Endogenous and symptomatic schizophrenia. Wherein lies the difference?

It is the opinion of the present writer that endogenous and symptomatic schizophrenia are two completely different matters. By classical symptomatology it is impossible to establish the distinction in every individual case. Nevertheless, in not one of the published cases known to us did Bonhoeffer err in his diagnosis of the one or the other. Evidently he made use of additional characteristica gathered in practice, about which he himself may not always have been quite clear.     

Identity From Variation: Representations of Faces Derived From Multiple Instances

Research in face recognition has tended to focus on discriminating between individuals, or “telling people apart.” It has recently become clear that it is also necessary to understand how images of the same person can vary, or “telling people together.” Learning a new face, and tracking its representation as it changes from unfamiliar to familiar, involves an abstraction of the variability in different images of that person's face. Here, we present an application of principal components analysis computed across different photos of the same person. We demonstrate that people vary in systematic ways, and that this variability is idiosyncratic—the dimensions of variability in one face do not generalize well to another. Learning a new face therefore entails learning how that face varies. We present evidence for this proposal and suggest that it provides an explanation for various effects in face recognition. We conclude by making a number of testable predictions derived from this framework.     

Are Intuitions Quasi‐Perceptual “Presentations”?

John Bengson has offered a detailed theory of the nature and epistemology of intuition according to which intuitions are quasi‐perceptual conscious experiences that “present” their contents as true. The paper offered here argues that Bengson’s terminology of “presentations” is difficult to interpret. Bengson does not provide a clear meaning for “presentation” or “presentational state,” and this makes it impossible to evaluate his proposal that intuitions are presentations. This paper argues, furthermore, that intuitions are not phenomenal mental states and therefore have no perception‐like phenomenology or epistemology. It concludes that Bengson’s theory fails to metaphysically, epistemologically, or methodologically legitimize intuitions.     

Are religious people nicer people? Taking a closer look at the religion–empathy relationship

It has been argued that an empathically mediated, kin-specific, altruistic impulse is part of the human genetic heritage, and that one of the functions of religion is to extend the range of this impulse beyond the kinship circle. However, it is clear that religion does not always succeed in this. The present study reconsiders the religiosity–empathy relation in a Flemish student sample (n?=?375), using the Post-Critical Belief Scale, which allows to distinguish between being religious or not (Exclusion versus Inclusion of Transcendence) from the way in which religious contents are processed (Literal versus Symbolic). It is argued that the religiosity–empathy relation should be understood in terms of how people process religious contents rather than in terms of whether or not people are religious. In line with this reasoning, results show that, whereas empathy is unrelated to being religious, it is positively related to processing religious contents in a symbolic way. Social desirability did not influence these relationships.     

Response to Hubert Dreyfus and Nancy Sherman

This paper tries to make clear what practical intelligibility is and how it is threatened at times of cultural breakdown or devastation. It argues that it is easy to overlook a breakdown in practical intelligibility because there is a tendency to frame the problems in terms of theoretical reason. Once one gets clear on what the threat to intelligibility is (and what it is not) one can see fairly straightforward ways to respond to the comments made by Dreyfus and Sherman.     

Overall Lifelong Fortune: A Critique of the Intrinsic Potential Account

It seems clear that a fortunate life for a human being is very different from a fortunate life for a dog. But it is not clear what the appropriate measure is for determining whether a life is fortunate or not. Jeff McMahan rejects the Species Norm Account and defends the Intrinsic Potential Account of overall lifelong fortune. In this article, I argue that the Intrinsic Potential Account fails. More specifically, I will argue that it is vulnerable to numerous counterexamples; fails for the same basic reason that McMahan rejects the Species Norm Account; and is insensitive to a consideration that is morally significant.     

The ontological commitments of inconsistent theories

In this paper I present an argument for belief in inconsistent objects. The argument relies on a particular, plausible version of scientific realism, and the fact that often our best scientific theories are inconsistent. It is not clear what to make of this argument. Is it a reductio of the version of scientific realism under consideration? If it is, what are the alternatives? Should we just accept the conclusion? I will argue (rather tentatively and suitably qualified) for a positive answer to the last question: there are times when it is legitimate to believe in inconsistent objects.     

In a Fitter Direction: Moving Beyond the Direction of Fit Picture of Belief and Desire

Those working within the tradition of Humean psychology tend to mark a clear distinction between beliefs and desires. One prominent way of elucidating this distinction is to describe them as having different “directions of fit” with respect to the world. After first giving a brief overview of the various attempts to carry out this strategy along with their flaws, I argue that the direction of fit metaphor is misleading and ought to be abandoned. It fails to take into account the actual complexity of the roles played by belief and desire and forces us to look for a single, fundamental contrast between these two that is unlikely to be found.

The efficacy of cue exposure with response prevention in extinguishing drug and alcohol cue reactivity

It has been suggested that drug cue‐elicited urges and psychophysiological reactions are the results of Pavlovian conditioning processes and that it should be possible to extinguish these responses with cue exposure with response prevention. It has already been shown that subjective cue‐elicited urges can be extinguished, but it is unclear whether this is also true for cue‐elicited psychophysiological arousal. This was tested in the present study in a heterogeneous sample of drug and alcohol dependent patients. It was found that cue‐elicited urges can indeed be extinguished. However, such a clear pattern of extinguished cue reactivity was not found for the psychophysiological measures. Furthermore, the extinction of drug urges was not specific for cue exposure treatment. It is concluded that cue‐elicited psychophysiological arousal does not underlie subjective cue reactivity and may not reflect Pavlovian conditioned drug responding. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The processing of invariant and variant face cues in the Garner Paradigm

Faces provide a complex source of information via invariant (e.g., race, sex and age) and variant (e.g., emotional expressions) cues. At present, it is not clear whether these different cues are processed separately or whether they interact. Using the Garner Paradigm, Experiment 1 confirmed that race, sex, and age cues affected the categorization of faces according to emotional expression whereas emotional expression had no effect on the categorization of faces by sex, age, or race. Experiment 2 used inverted faces and replicated this pattern of asymmetrical interference for race and age cues, but not for sex cues for which no interference on emotional expression categorization was observed. Experiment 3 confirmed this finding with a more stringently matched set of facial stimuli. Overall, this study shows that invariant cues interfere with the processing of emotional expressions. It indicates that the processing of invariant cues, but not of emotional expressions, is obligatory and that it precedes that of emotional expressions.     

Tarski's Hidden Assumption

It is clear that Tarski's T‐scheme, ‘T”p” if and only if p’, does not hold universally. It is not expected to hold, for instance, with ambiguous sentences, or with indexical sentences. Making explicit the circumstances where it does hold, however, is not just logical housekeeping: it turns out to have more radical consequences for the whole approach to Semantics associated with Tarski than has previously been envisaged.     

Facilitating 'Perspectival Reciprocity' in Medication: Some Reflections on a Failed Case

Mediation services arise in contexts where the notions of community cohesion, relationship integrity and social order are valued over their opposites (disorder, dissent, conflict etc). Yet it is not at all clear whether and how the mediation of conflict works to re-establish harmony or consensus. Indeed it is not at all clear that mediation is always effective or just. It has even been suggested that some conflicts (e.g. work-place, commercial and sexual assault) are either not resolved or not resolved justly by mediation. On the other hand, advocates maintain that mediation can bring resolution and repair to ongoing relationships, promote community harmony, and empower people to be self-determining in the construction and maintenance of their resolutions. Whether mediation is adjudged positively or not, all mediation is instantiated in, indeed performed through, talk. In this paper I examine mediations from an Australian mediation program, and use Conversation Analysis to expose the practical methods by which mediators achieve consensus between disputants. I then examine a case in which mediation has failed to produce the sought-after consensus, and explore one way of understanding the failure of mediation in that case.     

Unravelling the effects of sequential presentation in culprit‐present lineups

It is well established that sequential presentation of faces in an eyewitness situation can reduce false identification rates. The effect of a sequential presentation on the probability of accurately identifying a culprit when present in a lineup is less clear. The current study examined the efficacy of the sequential procedure in culprit present lineups approximating the real life condition where a person's appearance has changed between the time they were seen and the identification. Young (17–33 years) and older (58–80 years) witnesses viewed a video of a crime and then engaged in some filler tasks. Later they viewed a culprit‐present lineup presented in a simultaneous or sequential format. Some witnesses viewed lineups in which target appearance (hairstyle) had changed and some where it had not. Sequential testing was associated with fewer choices (hits and foil choices) as compared to simultaneous testing. A change of appearance lowered hit rates in sequential test conditions among young adults. Finally, participants in sequential conditions were more likely to report that they expected the target to be present in the lineup. We advise policy makers not to advocate sequential testing until we have a full understanding of the conditions under which the sequential‐superiority effect may be observed. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

THE DISJUNCTION EFFECT IN CHOICE UNDER UNCERTAINTY

Abstract —One of the basic axioms of the rational theory of decision under uncertainty IS Savage's (1954) sure-thing principle (STP) It states that if prospect x is preferred to y knowing that Event A occurred, and if x IS preferred to y knowing that A did not occur, then x should be preferred to y even when it is not known whether A occurred We present examples in which the decision maker has good reasons for accepting x if A occurs, and different reasons for accepting X if A does not occur Not knowing whether or not A occurs, however, the decision maker may lack a clear reason for accepting X and may opt for another option We suggest that, in the presence of uncertainty, people are often reluctant to think through the implications of each outcome and, as a result, may violate STP This interpretation is supported by the observation that STP is satisfied when people are made aware of their preferences given each outcome     

羽毛球运动重塑成年早期的大脑灰质和白质结构

以往研究发现, 球类运动员视知觉脑区的结构不同于非运动员, 但这些脑区结构的差异是训练经历引起还是天生结构不同所导致的, 尚未可知。本研究拟采用纵向设计, 以处于成年早期的成人非运动员为被试(23~27岁), 随机分成实验组和对照组, 实验组参加12周的羽毛球运动训练, 对照组在此期间不进行任何有规律的运动训练, 采集干预实验前后所有被试的结构像和弥散张量成像数据。结果发现, 实验组训练后左下枕叶、颞中回、颞下回灰质体积增加, 双侧内囊后肢、上放射冠各向异性分数(FA)增加, 进一步分析发现, FA增加的原因是径向扩散系数(RD)下降。提示羽毛球运动可增加成人与视运动知觉有关脑区的灰质容量, 增加纤维束的髓鞘厚度。     

Ice cream preference: the relationship of cost and quality

Junior high students showed a preference for inexpensive ice cream while adults preferred more expensive ice cream; university students were in a middle position. It appears that taste for more expensive ice cream is associated with age, but it is not clear whether this is learned although it appears to be inasmuch as it is not universal across the various groups.     

The size-constancy of underwater swimmers

The size-constancy of divers was measured by requiring them to adjust the distance between two disks of unequal size so that they appeared phenomenally equal. In clear water divers showed greater constancy-ratios than on land. In murky water, where visibility was reduced by suspended particles, constancy-ratios were the same as, or less than, on land. It is suggested that these effects may be due to changes in apparent distance: in clear water objects appear nearer through refraction, but in murky water they appear further away because of the distance cues provided by the visibility gradient.

The orientation of the display, or of the diver's body, did not affect constancy under water, though it does on land. It is argued that the effect on land is due to visual and proprioceptive cues which are absent in the water.