When elaboration leads to appropriation: Unconscious plagiarism in a creative task

Brown and Murphy's (1989) three-stage paradigm (generation, recall-own, generate-new) was used to assess the effects of participant elaboration on rates of unconscious plagiarism in two experiments using a creative task. Following the generation phase, participants imagined and rated a quarter of the ideas (imagery elaboration), generated improvements to another quarter (generative elaboration), and listened to a quarter of the ideas again without elaboration, with the remaining ideas acting as control. A week later, participants attempted to recall their own ideas, and generate new solutions to the same cues. In Experiment 1 both forms of elaboration equally increased correct recall, and decreased plagiarism in the generate-new task. However, generative elaboration led to significantly greater plagiarism in the recall-own task, but imagery elaboration did not. Participants in Experiment 2 were encouraged not to plagiarise by means of a financial incentive. However, they showed the same pattern as seen in Experiment 1. Therefore, contrary to a simple strength account, the probability of a person plagiarising another's ideas is linked to the particular nature of the elaboration carried out on that idea, rather than its familiarity.     

Examining variation in working memory capacity and retrieval in cued recall

Groups of individuals often work together to generate solutions to a problem. Subsequently, one member of the group can plagiarise another either by recalling that person's idea as their own (recall-own plagiarism), or by generating a novel solution that duplicates a previous idea (generate-new plagiarism). The current study examines the extent to which these forms of plagiarism are influenced by the quality of the ideas. Groups of participants initially generated ideas, prior to an elaboration phase in which idea quality was manipulated in two ways: participants received feedback on the quality of the ideas as rated by independent judges, and they generated improvements to a subset of the ideas. Unconscious plagiarism was measured in recall-own and generate-new tasks. For recall, idea improvement led to increased plagiarism, while for the generate-new task, the independent ratings influenced plagiarism. These data indicate that different source-judgement processes underlie the two forms of plagiarism, neither of which can be reduced simply to memory strength.     

When elaboration leads to appropriation: unconscious plagiarism in a creative task

Brown and Murphy's (1989) three-stage paradigm (generation, recall-own, generate-new) was used to assess the effects of participant elaboration on rates of unconscious plagiarism in two experiments using a creative task. Following the generation phase, participants imagined and rated a quarter of the ideas (imagery elaboration), generated improvements to another quarter (generative elaboration), and listened to a quarter of the ideas again without elaboration, with the remaining ideas acting as control. A week later, participants attempted to recall their own ideas, and generate new solutions to the same cues. In Experiment 1 both forms of elaboration equally increased correct recall, and decreased plagiarism in the generate-new task. However, generative elaboration led to significantly greater plagiarism in the recall-own task, but imagery elaboration did not. Participants in Experiment 2 were encouraged not to plagiarise by means of a financial incentive. However, they showed the same pattern as seen in Experiment 1. Therefore, contrary to a simple strength account, the probability of a person plagiarising another's ideas is linked to the particular nature of the elaboration carried out on that idea, rather than its familiarity.     

Why do I always have the best ideas? The role of idea quality in unconscious plagiarism

Groups of individuals often work together to generate solutions to a problem. Subsequently, one member of the group can plagiarise another either by recalling that person's idea as their own (recall-own plagiarism), or by generating a novel solution that duplicates a previous idea (generate-new plagiarism). The current study examines the extent to which these forms of plagiarism are influenced by the quality of the ideas. Groups of participants initially generated ideas, prior to an elaboration phase in which idea quality was manipulated in two ways: participants received feedback on the quality of the ideas as rated by independent judges, and they generated improvements to a subset of the ideas. Unconscious plagiarism was measured in recall-own and generate-new tasks. For recall, idea improvement led to increased plagiarism, while for the generate-new task, the independent ratings influenced plagiarism. These data indicate that different source-judgement processes underlie the two forms of plagiarism, neither of which can be reduced simply to memory strength.     

Whose idea was that? Source monitoring for idea ownership following elaboration

Unconscious plagiarism (UP) occurs when an individual claims a previously experienced idea as their own. Previous studies have explored the cognitive precursors of such errors by manipulating the ways that ideas are thought about between initial idea exposure and later test. While imagining other's ideas does not increase rates of UP relative to control on either a recall-own or generate-new task, improving others’ ideas substantially increases such errors in the recall-own task. This study explored the effects of elaboration on rates of UP when a source-monitoring test replaced the recall-own test. Plagiarism was again observed following idea improvement but not idea imagery even though participants engaged explicit source evaluation. Thus the probability of plagiarising another's idea appears linked to the generative nature of the idea processing performed.     

Whose idea was that? Source monitoring for idea ownership following elaboration

Unconscious plagiarism (UP) occurs when an individual claims a previously experienced idea as their own. Previous studies have explored the cognitive precursors of such errors by manipulating the ways that ideas are thought about between initial idea exposure and later test. While imagining other's ideas does not increase rates of UP relative to control on either a recall-own or generate-new task, improving others' ideas substantially increases such errors in the recall-own task. This study explored the effects of elaboration on rates of UP when a source-monitoring test replaced the recall-own test. Plagiarism was again observed following idea improvement but not idea imagery even though participants engaged explicit source evaluation. Thus the probability of plagiarising another's idea appears linked to the generative nature of the idea processing performed.     

Whose idea is it anyway? The importance of reputation in acknowledgement

Six‐year‐old children negatively evaluate plagiarizers just as adults do (Olson & Shaw, 2011), but why do they dislike plagiarizers? Children may think plagiarism is wrong because plagiarizing negatively impacts other people's reputations. We investigated this possibility by having 6‐ to 9‐year‐old children evaluate people who shared their own or other people's ideas (stories). In Experiment 1, we found that children consider it acceptable to retell someone else's story if the source is given credit for their story (improving the source's reputation), but not if the reteller claims credit for the story (steals credit away from someone else). Experiments 2 and 3 showed that children do not consider it bad to lie by giving someone else credit for one's own good story (improving someone else's reputation), but do consider it bad to give someone else credit for one's own bad story (improving one's own reputation at the expense of someone else's). Experiment 4 demonstrated that children think it is equally bad to take credit for someone else's idea for oneself as it is to take someone else's idea and give credit to someone else, suggesting that children dislike when others take credit away from someone else, regardless of whether or not it improves the plagiarizer's reputation. Our results suggest that children dislike plagiarism because it negatively affects others' reputations by taking credit away from them.     

Social influences on unconscious plagiarism and anti-plagiarism

People are more likely to unconsciously plagiarise ideas from a same-sex partner than a different-sex partner, and more likely to unconsciously plagiarise if recalling alone rather than in the presence of their partner [Macrae, C. N., Bodenhausen, G. V., & Calvini, G. (1999). Contexts of cryptomnesia: May the source be with you. Social Cognition, 17, 273–297. doi:10.1521/soco.1999.17.3.273]. Two sets of experiments explore these phenomena, using extensions of the standard unconscious plagiarism paradigm. In Experiment 1A participants worked together in same- or different-sex dyads before trying to recall their own ideas or their partner's ideas. More source errors were evident for same-sex dyads (Experiment 1A), but this effect was absent when participants recalled from both sources simultaneously (Experiment 1B). In Experiment 2A, participants recalled ideas from a single source either alone or in the presence of the partner, using an extended-recall task. Partner presence did not affect the availability of ideas, but did reduce the propensity to report them as task compliant, relative to a partner-present condition. Simultaneous recall from both sources removed this social effect (Experiment 2B). Thus social influences on unconscious plagiarism are apparent, but are influenced by the salience of the alternate source at retrieval.     

Inadvertent plagiarism in young and older adults: The role of working memory capacity in reducing memory errors

Two experiments examined inadvertent plagiarism in young and older adults. Young and older adults took turns generating category exemplars in small groups, and after a short retention interval recall was tested and subjects were asked to generate new exemplars (i.e., exemplars not initially generated). When asked to generate new exemplars, older adults were more likely to repeat exemplars that had been generated earlier by others (i.e., generate-new plagiarism). When asked to recall the exemplars they had generated earlier, older adults were more likely to claim that they had generated exemplars that had been generated by others (i.e., recall-own plagiarism), and were also more likely to falsely recall exemplars that had not been generated at all. There were no age differences in confidence for items that were plagiarized on the generate-new task. Hierarchical regression analyses indicated that age differences in generate-new plagiarism and false recall were entirely mediated by measures of episodic recall and working memory capacity. We conclude that inadvertent plagiarism errors result from the failure of systematic decision processes, and that controlled attention is important for avoiding memory errors.     

Effects of paraphrase and schema on intrusions,normalizations, and recall of thematic prose

The present experiment investigated the effects of task processing, historical knowledge of the subject matter, and retention interval on normalization rates, intrusions, and recall of thematic prose. Learners were given 16 sentences about the life and times of either Adolf Hitler or a fictitious character. Half the sentences were historically incorrect for Hitler but were not verifiable in terms of the fictitious character. Learners either paraphrased or copied the sentences verbatim and attempted to recall the sentences at either a zero retention interval or after 48 hours. Normalization and intrusion rates were strongly related to story type and retention interval, while overall sentence recall was influenced by processing task and retention interval. The results are discussed in terms of both the reconstructive schema model and the depth of processing hypothesis.     

The contributions of encoding,retention, and recall to the Hebb effect

The article reports an experiment testing whether the Hebb repetition effect—the gradual improvement of immediate serial recall when the same list is repeated several times—depends on overt recall of the repeated lists. Previous reports which suggest that recall is critical confound the recall manipulation with retention interval. The present experiment orthogonally varies retention interval (0 or 9 s) and whether the list is to be recalled after the retention interval. Hebb repetition learning is assessed in a final test phase. A repetition effect was obtained in all four experimental conditions; it was larger for recalled than non-recalled lists, whereas retention interval had no effect. The results show that encoding is sufficient to generate cumulative long-term learning, which is strengthened by recall. Rehearsal, if it takes place in the retention interval at all, does not have the same effect on long-term learning as overt recall.     

Modality independence of order coding in working memory: Evidence from cross-modal order interference at recall

Working memory researchers do not agree on whether order in serial recall is encoded by dedicated modality-specific systems or by a more general modality-independent system. Although previous research supports the existence of autonomous modality-specific systems, it has been shown that serial recognition memory is prone to cross-modal order interference by concurrent tasks. The present study used a serial recall task, which was performed in a single-task condition and in a dual-task condition with an embedded memory task in the retention interval. The modality of the serial task was either verbal or visuospatial, and the embedded tasks were in the other modality and required either serial or item recall. Care was taken to avoid modality overlaps during presentation and recall. In Experiment 1, visuospatial but not verbal serial recall was more impaired when the embedded task was an order than when it was an item task. Using a more difficult verbal serial recall task, verbal serial recall was also more impaired by another order recall task in Experiment 2. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis of modality-independent order coding. The implications for views on short-term recall and the multicomponent view of working memory are discussed.     

The credibility of a source influences the rate of unconscious plagiarism

Three experiments were conducted to investigate the relationship between the credibility of information and later unconscious plagiarism of that information. In each experiment, ideas concerning ways to reduce traffic accidents were presented from a more credible source (traffic planners) and a less credible source (college freshmen). After a distractor task, participants were asked to generate novel ways to reduce traffic accidents. In Experiments 1 and 2, unconscious plagiarism of ideas presented from the more credible source was greater than from the less credible source. In neither experiment was explicit memory for ideas from each source different in tests of source monitoring or free recall. However, the difference in unconscious plagiarism was eliminated in Experiment 3 by having participants generate the implications of ideas at study. The results are discussed in terms of the explicit factors that affect the incidence of unconscious plagiarism.     

No evidence of age-related increases in unconscious plagiarism during free recall

In three experiments younger and older participants took part in a group generation task prior to a delayed recall task. In each, participants were required to recall the items that they had generated, avoiding plagiarism errors. All studies showed the same pattern: older adults did not plagiarise their partners any more than younger adults did. However, older adults were more likely than younger adults to intrude with entirely novel items not previously generated by anyone. These findings stand in opposition to the single previous demonstration of age-related increases in plagiarism during recall.     

No evidence of age-related increases in unconscious plagiarism during free recall

In three experiments younger and older participants took part in a group generation task prior to a delayed recall task. In each, participants were required to recall the items that they had generated, avoiding plagiarism errors. All studies showed the same pattern: older adults did not plagiarise their partners any more than younger adults did. However, older adults were more likely than younger adults to intrude with entirely novel items not previously generated by anyone. These findings stand in opposition to the single previous demonstration of age-related increases in plagiarism during recall.     

Forgetting as a function of sleep at different times of day

The experiment studied the separate effects of sleep and time period of retention interval on forgetting. A free recall task was given to independent groups of subjects either at night or in the morning, and a second recall demanded 5 h later, after an intervening period of sleeping or waking activity. Oral body temperatures (BT) were measured at each session. The data were analysed in terms of (a) immediate recall at test 1, and (b) amount forgotten from test 1 to test 2. Immediate recall was higher for morning groups, in agreement with previous findings, serial position analysis indicating that the effect is confined to enhancement of the primary memory component. Long-term retention was higher over the night interval, irrespective of sleeping conditions, though having slept at night produced better retention than having stayed awake. Sleep during the morning was not effective in reducing forgetting. BT showed a marked drop for both night groups and rise for day groups over the retention interval. Alternative explanations for the classical sleep/memory findings are suggested in terms of (a) differential effects of sleep stages on memory, and (b) the underlying diurnal variation in BT and other processes.     

‘No fair, copycat!’: what children’s response to plagiarism tells us about their understanding of ideas

Adults believe that plagiarizing ideas is wrong, which requires an understanding that others can have ideas and that it is wrong to copy them. In order to test when this understanding emerges, we investigated when children begin to think plagiarism is wrong. In Study 1, children aged 7, 9 and 11 years old, as well as adults, disliked someone who plagiarized compared to someone who drew an original drawing or someone who drew an identical picture by chance. Study 2 investigated the same question with younger children, focusing on children aged 3–6 years old. Children aged 5–6 years old evaluated plagiarizers negatively relative to unique drawers, but 3–4-year-olds did not. Study 3 replicated the findings from Study 2 and found that children justify their negative evaluations of plagiarizers by mentioning concerns over copying. These experiments provide evidence that, by age 5 years old, children understand that others have ideas and dislike the copying of these ideas.     

Predicting one's own forgetting: the role of experience-based and theory-based processes

The authors examined the hypothesis that judgments of learning (JOL), if governed by processing fluency during encoding, should be insensitive to the anticipated retention interval. Indeed, neither item-by-item nor aggregate JOLs exhibited "forgetting" unless participants were asked to estimate recall rates for several different retention intervals, in which case their estimates mimicked closely actual recall rates. These results and others reported suggest that participants can access their knowledge about forgetting but only when theory-based predictions are made, and then only when the notion of forgetting is accentuated either by manipulating retention interval within individuals or by framing recall predictions in terms of forgetting rather than remembering. The authors interpret their findings in terms of the distinction between experience-based and theory-based JOLs.     

Evidence for alternative strategies of sentence retention

Measurements of pupil size were taken while subjects listened to sentences and either tried to repeat them (R) or answered a question about them (QuA), after either a 3 or 7 sec retention interval. Pupil dilations were larger for R than for QuA, both towards the end of presentation and during the retention interval. Similar results were obtained by Kahneman and Wright (1971) when comparing total and partial recall of word lists. They attributed the differences in pupil dilations to differences in rehearsal strategy. However, the interaction between recall condition and retention interval was less convincing with sentential material, and an alternative explanation is suggested in terms of the level of abstraction at which the sentences are processed. This interpretation is supported by other evidence relating to the existence of alternative sentence retention strategies.

Pupil dilations failed to reveal phrase juncture phenomena, although two levels of ambient illumination were used in the hope of detecting such effects. In a modified question condition (QuB), where the question was given before the sentence, pupil dilations varied as a function of the part of the sentence providing the answer. These data indicated that people did not begin to frame their answer until they encountered in the sentence those words used in the question.     

Time-dependent effects of post-trial amphetamine treatment in rats: evidence for enhanced storage of representational memory

Two studies were conducted to test the ability of post-trial amphetamine treatment to improve later recall in a nonaversively motivated task. These studies utilized 8- and 12-arm radial mazes, respectively, with an 11-h retention interval imposed after the rat traversed half the arms of the maze (termed, the to-be-remembered-event, or TBRE). In Experiment 1, the rats were injected with amphetamine (0, .25, and .50 mg/kg) immediately after the TBRE. Because the drug treatment improved retention, a time dependency study was conducted in which the drug (0 and .33 mg/kg) was administered 0, 3, and 6 h after the TBRE. The finding that amphetamine injection at 0, but not 3, h post-trial improved later recall indicates that the benefit derived from the former treatment is not due to proactive influences at the time of the retention test. Drug treatment 6 h post-trial produced a borderline improvement of recall; possible mechanisms are discussed. Two conclusions can be drawn from these results: (1) amphetamine administration can improve recall under conditions in which this effect cannot be attributed to alterations in information processing during either the learning or the retention sessions, indicating that the drug modulates memory storage processes; and (2) amphetamine treatment can improve working memory, thus excluding an alternative interpretation for the previous reports of impaired short-term memory in animals, all of which entailed assessments of working memory. The possibility remains, however, that the impairment seen in these tasks reflects the requirement for erasure of information from previous trials within each daily session, rather than the duration of the retention interval.