Lost in the Myst?: Narrative Video Gaming Decreases Self-Reported Propensity for Spiritual/Religious Experience

Based on the proposition that the visual “what you see is what you get” environment of video games may undermine ability/motivation for mental simulation/internal narrative, we hypothesized that exposure to virtual gaming would lead to decreased propensity for spiritual/religious experience. Fifty-six Canadian undergraduates moderately interested in gaming completed measures of propensity for unitive (focus on connectedness) and numinous (focus on presence of Other) experiences online, and again following a randomly assigned virtual or text-based narrative gaming session. Self-reported unitive and numinous propensities both declined significantly following the virtual gaming session as expected. Mystical propensity declined following the text-based session as well, but numinous propensity tended to increase in this condition. Virtual gaming offers an absorbing “escape” narrative with comparatively little “in the head” effort that appears to diminish—at least temporarily—the propensity for spiritual/religious experience, which is predicated upon a sustained internal narrative involving the Unseen.     

Narrative and the Stability of Intention

This paper addresses a problem concerning the rational stability of intention. When you form an intention to φ at some future time t, you thereby make it subjectively rational for you to follow through and φ at t, even if—hypothetically—you would abandon the intention were you to redeliberate at t. It is hard to understand how this is possible. Shouldn't the perspective of your acting self be what determines what is then subjectively rational for you? I aim to solve this problem by highlighting a role for narrative in intention. I'll argue that committing yourself to a course of action by intending to pursue it crucially involves the expectation that your acting self will be ‘swept along’ by its participation in a distinctively narrative form of self‐understanding. I'll motivate my approach by criticizing Richard Holton's and Michael Bratman's recent treatments of the stability of intention, though my account also borrows from Bratman's work. I'll likewise criticize and borrow from David Velleman's work on narrative and self‐intelligibility. When the pieces fall into place, we'll see how intending is akin to telling your future self a kind of story. My thesis is not that you address your acting self but that your acting self figures as a ‘character’ in the ‘story’ that you address to a still later self. Unlike other appeals to narrative in agency, mine will explain how as narrator you address a specifically intrapersonal audience.     

A Duet for one

This paper considers communication in terms of inference about the behaviour of others (and our own behaviour). It is based on the premise that our sensations are largely generated by other agents like ourselves. This means, we are trying to infer how our sensations are caused by others, while they are trying to infer our behaviour: for example, in the dialogue between two speakers. We suggest that the infinite regress induced by modelling another agent – who is modelling you – can be finessed if you both possess the same model. In other words, the sensations caused by others and oneself are generated by the same process. This leads to a view of communication based upon a narrative that is shared by agents who are exchanging sensory signals. Crucially, this narrative transcends agency – and simply involves intermittently attending to and attenuating sensory input. Attending to sensations enables the shared narrative to predict the sensations generated by another (i.e. to listen), while attenuating sensory input enables one to articulate the narrative (i.e. to speak). This produces a reciprocal exchange of sensory signals that, formally, induces a generalised synchrony between internal (neuronal) brain states generating predictions in both agents. We develop the arguments behind this perspective, using an active (Bayesian) inference framework and offer some simulations (of birdsong) as proof of principle.     

Good Intentions: Exploring Narratives of Preferred Parenting in Families of a Young Person Who Has Experienced a First Episode of Psychosis (FEP)

This research used a multimethod design to explore the narratives of seven parents of young people with a diagnosis of first episode psychosis. Findings revealed narratives in which parents described a range of adverse experiences in their childhoods and attempts were made to "normalise” these events. The core narrative themes that emerged from the analysis were supported by the AAI interviews, which revealed indicators of unresolved traumas and dismissive attachment strategies.The parents intentions to do things differently from how they were parented varied in their extremity and at times appeared to have become counterproductive for their parenting.     

Against Emotional Dogmatism

It may seem that when you have an emotional response to a perceived object or event that makes it seem to you that the perceived source of the emotion possesses some evaluative property, then you thereby have prima facie, immediate justification for believing that the object or event possesses the evaluative property. Call this view ‘dogmatism about emotional justification’. We defend a view of the structure of emotional awareness according to which the objects of emotional awareness are derived from other experiences such as bodily sensation, inner awareness, sensory perception, memory, and imagination. On this basis, we argue that dogmatism about emotional justification is an untenable position, regardless of whether the special feature of an immediate justifier that makes it an immediate justifier is its presentational phenomenology or its evidence insensitivity.     

The Phenomenology of Early Psychosis Elicited in an Occupational Therapy Expressive Evaluation

Expressive assessments facilitate sharing, and the therapeutic understanding of youth. The experiences of nine young adults seeking help for psychosis were explored with an arts-based, occupational therapy expressive evaluation. The study used participant-observation methods. Data analysis drew on hermeneutic phenomenology. The findings illustrate the challenges these participants have in feeling connected to a shared world of doing, and in locating themselves within the temporal flow of time. Of significance was the potential to read the unfolding of creation in clay media as an acted narrative to tap into “constellations of meaning.” Implications for clinical practice and professional reasoning are highlighted.     

A pilot study exploring compassion in narratives of individuals with psychosis: implications for an attachment-based understanding of recovery

There is increasing recognition that cultivating compassion for oneself and others can act as an antidote to feelings of threat, shame, humiliation and paranoia. This study aimed to explore the further development of a narrative-based measure of compassion. We hypothesised that greater compassion would be associated with lower levels of positive symptoms, negative symptoms, cognitive disorganisation, excitement and emotional distress. Participants were 29 individuals with psychosis. Greater narrative compassion was associated with less negative symptoms, less cognitive disorganisation and less excitement. We found no correlations between narrative compassion and the Self-Compassion Scale. Notwithstanding the methodological problems of our study, our findings have important implications for developing an attachment-based understanding of compassion and the use of compassion to support recovery from complex mental health problems such as psychosis.     

Fears as Conscious Perceivings

Peter Goldie has argued for the view that the intentionality of emotions is inseparable from their phenomenology (IPE), but certain criticisms have revealed his argument as problematic. I will argue that it is possible to address these problems, at least in the case of the emotion of fear, thereby vindicating IPE, by appeal to a Husserlian version of the perceptual account of emotions, centered on the idea that the contents of perceptual experiences are fulfillment conditions. Fulfillment means the achievement of a kind of immediate, or “full”, experience of an object or some of its aspects. In the case of visual perception, suppose you are looking at an apple. If you turn it around, you will find yourself in full view of its back side, which was previously anticipated “emptily”, fulfilling or disappointing (confirming or disconfirming) some of your anticipations in regard to it. On the Husserlian view, the success or failure of a visual perceptual experience consists in such fulfillments and disappointments. If we can provide an account of the intentionality of emotions along similar lines, it will necessarily involve the phenomenal contrast between fullness and emptiness, enabling us to support IPE.     

The Sense of Agency and the Search for a Narrative in Acute Psychosis

The search for a narrative in acute psychosis exists but the result of this search can be insufficient because the stories available do not sufficiently capture the pre-narrative quality of personal experience, and hence the sense of agency may be diminished. The context of reflexivity is lost when a subjugating story blocks an individual off from making a choice from among a multiplicity of stories. Psychosis can also be an escape in order to maintain a sense of agency. When the patient has trouble in creating meaning through narrative action, the aim of therapy and treatment is to open a channel through which the pre-narrative quality of life can become narrated, to create a multiplicity of stories, and so offer the possibility of choice in the construction of a narrative identity.     

Eigensinn und Psychose, Peer-Beratung und Psychotherapie

The narrow concepts of illness insight and compliance in psychiatry and psychotherapy will be discussed, not least because they contradict the dynamics of psychosis. Demands on therapeutic relations will be deduced from the therapeutic relationship between psychosis and ownness as well as of the experiences of untreated patients. The particular prospects of the accompaniment of a trained peer counsellor during convalescence will be represented and explained by the experiences of the Hamburg psychenet project. This new form of treatment in Germany is conceived as a supplement and not as competition to psychotherapy.     

Ways to Bolster Resilience in Traumatized Clients: Implications for Psychotherapists

This study aims to further theoretical and clinical discussions regarding the therapy of psychosis from a dialogical perspective and to contribute to the contemporary research literature that works toward developing methods for studying the dialogical processes in therapy. Three videotaped sessions of a therapy with a heterosexual couple, in which both partners had psychotic experiences, were analyzed using the Dialogical Investigations of Happenings of Change, a method developed with an aim to capture the dialogical qualities of multiactor conversations. The analysis illustrated shifts in the dialogical characteristics of the conversation through the sessions and associated shifts in the clients’ positioning, toward increased agency, as well as enrichment of the narratives regarding their difficulties. The gradual development toward more dialogical conversations, evidenced mainly in increased sharing of dominance and therapist responsiveness and participation, seemed to facilitate the joint construction of new words and meanings, the expression of strong feelings, the narration of difficult experiences, and increased agency. The findings support the view that a client's sense of agency, which can be particularly impoverished in psychosis, can be reconstructed in the context of dialogue, in which clients have a central place in telling their story.     

The self-narrative and acute psychosis

The aim of this study was to apply the narrative approach in analyzing family therapy meetings in cases of acute psychosis. The self-narrative is essential in acute psychosis since it is either collapsed or not coherent enough. The results indicate that it is important to create concrete practices that produce stories concerning the patient in relation to others. The self-narrative must be re-authored by the patient even though it is socially constructed. This is achieved by creating multiple perspectives of self-narratives in so-called therapy meetings with the patient, family members, and staff members representing different professionals.     

Self-starvation and the performance narrative in competitive sport

ObjectivesTo provide an alternative to medical understanding of disordered eating in sport through an emphasis on personal perspectives.DesignThis study draws on narrative theory to interpretively analyse the life of Holly, a female athlete who engages in severe self-starvation.MethodsMore than 7 hours of life history data was gathered over a period of 8 months through unstructured interviews. Holly's story was analyzed through principles of narrative analysis, with attention afforded to both narrative content and structure.ResultsHolly's life is characterized by a struggle to align her life experiences with a culturally specified “performance narrative” that lauds normative success. When neither her academic nor sporting endeavors are perceived to fulfil the achievement narrative, Holly is thrust into emotional turmoil and begins to conceive of self-starvation as a means to achieve.ConclusionsThe performance narrative spans both academic and sporting cultural domains and it can play a role in athlete disordered eating.     

How literature expands your imagination

Many great authors claim that reading literature can expand your phenomenal imagination and allow you to imagine experiences you have never had. How is this possible? Your phenomenal imagination is constrained by your phenomenal concepts, which are in turn constrained by the phenomenology of your own actual past experiences. Literature could expand your phenomenal imagination, then, by giving you new phenomenal concepts. This paper explains how this can happen. Literature can direct your attention to previously unnoticed phenomenal properties of your own past experiences, as brought to mind by involuntary memory. This process gives you the opportunity to notice those phenomenal properties for the first time, and so also to form phenomenal concepts of those properties. Forming a new phenomenal concept strictly expands the range of your phenomenal imagination. It gives you the capacity to imagine more than you could have before, including certain specific kinds of experience that you yourself have never enjoyed firsthand. Literature’s capacity to expand your phenomenal imagination in this way is central to its social, moral, and epistemic value.     

Reflection and Disagreement

How should you take into account the opinions of an advisor? When you completely defer to the advisor's judgment (the manner in which she responds to her evidence), then you should treat the advisor as a guru. Roughly, that means you should believe what you expect she would believe, if supplied with your extra evidence. When the advisor is your own future self, the resulting principle amounts to a version of the Reflection Principle—a version amended to handle cases of information loss. When you count an advisor as an epistemic peer, you should give her conclusions the same weight as your own. Denying that view—call it the “equal weight view”—leads to absurdity: the absurdity that you could reasonably come to believe yourself to be an epistemic superior to an advisor simply by noting cases of disagreement with her, and taking it that she made most of the mistakes. Accepting the view seems to lead to another absurdity: that one should suspend judgment about everything that one's smart and well‐informed friends disagree on, which means suspending judgment about almost everything interesting. But despite appearances, the equal weight view does not have this absurd consequence. Furthermore, the view can be generalized to handle cases involving not just epistemic peers, but also epistemic superiors and inferiors.     

Zombies and the Case of the Phenomenal Pickpocket

A prevailing view in contemporary philosophy of mind is that zombies are logically possible. I argue, via a thought experiment, that if this prevailing view is correct, then I could be transformed into a zombie. If I could be transformed into a zombie, then surprisingly, I am not certain that I am conscious. Regrettably, this is not just an idiosyncratic fact about my psychology; I think you are in the same position. This means that we must revise or replace some important positions in the philosophy of mind. We could embrace radical skepticism about our own consciousness, or maintain the complete and total infallibility of our beliefs about our own phenomenal experiences. I argue that we should actually reject the logical possibility of zombies.     

Immersion in altered experience: An investigation of the relationship between absorption and psychopathology

Understanding alterations in perceptual experiences as a component of the basic symptom structure of psychosis may improve early detection and the identification of subtle shifts that can precede symptom onset or exacerbation. We explored the phenomenological construct of absorption and psychotic experiences in both clinical (bipolar psychosis and schizophrenia spectrum) and non-clinical participants. Participants with psychosis endorsed significantly higher absorption compared to the non-clinical group. Absorption was positively correlated with all types of hallucinations and multiple types of delusions. The analysis yielded two distinct cluster groups that demarcated a distinction along the continuum of self-disturbance: on characterized by attenuated ego boundaries and the other stable ego boundaries. The study suggests that absorption is a potentially important but under-researched component of psychosis that overlaps with, but is not identical to the more heavily theorized constructs of aberrant salience and hyperreflexivity.     

Life story research: A relevant methodology for counsellors and psychotherapists

Aims: This paper introduces, describes and proposes life story research as an important, relevant and appropriate contribution to counselling and psychotherapy research. It shows how narrative knowledge is created and constructed through the stories people tell about their lived experiences and explores the concept of ‘narrative knowing’ (Bruner, 1986). Methods: Drawing on life story research with people who linked their history of problematic drug use with experiences of historic trauma/abuse, the paper contributes to the ongoing discussion related to the similarities/differences between therapy and research and what we might learn from each that informs the other. Implications for practice: The paper offers narrative ideas and practices as ways of researching matters of social and psychological importance. It suggests that therapists (and counselling researchers) could learn from what participants tell us about the therapeutic value of using life story methods which one participant described as helping him to face ‘out into the world, without unduly or specifically delving into, or focusing on [my] emotional state’. This learning may be particularly relevant for therapists working with traumatised clients.     

The symmetry of rational requirements

Some irrational states can be avoided in more than one way. For example, if you believe that you ought to A you can avoid akrasia by intending to A or by dropping the belief that you ought to A. This supports the claim that some rational requirements are wide-scope. For instance, the requirement against akrasia is a requirement to intend to A or not believe that you ought to A. But some writers object that this Wide-Scope view ignores asymmetries between the different ways of avoiding irrationality. In this paper I defend the Wide-Scope view against recent objections of this sort from Mark Schroeder and Niko Kolodny. I argue that once we are clear about what the Wide-Scope view is committed to—and, importantly, what it is not—we can see that Schroeder and Kolodny’s objections fail.