Demystifying Intuition: What It Is,What It Does,and How It Does It

Definitions of intuition are discussed and two working definitions are proposed. This is followed by a list of eight unresolved problems concerning intuition. It is suggested that all of these problems can be resolved by cognitive-experiential self-theory (CEST), a dual-process theory of personality according to which people process information with two systems, an experiential/intuitive system that is an associative learning system that humans share with other animals and a uniquely human verbal reasoning system. Intuition is considered to be a subsystem of the experiential/ intuitive system that operates by exactly the same principles and attributes but has narrower boundary conditions. The next section includes a presentation of the most relevant aspects of CEST with an emphasis on the operating rules and attributes of the experiential/intuitive system. This is followed by demonstrating how the operation of the experiential/intuitive system can resolve each of the unresolved problems concerning intuition. The article closes with a comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of the experiential/intuitive and rational/analytic systems. It is concluded that neither system is generally superior to the other, as each has important advantages and disadvantages.     

Dualist Mental Causation and the Exclusion Problem

The paper argues that dualism can explain mental causation and solve the exclusion problem. If dualism is combined with the assumption that the psychophysical laws have a special status, it follows that some physical events counterfactually depend on, and are therefore caused by, mental events. Proponents of this account of mental causation can solve the exclusion problem in either of two ways: they can deny that it follows that the physical effect of a mental event is overdetermined by its mental and physical causes, or they can accept that the physical effect is overdetermined but claim that this is unproblematic because the case is sufficiently dissimilar to prototypical cases of overdetermination.     

Liberal Daddy Quotas: Why Men Should Take Care of the Children,and How Liberals Can Get Them to Do It

The gendered division of labor is the major cause of gender inequality with respect to the broad spectrum of resources, occupations, and roles. Although many feminists aspire to an equality of outcome where there are no significant patterns of gender difference across these dimensions, many have also argued that liberal theories of social justice do not have the conceptual tools to justify a direct attack on the gendered division of labor. Indeed, many critics argue that liberalism positively condones it, presuming that it arises from the free choices of individuals, which must be respected. In this paper I will accept the feminist goal of equality of outcome across roles, occupations, income, and wealth, but will argue that liberal theories of justice are consistent with strong measures aimed at promoting such equality. I will show that liberalism has the conceptual resources to justify a concrete policy measure that goes considerably beyond the measures usually championed by feminists. The example I focus on is “daddy quotas,” which refers to the tagging of a significant part of parental leave for the exclusive use of fathers.     

Remembering Early Childhood: How Much, How, and Why (or Why Not)

In this article, we consider recent research on three questions about people's memories for their early childhood: whether childhood amnesia is a real phenomenon, whether implicit memories survive when explicit memories do not, and why early episodic memories are sketchy. The research leads us to form three conclusions. First, we argue that childhood amnesia is a real phenomenon, as long as the term is defined clearly. Specifically, people are able to recall parts of their lives from the period between ages 2 and 5 years, but they recall less from that period than from other periods. Second, we conclude that implicit memories from early childhood may be evident even when explicit memories are not, a finding that suggests early experience may affect behavior in ways that people do not consciously recognize. Third, we argue that although young children are well known to be wonderfully efficient learners of semantic information, they have difficulty in either encoding or retrieving the interlinked aspects of events that lend them their autobiographical character. Although more evidence is needed, the relative lack of episodic memories of early childhood may be linked to maturation of prefrontal cortex.     

Just Think About It: Mindfulness, Sexism, and Prejudice Toward Feminists

This study examined the relation between mindfulness, sexist motivations and beliefs, and prejudice toward women who violate traditional gender roles—namely feminists. In a preliminary study, 672 (251 men, 421 women) undergraduates from a United States Midwestern university completed a measure of mindfulness and warmth toward feminists and consistent with hypotheses, more mindfulness was associated with more warmth toward feminists. Extending this initial finding to the main study, 653 (273 men, 380 women) undergraduates from a U.S. Midwestern university completed measures of mindfulness, motivation to respond without sexism, ambivalent sexism, and warmth toward feminists. Consistent with hypotheses, compared to women participants, men participants were lower on internal motivation to respond without sexism, higher on hostile and benevolent sexism and less warm toward feminists. Also consistent with hypotheses, for men participants, more mindfulness was associated with higher internal motivation to respond without sexism, less benevolent sexism, and more warmth toward feminists. In contrast, for women participants, more mindfulness was only associated with less hostile sexism. Finally, a path analysis revealed that the positive relation between mindfulness and warmth toward feminists for men participants was partially mediated by more internal motivation to respond without sexism (i.e., a significant indirect effect), but not by less sexist beliefs. Implications for mindfulness, sexism, and prejudice more generally are discussed.     

Mental Manipulations and the Problem of Causal Exclusion

Leibniz has long faced a challenge about the coherence of the distinction between necessary and contingent truths in his philosophy. In this paper, I propose and examine a new way to save genuine contingency within a Leibnizian framework. I conclude that it succeeds in formally solving the problem, but at unbearable cost. I present Leibniz's challenge by considering God's choice of the best possible world (Sect. 2). God necessarily exists and necessarily chooses to actualize the best possible world. The actual world therefore could not be different, for if it were different it would be a distinct and inferior world and hence would not be created. In Section 3, I defend Leibniz from this challenge. I argue that, while it is necessary for God to choose to create the best possible world, it is not necessary for any world to be the best possible. This is because the criterion for judging perfection can itself be contingent. Different criteria will judge different worlds as the best. Thus it is necessary for God to create the best, but not necessary which is the best. Distinguishing between possible worlds in Leibniz's sense and in the modern sense allows a fuller exposition of this position. There are worries that can arise with the claim that the criterion of perfection is contingent. I consider two of the most pressing (Sect. 4). The first argues that the criterion is in God's understanding and hence is necessary; the second alleges that a contingent criterion of perfection violates Leibniz's cherished Principle of Sufficient Reason. These worries are well grounded, and examining them reveals a deep incompatibility between this solution and Leibniz's metaphysical views. I conclude that there is a real solution available, but that it is unacceptable to Leibniz or a Leibnizian. The search for a genuine solution that is genuinely Leibnizian goes on.     

知情同意为什么难以实现

实施知情同意旨在有效地保护患者的合法权利不受侵犯 ,同时也是缓解医患关系 ,减少医疗纠纷的有效手段。但在实际临床实践中往往由于多种原因的制约和影响使其陷入困境 ,达不到预期的效果。从根本上讲 ,是由于医患双方在沟通理解上还存在问题 ,造成了医患之间的互不信任。     

Why and How to Learn Why: Analysis-based Generalization of Procedures

Max Wertheimer, in his classic Productive Thinking, linked understanding to transfer: Understanding is important because it provides the ability to generalize the solution of one problem to apply to another. Recent work in human and machine learning has led to the development of a new class of generalization mechanism, called here analysis-based generalization, which can be used to provide a concrete account of the linkage Wertheimer suggested: these mechanisms all, in different ways, use understanding of examples in the generalization process. In this paper I review this class of mechanism, and describe a method for causal attribution that can produce the analyses of examples that the generalization methods require, in the domain of simple procedures in human-computer interaction. This causal analysis method is linked with analysis-based generalization to form EXPL, an implemented model which is a concrete, though limited, instontiation of Wertheimer s scheme. EXPL constructs an understanding of an example procedure and generalizes it on the basis of that understanding. Results of an empirical study suggest that some of EXPL's attribution heuristics are used by people, and that while a subclass of analysis-based methods, called superstitious methods, seem to provide a more plausible account of people's generalization under the conditions of the study than a contrasting class of rationalistic methods, at least some participants appear to use methods from both classes. The results also show that explanation-based methods, which rely on comprehensive domain theories, must be used in conjunction with a means for extending the domain theory. If thus enhanced, explanation-based methods are able to mimic the effects of other analysis-based methods, and can provide a good account of the data, though combinations of other methods must also be considered. Finally, I return to Wertheimer s ideas to argue that none of the current analysis-based generalization methods fully captures Wertheimer s notion of understanding. Proper choice among different possible analyses of an example is crucial for Wertheimer, but I argue that this problem may be beyond the reach of learning systems.     

It Just Doesn’t Feel Right: OCD and the ‘Scaling Up’ Problem

The ‘scaling up’ objection says non-representational ecological-enactive accounts will be unable to explain ‘representation hungry’     

Attention,People of Earth! Aristotelian Ethics and the Problem of Exclusion

Abstract

Growth in human happiness seems to do in part with insights gained through attentive emotional engagement with fictional characters and their identities. For this reason it is important to pay attention to the critique that founding ethics on what we cannot but affirm of ourselves, our identity (rationality and sociability, in Nussbaum’s reading of Aristotle), amounts to a moral elitism, excluding those who fail to meet these marks of human identity. This objection throws light on the importance of the shift towards thematizing ‘subjectivity’ in modern and contemporary philosophy. Ethics takes place at the level of the deliberating subject, intending the good. The foundational element is grasped through moral commitment and not at all ‘neutrally’, in a disengaged attitude alien to human aspirations – something disturbingly overlooked in much normative ethics today. The criteria picked out as essential to our humanity are clarifications of this commitment, and involve an attitude of inclusivity. In our own non-classical philosophical framework this needs spelling out, in a manner not made clear in Nussbaum’s ‘self-validating’ arguments, in terms of the exigencies of self-enactment and personal identity. This also answers critics who would disallow the conflation of identity and judgments of value.     

What Invariance Is and How to Test for It

Causal assessment is the problem of establishing whether a relation between (variable) X and (variable) Y is causal. This problem, to be sure, is widespread across the sciences. According to accredited positions in the philosophy of causality and in social science methodology, invariance under intervention provides the most reliable test to decide whether X causes Y. This account of invariance (under intervention) has been criticised, among other reasons, because it makes manipulations on the putative causal factor fundamental for the causal methodology; consequently, the argument goes, the account is ill-suited to those contexts where manipulations are not performed, for instance, the social sciences. The article aims to extend the account of invariance (under intervention), in a way that manipulations on the putative causal factors are not methodologically fundamental, and yet invariance remains key for causal assessment both in experimental and non-experimental contexts.     

How, When, and Why to Use Digital Experimental Virtual Environments to Study Social Behavior

Over the last decade, researchers have begun using immersive virtual environment technology (IVET; commonly known as virtual reality) to create digital experimental virtual environments (DEVEs) to investigate social psychological processes. Researchers increasingly recognize that IVET provides powerful and cost-effective ways to manipulate theoretical variables and to measure a host of outcome variables, while providing a remarkable level of experimental control and ecological realism. In this article, we discuss IVET, the nature of social influence within DEVEs, and the use of DEVEs to study social behavior.