Teachers' Pets and Why They Have Them: An Investigation of the Human Animal Bond1

The present study queried a random, university faculty sample as to their reasons for owning pets. Mere pet ownership was not correlated with self‐reported health, happiness, or quality of work life in this sample. Five dominant reasons were given for pet ownership. Women were more likely than men to self‐report reasons related to social support for pet ownership, including that a pet helped them get through hard times and that they would be lonely without a pet. Men were more likely to report pragmatic reasons, such as the pet facilitating exercise or serving a useful function. Beliefs in the positive effects of pets on health were typical. Those beliefs in the health promoting aspects of pets are suggested as a link to human health and a promising area for future research.     

Naturalizing the Human or Humanizing Nature: Science, Nature and the Supernatural

The present paper challenges the narrow scientistic conception of Nature that underlies current projects of naturalization involving, say, evaluative or intentional discourse. It is more plausible to hold that science provides only a partial characterization of the natural world. I consider McDowell's articulation of a more liberal naturalism, one which recognizes autonomous normative facts about reasons, meanings and values, as genuine constituents of Nature on a more liberal conception of it. Several critics have claimed that this account is vitiated by the threat of supernaturalism. Responsiveness to normative facts is, I argue, a phenomenological datum that we have good reason to take at face value. I trace the source of the supernaturalist objection to a misreading of McDowell's perceptual analogy with respect to value and a related failing to clearly distinguish physical and logical notions of an object.     

Science and Life-World: Husserl, Schutz, Garfinkel

In this article I intend to explore the conception of science as it emerges from the work of Husserl, Schutz, and Garfinkel. By concentrating specifically on the issue of science, I attempt to show that Garfinkel’s views on the relationship between science and the everyday world are much closer to Husserl’s stance than to the Schutzian perspective. To this end, I explore Husserl’s notion of science especially as it emerges in the Crisis of European Sciences, where he describes the failure of European science and again preaches for a return to the “things themselves”. In this respect I interpret ethnomethodology’s most recent program as an answer to that call originating from a sociological domain. I then argue that the Husserlian turn within ethnomethodology marks the split between Garfinkel and Schutz. In fact I try to show that Schutz’s epistemological work is only partially inspired by phenomenology and that his conception of science retains a rationalist stance that ethnomethodology opposes. In the final section I briefly discuss Garfinkel’s most recent program as a way of closing the gap between theory and experience by linking the topics of science to the radical experiential phenomena.     

Fathers,kings, and promises: Husserl and Reinach on the a priori

Internationale Akademie für Philosophie im Fürstentum LiechtensteinPrepared as part of the project The A Prlori in Austrian Philosophy of the Austrian Fonds zur Förderung der wissenschaftlichen Forschung. My special thanks for helpful comments and improvement suggestions go to the director of this project, Prof. Dr. Barry Smith, as well as to Roberto Casati, Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik, Graham White, and to the participants of the advanced seminar for formal ontology at the International Academy for Philosophy in the Principality of Liechtenstein.     

Feeling Stares: Places,Persons, and Pets

The belief that one can feel others staring without actually seeing them look is a common social phenomenon. From a comparative viewpoint, staring is associated with dominance behavior or aggression. In humans, staring is often viewed as a negative behavior. Thus, being the object of a stare is potentially dangerous. We predicted that persons in vulnerable circumstances (e.g., an unfamiliar situation) or with strangers rather than with friends would be sensitized to detect signals or stimuli associated with danger. We also hypothesized that persons high in self-consciousness or who were in a negative mood would have an increased bias toward detecting stares. The situational-context hypotheses received higher support than did the dispositional hypotheses. Beliefs concerning animals and stare perception were explored.     

Husserl on Meaning,Grammar, and the Structure of Content

Husserl’s Logical Grammar is intended to explain how complex expressions can be constructed out of simple ones so that their meaning turns out to be determined by the meanings of their constituent parts and the way they are put together. Meanings are thus understood as structured contents and classified into formal categories to the effect that the logical properties of expressions reflect their grammatical properties. As long as linguistic meaning reduces to the intentional content of pre-linguistic representations, however, it is not trivial to account for how semantics relates to syntax in this context. In this paper, I analyze Husserl’s Logical Grammar as a system of recursive rules operating on representations and suggest that the syntactic form of representations (both mental and linguistic) contributes to their semantics because it carries information about semantic role. I further discuss Husserl’s syntactic account of the unity of propositions and argue that, on this  account, logical form supervenes on syntactic form. In the last section I draw some implications for the phenomenology of thought and conjecture that the structural features it displays are likely to convey the syntactic structures of an underlying language-like representational system.     

Husserl,the active self,and commitment

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences - In “On what matters: Personal identity as a phenomenological problem” (2020), Steven Crowell engages a number of contemporary interpretations...     

Derrida, Husserl, and the Commentators: Introducing a Developmental Approach

This article argues that only a developmental approach-one that views Derrida's 1967 work on Husserl, La Voix et la phénomène, in light of Derrida's three earlier encounters with Husserl's work and recognizes significant differences among them-is able to resolve the bitter controversy that has lately surrounded Derrida's Husserl interpretation. After first reviewing the impasse reached in these debates, the need for "a new hermeneutics of deconstruction" is set out, and, then, the reasons why strong development has been rejected internal to Derrida's corpus are discussed. After this, in a discussion of interest with respect to Husserl's own late teachings, as well as Derrida's standpoint, this article focuses on Derrida's 1962 "Introduction to Husserl's Origin." Against the prevailing interpretation, an argument is made showing that Derrida is much closer to Husserl's own positions than has been suspected, most importantly, in section VII of the "Introduction" where the theme of writing is first introduced. Thanks to this, that significant development in Derrida's thought does take place between 1962 and 1967 is demonstrated-and the present piece concludes by providing a brief sketch of the development of deconstruction overall as it came about through Derrida's repeated encounters with Husserlian phenomenology in the years 1954–67. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

The Theoretical Reformer: on Husserl’s Plato (Husserl and the Figures of the History of Philosophy)

ABSTRACT

The present research contributes to the elucidation of an important aspect of Husserl’s interpretation of the history of philosophy, that is, his reading of the beginning of Western thought. In particular, it aims to clarify the sense in which Husserl deems Plato the father of the idea itself of philosophy as a science. As will be maintained, Husserl thinks of Socrates and Plato together as providing the first reform of philosophy, whose overall goal is to give reason (Vernunft) a universal method of self-justification against the general skepticism of the sophists. The analysis will be both systematically and historically oriented, for, it will try to both reconstruct Husserl’s interpretation of the background against which Plato first introduces the idea of philosophy as a science, and to show that what is truly at stake for Husserl is the nature of philosophy itself.