A-Theory for B-Theorists

I attempt to characterize the A-theory of time in such a way as to avoid certain standard objections to it, like those derived from McTaggart's paradox. These objections often arise from conflation of the A-theory with other doctrines which are not entailed by it, but which happen to be held by individual A-theorists. In my view, the A-theory is most defensible when combined with a certain analysis of tense (which I call 'the counterfactual theory of tense'), and with realism about the past and future.     

The A-theory of time and induction

The A-theory of time says that it is an objective, non-perspectival fact about the world that some events are present, while others were present or will be present. I shall argue that the A-theory has some implausible consequences for inductive reasoning. In particular, the presentist version of the A-theory, which holds that the difference between the present and the non-present consists in the present events being the only ones that exist, is very much in trouble.     

A Dilemma for Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness

Higher Order theories of consciousness have their fair share of sympathisers, but the arguments mustered in their support are—to my mind—unduly persuasive. My aim in this paper is to show that Higher Order theories cannot accommodate the possibility of misrepresentation without either falling into contradiction, or collapsing into a First-Order theory. If this diagnosis is on the right track, then Higher Order theories—at least in the specific versions here considered—fail to give an account of what they set out to explain: what is distinctive of ‘conscious’ phenomena.     

No bare particulars

There are predicates and subjects. It is thus tempting to think that there are properties on the one hand, and things that have them on the other. I have no quarrel with this thought; it is a fine place to begin a theory of properties and property-having. But in this paper, I argue that one such theory—bare particularism—is false. I pose a dilemma. Either bare particulars instantiate the properties of their host substances or they do not. If they do not, then bare particularism is both unmotivated and false. If they do, then the view faces a problematic—and, I shall argue, false—crowding consequence.     

Why do Mathematicians Need Different Ways of Presenting Mathematical Objects? The Case of Cayley Graphs

This paper investigates the role of pictures in mathematics in the particular case of Cayley graphs—the graphic representations of groups. I shall argue that their principal function in that theory—to provide insight into the abstract structure of groups—is performed employing their visual aspect. I suggest that the application of a visual graph theory in the purely non-visual theory of groups resulted in a new effective approach in which pictures have an essential role. Cayley graphs were initially developed as exact mathematical constructions. Therefore, they are legitimate components of the theory (combinatorial and geometric group theory) and the pictures of Cayley graphs are a part of practical mathematical procedures.     

Between Insensitivity and Incompleteness: Against the Will Theory of Rights

This paper recasts an old objection to the will theory in the light of recent attempts to defend that theory, notably by Nigel Simmonds and Hillel Steiner. It enlists the idea of duties of care—effectively restrictions over legal officials’ discretionary exercise of powers—to form a dilemma for such theorists: either legal officials’ discretion over powers is restricted by duties of care for the unempowerable, or it is not. If their discretion is unrestricted, then the will theory is insensitive to the (values of the) lives of the unempowerable, in virtue of the fact that these lives are viewed as not meriting direct normative consideration. If, on the other hand, their discretion is restricted by duties of care, then the will theory has no argumentative resources within its conceptual apparatus to ascribe or justify them. It is therefore incomplete as a theory of rights.     

The minimal A-theory

Timothy Williamson thinks that every object is a necessary, eternal existent. In defense of his view, Williamson appeals primarily to considerations from modal and tense logic. While I am uncertain about his modal claims, I think there are good metaphysical reasons to believe permanentism: the principle that everything always exists. B-theorists of time and change have long denied that objects change with respect to unqualified existence. But aside from Williamson, nearly all A-theorists defend temporaryism: the principle that there are temporary existents. I think A-theorists are better off without this added commitment, but I will not argue for that in any great detail here. Instead, I will contend that a very tempting argument for temporaryism is unsound. In the first half of the paper, I will develop the Moorean ??common sense?? argument for temporaryism and dispute its central premise, namely that temporaryism is the best generalization from our ordinary beliefs about creation, destruction, coming to be, and passing away. I will argue that given the pervasive vagueness in our ordinary beliefs and the background commitments of all A-theories, temporaryists cannot claim to have the common sense view because no party can accommodate most of our common sense beliefs. In the second half of the paper, I will propose a permanentist A-theory that explains all change over time as a species of property change. I call it the minimal A-theory, since it dispenses with the change in existence assumption. As we??ll see, the permanentist alternative performs well enough in explaining our ordinary beliefs, and it has better prospects for answering three objections commonly levied against A-theories.     

Temporal Metaphysics in Z-Land

John Perry has argued that language, thought and experience often contain unarticulated constituents. I argue that this idea holds the key to explaining away the intuitive appeal of the A-theory of time and the endurance theory of persistence. The A-theory has seemed intuitively appealing because the nature of temporal experience makes it natural for us to use one-place predicates like past to deal with what are really two-place relations, one of whose constituents is unarticulated. The endurance view can be treated in a similar way; the temporal boundaries of temporal parts of objects are unarticulated in experience and this makes it seem that the very same entity exists at different times.     

Unfinkable dispositions

This paper develops two ideas with respect to dispositional properties: (1) Adapting a suggestion of Sungho Choi, it appears the conceptual distinction between dispositional and categorical properties can be drawn in terms of susceptibility to finks and antidotes. Dispositional, but not categorical properties, are not susceptible to intrinsic finks, nor are they remediable by intrinsic antidotes. (2) If correct, this suggests the possibility that some dispositions—those which lack any causal basis—may be insusceptible to any fink or antidote. Since finks and antidotes are a major obstacle to a conditional analysis of dispositions, these dispositions that are unfinkable may be successfully analysed by the conditional analysis of dispositions. This result is of importance for those who think that the fundamental properties might be dispositions which lack any distinct causal basis, because it suggests that these properties, if they exist, can be analysed by simple conditionals and that they will not be subject to ceteris paribus laws.     

A New Problem for the A-theory of Time

I offer a new approach to the increasingly convoluted debate between the A- and B-theories of time (the 'tensed' and 'tenseless' theories). It is often assumed that the B-theory faces more difficulties than the A-theory in explaining the apparently tensed features of temporal experience. I argue that the A-theory cannot explain these features at all, because on any physicalist or supervenience theory of the mind, in which the nature of experience is fixed by the physical state of the world, the tensed properties of time posited by the A-theory could play no role in shaping temporal experience. It follows that the A-theory is false; even a priori arguments for it fail, because they still require the tensed vocabulary which is used to describe temporal experience.     

Reappraisal modulates the electrocortical response to unpleasant pictures

Cognitive strategies such as reappraisal reduce the intensity of negative experience and brain activity that is sensitive to emotional salience. The time course of reappraisal-related neural modulation remains unclear, and it is unknown whether the electrocortical response to emotional stimuli is sensitive to reappraisal. Event-related brain potentials were recorded first while participants passively viewed pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral pictures, and then during an emotion regulation block in which participants were instructed to attend to or reappraise unpleasant pictures. The late positive potential (LPP) was enhanced for pleasant and unpleasant pictures in the passive viewing block, and reappraisal resulted in a reliably reduced LPP—a protracted modulation that began 200 msec after stimulus onset. The degree of LPP modulation was positively related to reductions in the self-reported emotional intensity that followed emotion regulation instructions. These results indicate that reappraisal modulates early electrocortical activity that is related to emotional salience, and that the LPP is a useful tool for studying emotion regulation.     

Connecting Information with Scientific Method: Darwin’s Significance for Epistemology

Theories of epistemology make reference—via the perspective of an observer—to the structure of information transfer, which generates reality, of which the observer himself forms a part. It can be shown that any epistemological approach which implies the participation of tautological structural elements in the information transfer necessarily leads to an antinomy. Nevertheless, since the time of Aristotle the paradigm of mathematics—and thus tautological structure—has always been a hidden ingredient in the various concepts of knowledge acquisition or general theories of information transfer. We hold that Darwin’s Evolutionary Theory is the first scientific theory which consistently presupposes a non-tautological structure for the information transfer and, at the same time, keeps it strictly distinct from the tautological metric of scientific observation. The consequences of this technique—namely the dissociation of information from intentionality—have not yet been fully drawn.     

From da Vinci to CAD and beyond

Here what I would like to accomplish is to set something of the stage from which the growing recognition of what I shall now term technoscience’s visualism—a term which can accommodate both sciences and engineering, and both imaging and design practices—takes its recognition. I shall very briefly look at the ‘godfathers and peers’ who help set this stage, and then proceed to an examination of a few moments in the development of visualism from da Vinci to computer assisted design (CAD) and beyond.     

Knowability and bivalence: intuitionistic solutions to the Paradox of Knowability

In this paper, I focus on some intuitionistic solutions to the Paradox of Knowability. I first consider the relatively little discussed idea that, on an intuitionistic interpretation of the conditional, there is no paradox to start with. I show that this proposal only works if proofs are thought of as tokens, and suggest that anti-realists themselves have good reasons for thinking of proofs as types. In then turn to more standard intuitionistic treatments, as proposed by Timothy Williamson and, most recently, Michael Dummett. Intuitionists can either point out the intuitionistc invalidity of the inference from the claim that all truths are knowable to the insane conclusion that all truths are known, or they can outright demur from asserting the existence of forever-unknown truths, perhaps questioning—as Dummett now suggests—the applicability of the Principle of Bivalence to a certain class of empirical statements. I argue that if intuitionists reject strict finitism—the view that all truths are knowable by beings just like us—the prospects for either proposal look bleak.     

Actions and outcomes: two aspects of agency

Agency can be construed as both the manner in which autonomous individuals embark on particular courses of action (or inaction), and the relationship between such agents and the outcomes of the courses of action on which they embark. A promising strategy for understanding both senses of agency consists in the combination of a modal logic of agency and branching time semantics. Such is the strategy behind stit theory, the theory of agentive action developed by Nuel Belnap and others. However, stit theoretic evaluations of the agentive relationship between agents and outcomes that are uncertain—due to either the presence of indeterminism, or the possible intervention of other agents—yield counterintuitive results. This paper develops a pair of alternative operators (the “act” operators) for modeling agency with respect to uncertain outcomes. Unlike the stit-theoretic model, the act-theoretic model of agency with respect to a particular state of affairs does not require that the state of affairs be realized in every possible history. If the state of affairs in fact obtains in the actual history, and its obtaining was dependent on the agent’s pursuing a particular course of action, then the agent is deemed agentive under act theory.     

Spatial information with pictures and words in visual short-term memory

In a delayed matching task, the influence of spatial congruence between study and test on visual short-term memory for geometric figures and words was investigated. Subjects processed series of pictures which showed three words or three geometric figures arranged as rows or as triangular configurations. At test, the elements were presented in the identical or in the alternative configuration as at study. In the non-matching case, one of the studied elements was exchanged. The delay was 5 s. Subjects judged whether the elements were the same as during study, independent of their configuration. In Exp. 1, pictures of figures and words were mixed within one list. For both modalities, the response times were longer if the configuration at test was incongruent to the one at study. This contradicts the results of Santa, who observed effects of spatial congruency for figures, but not for words. In Exp. 2 we therefore presented the same material as in Exp. 1, but now the lists were modality-pure, as in the experiment of Santa – i.e., words and figures were shown in different lists. This time, spatial incongruency impaired recognition of the figures, but not recognition of the words. These results show that in a non-verbal context, isolated visually presented words are spatially encoded as non-verbal stimuli (figures) are. However, the word stimuli are encoded differently if the task is a pure verbal one. In the latter case, spatial information is discarded. Received: 9 September 1997 / Accepted: 30 March 1998     

Psychotherapy Research Needs Theory. Outline for an Epistemology of the Clinical Exchange

This paper provides an analysis of a basic assumption grounding the clinical research: the ontological autonomy of psychotherapy—based on the idea that the clinical exchange is sufficiently distinguished from other social objects (i.e. exchange between teacher and pupils, or between buyer and seller, or interaction during dinner, and so forth). A criticism of such an assumption is discussed together with the proposal of a different epistemological interpretation, based on the distinction between communicative dynamics and the process of psychotherapy—psychotherapy is a goal-oriented process based on the general dynamics of human communication. Theoretical and methodological implications are drawn from such a view: It allows further sources of knowledge to be integrated within clinical research (i.e. those coming from other domains of analysis of human communication); it also enables a more abstract definition of the psychotherapy process to be developed, leading to innovative views of classical critical issues, like the specific-nonspecific debate. The final part of the paper is devoted to presenting a model of human communication—the Semiotic Dialogical Dialectic Theory–which is meant as the framework for the analysis of psychotherapy.     

Hypermedia, cognition, and artificial intelligence

Alice was beginning to get very tired of sitting by her sister on the bank and of having nothing to do: once or twice she had peeped into the book her sister was reading, but it had no pictures or conversation in it, “and what is the use of a book,” thought Alice, “without pictures or conversation?” Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland. Lewis Carroll Hari Seldon and his band of psychologists planted a colony—the Foundation—to incubate art, science, and technology, and form the nucleus of the Second Empire. The Foundation Trilogy. Isaac Asimov     

The Nature and Disvalue of Injury

This paper explicates a conception of injury as right-violation, which allows us to distinguish between setbacks to interests that should, and should not, be the concern of theories of justice. It begins by introducing a hybrid theory of rights, grounded in (a) the mobilisation of our moral equality to (b) protect our most important interests, and shows how violations of rights are the concern of justice, while setbacks where one of the twin grounds of rights is defeated are not. It then looks more closely at the substantive moral components of injury, namely harm—damage to one’s interests—and wrong—disrespect for one’s moral equality. It argues that, on the hybrid conception of rights, harm and wrong are individually necessary and jointly sufficient components of injury, and the disvalue of neither is reducible to the other—in particular, it is a mistake to construe the disrespect identified by wrong as another damaged interest. Finally, it distinguishes between the public and private dimensions of harm and wrong, and makes some preliminary suggestions as to whether the remedy for these different dimensions should lie in criminal, distributive, or corrective justice.