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Joshua Gert 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(3):437-445
Jason Stanley has criticized a contextualist solution to the sorites paradox that treats vagueness as a kind of indexicality.
His objection rests on a feature of indexicals that seems plausible: that their reference remains fixed in verb phrase ellipsis.
But the force of Stanley’s criticism depends on the undefended assumption that vague terms, if they are a special sort of
indexical, must function in the same way that more paradigmatic indexicals do. This paper argues that there can be more than
one sort of indexicality, that one term might easily have both sorts, and that therefore, and despite Stanley’s worries, vagueness
might easily be assimilated to one form.
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Joshua GertEmail: |
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Miguel Ángel Sebastián 《Ratio》2018,31(3):285-293
The non‐transitivity of the relation looks the same as has been used to argue that the relation has the same phenomenal character as is non‐transitive—a result that jeopardizes certain theories of consciousness. In this paper, I argue against this conclusion while granting the premise by dissociating lookings and phenomenology; an idea that some might find counter‐intuitive. However, such an intuition is left unsupported once phenomenology and cognitive access are distinguished from each other; a distinction that is conceptually and empirically grounded. 相似文献
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Synthese - On some accounts of vagueness, predicates like “is a heap” are tolerant. That is, their correct application tolerates sufficiently small changes in the objects to which they... 相似文献
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Marian PrzeŁęcki 《Studia Logica》1983,42(2-3):285-291
The approach adopted in the paper is based on the theory known as Montague grammar. Accepting, in general, that theory — especially in its modified version, which is due to Thomason and Kaplan — the author points out certain inadequacy in its treatment of the meaning of some indexical expressions and suggests some modification of its theoretical framework in order to avoid that shortcoming. It is claimed that to do justice to the meaning of so-called indefinite indexicals (such as “we”, “you”, “now”) two kinds of dependence of their semantic values upon the context of use must be taken into account — a semantic (or lexical) and a pragmatic (or extralexical) one. 相似文献
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Lawrence Roberts 《Philosophia》1984,14(1-2):111-127
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Patrick Grim 《Philosophia》1984,14(3-4):251-272
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Modus ponens is the argument from premises of the form If A, then B and A to the conclusion B (e.g., from If it rained, Alicia got wet and It rained to Alicia got wet). Nearly all participants agree that the modus ponens conclusion logically follows when the argument appears in this Basic form. However, adding a further premise (e.g., If she forgot her umbrella, Alicia got wet) can lower participants’ rate of agreement—an effect called suppression. We propose a theory of suppression that draws on contemporary ideas about conditional sentences in linguistics and philosophy. Semantically, the theory assumes that people interpret an indicative conditional as a context‐sensitive strict conditional: true if and only if its consequent is true in each of a contextually determined set of situations in which its antecedent is true. Pragmatically, the theory claims that context changes in response to new assertions, including new conditional premises. Thus, the conclusion of a modus ponens argument may no longer be accepted in the changed context. Psychologically, the theory describes people as capable of reasoning about broad classes of possible situations, ordered by typicality, without having to reason about individual possible worlds. The theory accounts for the main suppression phenomena, and it generates some novel predictions that new experiments confirm. 相似文献
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