Disorder as harmful dysfunction: a conceptual critique of DSM-III-R's definition of mental disorder.

The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3rd ed., rev.; DSM-III-R) operationally defines disorder essentially as "statistically unexpectable distress or disability." This definition is an attempt to operationalize 2 basic principles: that a disorder is harmful and that a disorder is a dysfunction (i.e., an inability of some internal mechanism to perform its natural function). However, the definition fails to capture the idea of "dysfunction" and so fails to validly distinguish disorders from nondisorders, leading to invalidities in many of DSM-III-R's specific diagnostic criteria. These problems with validity are traced to DSM-III-R's strategies for increasing reliability.     

Personality disorder as harmful dysfunction: DSM'S cultural deviance criterion reconsidered

The DSM's general criteria for personality disorder (PD) attempt to define PD versus nondisordered personality conditions. If dimensionalization of PD occurs in the DSM-V (perhaps, it is suggested, with PD diagnosis moved to Axis I and overall personality assessment in Axis II, thus separating diagnosis from case formulation), general criteria likely will still be needed to prevent massive false positives. In this article, one of the general criteria, the cultural deviance requirement (CDR), is examined from the perspective of the evolution-based harmful-dysfunction analysis of disorder. The CDR is often assumed to express value relativity of harm in diagnosis, but cultural values are a designed feature of human social functioning that influence personality formation. The CDR is thus argued to be an indicator of whether an individual's personality organization is due to an evolutionary dysfunction. Value relativity and evolutionary analysis thus converge.     

Harmful dysfunction and the DSM definition of mental disorder.

Physicians, including psychiatrists, give a lot of thought in their everyday work to answer the question of whether or not a particular patient has a disorder; they rarely give much thought to the broader issue of what constitutes a disorder. Remarkably, and consistent with the harmful dysfunction (HD) analysis, there is a broad consensus in both the general public and the medical and health professions as to what conditions are disorders--even though there is no consensus definition of disorder. The HD analysis is a substantial advance over previous attempts to define disorder in specifying the nature of what is not working in the individual (the dysfunction). The adoption of the HD analysis in DSM-V (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th ed.) would probably have little if any effect on the list of categories of mental disorders. Its main value would be in helping make revisions in the diagnostic criteria more valid as true indicators of disorder.     

On the nature of mental disorder: towards an objectivist account

According to the predominant view within contemporary philosophy of psychiatry, mental disorders involve essentially personal and societal values, and thus, the concept of mental disorder cannot, even in principle, be elucidated in a thoroughly objective manner. Several arguments have been adduced in support of this impossibility thesis. My critical examination of two master arguments advanced to this effect by Derek Bolton and Jerome Wakefield, respectively, raises serious doubts about their soundness. Furthermore, I articulate an alternative, thoroughly objective, though in part normative, framework for the elucidation of the concept of mental disorder. The concepts of mental dysfunction and impairment of basic psychological capacities to satisfy one??s basic needs are the building blocks of this framework. I provide an argument for the objective harmfulness of genuine mental disorders as patterns of mental dysfunctions with objectively negative biotic values, as well as a formally correct definition of the concept of mental disorder. Contrary to the received view, this objective framework allows for the possibility of genuine mental disorders due to adverse social conditions, as well as for quasi-universal mental disorders. I conclude that overall, the project of providing an objective account of the concept of mental disorder is far from impossible, and moreover, that it is, at least in principle, feasible.     

Action-monitoring dysfunction in obsessive-compulsive disorder

Evidence suggests that a hyperactive frontal-striatal-thalamic-frontal circuit is associated with the symptoms of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), but there is little agreement about the function of the exaggerated activity. We report electrophysiological evidence suggesting that part of this system monitors events and generates error signals when the events conflict with an individual's internal standards or goals. Nine individuals with OCD and 9 age-, sex-, and education-matched control participants performed a speeded reaction time task. The error-related negativity, an event-related brain potential component that reflects action-monitoring processes, was enhanced in the individuals with OCD. The magnitude of this enhancement correlated with symptom severity. Dipole modeling suggested that the locus of the enhancement corresponded to medial frontal regions, possibly the anterior cingulate cortex.     

Brain network dysfunction in bipolar disorder

Bipolar disorder is a common psychiatric condition with significant associated morbidity and mortality. Despite its significance, the neurophysiology and neuropathology of this illness is incompletely understood. Recent advances in neuroimaging techniques have helped to begin clarifying these areas. Specifically, bipolar disorder appears to arise from abnormalities within discrete brain networks (eg, the anterior limbic network). The expression of the symptoms of bipolar disorder does not appear to result from single, localized brain lesions, but rather are emergent properties of dysfunction of these brain networks. As neuroimaging techniques continue to improve, the underlying neural basis of bipolar disorder will be clarified.     

Attitudes and the attribution of mental disorder

Among the problems of understanding mental pathology through a labeling perspective is the need to understand more about the attributional process itself. It is postulated that characteristics of observers, in particular their attitudes, influence the attribution of mental disorder to individuals manifesting deviant behavior. Questionnaire items were factor analyzed to produce several dimensions of attitudes and types of deviance. Tests of seven sub‐hypotheses provide support for the major hypothesis that the probability mental disorder will be attributed by an observer to an actor is positively related to the degree an actor's behavior (implying beliefs or attitudes) differs from the beliefs and attitudes of the observer.     

Neuropharmacological treatment of mental dysfunction in Parkinson's disease

Many patients with Parkinson's Disease (PD) experience significant cognitive and mood impairment -even early in the course of the disease. These mental impairments are only partially responsive to levodopa treatment and are often as disabling as the motor impairment, particularly in mid and late stages of the disease. Investigators have recently begun a search for new agents that can effectively treat mental dysfunction of PD. Although there have been only a handful of properly controlled clinical trials of interventions targeted at amelioration of mental dysfunction in PD, progress has been made. Based on the available evidence, targeting catecholaminergic and cholinergic function may be an effective strategy for amelioration of cognitve, mood and psychiatric disturbances in PD.     

Harmful dysfunction and the search for value neutrality in the definition of mental disorder: response to Wakefield, part 2

Wakefield's claims to have identified and objective scientific component of mental disorders in the concept of dysfunction are examined in light of previous attempts to state a value free concept of mental disorders. The harmful dysfunction concept of dysfunction is not value free because it confounds cause and purpose in a specious use of evolutionary theory and because evolutionary theory cannot reliably supply standards for when a function is broken. Harmful dysfunction analysis collapses into a value-laden concept of mental disorders and serves the untoward goal of promoting the status quo in the modern DSMs. If the concept of dysfunction were taken seriously and rigorously defined, then it might be possible to separate what is medical from what is not in the domain of mental disorders.     

The concept of mental disorder. On the boundary between biological facts and social values.

Although the concept of mental disorder is fundamental to theory and practice in the mental health field, no agreed on and adequate analysis of this concept currently exists. I argue that a disorder is a harmful dysfunction, wherein harmful is a value term based on social norms, and dysfunction is a scientific term referring to the failure of a mental mechanism to perform a natural function for which it was designed by evolution. Thus, the concept of disorder combines value and scientific components. Six other accounts of disorder are evaluated, including the skeptical antipsychiatric view, the value approach, disorder as whatever professionals treat, two scientific approaches (statistical deviance and biological disadvantage), and the operational definition of disorder as "unexpectable distress or disability" in the revised third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 1987). The harmful dysfunction analysis is shown to avoid the problems while preserving the insights of these other approaches.     

Harm should not be a necessary criterion for mental disorder: some reflections on the DSM-5 definition of mental disorder

Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics - The general definition of mental disorder stated in the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders seems to identify a mental...     

Measures of prefrontal system dysfunction in posttraumatic stress disorder

Clinical observations have suggested that individuals who have suffered traumatic stressful events exhibit disruption in abilities mediated by frontal brain systems. Therefore, this study employed tasks sensitive to frontal lobe dysfunction, including delayed response (DR), delayed alternation (DA), object alternation (OA), delayed matching-to-sample (DMTS), and delayed nonmatching-to-sample (DNMTS), with participants having posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Compared to controls, the PTSD participants were unimpaired on DA and DMTS, but they showed deficits on DR, OA, and DNMTS tasks. This pattern of results suggests disruption of functioning in selective prefrontal brain systems. Results are discussed in the context of the neuropsychological features of PTSD, as well as possible neuropathological and etiological underpinnings of this disorder.     

Perceived dysfunction of male-typed and female-typed DSM-IV personality disorder criteria

To determine whether female-typed personality disorders are associated with a different pattern of dysfunction than male-typed disorders, lay judges (N = 216) estimated the amount of social impairment, occupational impairment, and personal distress related to symptoms of personality disorders. Results for both the subset of six disorders originally rated by clinician judges in the research of Funtowicz and Widiger (1999) and for a larger set of nine disorders revealed a pattern originally reported by Funtowicz and Widiger where female-typed disorders were associated with relatively higher ratings of personal distress, whereas male-typed disorders were associated with relatively higher ratings of social (and sometimes occupational) impairment. Findings are discussed with respect to the emphasis of different forms of dysfunction for male- and female-typed disorders, lay versus clinician judgments, and directions for future research.     

Defining mental disorder. Exploring the 'natural function' approach

Due to several socio-political factors, to many psychiatrists only a strictly objective definition of mental disorder, free of value components, seems really acceptable. In this paper, I will explore a variant of such an objectivist approach to defining metal disorder, natural function objectivism. Proponents of this approach make recourse to the notion of natural function in order to reach a value-free definition of mental disorder. The exploration of Christopher Boorse's 'biostatistical' account of natural function (1) will be followed an investigation of the 'hybrid naturalism' approach to natural functions by Jerome Wakefield (2). In the third part, I will explore two proposals that call into question the whole attempt to define mental disorder (3). I will conclude that while 'natural function objectivism' accounts fail to provide the backdrop for a reliable definition of mental disorder, there is no compelling reason to conclude that a definition cannot be achieved.     

Free will and mental disorder: Exploring the relationship

A link between mental disorder and freedom is clearly present in the introduction of the fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV). It mentions “an important loss of freedom” as one of the possible defining features of mental disorder. Meanwhile, it remains unclear how “an important loss of freedom” should be understood. In order to get a clearer view on the relationship between mental disorder and (a loss of) freedom, in this article, I will explore the link between mental disorder and free will. I examine two domains in which a connection between mental disorder and free will is present: the philosophy of free will and forensic psychiatry. As it turns out, philosophers of free will frequently refer to mental disorders as conditions that compromise free will and reduce moral responsibility. In addition, in forensic psychiatry, the rationale for the assessment of criminal responsibility is often explained by referring to the fact that mental disorders can compromise free will. Yet, in both domains, it remains unclear in what way free will is compromised by mental disorders. Based on the philosophical debate, I discuss three senses of free will and explore their relevance to mental disorders. I conclude that in order to further clarify the relationship between free will and mental disorder, the accounts of people who have actually experienced the impact of a mental disorder should be included in future research.