Naming the color of a word: is it responses or task sets that compete?

Subjects named the colors in which high- and low-frequency words and pronounceable nonwords, otherwise matched, were displayed. Color naming was slower for all three item types than for visually equivalent strings of nonalphanumeric symbols but was no slower for words than for nonwords, nor for high-frequency words than for low-frequency words. Unpronounceable letter strings had intermediate color-naming latencies. However, frequency and lexical status had large effects on latency for reading the same words and pseudowords aloud. Interference is thus predicted not by the strength of association between a letter string and its pronunciation but by the presence of word-like constituents. We argue that the interference from an unprimed noncolor word is due to, and isolates, one of two components of the classic Stroop effect: competition from the whole task set of reading. The other component, response competition, occurs only when lexical access is sufficiently primed.     

Enhanced memory for emotional pictures: A product of increased attention to affective stimuli?

The current experiment addressed the question, is enhanced memory for emotional pictures due to increased attention to affective stimuli? Participants viewed pairs of pictures (emotional-neutral or neutral-neutral) whilst their eye movements were recorded; participants had to decide which picture out of each pair they preferred. There was increased attention to positive pictures and decreased attention to negative images during picture viewing. Despite this, when a recognition test was given 1 week later, memory enhancements were found for negative pictures only. Moreover, although there was a general correlation between total inspection time and memory performance, this reliability was clear only for neutral pictures, and not for emotional images. The results suggest that memory advantages for emotional pictures can occur without increased attention to such images.     

Depression or anxiety: which is best able to predict patterns of lateralisation for the processing of emotional faces?

Previous research has shown that both anxiety and depression are associated with strength of lateralisation for the processing of emotive faces, although these clinical measures have always been considered in separate studies. In the present study, we measure depression and anxiety, within the same non-clinical sample, and consider whether these variables can predict strength of lateralisation, measured using the chimeric faces test. There are two key findings from this study. First, for females only, anxiety is negatively associated with right hemispheric superiority for processing of negative emotional expressions. Second, there was only one finding for depression, showing a relationship with strength of lateralisation for the processing of fearful faces that differed according to sex.     

It’s a matter of time (perspectives): shifting valence responses to emotional ambiguity

Our stage in life has profound influences on our emotions. A well-established age-related positivity effect is putatively related to time perspectives—older adults have a limited time perspective and a greater motivation to experience positivity than young adults. Ambiguous emotions (e.g., surprised expressions) have both a positive and negative meaning, offering a highly relevant model for examining this developmental trend. Indeed, there are stable, trait-like individual differences in valence bias, or the tendency to interpret surprise as positive or negative, with a developmental trend toward positivity (older adults are more positive than young adults, who are more positive than children). However, little research has determined the extent to which the bias can be shifted. In three experiments, we found that ambiguity ratings were sensitive to time perspectives, even within a population of college students, and that this effect is relatively long-lasting. Results extend socioemotional selectivity theory and demonstrate that our life stage may have profound effects on otherwise stable emotional responses.     

The state of boredom: Frustrating or depressing?

Boredom is a prevalent emotion with potential negative consequences. Previous research has associated boredom with outcomes indicating both high and low levels of arousal and activation. In the present study we propose that the situational context is an important factor that may determine whether boredom relates to high versus low arousal/activation reactions. In a correlational (N?=?443) and an experimental study (N?=?120) we focused on the situational factor (perceived) task autonomy, and examined whether it explains when boredom is associated with high versus low arousal affective reactions (i.e., frustration versus depressed affect). Results of both studies indicate that when task autonomy is low, state boredom relates to more frustration than when task autonomy is high. In contrast, some support (i.e., Study 1 only) was found suggesting that when task autonomy is high, state boredom relates to more depressed affect than when task autonomy is low. These findings imply that careful attention is needed for tasks that are relatively boring. In order to reduce frustration caused by such tasks, substantial autonomy should be provided, while monitoring that this does not result in increased depressed affect.     

Neuronal representations of cognitive state: reward or attention?

The effects of spatial or featural attention on the activity of neurons have been studied in many experiments that have used a variety of neurophysiological approaches. Other experiments have examined how expectations about reward are represented in neuronal activity in various brain regions. Although attention and reward are distinct concepts, I argue here that many neurophysiological experiments on attention and reward do not permit a clean dissociation between the two. This problem arises in part because reward contingencies are the only parameter manipulated in any of these experiments. I describe how attention and reward expectations have been confounded, giving rise to uncertainty about how signals related to attention and reward are distributed in the brain.     

The My Emotions Questionnaire: A self-report of mothers’ emotional responses to infant crying

The purpose of this article was to examine the psychometrics of the My Emotions Questionnaire, a self-report designed to assess mothers’ emotional reactions when their infants cry. Participants were 240 first-time mothers. When infants were 6 months and 1 year old, mothers completed the new questionnaire and measures assessing beliefs and behavioral responses to infant crying, and interview-based measures of mothers’ emotional reactions and causal attributions about crying were administered. Maternal sensitivity and negative behaviors were observed when infants were 6 months and 1 and 2 years old. Mothers reported on their discipline practices when children were 2 years old. Five emotion factors emerged based on exploratory factor analysis (EFA) of the 6-month data: Amusement, Anxiety, Frustration, Sympathy, and Protective. The five-factor structure was supported via a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) of the 1-year data. All scales demonstrated adequate internal consistency reliability and significant stability from 6 months to 1 year. Amusement, Frustration, and Protectiveness demonstrated the best convergent validity with cry cognitions and predictive validity to parenting measures, followed by Anxiety, although effects tended to be small to moderate. Evidence for the validity of Sympathy was less compelling. The potential utility of the questionnaire for basic and applied research is discussed.     

Homelessness: What is a psychologist to do?

Contrasts person-centered and structural explanations for homelessness. Methodological problems in studies of homeless people tend to exaggerate the role of individual deficits as causes of homelessness. A review of data on the distribution of poverty and of inadequate and unaffordable housing, with special emphasis on families, suggests the importance of structural causes. Data from 700 families requesting shelter and 524 families randomly drawn from the public assistance case load in New York City provide more support for a structural than for an individual deficit model. Individual demographic factors are also important. Implications are drawn for research and action by psychologists.     

Repeated failure: a source of helplessness or a factor irrelevant to its emergence?

We tested the validity of the egotism model of human helplessness. In contrast to the original theoretical approach of Seligman and his associates, which points to response-outcome noncontingency as the main source of helplessness, the egotism alternative proposes that repeated failure itself is the critical determinant of helplessness symptoms. Repeated failure threatens the self-esteem of the subject, who supposedly engages in a least-effort strategy during the test phase of a typical learned helplessness study, which results in performance impairment. To examine the egotism explanation, we gave subjects noncontingent-feedback training with or without repeated failure on five consecutive discrimination problems. In two experiments, noncontingent-feedback preexposure produced helplessness deficits in performance on avoidance learning, whereas repeated failure appeared irrelevant to helplessness. This and our other findings from research are inconsistent with the egotism explanation and support instead Seligman's original proposal, in which helplessness is attributed to prolonged experience with noncontingency.     

Mental models or methodological artefacts? Adults' naïve responses to a test of children's conceptions of the earth

Vosniadou and Brewer (1992) claim that children's drawings and answers to questions show that they have naïve, theory‐like ‘mental models’ of the earth; for example, they believe it to be flat, or hollow with people inside. However, recent studies that have used different methods have found little or no evidence of these misconceptions. The contrasting accounts, and possible reasons for the inconsistent findings, were tested by giving adults (N=484) either the original task (designed for 5‐year olds) or a new version in which the same drawing instructions and questions were rephrased and clarified. Many adults' responses to the original version were identical to children's ‘naïve’ drawings and answers. The new version elicited substantially fewer non‐scientific responses. These findings indicate that even adults find the original instructions and questions ambiguous and confusing, and that this is the principal reason for their non‐scientific drawings and answers. Since children must find the task even more confusing than adults, this explanation very probably applies to many of their non‐scientific responses, too, and therefore accounts for the discrepant findings of previous research. ‘Naïve’ responses result largely from misinterpretation of Vosniadou and Brewer's apparently simple task, rather than from mental models of the earth.     

Disgust: Sensory affect or primary emotional system?

We argue in this paper for the inclusion in the primary emotional systems enumerated by Panksepp of a neural system that organises disgust responses. The DISGUST system arose phylogenetically in response to danger to the internal milieu from pathogens and their toxic products. We suggest that the primitive emotive circuit, which originally provided defence by regulating consummatory behaviours, gave rise to a primary emotional system that facilitates evaluation of reinforcers. Unlike the sensory affect of distaste from which it is experimentally dissociable, disgust responses can involve flexible learned components triggered by several modalities. The anterior insula is implicated as playing a major role in the DISGUST system both in organising disgust responses in the individual and recognising disgust responses in others.     

Higher order encoding: Process or state?

While prior data has seemed to suggest that learning occurs as a result of encoding information into higher order memory units, rather than the formation of interitem associations, the process whereby the encoding occurs has been left relatively unspecified. Two encoding models were outlined which differed to the extent that one assumed that encoding occurred as an active process after the specific items of information were registered in memory, while the other assumed that information is initially registered in memory in the encoded state. The results from two studies seem to offer the most support for the second of these two models.     

Forebrain emotional asymmetry: a neuroanatomical basis?

There is considerable psychophysiological evidence to indicate that the left and right halves of the human forebrain differentially associate with particular emotions and affective traits. A neurobiological model is needed. Here I propose that forebrain emotional asymmetry is anatomically based on an asymmetrical representation of homeostatic activity that originates from asymmetries in the peripheral autonomic nervous system. This proposal builds on recent evidence indicating that lateralized, higher-order re-representations of homeostatic sensory activity provide a foundation for subjective human feelings. It can subsume differing views of emotion and the forebrain because it suggests that emotions are organized according to the fundamental principle of autonomic opponency for the management of physical and mental energy.     

A state model of negative urgency: Do momentary reports of emotional impulsivity reflect global self-report?

Negative urgency is a trait that is a risk factor for a range of psychopathology. Yet, little research has tested whether global self-report measures of negative urgency truly reflect a heightened association between real-world negative emotions and impulsive behaviors. In a sample of young adults (N = 222) assessed 3 times per day for 10 days, we tested whether negative emotions were associated with multiple facets of impulsivity at the state-level, and whether those associations were moderated by global self-report of negative urgency. Our findings suggest a robust within-person association between negative affect and acting on impulse. However, global self-report of negative urgency did not moderate any emotion-impulsivity association we tested.     

Rats respond for food in the presence of free food: How free is the “free” food?

An experiment conducted by A.J. Neuringer (Science, 1969,166, 399–401) in which he reported that rats maintained appreciable levels of bar pressing for earned food in the presence of freely available food was critically examined and replicated. Rats were trained to bar press, then housed in operant chambers and administered a 15-day preference test between free and earned food, followed successively by 10 days of free food only, a second 6-day preference test, and 7 days of earned food only. Throughout the experiment half of the animals were provided with tall free-food containers similar to those used by Neuringer; the other half were provided with short containers similar to those more commonly employed by other researchers. The former animals showed a consistent propensity to bar press for earned food across both preference tests, while the latter animals showed only an initial propensity to bar press which subsequently declined to very low levels. These results indicate that the maintenance of significant amounts of bar pressing by the rats in Neuringer's report was due to the relatively more effortful free-food source he employed. The utility of a neophobia-optimality model in explaining the present data is discussed.     

Difference – is it hated or desired? Reflections on the totalitarian state of mind

In an age of polarized political views and growing nationalism it is vital that the psychoanalytic profession offers its contribution. The author makes a link between early infant development and social and political behaviour. Psychoanalytic, Jungian and Relational ideas are explored. Starting from Freud and his theory of ‘minor differences’, a dichotomy between closeness and separateness is investigated. The writer argues that difference is at the centre of human identity and human development and explores why we struggle to accept it. The totalitarian political system is described as one that eliminates difference. A case study is offered as an illustration of a patient’s struggle to move from a symbiotic, undifferentiated state towards object relating and individuation .     

Decoders' processing of emotional facial expression — a top-down or bottom-up mechanism?

To date little evidence is available as to how emotional facial expression is decoded, specifically whether a bottom-up (data-driven) or a top-down (schema-driven) approach is more appropriate in explaining the decoding of emotions from facial expression. A study is reported (conducted with N = 20 subjects each in Germany and Italy), in which decoders judged emotions from photographs of facial expressions. Stimuli represented a selection of photographs depicting both single muscular movements (action units) in an otherwise neutral face, and combinations of such action units. Results indicate that the meaning of action units changes often with context; only a few single action units transmit specific emotional meaning, which they retain when presented in context. The results are replicated to a large degree across decoder samples in both nations, implying fundamental mechanisms of emotion decoding.