学前儿童欺骗及欺骗策略发展的研究

选取130名学前儿童,采用“找钱币”欺骗任务和标准误信念任务,研究学前儿童欺骗及欺骗策略的发生、发展。结果发现:随年龄增长,采用“破坏证据”和“说谎”欺骗策略的人数呈下降趋势,采用四种联合策略的人数则呈上升趋势;即使3岁儿童也能出示“破坏证据”和“说谎”这两种行为主义的欺骗策略,但“制造虚假痕迹”的心理主义欺骗策略在4岁以后才开始出现;3岁、6岁儿童的误信念理解与欺骗策略不相关,而4岁和5岁儿童的则相关。     

3～6岁儿童“心理理论”的发展

“心理理论”是发展心理学的研究热点,在儿童获得心理理论的年龄和发展阶段问题上仍存在争议。该研究以3所城市幼儿园中的233名3-6岁儿童为被试,采用“意外转移”和“欺骗外表”两个错误信念测验任务考察儿童“心理理论”的获得年龄和发展阶段。研究得出如下结论:3岁之前儿童已理解外表与真实的区别,但还不能理解错误信念。 4岁儿童理解了欺骗外表任务中自己和他人的错误信念,5岁儿童理解了意外转移任务中的错误信念。4-5岁是儿童获得“心理理论”的关键年龄,但这会因测验任务的不同而有所差异。儿童的错误信念理解不存在显著的性别差异。     

儿童欺骗的情境依赖

采用竞争游戏的方式研究3～6岁儿童在外显和隐蔽情境里的欺骗。结果表明4、5岁儿童行为上的隐蔽欺骗和错误信念理解显著相关;3岁儿童语言上的外显欺骗（说谎）和错误信念理解显著相关;各年龄段儿童行为上的外显欺骗和错误信念理解没有显著相关。和Cartson（1998）的研究结果不一致的是,本研究中4、5、6岁儿童的隐蔽欺骗人数显著超过外显欺骗人数。结果提示,语言上的外显欺骗（说谎）不仅和儿童的执行功能有关,还可能和欺骗时的情境压力有关。     

学前儿童欺骗的阶段性发展的实验研究

研究以3~6岁的学前儿童为被试,探讨学前儿童欺骗的阶段性发展。实验的研究结果说明学前儿童欺骗的发展呈阶段性,包括三个阶段:行为主义的欺骗阶段,一级信念的欺骗阶段和二级信念的欺骗阶段,其中后两个阶段都属于心理主义阶段;就年龄而论,则可以说3岁儿童处于第一阶段,4、5岁儿童处于第二阶段,6岁以后进入第三阶段。     

西方关于儿童欺骗研究的新进展

欺骗是指意图培养他人的错误信念,以至于使他人产生错误或进入误区的行为。本文介绍了西方关于儿童欺骗研究的新进展,其中包括欺骗与说谎的区别,欺骗的理论假设、相关研究,以及儿童欺骗研究的焦点和现存问题。     

幼儿说谎行为的特点及其与心理理论水平的关系

首先考察3-4岁幼儿在抵制诱惑情景下出现违规行为后的说谎行为特点,然后进一步探讨了说谎行为与心理理论水平之间的关系。研究结果发现,3岁儿童中有59.3%出现说谎行为,而4岁时这个比例达到75%;但经统计检验没有发现显著的年龄差异,性别差异也不显著。另外,说谎与未说谎组在错误信念任务上的得分没有显著性差异,但有策略的说谎组比没有策略组在错误信念任务上的得分更高;说谎水平与错误信念任务之间有显著的正相关     

学前儿童对事实、信念、愿望和情绪间关系的认知

76名3至5岁儿童接受了区分事实和信念、根据信念推测他人愿望、根据愿望推测他人情绪等实验任务,通过考查学前儿童对事实、信念、愿望和情绪间关系的认知,探察学前儿童心理理论发展的特点。结果显示3岁儿童在区分信念和事实时,出现错报事实或错报信念两种错误,而不单纯是现实主义偏向错误;在推测他人愿望时,部分3岁和4岁儿童虽然能够正确报告他人的信念却不能正确推测他人愿望,愿望认知发展有其复杂性的一面。学前儿童主要依据愿望推测他人情绪,儿童对信念和愿望的认知水平制约儿童对他人情绪的理解。     

欺骗如何可能?——维特根斯坦论隐藏、假装和说谎

基于维特根斯坦的语言哲学和心理学哲学,我们发现他在欺骗如何可能问题上持有以下立场:行动者不能对人隐藏一切,因此驳斥了认为我们总是生活在假装和谎言之中的观点;欺骗行为是复杂的人类行为的产物;欺骗者和被骗者依照相似的语言游戏学会欺骗,因此凡是能存在欺骗之处,都存在识别欺骗的可能;隐藏的核心在于外在行为的某种不可理解性,有时之所以难以识破欺骗,就在于对行动者的外在行为缺乏足够了解;行动者的外在行为是判定他是否隐藏假装或说谎的语法上或逻辑上的标准。     

外表真实区别、表征变化和错误信念的任务分析

自20世纪80年代以来,“心理理论”已成为发展心理学的研究热点和最活跃、最多产的领域。为了分析和比较“心理理论”的实验任务,该研究以济南市3所幼儿园中的233名3—6岁儿童为有效被试。进行了“意外转移。和“欺骗外表”两种心理理论实验任务。得出如下主要结论：(1)意外转移任务中内隐错误信念显著难于标准错误信念,易化错误信念与标准错误信念的难度不存在显著差异。(2)欺骗外表任务中外表真实区别难度显著低于表征变化和错误信念。(3)意外转移任务的错误信念显著难于欺骗外表任务的错误信念。     

聋童与正常儿童对假装表征、模仿性假装和欺骗性假装的认识

本研究认为,对假装的认识包含理解假装表征、模仿性假装和欺骗性假装。选取了86名3-5岁的学前儿童和122名3-12岁的聋童,考察他们对假装上述内容的认知情况及差异。结果表明：（1）当假装任务中涉及的事物特征不符合儿童经验时,9岁前的聋童和正常学前儿童难以理解假装表征和模仿性假装。反之若符合儿童的经验,大部分3岁正常儿童及7岁聋童就能正确理解上述内容;（2）5岁正常儿童和7岁聋童已能正确理解欺骗性假装,这比他们在同样情境下理解假装的表征和模仿性假装的年龄要迟。（3）聋童理解假装问题要比正常儿童滞后2-4年,但他们正确理解这些问题的年龄起点及达到的程度与正常儿童可能是一致的,而且发展的趋势也是相似的。（4）手语聋童理解假装问题的成绩好于口语聋童,那些父母会手语或父母是聋人的聋童的成绩好于其他聋童。本研究的结论是：低龄正常儿童和聋童还难以真正理解假装表征;聋童对假装的认识比正常儿童滞后2-4年,但发展趋势相似;聋童自身的手语水平及其父母的手语水平是影响他们理解假装的主要因素。     

Deception by young children following noncompliance

A paradigm devised by M. Lewis, C. Stanger, and M. W. Sullivan (1989) was adapted to study deception and false-belief understanding. In Study 1, 3- and 5-year-olds were asked not to touch a toy in the experimenter's absence. Just over half of the children touched the toy, and of those children, the majority denied having done so. Of control children who were given permission to touch the toy, all touched it and admitted having done so. In Study 2, 3- and 5-year-olds were asked not to look in a box to identify its contents. Almost all children looked, most denied having looked, and a minority consistently feigned ignorance of the contents. False-belief understanding was linked to denial of looking but not to feigning ignorance. Of control children who were given permission to look, all acknowledged looking, and they almost always revealed their knowledge of the contents. The studies confirm that preschoolers deceive in the context of a minor misdemeanor but are less effective at feigning ignorance.     

Children's level of participation in a false-belief task, age, and theory of mind

The hide-and-seek deception task of M. Chandler, A. S. Fritz, and S. Hala (1989) was modified to provide a more precise estimate of the age at which children acquire and manifest a theory of mind. Two characters (good, bad) and two levels of involvement (pretend play, sociodramatic play) were incorporated into the research design, so that children's representational understanding of deception could be studied. Two-, 3-, and 4-year-olds (N = 90) participated in the study. The results indicated that 4-year-olds used significantly more deceptive strategies than 2- and 3-year-olds in pretend play and in sociodramatic play. There was no difference between 2- and 3-year-olds in the use of deceptive strategies; they used significantly fewer strategies in the bad roles than in the good roles. No significant differences were found in the 3 age groups' performances in the good-character tasks. The reality-masking hypothesis (P. Mitchell, 1994) accounts for the differences in performances on that task; thus, children younger than 4 years old do seem to have a theory of mind.     

Children's Level of Participation in a False-Belief Task,Age, and Theory of Mind

The hide-and-seek deception task of M. Chandler, A. S. Fritz, and S. Hala (1989) was modified to provide a more precise estimate of the age at which children acquire and manifest a theory of mind. Two characters (good, bad) and two levels of involvement (pretend play, sociodramatic play) were incorporated into the research design, so that children's representational understanding of deception could be studied. Two-, 3-, and 4-year-olds (N = 90) participated in the study. The results indicated that 4-year-olds used significantly more deceptive strategies than 2- and 3-year-olds in pretend play and in sociodramatic play. There was no difference between 2- and 3-year-olds in the use of deceptive strategies; they used significantly fewer strategies in the bad roles than in the good roles. No significant differences were found in the 3 age groups' performances in the good-character tasks. The reality-masking hypothesis (P. Mitchell, 1994) accounts for the differences in performances on that task; thus, children younger than 4 years old do seem to have a theory of mind.     

The relationship between theory of mind and episodic memory: evidence for the development of autonoetic consciousness

The study investigated a link between theory of mind and episodic memory involving autonoetic consciousness (). Eighty-nine Japanese 4- to 6-year-olds received two versions of a false belief task, a task of aspectuality or knowledge origins, and four memory tests. After controlling for age, most theory of mind abilities showed no interrelations, and own and other's belief understandings in deceptive appearance tasks were solely related to source memory, but not to free recall, temporal ordering, or working memory. Moreover, even when age and verbal intelligence were controlled, the association between representational change and source memory was highly significant in 6-year-olds but not in 4- and 5-year-olds. Results suggest that during development only a particular kind of theory of mind ability is integrated with episodic memory.     

Exploring mental-state reasoning as a social-cognitive mechanism for social loafing in children

The authors explored mental-state reasoning ability among 72 preschoolers (ages 3-5 years) as a possible developmental mechanism for the well-known social loafing effect: diminished individual effort in a collaborative task. The authors expected that older children would outperform young children on standard mental-state reasoning tests and that they would display greater social loafing than younger children. In addition, we hypothesized that the ability to infer the mental states of others would be predictive of social loafing, but that the ability to reason about one's own knowledge would not. The authors gave children three standard false-belief tasks and participated in a within-subjects balloon inflation task that they performed both individually and as part of a group. Results indicated that 3-year-olds performed significantly below older preschoolers on mental-state reasoning tasks. Only 4- and 5-year-olds displayed diminished individual effort. Multiple regression analysis indicated that only the ability to reason about others' false beliefs accounted for a significant amount of variance in social loafing; age (in months) and own false-belief reasoning did not. The authors discussed theoretical and pedagogical implications.     

学前儿童朴素情绪理论的发展

对情绪的心理层面的理解是幼儿心理理论发展中出现得相对较迟的能力, 他们如何通过愿望和信念等不同的心理状态对人们的情绪做出判断？随着年龄的增长, 他们采用不同策略推测情绪的能力又发生了什么变化？本研究结合主人公愿望是否得到满足的状态, 通过利用图片故事个别测查的方法探查了90名3~5岁学前儿童在“内容错误信念”任务中对他人情绪的推测。结果显示, 年幼儿童、尤其是3岁幼儿的高兴情绪理解受其对情境是否满足愿望的认知的影响, 呈现出显著的“积极情绪偏差效应”; 学前儿童对情绪的认知表现出从不能采用信念—愿望策略到错误地采用信念—愿望策略、到正确采用信念—愿望策略的发展模式, 且其基于信念的情绪理解在一定程度上呈现出落后于其错误信念理解的“滞后效应”。结果还显示幼儿的惊奇情绪判断不仅由信念成分决定, 也受愿望理解的影响。这些结果突显出心理状态在儿童情绪理解中的重要作用, 揭示出学前儿童相对完整的朴素情绪理论发展模式。     

Three‐year‐olds express suspense when an agent approaches a scene with a false belief

Research on early false belief understanding has entirely relied on affect‐neutral measures such as judgments (standard tasks), attentional allocation (looking duration, preferential looking, anticipatory looking), or active intervention. We used a novel, affective measure to test whether preschoolers affectively anticipate another's misguided acts. In two experiments, 3‐year‐olds showed more expressions of suspense (by, e.g. brow furrowing or lip biting) when they saw an agent approach a scene with a false as opposed to a true belief (Experiment 1) or ignorance (Experiment 2). This shows that the children anticipated the agent's surprise and disappointment when encountering reality. The findings suggest that early implicit knowledge of false beliefs includes anticipations of the affective implications of erring. This vital dimension of beliefs should no longer be ignored in research on early theory of mind.     

Developing domain-specific causal-explanatory frameworks: the role of insides and immanence

Two studies investigate children's knowledge of internal parts and their endorsement of immanent causes for the behaviors of living and non-living things. Study 1, involving 48 preschoolers, showed that domain-specific knowledge of internal parts develops between ages 3 and 4. Study 2 included 43 4-year-olds, 30 8-year-olds, and 35 adults and showed that preschoolers do not endorse these internal parts as causally responsible for familiar biological events (e.g., movement, growth). Like adults and older children, however, preschoolers endorse an abstract cause, “its own energy,” for animals but not for machines. The results suggest that children recognize domain-specific internal parts as early as age 4 but that their causal attributions are not yet anchored in a detailed biological theory. Findings are discussed in terms of theory change and an essentialist assumption.     

Relations Between the Development of Teaching and Theory of Mind in Early Childhood

The relations among children’s theory of mind (ToM), their understanding of the intentionality of teaching, and their own peer teaching strategies were tested. Seventy-five 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds completed 11 ToM and understanding-of-teaching tasks. Subsequently, 30 of the children were randomly chosen to teach a peer how to play a board game, and their teaching strategies and levels of contingent teaching were recorded. There were developmental changes in the children’s understanding of teaching as an intentional activity. When teaching their peers, 3-year-olds used demonstration, whereas 4- and 5-year-olds added verbal explanations and began to adapt contingently to the learners’ changing knowledge level. Relations among ToM, understanding of teaching, and teaching level were found. The results suggest that the development of children’s teaching strategies and their contingency are closely tied to the development of ToM.     

‘Theory of mind’ development of Pakistani children: Do preschoolers acquire an understanding of desire,pretence and belief in a universal sequence?

Research on “theory of mind” (TOM) suggests that a grasp of the mind develops universally and sequentially, but both these claims require testing in different cultural groups. Study 1, involving 72 preschoolers, showed the expected developmental transition on false belief tasks; 3 year olds were below statistical chance, while 4 year olds were at chance, representing a lag behind Western children. The same pattern of at chance (pretence, desire and belief) and below chance performance (false belief) was replicated in study 2 with 77 preschoolers (3–5 years) and corroborated the lag identified for some Asian countries. This deficient and varied timing of TOM performance is consistent with theories (social constructivist) supporting the role of social factors in TOM development. Moreover, significant inter-task correlations corroborate the need to broaden the research focus beyond false belief tasks.