Reply to Catriona Mackenzie

In her excellent critique of my book Self to Self (2006), Catriona Mackenzie highlights three gaps in my view of the self. First, my effort to distinguish among different applications of the concept ‘self’ is not matched by any attempt to explain the interactions among the selves so distinguished. Second, in analyzing practical reasoning as aimed at self-understanding, I speak sometimes of causal-psychological understanding (e.g. in the paper titled ‘The Centered Self’) and sometimes of narrative self-understanding (e.g. in ‘The Self as Narrator’), but I never explain how these two modes of self-understanding are related. Third, I never explain how my account of autonomous agency can be reconciled with my interpretation of Kant's (e.g., in ‘A Brief Introduction to Kantian Ethics’). In this reply to Mackenzie, I agree with her about all three of these gaps, and I offer some (admittedly incomplete) ideas about how they might be filled.     

ONENESS AND SELF‐CENTEREDNESS IN THE MORAL PSYCHOLOGY OF WANG YANGMING

Rather than “selfishness,” a more accurate and revealing interpretation of Wang's use of siyuis “self‐centeredness.” One of the main goals in Wang's model of moral cultivation was to attain a state devoid of self‐centered desires. Wang relied a great deal on the exercise and cultivation of an emotional identification and feeling of oneness with others. In this paper, I first provide a brief summary of the role of Wang's concept of siyu in his moral psychology. I then examine key passages in Wang's writings that reveal his nuanced understanding of siyu and, along the way, I draw on empirical research in psychology to help illuminate the significance of Wang's view of siyu to his overall model of moral cultivation.     

Ideas of self and community: Ethical implications for a communitarian conception of moral autonomy

This paper attempts to construct a concept of moral autonomy thai is compatible with a relationally-based or care-based ethical theory. After critiquing the traditional liberal identification of the ethical self with an abstract rational self detached from community and historical narrative, I argue that the ethical self emerges in a dialectical relation with the community itself. Essentially, I argue for a concept of autonomy that will be analyzed as a critical perspective from within a community rather than as a privileged view from outside. Central to this argument is an understanding of the nature and role of moral conversation in the regeneration of community. The nature of that conversation is examined.     

RATIONALITY AND MORAL REALISM

What can a moral realist say about why we should take morality seriously and about the relation between morality and rationality? I take off from Christine Korsgaard's criticism of moral realism on this score. The aim is to achieve an understanding of the relation between moral and rational properties and of the role of practical deliberation on a realist view. I argue that the justification for being concerned with rational and moral normative properties may not be an aspect of our minds to which we have access. I argue against a view that gives automatic pride of place to the rational properties of our mind by drawing attention to valuable non‐rational modes of thought such as creative, imaginative and instinctive thought. Thus the value of taking account of rationality is contingent on its benefits. But this is not why we should be taking account of morality.     

Moral Compromises, Moral Integrity and the Indeterminacy of Value Rankings

Though the art of compromise, i.e. of settling differences by mutual concessions, is part of communal living on any level, we often think that there is something wrong in compromise, especially in cases where moral convictions are involved. A first reason for distrusting compromises on moral matters refers to the idea of integrity, understood in the basic sense of 'standing for something', especially standing for the values and causes that to some extent confer identity. The second reason points out the objective nature of moral values, which seems to make them immune from negotiation and barter. If one sincerely holds some moral conviction to be true, than compromising on that belief must be a sign of serious confusion.In order to reach a better understanding of these two reasons, I analyse what is involved in personal integrity and how this relates to moral integrity. I argue that the search for moral integrity naturally brings us to the question of how one could accept moral compromises and still uphold the idea that moral values and principles have an objective authority over us. To address this question I will present a version of moral pluralism which tries to capture the enormous complexity of what should matter to us as moral persons, and which explains why value-rankings are often deeply indeterminate. The general position I defend in this paper is that compromises involving moral values and norms may be morally required and, therefore, be laudable. To sustain this position I will arrive at a view of ethical objectivity that allows the possibility to negotiate about the truth of moral beliefs.     

MORAL FACTS AS CONFIGURING CAUSES

Abstract:  The overarching aim of this essay is to argue that moral realists should be "causalists" or claim that moral facts of certain kinds are causally efficacious. To this end, I engage in two tasks. The first is to develop an account of the sense in which moral facts of certain kinds are causally efficacious. After having sketched the concept of what I call a "configuring" cause, I contend that the exercise of the moral virtues is plausibly viewed as a configuring cause. The second is to show that the causalist position I develop can withstand objections inspired by the work of Robert Audi and Jaegwon Kim.     

Reappraising the Moral Nature of Emotions in Decision Making: The Case of Shame and Guilt

Emotions play a crucial role in moral behavior. The present paper does not contest this point but argues that qualifications of certain feelings such as shame and guilt as moral emotions should not exclusively be based on a proximal analysis of their function. A proximal analysis details how moral emotions produce moral behavior. Emotions are qualified as moral when they are elicited by concerns for others rather than the self and produce prosocial action tendencies. Although researchers have acknowledged that moral emotions may also have an ultimate function that details why it is in the individual interest that these moral effects occur, they have neglected to translate such ideas into testable hypotheses. Using guilt and shame as an example, we show how an analysis of ultimate functions accommodates recent findings, which contest the view that guilt is more moral than shame and provides new insights as to when and why moral emotions will produce moral effects.     

Error Theory and Abolitionist Ethics

Here is a prima facie plausible view: since the metaethical error theory says that all positive moral claims are false, it makes no sense for error theorists to engage in normative ethics. After all, normative ethics tries to identify what is right or wrong (and why), but the error theory implies that nothing is ever right or wrong. One way for error theorists to push back is to argue for “concept preservationism,” that is, the view that even though our ordinary moral discourse is deeply flawed, we should nevertheless continue to engage in moral thought and talk. However, in this article, I pursue a different strategy. I argue that even if we completely abandon moral discourse, thus endorsing “concept abolitionism,” the discipline of normative ethics survives. While traditional normative ethics uses as its “starting points” moral claims and beliefs, instead, concept abolitionists can make use of alternative utterances and attitudes that share salient characteristics with moral claims and beliefs, allowing for a kind of theorizing that is practically oriented, impartial, involves the traditional subject matters and methods of normative ethics, and allows engagement with the arguments of traditional moral philosophers.     

Continuity and Change in Possible Selves in Later Life: A 5-Year Longitudinal Study

This study explored how older adults' possible selves (i.e., images of the self in the future) are influenced by the passage of time. We investigated whether possible selves would display continuity or change, and whether balance exists in the possible selves repertoire (i.e., presence of a hoped-for and a feared self in the same domain). In addition, we examined the influence of psychosocial factors (i.e., health locus of control, life satisfaction). Findings show that both hoped and feared possible selves remain stable and balanced over time. When change was found it was generally emergent in nature, with domains becoming important over time. This was especially true for the domain of health. As the first reported longitudinal study of possible selves, this study highlights the developmental sensitivity of possible selves as a tool for understanding the age-related concerns of older adults.     

Happiness,morality, and politics

The idea that politics should promote the happiness of the population is rather common in the community of happiness researchers. This political view is sometimes based on the happiness principle, the fundamental ethical view that we have a strong moral reason to do what we can to maximize the happiness and minimize the suffering in the world. The first main purpose of this paper is to investigate (1) what role this principle play in ethics as a whole, how it should be weighed against other moral considerations, and (2) how exactly it should be understood, i.e. which possible version of the principle that is most plausible. This is the only way to arrive at well-founded theory of the fundamental moral (and political) significance of happiness and suffering (an “ethics of happiness and suffering”). The idea that politics should promote happiness is sometimes accompanied by the notion that we should introduce some kind of happiness index, and that it is a central goal of politics to maximize the value of this index. The second main purpose of this paper is to examine this suggestion. I will first ask (3) how such an index should be constructed, assuming that it might be a good idea to construct an index in the first place. I assume that an index of this kind cannot be plausible unless it incorporates a number of moral considerations, and that (3) is very closely related to (2). I will then ask (4) whether the suggestion is plausible, or whether there are better ways to put a politics of happiness into practice, e.g. to simply apply the knowledge we have about the determinants of happiness.     

How temporal distance from past selves influences self‐perception

The present studies examine how perceived temporal distance from past selves influences perceptions of the current self. Participants recalled their past self either at age 9 or 15. These two past selves differ in levels of identification with gender and thus denote different standards of comparison. Three hypotheses were tested. Temporal distance should determine whether recalled past selves produce assimilation or contrast effects on the current self. Second, temporal comparison effects should be weaker when people recall their past in terms of stable, relatively enduring characteristics (e.g. traits). Third, past selves should to a greater extent be biased by stereotypical knowledge about former lifetime periods the farther away individuals feel from past selves. Past selves coloured by stereotypical knowledge are more extreme and should thus produce stronger judgemental effects on the current self. The results supported the hypotheses. Implications for autobiographical remembering are discussed. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Stem cell research: a target article collection: Part III--determining moral status

In this chapter, I review some of the background thinking concerning matters of moral status that I had developed in previous years and that I would now bring to the work of the Human Embryo Research Panel. Two ideas were at the forefront of my thinking. First, that biology usually offers not decisive "events" but only continuous processes of development. Second, in making status determinations we do not so much "identify" a point on a developmental continuum where moral respect should be accorded as "choose" that point. These choices are "balancing decisions" in which the community of moral agents weighs its interests in protecting an entity against the burdens of doing so. After illustrating these two contentions, I consider some of the reasons why thinkers on the "right" and "left" of our bioethics debates have resisted or missed this basic insight.     

Complications of Culture in Obtaining Informed Consent

In this chapter, I review some of the background thinking concerning matters of moral status that I had developed in previous years and that I would now bring to the work of the Human Embryo Research Panel. Two ideas were at the forefront of my thinking. First, that biology usually offers not decisive "events" but only continuous processes of development. Second, in making status determinations we do not so much "identify" a point on a developmental continuum where moral respect should be accorded as "choose" that point. These choices are "balancing decisions" in which the community of moral agents weighs its interests in protecting an entity against the burdens of doing so. After illustrating these two contentions, I consider some of the reasons why thinkers on the "right" and "left" of our bioethics debates have resisted or missed this basic insight.     

Emotion and Moral Judgment

This paper argues that an emotion is a state of affectively perceiving its intentional object as falling under a "thick affective concept" A, a concept that combines cognitive and affective aspects in a way that cannot be pulled apart. For example, in a state of pity an object is seen as pitiful , where to see something as pitiful is to be in a state that is both cognitive and affective. One way of expressing an emotion is to assert that the intentional object of the emotion falls under the thick affective concept distinctive of the emotion. I argue that the most basic kind of moral judgment is in this category. It has the form "That is A" (pitiful, contemptible, rude, etc.). Such judgments combine the features of cognitivism and motivational judgment internalism, an advantage that explains why we find moral weakness problematic in spite of its ubiquity. I then outline a process I call "thinning" the judgment, which explains how moral strength, weakness, and apathy arise. I argue that this process is necessary for moral reasoning and communication, in spite of its disadvantage in disengaging the agent's motivating emotion from the judgment.     

Crispin Wright on Moral Disagreement

Wright argues that if there are moral disagreements that cannot be attributed to inferential error, ignorance of relevant data or some similar form of deficiency (i.e., what I call 'radical' disagreements), then moral realists are committed to the view that moral truths are evidence-transcendent. Moreover, since he thinks that this view is implausible and that moral disagreements can indeed be radical, he has suggested that we should reject realism here. I indicate how a realist can respond to this challenge, by offering two arguments to the effect that a realist might plausibly hold that moral disagreements can never be found to be radical. However, this is not so much intended to be a defence of moral realism as a critique of Wright's basic strategy, since a similar defence may be provided in support of realism about any (minimally truth-apt) discourse.     

Being an Intelligent Slave of God

How did premodern Muslim thinkers talk about living authentically as a Muslim in the world? How, in their view, could selves transform themselves into ideal religious subjects or slaves of God? Which virtues, technologies of the self and intersubjective relations did they see implicated in inhabiting or attaining what I shall call ?abdī subjectivity? In this paper, I make explicit how various discursive, ethical strategies formed, informed, and transformed Muslim subjectivity in early Muslim thought by focusing on the writings of an important ninth century Muslim moral pedagogue, al‐Mu?āsibī (d. 857). This study illustrates the advantages of approaching early Muslim texts and discourses through the tools and methods made available by comparative religious ethics in order to reexamine our understanding of Muslim subject formation and the role of ethical and theological discourses in the same.     

Emerging selves: representational foundations of subjectivity

A hypothetical evolutionary scenario is offered meant to account for the emergence of mental selves. According to the scenario, mental selves are constructed to solve a source-attribution problem. They emerge when internally generated mental contents (e.g., thoughts and goals) are treated like messages arising from external personal sources. As a result, mental contents becomes attributed to the self as an internal personal source. According to this view, subjectivity is construed outward-in, that is, one's own mental self is derived from, and is secondary to, the mental selves perceived in others. The social construction of subjectivity and selfhood relies on, and is maintained in, various discourses on subjectivity.     

Bare Personhood? Velleman on selfhood

In the Introduction to Self to Self, J. David Velleman claims that ‘the word “self” does not denote any one entity but rather expresses a reflexive guise under which parts or aspects of a person are presented to his own mind’ (Velleman 2006, 1). Velleman distinguishes three different reflexive guises of the self: the self of the person's self-image, or narrative self-conception; the self of self-sameness over time; and the self as autonomous agent. Velleman's account of each of these different guises of the self is complex and repays close philosophical attention. The first aim of this paper is therefore to provide a detailed analysis of Velleman's view. The second aim is more critical. While I am in agreement with Velleman about the importance of distinguishing the different aspects of selfhood, I argue that, even on his own account, they are more interrelated than he acknowledges. I also analyse the role of the concept of ‘bare personhood’ in Velleman's approach to selfhood and question whether this concept can function, as he wants it to, to bridge the gap between a naturalistic analysis of reasons for action and Kantian moral reasons.