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1.
This paper provides an argument for a more socially relevant philosophy of science (SRPOS). Our aims in this paper are to
characterize this body of work in philosophy of science, to argue for its importance, and to demonstrate that there are significant
opportunities for philosophy of science to engage with and support this type of research. The impetus of this project was
a keen sense of missed opportunities for philosophy of science to have a broader social impact. We illustrate various ways
in which SRPOS can provide social benefits, as well as benefits to scientific practice and philosophy itself. Also, SRPOS
is consistent with some historical and contemporary goals of philosophy of science. We’re calling for an expansion of philosophy
of science to include more of this type of work. In order to support this expansion, we characterize philosophy of science
as an epistemic community and examine the culture and practices of philosophy of science that can help or hinder research
in this area. 相似文献
2.
We provide an overview of three ways in which the expression “Historical epistemology” (HE) is often understood: (1) HE as
a study of the history of higher-order epistemic concepts such as objectivity, observation, experimentation, or probability;
(2) HE as a study of the historical trajectories of the objects of research, such as the electron, DNA, or phlogiston; (3)
HE as the long-term study of scientific developments. After laying out various ways in which these agendas touch on current
debates within both epistemology and philosophy of science (e.g., skepticism, realism, rationality of scientific change),
we conclude by highlighting three topics as especially worthy of further philosophical investigation. The first concerns the
methods, aims and systematic ambitions of the history of epistemology. The second concerns the ways in versions of HE can
be connected to versions of naturalized and social epistemologies. The third concerns the philosophy of history, and in particular
the level of analysis at which a historical analysis should aim. 相似文献
3.
The thesis of underdetermination presents a major obstacle to the epistemological claims of scientific realism. That thesis
is regularly assumed in the philosophy of science, but is puzzlingly at odds with the actual history of science, in which
empirically adequate theories are thin on the ground. We propose to advance a case for scientific realism which concentrates
on the process of scientific reasoning rather than its theoretical products. Developing an account of causal–explanatory inference
will make it easier to resist the thesis of underdetermination. For, if we are not restricted to inference to the best explanation
only at the level of major theories, we will be able to acknowledge that there is a structure in data sets which imposes serious
constraints on possible theoretical alternatives. We describe how Differential Inference, a form of inference based on contrastive
explanation, can be used in order to generate causal hypotheses. We then go on to consider how experimental manipulation of
differences can be used to achieve Difference Closure, thereby confirming claims of causal efficacy and also eliminating possible
confounds. The model of Differential Inference outlined here shows at least one way in which it is possible to ‘reason from
the phenomena’. 相似文献
4.
Trust is a central concept in the philosophy of science. We highlight how trust is important in the wide variety of interactions
between science and society. We claim that examining and clarifying the nature and role of trust (and distrust) in relations
between science and society is one principal way in which the philosophy of science is socially relevant. We argue that philosophers
of science should extend their efforts to develop normative conceptions of trust that can serve to facilitate trust between
scientific experts and ordinary citizens. The first project is the development of a rich normative theory of expertise and
experience that can explain why the various epistemic insights of diverse actors should be trusted in certain contexts and
how credibility deficits can be bridged. The second project is the development of concepts that explain why, in certain cases,
ordinary citizens may distrust science, which should inform how philosophers of science conceive of the formulation of science
policy when conditions of distrust prevail. The third project is the analysis of cases of successful relations of trust between
scientists and non-scientists that leads to understanding better how ‘postnormal’ science interactions are possible using
trust. 相似文献
5.
Steven French 《Synthese》2010,172(2):231-249
Stein once urged us not to confuse the means of representation with that which is being represented. Yet that is precisely
what philosophers of science appear to have done at the meta-level when it comes to representing the practice of science.
Proponents of the so-called ‘syntactic’ view identify theories as logically closed sets of sentences or propositions and models
as idealised interpretations, or ‘theoruncula, as Braithwaite called them. Adherents of the ‘semantic’ approach, on the other
hand, are typically characterised as taking them to be families of models that are set-theoretic, according to Suppes and
others, or abstract, as Giere has argued. da Costa and French (Science and Partial Truth. OUP, Oxford, 2003) suggested that
we should refrain from ontological speculation as to the nature of scientific theories and models and focus on their appropriate
representation for various purposes within the philosophy of science. Such an approach allows both linguistic and non-linguistic
resources to play their appropriate role (see also French and Saatsi, Philosophy of Science, Proceedings of the 2004 PSA Meeting,
78:548–559, 2006) and can be supported by recent case studies illustrating the heterogeneity of scientific practice. My aim
in this paper is to further develop this ‘quietist’ view, and to indicate how it offers a fruitful way forward for the philosophy
of science. 相似文献
6.
Alfredo Marcos 《Axiomathes》2018,28(6):653-664
The present article offers an introductory vision to the political philosophy of science. The political philosophy of science is a new field of study where the philosophy of science and political philosophy converge. We will see the main contents of this field. We will also note that it depends on the construction of a model of rationality where science and politics can meet each other. Finally, the article tries to outline such a model of rationality. In order to do so, we will review the relationship between Karl Popper’s scientific and political philosophy. I suggest to read Popper’s critical rationalism in terms of a kind of prudential rationality. 相似文献
7.
While epistemic justification is a central concern for both contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science, debates in
contemporary epistemology about the nature of epistemic justification have not been discussed extensively by philosophers
of science. As a step toward a coherent account of scientific justification that is informed by, and sheds light on, justificatory
practices in the sciences, this paper examines one of these debates—the internalist–externalist debate—from the perspective
of objective accounts of scientific evidence. In particular, we focus on Deborah Mayo’s error-statistical theory of evidence
because it is a paradigmatically objective theory of evidence that is strongly informed by methodological practice. We contend
that from the standpoint of such an objective theory of evidence, justification in science has both externalist and internalist
characteristics. In reaching this conclusion, however, we find that the terms of the contemporary debate between internalists
and externalists have to be redefined to be applicable to scientific contexts. 相似文献
8.
N Laor 《Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association》1985,33(1):149-166
The scientific status of psychoanalysis has been the focus of heated debates among philosophers of science and among psychoanalysts. The most recent challenge to psychoanalysis as a science comes from the quarters of the inductivist philosophy of science. Since inductivism is a self-defeating philosophy, it is not surprising that inductivists demand that psychoanalysts pay an unlimited price for their claim of scientific status for psychoanalysis. Most psychoanalysts, in their response to this impossible challenge, unwittingly claim to have paid the price. What is worse, the claim is made in a confused and emotionally charged manner. Hence, psychoanalysts are usually defensive and, thus, in error when repelling (in this way) the attack of the inductivist philosopher. It is not psychoanalysis inductivists attack, but their own commitment to their own logic which leads inexorably to the dissolution of their argument, of all science, and, indeed, of psychoanalysis as well. It seems much more reasonable to postpone any response to the challenges that confront psychoanalysis today and to invest effort in a reformulation of the problem of the scientific status of psychoanalysis. Different rational solutions to the problem may evolve if we take care to become well informed first about the limits of our theoretical frameworks and show readiness to change them, if and when needed. That is to say, we can start with a somewhat tentative, not to say skeptical, frame of mind concerning the very concept of scientific status. We may try to keep and to contain our skepticism to the degree required by the discourse at hand, carry on exploring in our practice, report our results, and discuss them respectfully. We should start by admitting that, quite possibly, our discourse will end inconclusively. 相似文献
9.
Sarah S. Richardson 《Synthese》2010,177(3):337-362
Feminist philosophy of science has led to improvements in the practices and products of scientific knowledge-making, and in
this way it exemplifies socially relevant philosophy of science. It has also yielded important insights and original research
questions for philosophy. Feminist scholarship on science thus presents a worthy thought-model for considering how we might
build a more socially relevant philosophy of science—the question posed by the editors of this special issue. In this analysis
of the history, contributions, and challenges faced by feminist philosophy of science, I argue that engaged case study work
and interdisciplinarity have been central to the success of feminist philosophy of science in producing socially relevant
scholarship, and that its future lies in the continued development of robust and dynamic philosophical frameworks for modeling
social values in science. Feminist philosophers of science, however, have often encountered marginalization and persistent
misunderstandings, challenges that must be addressed within the institutional and intellectual culture of American philosophy. 相似文献
10.
A. Nicolás Venturelli 《Estudios de Psicología》2013,34(3):509-532
AbstractI explore two proposals on the dynamics of scientific change in the general philosophy of science and I evaluate the extent to which they can be applied in the cognitive sciences. I do this by paying special attention to the youth and diversity which characterize this field of scientific research. Firstly, I distinguish two kinds of uses of Kuhn’s work: direct but loose applications of Kuhnean concepts to the history of cognitive science, on the one hand, and indirect applications of certain aspects of Kuhnean ideas, on the other hand. Secondly, I criticize their pertinence on the basis of the secondary role which theories play in the field. Finally, I defend the fertility of the concept of ‘research tradition’ proposed by Laudan, by focusing on the previously highlighted set of idiosyncratic characteristics of the cognitive sciences. 相似文献
11.
Lee McIntyre 《Synthese》2007,155(3):337-343
In this paper I argue that the ontological interpretation of the concepts of reduction and emergence is often misleading in
the philosophy of science and should nearly always be eschewed in favor of an epistemological interpretation. As a paradigm
case, an example is drawn from the philosophy of chemistry to illustrate the drawbacks of “ontological reduction” and “ontological
emergence,” and the virtues of an epistemological interpretation of these concepts. 相似文献
12.
Boltzmann’s Bildtheorie, which asserts that scientific theories are ‘mental pictures’ having at best a partial similarity
to reality, was a core element of his philosophy of science. The aim of this article is to draw attention to a neglected aspect
of it, namely its significance for the issue of scientific explanation and understanding, regarded by Boltzmann as central
goals of science. I argue that, in addition to being an epistemological view of the interpretation of scientific theories
Boltzmann’s Bildtheorie has implications for the nature of scientific understanding. This aspect has as yet been ignored because
discussion of the Bildtheorie has been restricted to the realism-instrumentalism debate. To elucidate my analysis of Boltzmann’s
Bildtheorie concrete examples are presented, and the pragmatist and Darwinist roots of Boltzmann’s view are discussed.
Moreover, I propose to use Boltzmann’s ideas as a starting-point for developing a novel analysis of the notion of scientific
understanding, of which a brief impression is given. It shows that the study of Boltzmann’s philosophy is not only of historical
interest but can be relevant also to modern philosophy of science and to the methodology of theoretical physics.
This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
13.
Robert C. Bishop 《Synthese》2008,160(2):229-248
Recent developments in nonlinear dynamics have found wide application in many areas of science from physics to neuroscience.
Nonlinear phenomena such as feedback loops, inter-level relations, wholes constraining and modifying the behavior of their
parts, and memory effects are interesting candidates for emergence and downward causation. Rayleigh–Bénard convection is an
example of a nonlinear system that, I suggest, yields important insights for metaphysics and philosophy of science. In this
paper I propose convection as a model for downward causation in classical mechanics, far more robust and less speculative
than the examples typically provided in the philosophy of mind literature. Although the physics of Rayleigh–Bénard convection
is quite complicated, this model provides a much more realistic and concrete example for examining various assumptions and
arguments found in emergence and philosophy of mind debates. After reviewing some key concepts of nonlinear dynamics, complex
systems and the basic physics of Rayleigh–Bénard convection, I begin that examination here by (1) assessing a recently proposed
definition for emergence and downward causation, (2) discussing some typical objections to downward causation and (3) comparing
this model with Sperry’s examples.
The aim of science is not things themselves, as the dogmatists in their simplicity imagine, but the relations among things;
outside these relations there is no reality knowable. – Poincaré 相似文献
14.
15.
Daniel G. Campos 《Synthese》2011,180(3):419-442
I argue against the tendency in the philosophy of science literature to link abduction to the inference to the best explanation
(IBE), and in particular, to claim that Peircean abduction is a conceptual predecessor to IBE. This is not to discount either
abduction or IBE. Rather the purpose of this paper is to clarify the relation between Peircean abduction and IBE in accounting
for ampliative inference in science. This paper aims at a proper classification—not justification—of types of scientific reasoning.
In particular, I claim that Peircean abduction is an in-depth account of the process of generating explanatory hypotheses,
while IBE, at least in Peter Lipton’s thorough treatment, is a more encompassing account of the processes both of generating
and of evaluating scientific hypotheses. There is then a two-fold problem with the claim that abduction is IBE. On the one
hand, it conflates abduction and induction, which are two distinct forms of logical inference, with two distinct aims, as
shown by Charles S. Peirce; on the other hand it lacks a clear sense of the full scope of IBE as an account of scientific
inference. 相似文献
16.
Theodore Arabatzis 《国际科学哲学研究》2017,31(1):69-82
In this article, I explore the value of philosophy of science for history of science. I start by introducing a distinction between two ways of integrating history and philosophy of science: historical philosophy of science (HPS) and philosophical history of science (PHS). I then offer a critical discussion of Imre Lakatos’s project to bring philosophy of science to bear on historical interpretation. I point out certain flaws in Lakatos’s project, which I consider indicative of what went wrong with PHS in the past. Finally, I put forward my own attempt to bring out the historiographical potential of philosophy of science. Starting from Norwood Russell Hanson’s insight that historical studies of science involve metascientific concepts, I argue that philosophical reflection on those concepts can be (and, indeed, has been) historiographically fruitful. I focus on four issues (epistemic values, experimentation, scientific discovery and conceptual change) and discuss their significance and utility for historiographical practice. 相似文献
17.
Brad J. Kallenberg 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2012,71(1):55-73
Careful readers of Wittgenstein tend to overlook the significance his engineering education had for his philosophy; this despite
Georg von Wright’s stern admonition that “the two most important facts to remember about Wittgenstein were, firstly, that
he was Viennese, and, secondly, that he was an engineer.” Such oversight is particularly tempting for those of us who come
to philosophy late, having first been schooled in math and science, because our education tricks us into thinking we understand
engineering by extension. But we do not. I will illustrate this common tendency to misread Wittgenstein by examining three
engineering concepts that have little significance for science but played important roles in Wittgenstein’s philosophical
thinking. These are: method of projection, dynamical similarity, and satisfactoriness. The upshot of this analysis will be
a strong challenge to the myth of his putative fideism because neither fideism nor its contrary simply would have occurred
to Wittgensteinthe-engineer. 相似文献
18.
Huib Looren de Jong 《Synthese》2006,151(3):435-443
It is argued that John Bickle’s Ruthless Reductionism is flawed as an account of the practice of neuroscience. Examples from genetics and linguistics suggest, first, that not every mind-brain link or gene-phenotype link qualifies as a reduction or as a complete explanation, and, second, that the higher (psychological) level of analysis is not likely to disappear as neuroscience progresses. The most plausible picture of the evolving sciences of the mind-brain seems a patchwork of multiple connections and partial explanations, linking anatomy, mechanisms and functions across different domains, levels, and grain sizes. Bickle’s claim that only the molecular level provides genuine explanations, and higher level concepts are just heuristics that will soon be redundant, is thus rejected. In addition, it is argued that Bickle’s recasting of philosophy of science as metascience explicating empirical practices, ignores an essential role for philosophy in reflecting upon criteria for reduction and explanation. Many interesting and complex issues remain to be investigated for the philosophy of science, and in particular the nature of interlevel links found in empirical research requires sophisticated philosophical analysis. 相似文献
19.
F. A. Muller 《Synthese》2011,183(1):87-114
We inquire into the question whether the Aristotelian or classical ideal of science has been realised by the Model Revolution, initiated at Stanford University during the 1950s and spread all around
the world of philosophy of science—salute Suppes. The guiding principle of the Model Revolution is: a scientific theory is a set of structures in the domain of discourse of axiomatic set-theory, characterised by a set-theoretical predicate. We expound some critical reflections on the Model Revolution; the conclusions
will be that the philosophical problem of what a scientific theory is has not been solved yet—pace Suppes. While reflecting critically on the Model Revolution, we also explore a proposal of how to complete the Revolution
and briefly address the intertwined subject of scientific representation, which has come to occupy center stage in philosophy of science over the past decade. 相似文献
20.
Thomas Aastrup Rømer 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2011,30(5):499-506
In this essay, I argue that education should be conceived of as a thing in itself. To lift this view, I present aspects of
Graham Harman’s philosophy, a speculative realism that can be seen as a radical break with social constructivism and similar
approaches. Next, I attempt to outline a rough sketch of an educational “thing”, drawing on concepts such as protection, love,
swarm, tension and shadow. Finally, I briefly discuss some implications of this vision for philosophy of education. In particular,
I think that my discussion point to philosophy of education as the basic discipline in an educational science. 相似文献