions of the origins of mental illness. 180 university students completed a survey on attribution of mental illness and social distance across several disorders (psychiatric and physical). Participants indicated greater social distance for severe mental illness (i.e., schizophrenia) than less severe mental illness and physical illness. More desire for social distance may be related to unfamiliarity with severe mental illness rather than less severe mental and physical illnesses. Greater understanding of how individuals perceive mental illness can inform efforts to educate the public.